वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 3. 46.
ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 441
as the soul)”. That is, the soul is a part of Brahman in the sense of
being an attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of Brahman; and just as the attribute and
its substratum are not identical, so the soul and Brahman are not ¹
They continue the same topic in the following two sūtras.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 44 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely
different He begins a new adhikarana here (five sūtras) concerned
with the question of the Lord’s incarnations. Thus, this sūtra means,
according to him: “But supreme (incarnations of the Lord are) not so;
(i.e parts of the Lord as the individual souls are), as in the case of
light”. That is, just as though the sun and the fire-fly are both called
‘light’, yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the sun,
so though the incarnations and ordinary individual souls are both
called ‘parts’ of the Lord, yet the word has a different meaning when
applied to the incarnations, i.e. it means then the entire Lord.²
SŪTRA 46
“AND SMṚTIS DECLARE”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“And Smṛtis declare”: ‘Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is
declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He
is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus-leaf is not touched by
water.³ The active self, on the other hand, is something different,
who is subject to bondage and release’ (Mahā. 12.13754-13755 ⁴).
Vedānta-kaustubha
The sages also declare that the part alone is subject to the fruits
of action done by itself, but not the whole, thus: ‘Of these, He who
is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties
of matter, and He is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus-
leaf is not touched by water.—The active self, on the other hand,
1 Śrī. B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Part 2; Śk B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Parts 7 and 8.
2 G.B. 2.3.44, pp. 223-24, Chap. 2.
3 One line omitted. 4 P. 852, lines 9-10, vol. 3.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 47.
442 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 12]
is something different, who is subject to bondage and release. He is
subject to seventeen rāśis (Mahā. 12.13754–56a). It has been
declared by Scripture, too, thus ‘Of the two, one eats the sweet berry,
the other, without eating looks on’ (Śvet. 4.6, Muṇḍ. 3.1.1).
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They quote from Smṛti to show that the soul is the attribute of
the Lord.¹
Baladeva
He quotes from Smṛti to show that the incarnations are not parts
of the Lord in the same sense the individual souls are.²
SŪTRA 47
“INJUNCTION AND PROHIBITION (FIT IN) ON ACCOUNT OF (THE
SOULS’) CONNECTION WITH BODIES, AS IN THE CASE OF FIRE AND
SO ON.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“Injunction and prohibition” like ‘One who is desirous of heaven
should perform sacrifices’ (Tait Sam. 2 5 5³), ‘A Śūdra is not to be
initiated to a sacrifice’ (Tait Sam. 7.1.1⁴) and so on do indeed fit in,
on account of the connection of the individual souls with different
bodies, in spite of their being an equality among them as parts of
Brahman; just as fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya,⁵ but not
from the crematory; or just as water and the like, touched by clean
persons, pots and so on are accepted and not others.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If the individual souls be all equal as parts and the rest of Brahman,
then to whom can the injunctions and prohibitions refer? Listen!
In spite of their sameness, injunctions and prohibitions like: ‘One
¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.46, p. 162, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.46, p. 160, Parts 7 and 8.
² G.B. 2.3.45.
³ P. 208, line 27, vol. 2. Not quoted by others.
⁴ P. 241, line 21, vol. 2. Not quoted by others
⁵ A Brāhmaṇa versed in the Veda.

[sŪ. 2. 3. 48.
ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 443
desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices’ (Tait. Sam 2 5.5),
‘Hence a Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice’ (Tait Sam. 7.1.1)
fit in on account of their connection with different bodies, “as in the
case of fire and so on”, i.e just as in spite of being the same, fire is
brought from the house of a Śrotriya, but one from crematory and the
like is rejected; and just as the urine and excrement of cows and the
like are enjoined as holy, but those very things of different animals
are rejected.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
He develops in this connection his doctrine of Adhyāsa.¹
Bhāskara too speaks of his peculiar doctrine of Upādhi.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. He continues the same
theme,—viz. the distinction between incarnations and ordinary
individuals. He interprets the sūtra thus: (In the case of individual
souls there are) injunctions and prohibitions, on account of (their)
connection with bodies, as in the case of light (i e. the eye).² That is,
the individual soul, though a part of the Lord, is yet connected with
nescience and a body, and is as such under the control of the Lord
for its activity and inactivity and so on. But an incarnation, though
a part of the Lord, is not under His control; just as the eye or the
power of vision, though a part of the sun, depends upon the per-
mission, i.e. the presence, of the sun for its activity or otherwise, but
a ray of the sun, as a part of the sun, is identical with it, and does not
depend upon any permission and the like of the sun.
SŪTRA 48
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF NON-EXTENSION THERE IS NO EXTENSION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In spite of the fact that the individual souls are parts of the
all-pervasive Being, and in spite of the fact that they themselves are
1 Ś.B. 2.3.48, pp. 640 ff , Bh. B. 2.3.48. p. 142.
2 G B. 2.3.46. pp. 226-27, Chap 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 49
444 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 12.]
all-pervasive by reason of their (all-pervasive) attribute (of knowledge),¹
the individual souls, being atomic by nature, are not all-pervasive;
and as such there is no confusion among karmas
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. On your view, too, on account of being
parts of the all-pervasive Being, as well as on account of possessing
an all-pervasive attribute, all the souls come to experience the
pleasures and the like in all the bodies; and as such a confusion among
karmas, as well as a confusion among the enjoyments of their fruits
will result. Hence, as the view that the soul is a part of the all-
pervading Brahman, is atomic by itself and is all-pervasive by reason
of its attribute, involves unnecessary complications, so Kapila's
doctrine of the soul, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive by itself, is
more acceptable,—the author replies here.
"On account of the non-extension," i.e non-all-pervasiveness
of the souls,—mutually distinct by reason of being atomic, and distinct
also from the Whole (i.e. the Lord) by being predicated as parts,—
"there is no confusion". The term "and" indicates the contraction
of the soul's knowledge during its state of bondage.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. The same topic continued:
"And on account of the non-extension (i.e. incompleteness of the
individual soul, there is) no (possibility of) a confusion (between it
and an incarnation)". That is, the soul is atomic and not full and
perfect like an incarnation, hence different from him ²
SŪTRA 49
"AND (THE DOCTRINES OF THE ALL-PERVASIVENESS OF THE SOUL)
ARE FALLACIES MERELY."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of the
opponents like Kapila and others are "fallacious merely", since,
1 Vide V.P.S. 2.3.28 2 G.B. 2.3 47, p. 227, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 3. 49.
ADH 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 445
on those views, there results a confusion (among karmas and so on
of the souls).
Vedānta-kaustubha
But the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of Kapila,
Kaṇāda and so on are "fallacious merely", as they have no (scriptural)
basis, and as, on these views, there a confusion among all practical
transactions will result. By the term "and" it is indicated that
such teachers simply delude people.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He reads "ābhāsaḥ" in place
of "ābhāsāḥ". Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "(The indivi-
dual soul is) only a reflection (of Brahman)". Thus, here he develops
his doctrine of Pratibimba.¹
Rāmānuja
He reads "ābhāsaḥ", and interprets the sūtra thus: "(The view
that Brahman is obscured by limiting adjunct or nescience) is simply
a fallacy". He accepts the alternative reading "ābhāsāḥ" too and
points out that in that case the sūtra will mean: "(The various reasons
advanced by the supporters of the above doctrine) are simply
fallacies".²
Bhāskara
This is sūtra 50 in his commentary He substitutes "vā" in
place of "ca". He, also, like Rāmānuja, directs this sūtra against
the Śaṃkarite view, thus: "(Nesciences are) simply fallacies".³
Śrīkaṇṭha
He too directs this sūtra against the Śaṃkarite view, interpreting
it like Rāmānuja's second interpretation.⁴
Baladeva
This is sūtra 48 in his commentary He reads "ābhāsaḥ". The
same topic continued, viz. "(The reason adduced by the prima facie
¹ Ś.B. 2.3.50, pp. 642. ² Śrī. B. 2.3.49, p. 163, Part 2.
³ Bh. B. 2.3.50, p. 142. ⁴ Śk. B. 2.3.49, p. 101, Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 50.
446 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 12 ]
objector to prove the similarity of the soul with the incarnation) is a
mere fallacy". That is, the argument:
The soul is a part of the Lord.
The incarnation is a part of the Lord
∴ the soul is equal to the incarnation,
evidently involves the logical fallacy of undistributed middle.¹
SŪTRA 50
"BECAUSE OF THE NON-RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE
UNSEEN PRINCIPLE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, confusion is unavoidable
even if recourse be taken to the unseen principle, "because of the
non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle".
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the argument, viz. there is no confusion among all practical
transactions on our view too, since the unseen principle is the regulator,
—the author replies:
Confusion results indeed on the view of the opponents, "because
of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle", viz. to
whom may the unforeseen principle, generated in the vicinity of all
the all-pervasive souls, belong and to whom not.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
Interpretation same, only they direct this and the remaining
sūtras to the refutation of the Śaṁkarite view, and not to the view
of Kapila and others.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 50 in his commentary He begins a new adhikaraṇa
here (three sūtras), concerned with proving the mutual difference
among the individual souls. Thus, this sūtra means, according to
¹ G.B. 2.3.48, p. 228, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 3 51.
ADH 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 447
him "(The individual souls, though similar in their essential nature,
are yet different from one another) on account of the non-determinate-
ness (i e. non-similarity) of (their) destinies".¹
SŪTRA 51
“AND IT IS SO EVEN WITH REGARD TO DETERMINATION AND THE
LIKE ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is no restriction "even with regard to determinations and
the like", such as: 'I shall do this and not that'.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the argument, viz. A restriction is possible, viz. the unseen
principle belongs to one who has the determination: 'I shall do this
and not that',—the author replies here:
“Determination” means resolution. By the phrase “and the
like” reverence and so on are understood. There is, indeed, no
restriction with regard to the unseen principle even in the case of
resolution, reverence and the rest
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. He continues the same theme,
viz. “And thus (the individual souls are different) with regard to
(their) desire and the rest also”. That is, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle
is the ultimate cause which determines the difference between the
souls, and not their desires, inclinations and the like, which are only
the secondary causes.²
1 G.B. 2.3.49, p. 229, Chap. 2.
2 G.B. 2.3.50, p. 230, Chap. 2.

448 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 52.
ADH. 12.]
SŪTRA 52
"IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF PLACE, (WE REPLY:) NO,
ON ACCOUNT OF INCLUSION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be argued that "on account of the place" of the self, situated
within its own body, everything is consistent,—(we reply:) "no".
"On account of the inclusion" therein of the places of all the souls.
Here ends the third quarter in the second chapter of the Vedānta-
pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā
texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected: A definite restriction is possible with regard to
determinations and the rest, "on account of place", i.e. it is in the region
of the soul, situated within its own body alone, that the conjunction
of the mind (with the soul) takes place,—on account of such a place of
the soul,—(we reply:) "no", "on account of the inclusion" therein
of the places of other souls too. The sense is this: Since all the
souls are connected with one and the same mind, the determinations
and the rest, due to the conjunction of the mind (with the soul), must
be common to all; and hence the unseen principle, due to them, must
indeed be common to all. This being so, the confusion among all
practical transactions remains as before. Hence, it is established
that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva, is
atomic in size, knowledge by nature, possessed of the attributes of
'being an agent', 'being a knower' and so on and different in every
body.
Here ends the section entitled "A part" (12).
Here ends the third quarter of the second chapter in the holy
Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā and
composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-
feet of the holy Nimbārka.

[sū. 2. 3 52.
ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 449
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. The same topic continued :
"If it be objected (that the difference among the individual souls is)
due to the difference of (their) environments, (we reply :) no, because
(the difference of environments, such as heaven, hell, and different
lots in the world) are included under (i.e. due to) adṛṣṭa". That is,
finally, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle is the cause of the difference
among the souls.¹
Résumé
The third quarter of the second chapter contains—

1. 52 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka ;
2. 53 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara ;
3. 52 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja ;
4. 53 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara ;
5. 52 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha,
6. 51 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.
   Śaṃkara and Bhāskara break each of the sūtras 3 and 26 in
   Nimbārka's commentary into two different ones, and omit sūtra 11.
   Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha break sūtra 5 in Nimbārka's com-
   mentary into two different sūtras, and take sūtras 33 and 34 in it as
   one sūtra, reversing the order.
   Baladeva omits sūtra 11 in Nimbārka's commentary.

¹ G.B. 2.3.51, p. 230, Chap. 2.
29

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)
FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)
Adhikarana 1: The section entitled “The origin
of the sense-organs”. (Sūtras 1–4)
SŪTRA 1
“LIKEWISE THE SENSE-ORGANS.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The origin of the organs is being considered. The sense-organs
originate like the ether and the rest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
In the preceding quarter, the absence of any contradiction among
the scriptural texts regarding the ether and the rest has been shown.
Now, the author is showing the non-contradictory nature of the
scriptural texts regarding the organs of the individual soul.
On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs originate or not,
the prima facie view is as follows: In the discussions about origin,
e.g. in the scriptural text: ‘From this soul the ether has originated’
(Tait. 2.1), there is no mention of the origin of the sense-organs;
and in the scriptural text: ‘“The non-existent, verily, was this in the
beginning”. Then they said: “What was that non-existent”? “The
sages, verily, were the non-existent in the beginning.” Then they
said: “Who were those sages”. “The sense-organs, verily, were the
sages”’ (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1¹), the sense-organs are declared to exist
prior to creation; hence they do not originate.
With regard to it, we reply: Just as the elements like the ether
and the rest, mentioned in the passage: ‘From him arise the vital-
breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, fire’
(Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), originate, “so the sense-organs”, too, originate.

¹ P. 499, lines 1-2.

[SŪ 2. 4. 2.
ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 451
COMPARISON
Śrīkaṇṭha
Interpretation different, viz. he takes it to be setting down the
prima facie view thus: ‘(Just as the individual soul is eternal) so are
the sense-organs ¹ (as declared by Scripture ²)’.
SŪTRA 2
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SECONDARY (ORIGIN)"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It cannot be said also that in the section concerned with creation,
e.g. in the passage: "From the self the ether has originated" (Tait
2 1), there being no mention of the origin of the organs, the text
regarding the origin of the organs is secondary,—"on account of the
impossibility of a secondary" (origin). That is, the sense-organs
must have origin, as the majority of scriptural texts designate such an
origin, and as, otherwise, the initial proposition that there is the
knowledge of all through the knowledge of one will come to be con-
tradicted
Vedānta-kaustubha
Having rejected the doubt,—viz. by reason of its opposition
to the scriptural text: ‘“The non-existent, verily, was this in the
beginning”’ (Tait. 2.7), the scriptural text about the origin of the
sense-organs is secondary,—the author states the reason for the view
that the sense-organs, too, originate.
The compound "gauṇyāsambhava" is to be explained as ‘impos-
sibility of a secondary (origin)’, i.e. the scriptural text about the
origin of the sense-organs cannot be secondary. Hence the sense-
organs do originate. If it be asked: Why impossible?—(we reply:)
Because the scriptural text about origin can be understood literally,
because there are numerous scriptural texts regarding such an origin,
and because otherwise the initial proposition will come to be con-
tradicted, i.e. because there are numerous scriptural texts designat-
ing origination, such as: ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the
¹ Śk. B. 2.4.1, p. 168
² I.e. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1—quoted by Śrīnivāsa.

452 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 4. 2.
ADH. 1.]
mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), 'Just as small sparks
come forth from fire, so exactly do all the sense-organs from this soul'
(Bṛh. 2.1.20), 'Seven sense-organs arise' (Muṇḍ 2.1.7). Having
made the initial assertion, viz that there is the knowledge of one
through the knowledge of all thus: '"What being known, sir, all this
comes to be known?"' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the text goes on to declare,
in order to prove it, that 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind
and all the sense-organs' (Mund 2 1 3) and so on. This initial
proposition is proved only if all the effects, like the sense-organs and
the rest, are admitted to have Him as their material cause. The
scriptural text: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning'
(Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1), on the other hand, is to be explained as referring
to the cause. Hence there is no contradiction.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja
He takes this and the next sūtra as one sūtra Interpretation
different, viz. "(The plural number in the text ¹) is secondary, be-
cause of impossibility", i.e. because prior to creation Brahman alone
exists.²
Śrīkaṇṭha
He regards this sūtra as answering the prima facie objection.
He too like Rāmānuja takes this and the next sūtra as forming a
single sūtra, and interprets it just like Rāmānuja
Baladeva
Interpretation just like Rāmānuja's.
¹ Viz. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1. See Śrīnivāsa above. It has been stated under
the previous sūtra that the words 'sense-organs' and 'sages' in that passage denote
Brahman. But how then to account for the plural number?—to this question
the present sūtra replies.
² Śrī. B. 2.4.2, p. 170, Part 2.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 3-4.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 453
SŪTRA 3
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIRECT MENTION (IN) THAT OF WHAT
IS PRIOR."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"On account of the direct mention," in that text, of the verb,—
used in its primary sense in connection with the ether and the rest,—
in reference to the sense-organs as well, the origin of the sense-organs
is primary.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, the origin of the sense-organs is primary,—
so says the author.
"On account of the direct mention," in "that", i.e in the text:
'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs,
the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2 1 3), of the word 'arises',—used in its
primary sense with reference to the ether and so on,—with reference
to the sense-organs, mentioned even prior to the ether and the rest,—
the scriptural text designating the origin of the sense-organs is, indeed,
primary. It is not possible that one and the same word 'arises' is
used in a secondary sense with reference to the sense-organs, and in a
primary sense with reference to the ether and the rest. For this
reason too, it is used in a primary sense alone in both the cases.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation exactly like Rāmānuja's second half of the preced-
ing sūtra.¹
SŪTRA 4
"ON ACCOUNT OF SPEECH BEING PRECEDED BY THAT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest because
of the mention of speech, the vital-breath and the mind as preceded
by light, water and food in the passage: " 'The mind, my dear, is
¹ G.B. 2.4.3, p. 234. Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 4.
454 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
composed of food, the vital-breath is composed of water, speech is
composed of light’” (Chānd. 6.5.4 ¹)
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the allegation, viz. that in the section treating of creation,
the origin of the sense-organs is not mentioned,—the author replies
here:
On account of the mention in the Chāndogya of speech, the vital-
breath and the mind as preceded by light, water and food respectively,
having Brahman for their material cause, thus · ‘“The mind, my
dear, is composed of food, the vital-breath is composed of water,
speech is composed of light”’ (Chānd 6.5 4), there is origin (of the
sense-organs). Hence it is established that the sense-organs do
originate on the ground of the following reasons, viz. there is the
mention of the origin (of the sense-organs) in the section treating of
origin too, there are also numerous texts designating the origin of
the sense-organs, and, finally, the initial assertion too that there is the
knowledge of all through the knowledge of one is established only
on this view.
Here ends the section entitled “The origin of the sense-organs” (2).
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja
This is sūtra 3 in his commentary. Interpretation different
He continues the same topic, viz. that the word ‘prāṇa’ in the above
passage does not stand for the sense-organs, but for Brahman. Hence
the sūtra: “Because of speech (i.e. names of objects) being preceded
by that (viz. the existence of those objects)”. That is, names of
objects pre-suppose the existence of objects. But prior to creation
there were no objects, and hence no speech or organs of speech and
so on.²
Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 3 in his commentary too. Interpretation similar
to Rāmānuja’s, viz. “Because of speech (i e. names and forms) being
preceded by that (i.e by the creation by the Lord).³
¹ Ś, B. ² Śrī. B. 2.4.3, pp 170-71, Chap. 2.
³ Śk. B. 2.4.3, p. 167, Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 5.
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 455
Baladeva
He also continues the same topic thus. "Because of speech (i.e.
Brahman) being prior to that (viz. pradhāna and rest) ".¹
Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The going
of the seven". (Sūtras 5-6)
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 5)
SŪTRA 5
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE GOING OF THE SEVEN, AND ON ACCOUNT
OF BEING SPECIFIED"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On the doubt, viz. whether they are seven or eleven, the prima
facie view is as follows: Because of the going (of the sense-organs),
mentioned in the passage: 'The vital-breath going out all the
sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2 ²), and because of their being specified
as seven only in that very passage: 'He does not see,—does not
smell,—does not taste,—does not speak,—does not hear,—does not
think,—does not touch' (Bṛh. 4.4.2 ³), the sense-organs are seven
only.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, desirous of determining the number of the sense-organs,
the author is stating the prima facie view with a view to removing
the contradictions among the texts about it.
On the doubt, viz whether these sense-organs are seven or eleven,
(the prima facie objector replies:) "Because of the going of seven",
mentioned in the passage: 'The vital-breath going out, all the sense-
organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2), they are seven only. How is it known
that seven alone go out? "Because of (their) being specified,"
i.e. because in the passage: "When the person in the sun moves
about back, then he becomes non-knowing of forms, he becomes one,
¹ G.B. 2.4.4, p. 235, Chap. 2.
² B.
³ Not quoted by others. The phrase: "iti āhuḥ ekī-bhavati" is to be
supplied in each dotted portion.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 6.
456 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 2 ]
he does not see, does not smell, does not taste, does not speak, does
not hear, does not think, does not touch' (Bṛh 4.4.1-2), only seven,
like the eye, etc., are specified.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
According to him "gateḥ" = avagateḥ, i.e. because of under-
standing.¹
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 6)
SŪTRA 6
"BUT (THERE ARE) HANDS AND THE REST, (THESE ADDITIONAL
SENSE-ORGANS) BEING ESTABLISHED, THEREFORE (THAT) IS NOT
SO."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The correct conclusion is as follows It being definitely ascertained
from the passage: 'The hand, verily, is an organ of sense' (Bṛh.
3.2.8 ²) and so on, that there are more than seven, it is not to be thought
there are only seven sense-organs. In accordance with the scriptural
passage. 'There are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the
eleventh' (Bṛh. 3.9.4 ³), there are eleven sense-organs.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author states the right conclusion.
The term "but" intimates the blindness of the prima facie
opponent. In the scriptural text: 'The hand, verily, is an organ of
sense. It is seized by action as an over-sense-organ, for by the hands
one performs action' (Bṛh. 3.2.8), "the hands and the rest", over
and above the seven, are mentioned. "Therefore" the hands and the
rest, over and above the seven, "being established", and in the pas-
sage: 'All the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2) the going out of all
the sense-organs being not specified, it cannot be thought that there
are only seven of them. But the fact is that there are eleven sense-
organs in accordance with the scriptural and Smṛti texts: 'There
1 Ś.B. 2.4.5, p. 653.
2 Ś, Bh, B. 3 Op. cit.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 7.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 457
are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh’ (Bṛh. 3.2.8),
‘The sense-organs are ten and one’ (Gītā 15 5). Among these,
five are organs of knowledge, viz ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose.
They have five objects, viz sound and the rest. Five are organs of
action, viz. speech, hands, feet, organ of elimination and organ of
generation. They have five objects like word and the rest. The
internal organ is the mind, the cause of resolution and the rest In
this way it is established that there are altogether eleven sense-organs
Here ends the section entitled “The going of the seven” (2).
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 5 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 6
in the commentary of the last. Interpretation of the word “sthite”
different, viz. “because of abiding (in the body and assisting the soul).¹
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled “The atom-
icity of the sense-organs”. (Sūtra 7)
SŪTRA 7
“AND ATOMIC.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In accordance with the scriptural text regarding going out, viz.:
‘All the sense-organs go out’ (Bṛh. 4 4.2²), the sense-organs are
“atomic”.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now the author is showing the size of the sense-organs.
On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs are atomic or all-
pervading, the Sāṁkhyas maintain that they are all-pervasive, being
effects of the unlimited ahaṁkāra. In accordance with the scriptural
¹ Śrī. B. 2 4.5, p. 173, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.4.5, p. 169, Parts 7 and 8; G.B.
2.4.6.
² R, Śk, B.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 8.
458 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4.]
text also: ‘These are equal and infinite’ (Bṛh. 1.5.13), they are
certainly all-pervading, this is the prima facie view.
The correct conclusion is that in conformity with the scriptural
text about their going out, viz.: ‘The vital-breath going out, all the
sense-organs go out’ (Bṛh. 4.4.2), they are atomic. There is no
fixed rule that unlimited effects arise from what is unlimited, it being
found that a small flower arises from a huge tree and so on. The
above-quoted scriptural text, on the other hand, simply lays down
that the sense-organs are innumerable, or serves the purpose of medi-
tation, mentioned in the scriptural text: ‘Now who, verily, meditates
on these, the infinite’ (Bṛh. 1.5.13). Hence it is established that
the sense-organs are atomic.
Here ends the section entitled “The atomicity of the
sense-organs” (3).
Adhikarana 4. The section entitled “The origin
of the chief vital-breath”. (Sūtra 8)
SŪTRA 8
“AND THE BEST.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“The best,” i.e. the chief vital-breath, mentioned in the scrip-
tural text: ‘The vital-breath, verily, is the oldest and the best’
(Chānd. 5.1.1 ¹), originates like the great elements. Why? In
conformity with the same scriptural text, viz. ‘From him arise the
vital-breath’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3).
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, incidentally, the origin of the chief vital-breath is being
considered.
On the doubt, viz. whether the chief vital-breath, the cause of
the subsistence of body and mentioned in the scriptural text, viz.:
‘The vital-breath, verily, is the oldest and the best’ (Chānd. 5.1.1),
originates like the great elements,—if it be suggested: It does not
originate. Why? Because in the text: ‘There was neither death,
nor the immortal, nor then a sign of night or day. That one breathed
1 Ś

[sū. 2. 4. 9.
ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 459
without wind by its self-power. There was, verily, nothing whatso-
ever other than it, or higher’ (Ṛg. V. 10.129.2¹), by the words ‘was
breathing’, meaning ‘He existed breathing’, the motion of the vital-
breath at the time of the universal dissolution is designated.
We reply: “The chief too”, i.e. the chief vital-breath, too,
originates like the elements and the rest, since in the scriptural text:
‘From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs,
the ether, the air’ (Muṇḍ. 2 1.3), like the origin of the great elements
and the rest, the origin of the chief vital-breath, too, is mentioned;
and since it is known that prior to creation there was unity alone
and no diversity.
The meaning of the text: ‘There was neither death’ (Ṛg. V.
10.129.2), on the other hand, is as follows: ‘Then’, i.e at the time
of the universal dissolution, ‘there was no death’, the killer. There
was ‘no immortal with self-power’, i e there was no food of the
gods (amṛta) together with the food of fathers (svadhā). There was
neither the moon, the sign of the night, nor the sun, the sign of the
day. ‘That one,’ i.e. Brahman alone, the seed of the universe,
‘breathed’, i.e. existed Of what nature was He? ‘Breathless,’
i.e. without effects like the air and the rest, viz in His causal state.
There was nothing other than Him, i e. Brahman.
Hence it is established that like the ether and the rest, the chief
vital-breath too originates from Brahman.
Here ends the section entitled “The origin of the chief vital-
breath” (4).
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled “The air
and function”. (Sūtras 9—12)
SŪTRA 9
“(THE VITAL-BREATH IS) NOT AIR AND FUNCTION, ON ACCOUNT
OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The vital-breath is “not” mere “air”, nor a sense-organ, nor a
“function” (of the sense-organs). But we hold that the vital-breath
¹ P. 387, lines 21–23.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 9.
460 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.]
is nothing but air that has assumed a different condition, “on account
of the separate teaching”, viz ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the
mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air’ (Muṇḍ. 2 1.3).
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now the author is stating the nature of the chief vital-breath.
On the doubt, viz. whether the vital-breath, the oldest, is the air,
one of the great elements, or the general function of the sense-organs,
or nothing but the great element air that has assumed a different
condition, if it be suggested In accordance with the statement, viz.:
“What is the vital-breath that is the air. This air is five-fold, prāṇa,
apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna”,¹ it is nothing but the air. Or else,
the vital-breath is the common function of the sense-organs as held
by the Sāṁkhyas ² and is of five kinds,—
We reply: The vital-breath is “not the air” simply, nor a general
mode consisting in the function of the sense-organs. Why? “On
account of the separate teaching,” i.e. because in the text: ‘From
him arise the vital breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether,
the air’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the vital-breath is taught as something
different from the second great element air and from the sense-organs.
If the vital-breath be mere air, then this separate designation would
be set aside. And, if it be a mere mode of the sense-organs, then, too,
its separate designation from the possessors of the mode (viz. the
sense-organs) would be futile, as what arises separately being itself
an object, cannot be the function of other objects like the sense-
organs. The vital-breath, thus, is nothing but the great element air
that has assumed a different condition, this being the only alternative
left. Hereby, any conflict with the text ‘What is the vital-breath
that is the air’, too, is avoided.
¹ For the nature and function of these five modes, see V.R.M.
² Vide Sām. Sū. 2.31.