पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 19
during the rains that a horse running at full speed would bury itself chest-
deep in a few steps. The riverside land becomes boggy and too treacherous
to be entered. Thick undergrowth of rushes and thorny bushes makes pene-
tration by infantry also very difficult. While these were the difficulties which
the Maratha army had to face, Najib's line of communications in the rear
always remained open even during the rains, as due to a bend in the river,
the force of the current there becomes the least troublesome. The trans-
Gangetic region was peopled and controlled by his own kith and kin, the
Ruhelas. There was never any difficulty in fetching grain and fodder, am-
munition and other war necessaries. Added to these were, of course, the in-
domitable spirit, the singleness of purpose and personal bravery of his troops
who were the best infantry trained on the European model in those days
Dattaji was camping some two miles from Sukartal near the. village
Miranpur, which was the centre of the famous Sayyads. These Sayyads be-
longed to the Shia sect and hence hated the Sunni Ruhelas. Dattaji had
built a temporary mud fort for his camp. Thence the Maratha troops would
sally out and try to come into direct contact with the Ruhelas. But this had
been made difficult for the Maratha cavalry, and it seems the Maratha foot-
men in the 18th century had none of the virtues of pluck and resourcefulness
which were the most enviable and noticeable features of Shivaji's Mavlas.
During a siege which lasted for more than four months, there were scarcely
any actions as such. The Bhau Bakhar gives a vivid description of the condi-
tions during these months. The exchange of artillery fire between the two
armies was indecisive, because the shots from the Maratha side could not hit
Najib's camp under any circumstances. At a lower angle the shot would fall
into the surrounding ravines and at a higher angle the shot would go whistling
across Najib's camp and fall into the Ganges. On the other hand, fire from
Najib's camp was very effective and would daily kill a few who tried to
approach. Dattaji had this time some forty thousand troops with him in-
cluding the contingents of Govindpant, Antaji Manakeshwar's son Bahiropant
and the local levies of the Sayyads. Najib had possibly not more than ten
thousand troops, though it is quite impossible to be sure of the figures of those
days. But though the troops actually staying in Najib's camp were com-
paratively few, beyond the Ganges the whole clan of the Ruhelas, some fifty
thousand strong, was helping him in all possible ways. While the Maratha
troops suffered from scarcity, Najib always had access to all the things he
wanted. Besides, the climate of those muddy and boggy low lands was found
unsuitable to the health of the Maratha troops and the animals of the south-
ern breed. Whenever Dattaji tried to assault, he was repulsed at heavy cost.
Two such offensive actions seem to have taken place during these months with
more than a thousand casualties. Jivaji Shinde and his son Hanmantrao were
killed in one of these actions.
As the siege was dragging on, Najib Khan's diplomacy was winning
greater successes for him. Ahmad Shah had already started from Kandahar
and was thinking of entering-the Panjab from the southern side via Bhakkar
and Multan. But he could not cross the Indus at any point and had to come

20 PANIPAT: 1761
north to Attock along the right bank of the river via Mithankot, Dera Ghazi
Khan and Dera Ismail Khan. His general, Jahan Khan, entered the Panjab
in October 1759 by way of Peshawar. Madhosingh of Jaipur, who was a party
to the anti-Maratha conspiracy, made a firm stand against the troops of Malhar-
rao Holkar who had been ordered by the Peshwa to go to Dattaji's help.
Shuja-ud-daulah had been sounded by Najib, though their earlier relations
were none of the best. Najib impressed on Shuja the gravity of the situa-
tion in which Shuja would find himself if the Marathas were ever able to cross
the Ganges and enter Oudh. Feeling the impending danger, Shuja consented to
help Najib in every way to hold the line of the Ganges.
When October came in, Dattaji devised a new strategy of squeezing
out Najib. Getting the help of one Jeta Gujar who pointed out a ford higher
up the Ganges, Govindpant Bundele with ten thousand troops crossed the
river⁴ at the back of Najib and attacked Jalalabad, the Ruhela fort, around
which a town had also grown. There were no troops worth the name there, but
at the call of Zabeta Khan, Najib's son, the Afghan clansmen all over Rohil-
khand came to help him. They held the fort while the Maratha troops plun-
dered and burnt their property and houses in the southern plain. Govindpant
next turned due south to the bridge-head on the eastern bank of the Ganges,
opposite Sukartal. The Marathas succeeded in cutting off the bridge-head and
thus threatened Najib's line of communication by the bridge of boats. Hafiz
Rahmat, the grand old man amongst the Ruhelas, advised Najib to come to
terms with the Marathas, but Najib would not leave Sukartal under any cir-
cumstances and bided his time. His Ruhela troops were alarmed and began
to waver, but Najib clenched his teeth and pulled on as best as he could, till
he was relieved by the vanguard of the Oudh army sent by Shuja under
Umraogir Gosawi. The rumours of Abdali's quick and near approach through
the Panjab were also circulated by Najib to frighten the Marathas. As a mat-
ter of fact, Abdali was still far away. But the Maratha troops under Govind-
pant lost heart and precipitately returned without crossing swords with the
Gosawi troops. The rumour of Abdali's coming to the Panjab and Janakoji's
chit to return hastened Govindpant's sudden flight.⁵ Thus the advantage
which might have been gained by the Maratha side was lost by this sudden
development. Though the troops returned in a hurry and as a result some
were actually killed or drowned, Sir Jadunath's estimate that half of their
number were drowned is very wide of the mark. This can be seen from Govind-
pant's letter to Sadashivrao Bhau.⁶ Najib Khan was almost on the point of
running away from Sukartal as most of his troops had left to defend their
homes, but in all these affairs destiny ultimately is found going against the
Marathas. Because Umraogir entered the scene just in time and rumours
were circulated by Najib that Shuja was himself following with thirty-thou-
sand troops, Janakoji thought it necessary to send a note to Govindpant to re-
turn at once. Similarly the early rumours of Abdali's march had their effect on
⁴ Raj. I 140, 141, 142.
⁵ Ibid. 1.143.
⁶ SPD 40.126

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 21
Dattaji's removing his camp from Sukartal Sabaji actually reached Dat-
taji's camp on 10th November, 1759, but the news of his coming back was
circulated a month earlier so as to loosen Dattaji's grip over Sukartal Abdali
was still near Lahore and his troops had not penetrated up to Thaneshwar till
the last week of December, but Ghazi ud din, who was chicken hearted, was
frightened when he caught certain news carriers carrying letters to and from
the Emperor Alamgir at Delhi Therein the Emperor was found writing in
vitations to Shuja ud daulah on the one hand and Ahmad Shah Abdali on the
other, and they were assuring him of their imminent arrival Seeing the danger,
the Wazir, who was quick in decision and had no qualms of conscience, got
the Emperor and Intizam ud daulah (his rival for Wazirship) murdered on
November 29, 1759, through Balabash Khan, his captain, and unceremoniously
flung their corpses on the river bank Next, the Wazir's assistants produced a
prince from the house of Taimur and crowned him as Emperor under the
title of Shah Jahan III This prince was a grandson of Kam Bakhsh,⁷ the
youngest son of Aurangzib, and was dragging his life out in the imperial prison
Thus the Wazir thought that he had taken precautions against Abdali's making
use of the old Emperor and his possible Wazir As a matter of fact, this
event sent a thrill of horror through the Muslims of Hindusthan and the Wazir,
who was already hated as a tool of the Marathas, lost what little respect was
still felt for him As the Marathas did not seem to have protested against this
act, they were naturally held morally responsible for this butchery It took
away the sympathy for the Marathas and had a worse effect on Sadashivrao
Bhau's campaign the following year
Dattaji being thoroughly disappointed at the siege and at the negotia-
tions for tribute and help from Shuja ud daulah, ultimately raised the siege
on 15th December and divided his army into two parts He placed the camp,
the bazar and their inmates, together with his family, under the charge of
Rupram Kothari and asked him to go back to Delhi with his Jat troops He
himself with his select troops proceeded to meet Abdali beyond the Jamuna so
as to stop him from entering the Doab and joining Najib He had perhaps
twenty five thousand chosen horsemen under him He proceeded to Karnal by
crossing the Jamuna south of Kunjpura at the Andhera Ghat on 18th Decem
ber, 1759, and sent scouts to find out Abdali's movements He learnt that
Abdali s son, Taimur Shah, with forty thousand troops and all his Sardars had
arrived north of Ambala and were camping at Laldu, Banora and Chhat⁸ on
Saturday, the 15th of December, and that Ahmad Shah was himself following
The first skirmish between the vanguards of the two armies took place on 20th
December Dattaji himself proceeded north with his chosen twenty five thou
sand troops without any camp equipment, carrying only as much luggage as
a soldier could carry on his horse He had ordered Janakoji Shinde and the
Wazir Ghazi ud din to remain at Karnal some fifteen miles behind his ad-
vance line, with their parks of artillery, in order to check any surprise party of
the Durrani troops proceeding south to attack the main camp and the bazar,
⁷ Ibid. 2 107
⁸ Ibid 2.109

22 PANIPAT: 1761
from proceeding further south towards Delhi with Govindpant Bundele. Hear-
ing that Dattaji was advancing with his unencumbered troops to cut him off
before reaching the Jamuna, Abdali changed his intention of crossing the river
by the easier crossing, south of Kunjpura, so as to proceed straight through
Shamli and Muzaffarnagar to Sukartal. Instead, he kept close to the moun-
tain side and arrived at Jagadhri on the 23rd. He himself with his select troops
and a park of mobile artillery stopped to engage the advancing Dattaji, and
ordered his camp with its heavy baggage to begin crossing at once. Dattaji
advanced vigorously, but to his dismay found that he had been anticipated by
the Durrani and thus was unable to cut off and loot his camp equipage. On
the other hand, he had to face the sharp fire of Shutarnals which killed his
troops en masse. Thus no effect could be produced on Abdali's army, while
the loss on the Maratha side was considerable, amounting to some four thou-
sand killed and wounded. There was no corresponding gain in obstructing
Abdali's advance. On the night of that battle of 24th December, Abdali de-
camped with his whole camp crossing the river by the Budhia Ghat on his way
to Saharanpur. Next morning, when Dattaji saw the number of killed and
wounded, he must have felt deeply for his error of judgment in keeping his
artillery behind. This was the first occasion on which the Marathas discovered
the weakness of their traditional mode of warfare, which was found inade-
quate in dealing with the new mode based on artillery and musketry.
Dattaji now retreated to Delhi, arriving there about the 5th January,
1760. Thence he detached his camp and sent it back under the protection of
Ruparam Kothari to the Jat territory. He himself was preparing to go to
Meerut and attack Abdali and the Ruhelas combined. The Peshwa had long
ago ordered Malharrao Holkar to leave Rajputana and proceed to Sukartal
to help the Shindes. But his life-long habits of procrastination and perhaps
his unwillingness to join his forces with those of the Shindes, especially in the
work of completely crushing Najib against his will, delayed his march from
Balwada which he was besieging then. As a matter of fact, Balwada was an
insignificant fort under a captain of Jaipur. But it held out this time for some
two months. This seems to be due to Madhosingh's policy of engaging the
Maratha generals separately till the arrival of Ahmad Shah Abdali. As Najib
Khan and Madhosingh of Jaipur were the two most important conspirators in
the conspiracy of driving the Marathas south of the Narbada with the help
of Abdali, it was but natural that Madhosingh should, in furtherance of their
cause, try to pin down Malharrao to Rajputana so as to frustrate his plans of
proceeding to help Dattaji. Anyway, Malharrao's conduct on this occasion
had the effect of putting the whole brunt of meeting Abdali on the Shindes.
Dattaji was trying now to postpone a trial of strength with the combined Dur-
rani and Ruhela troops till the arrival of Malharrao. Malharrao in extenua-
tion of his delaying conduct is found putting the plea that the Shindes⁹ had
cancelled their first call for help from Sukartal, when they found they had
enough troops with them after the arrival of the Panjab troops under Sabaji
and Tukoji. But after the first battle near the Budhia Ghat, Janakoji sent
⁹ Ibid. 2.117

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 23
an express call for help to Malharrao who started at once on the first of Janu-
ary, 1760. Had there been a man of Bajirao's type, he would have possibly
covered the distance from Jaipur to Delhi just in time to join Dattaji. But
Ahmad Shah probably knowing the speed of Malharrao's advance, decided
to forestall him.
Ahmad Shah left Sukartal within a week and advanced by way of
Meerut to Luni on the Jamuna. This place is about seven miles to the north-
east of Delhi and opposite to it is the ferry of Jagatpur. Abdali was trying to
find the least defended part on the opposite bank of the Jamuna so as to cross
the river without giving any chance to the enemy to attack his force while
crossing. It was impossible for him to cross near Delhi, because the fire from
the Delhi fort could have been effectively used against him by the Wazir.
The ghats just to the north of Delhi were guarded by Dattaji's scouts. Dat-
taji himself was camping in the vicinity of Majnu's hillock, two miles to the
north of Delhi. He had so distributed his army as to meet any surprise cross-
ing by the Durrani troops at any point. But the river was fordable at many
points, and it was difficult to keep watch in a low land with the dense fog of
January covering it. As Dattaji could have no intimation of Abdali's intentions,
he had to depend on mere guess work. Three days passed in manoeuvring for
a crossing, and Abdali ultimately chose to cross opposite the village of Buradi,
where the terrain was most uneven and difficult. This place is some seven miles
to the north of Delhi. Dattaji had guarded the crossings to the south of this
place well. In order to mislead the Marathas, Abdali sent small parties to
each of the crossings and with the main army he went to Badarpur and tried
to cross thence. He crossed over to Buradi because that was probably the least
guarded part. The river there had separated into two streams with a sandy
low island between. It was overgrown with thick rushes which attain in these
parts a height of ten feet. If soldiers lie in ambush interspersed in these rushes,
it would be impossible to see or locate them within a few yards. Till one
actually arrives on the edge of the river, one cannot see it from any point in the
vicinity. Nor can the crossing at this point be seen from any southern point
on the bank, because the land there bulges out a little and shuts the view to the
north. Though the Marathi chronicle indulges in vivid description, it is not
known whether Dattaji had actually placed a force at this particular point.
. Perhaps he had not, and he seems to have been informed of the crossing when
half the army of Abdali had already crossed. This was on the morning of 10th
January, 1760.
Early that morning, Dattaji received news, one after the other, of his
guards at various points on the river being simultaneously attacked by the cross-
ing parties of Durrani and Ruhela soldiers and being very roughly handled by
them. This was Abdali's ruse to send Dattaji on the wrong scent. But Dat-
taji would not move unguardedly and would not call in the help from his
whole camp which was spread over a vast plain, each part being separated
from the other by a considerable distance. In fact he had no mind to engage
the enemy till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar for whom he was waiting and
perhaps wanted to fall back on the city in case of need. His only intention

24 PANIPAT: 1761
was to keep the enemy at a distance from the city till Holkar's arrival so as
not to be besieged within the city walls. But this was the very reason why the
Durrani made haste and crossed over simultaneously at various points. It
seems that none of the parties placed by Dattaji with a few thousand troops
each could stand against the enemy's advance with fire from the light cannon
placed on the elephants, who swam across in front. Practically the whole of
the Shinde contingent was composed of horsemen used to sword and lance,
unlike the Ruhelas who were footmen armed with muskets and rifles. The
result was that in fights from a distance the Marathas were always at a dis-
advantage. When almost all the Maratha parties had been completely routed
with heavy loss of life, Dattaji received news from Janrao Wable, a veteran
captain of horse, that half the army of the enemy had crossed the river. Dat-
taji sent Bayaji Shinde to help Janrao in holding the ghat at Buradi, which is
some three miles away from the village of that name. Receiving the news
that Bayaji was worsted with his three thousand horse, and he himself killed
by a bullet-shot, Dattaji ordered his whole contingent to follow him to the river-
bank. He tried to go to the Buradi Ghat not from the west side but from the
south-west along the village of Jagatpur. He crossed first an ordinary nullah
and then the lake-like inner stream. When he entered the part overgrown with
rushes, his cavalry could not keep any line or move in any close formation.
The Ruhela infantry, which was lying in ambush in the rushes, opened fire
from here, there and everywhere, and made it impossible for Dattaji to proceed.
Janakoji who was accompanying Dattaji though forbidden, received a bullet-
wound on the right upper arm. The news of this incident had the effect of still
more demoralising the Maratha troops, and each tried to turn back to escape
what seemed certain death. Dattaji was advised by those near him to order a
retreat. But before anything could be done, he himself fell down with a bullet-
wound in his ribs. The Afghans then rushed out and completed the rout of the
Maratha army with a heavy massacre. The story of the wounded Dattaji being
taunted and kicked by Mian Qutb Shah and his cutting off Dattaji's head after
some talk, seems more dramatic than true and an invention of the author of the
chronicle. We have no belief in it.
There was no regular battle at Buradi Ghat and the two armies were
never drawn together in battle array, nor is the number of casualties known.
Yashvantrao Jagdale, Bayaji Shinde and Maloji Shinde were the noted persons
who lost their lives in this action. Govindpant Bundele does not seem to have
taken any part in guarding the ghats as written in the chronicle, though he
was not far away from the field of battle. Perhaps he was in the camp of
Janakoji a few miles away from Delhi. On the Afghan side, Shuja-ud-daulah
does not seem to have been present in Abdali's camp nor any of his troops
like the Gosawi corps. Therefore, the story given in the Bhau Bakhar of
Shuja begging for the head of Dattaji and Umraogir Gosawi buying it for two
lakhs and afterwards attending to his full funeral rites must be treated as pure
fiction written to console the Shinde family and recommend Ragho Ram Page
and Rajaram Chobdar to their attention. The action was fought mainly be-
tween the Ruhelas of Najib and Qutb Shah, and Dattaji, though the Dur-
ranis followed soon after to turn it into a rout and pursue the Shinde contin-

KARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 25
gent to a long distance. Purushottam Mahadev Hingne¹⁰ who was present in
the battle and received a bullet-wound on his thigh, writes that the action was
a short and swift one, turning into a rout on account of the general's ac-
cidental death in the very first round and the leader receiving a bullet-wound
himself. No battle could be fought because the place was unsuitable on ac-
count of the thick rushes, and because there was no intention either of offer-
ing one till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar. In fact, the main part of the
Maratha army was at a distance from the river-bank and not ready for a
fight. The division under Dattaji was not sufficient to meet the combined
forces of Abdali and Najib with any hope of success. That is why Dattaji had
asked Govindpant Bundele with his small brigade to continue with him all
along and invited help from Surajmal Jat, who was the only ally left to the
Marathas in Northern India. The Wazir's contingent was not more than five
thousand strong this time, and was not very helpful or wholeheartedly with
the Marathas.
The Durranis pursued Janakoji for twenty-five miles and then re-
turned. Malharrao who had started on the 1st of January was still at a dis-
tance of some one hundred and fifty miles from Delhi! Janakoji followed
in the direction of Rewadi towards which place his camp had been despatched
with Ruparam Kothari and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar, the Shinde's Diwan.
It was impossible for Janakoji to ride a horse with his aching wound which
had become worse by the first day's headlong flight. As the whole baggage had
been looted by the pursuers or left behind as heavy, there was no palanquin
with carriers in the whole army. A char-pai (cot) was taken as a substitute
and Janakoji was carried on it by the soldiers themselves acting as carriers,
leaving their horses in the charge of others. After covering thirty miles in this
manner, with great trouble Janakoji reached his camp with the remnants of
his broken army after midnight that day. Bhagirathibai, who seems to be a
second wife of Dattaji, was in advanced pregnancy and went with the retreat-
ing camp. As soon as Janakoji arrived in the camp, his wife Kashibai and
Bhagirathibai came out of their tent to see what had happened. Coming to
know of Dattaji's death and the defeat of his army, the whole camp was
plunged into grief, and there was a great uproar and wailing. From the
dramatic description of the Bakhar, Bhagirathibai who was not more than
sixteen in age (having been married to Dattaji in March 1758) seems to have
been a woman of exceptional self-composure and precociously wise. Instead
of indulging in useless crying, she reprimanded others for not taking courage
and acting as was necessary under the circumstances. She ordered a halt till
the morning and stopped the march of the army so as to dress Janakoji's
wounds and afford him rest after a run of twenty hours; but the camp which
was terrified by what they had heard and afraid of being caught by the
pursuing Durrani troops, started at once in the small hours of the morning in
the direction of Rewadi. Disobeying her orders, the whole civil camp started,
and as a consequence it became difficult for the leaders to continue the halt
without the help of camp-followers. The officers in the Shinde contingent
10 Ibid. 2.114.

26 PANIPAT: 1761
found it an extremely difficult problem to carry the heavy baggage, including
stores of cloth, grain and fodder. They sought counsel with the two women
who were now in place of their masters, and after a short consultation, took
with them the most necessary and light equipment only, setting fire to the
rest for fear of its falling into the hands of the enemy. They placed Janakoji
in the lady's palanquin and began to search for horses for the use of the two
women. Meanwhile, under the stress of panic, the camp-followers had caught
all the available horses and run away with them. With difficulty two ponies
were secured and the women started on them. Rupram Kothari, who was
accompanying the party, suggested, in order to mislead the Durrani pursuers
and to put them on the wrong scent, that the two women and Janakoji should
separate themselves from the disorderly camp and go secretly to Kumbher.
But Kashibai, for fear of falling into the Jat's hands should they turn traitors
in this calamity, disapproved the plan and they continued with the broken
camp and the army as best as they could. After four days of continuous trou-
ble, the fore-runners of the army came into touch with the advance party of
the Holkar's contingent and stopped there. • On the 15th January, 1760,
Malharrao came and joined the party to the north of Kot Putali. Then only
the panic subsided and men found time to think of what had happened and
to plan the future in accordance with it.
• It seems from Janakoji's letter¹¹ to the Peshwa that the plight of the
Shinde army was exaggerated by the Bakhar writer. The Shinde division
though defeated, was not as helpless as the author of the chronicle would paint
it to be. The action at the Buradi Ghat was fought on the 10th of January,
and not on the 9th, as the day was Thursday.¹² Malharrao and his Diwan
Gangadharpant Chandrachud were men of quite a different type from Janakoji
Shinde and his Diwan Ramaji Anant Dabholkar. Cautiousness and far-sighted-
ness were the chief virtues of Malharrao, and these fully coincided with the
traditional habits and temper of the Marathas. Malharrao's whole policy was
based on opportunism and not on any fixed principles. He would take no
risk which would land him into a disaster. If the Marathas got something with-
out much effort and little risk, that was sufficient and good. If they could
not get the desired fruit and had to return without it, it was no dishonour to
them, so thought Malharrao. And it was the guiding philosophy of his life.
The Shinde family, on the other hand, was of a different temper. They were
straightforward and would not mince matters in their dealings with friend
or foe. They were more loyal servants trying to obey the Peshwa's commands
as best as they could, and would shirk no risk in gaining their ends. The result
is exemplified in the careers of the members of that illustrious family, which
was mainly responsible for the Maratha activities in the north for three quar-
ters of a century. Malharrao, on the contrary, would, in the greatest diffi-
culties, first think of the safety of his life and property and then of everything
else. With such a frame of mind, he was honest to himself but not necessarily
to others with different principles, tempers and standards of conduct. This
11 Ibid. 21.182.
12 Ibid. 27.247.

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 27
somewhat rough man with blunt manners looked out of place and bizarre in
a mixed company of polished men with suave manners. At the same time
there was always a substratum of truth in his mode of thinking, and others had
to fall in line with it in times of difficulty. The present was such a time and
Janakoji had to keep his family-dash in the background and follow Malharrao.
Malharrao sent back the families with the baggage and the bazar to
their homes through the friendly territory of the Raja of Keravli to Gwalior
under the guardianship of Govindpant Bundele. He started from Kot Putali
on the 23rd February. Bhagirathibai gave birth to a posthumous son¹³ of Dat-
taji that night, but he seems to have died soon after. Malharrao and Janakoji
then started back towards Delhi with a view to check Abdali's progress and
counteract his plans. The Marathas do not seem to have lost courage after
the recent untoward happenings. They were still confident of being able to
checkmate Abdali and the Ruhelas. Malharrao knew "that Najib Khan and
Madhosingh were the chief wirepullers in inviting Ahmad Shah" and, contrary
to the common belief, was ready now to reshuffle his former policy of befriend-
ing Najib and the Wazir, whom he himself had put on the pedestal. He had
thoroughly understood that "Ghazi-ud-din was not acting in consonance with
the dignity of his high office and was fickle to a degree. Even though weak
himself, he would still indulge in vile machinations and back-door politics. He
would do what he liked and on meeting others, humble himself to such an ex-
tent as to take away all wrath against his conduct and thus try to wipe out¹⁴
the evil effects of his behaviour." The Peshwa, Nanasaheb, on the other hand,—
and in this case acting on the information and the prejudices of Raghunathrao¹⁵
----wished to stick up for a person up to the last, after once having taken his
side, and would not change his position unless an open and sufficient cause
obliged him to do so. He had instructed Dattaji to act accordingly, but Ghazi-
ud-din would neither grant what the Marathas wanted nor issue imperial
sanads bestowing Allahabad and Benares on the Marathas.¹⁶ though Shuja-
ud-daulah, his rival, would have been the loser. "You can conquer and take
possession of the places you want as you are strong. Why do you want sanads
for the same?" he would argue with the Marathas. Simultaneously he would
write to Shuja-ud-daulah asking him never to grant or hand over these holy
cities to the Marathas, but to prepare himself to defend them to the last. To
which Shuja¹⁷ would reply that he would do the needful. Thus the two rivals
for the chancellorship of the Empire were simultaneously acting hand in glove
with the Marathas and also trying to defend the Muslim dominions at all
costs and by every subterfuge. Najib had already deceived; fooled and ruined
Dattaji, and the Wazir was now following in his wake. But after his late as-
sassinations, it was impossible for the Marathas to back him any more and they
had to re-orient their policy.
13 RAJ 1.162.
14 SPD 2 117.
15 Ait. Patra, Yadi 171
16 SPD 27.240
17 Ibid 27.240

28 PANIPAT: 1761
The Peshwa had, in his dire need of money, permitted¹⁸ Dattaji to ap-
point Shuja to the office of the Wazir if he would grant the Maratha claims
and pay down cash. Surajmal Jat was on good terms with Shuja as he was
his friend's son and their interests also would not clash. On the one hand the
Peshwa wanted these two allies to check-mate the Wazir in case he was not
amenable to Maratha interests. On the other hand, he feared their combina-
tion as likely to prove too strong for the Maratha power and, therefore, he
was willing to support Ghazi-ud-din at all costs, as there was no fear of his
becoming powerful enough to defy the Marathas. Dattaji had, therefore,
chosen the path of placating Najib while keeping the question of the Chancel-
lorship pending. Now that that alternative had disappeared, Malharrao had
definitely decided to do away with the double-dealing and ambitious Wazir
and invest¹⁹ Shuja with that office. Both Shuja and the Jat feared the Afghan
union, as they were likely to be the next victims of that combination. Besides,
Surajmal had the ambition of profiting and aggrandizing himself at the cost
of the Ruhelas by spreading his power beyond the Jamuna and even the Ganges.
Already the Jats had spread in the Doab and colonised certain parts of it. It
was but natural, therefore, that they should rally round Surajmal as the "Lord
of Braj." Just as Surajmal had made his power unassailable by building,
strengthening and storing his forts of Deeg, Kumbher and Bharatpur, similarly
he took the fortalice of Sabitgad, near Kol, re-named it Ramgad, and
began to turn it into a second Kumbher. From this base he was trying to
dominate the upper Doab and Rohilkhand beyond the Ganges. Malharrao
had now established friendship²⁰ with the Jat Raja, forgetting the siege of
Kumbher and his son's death. As it was in the interest of Surajmal to combat
the Afghan power, he made common cause with the Marathas and helped them
in this guerilla warfare.
From Kot Putali, Malharrao and Janakoji began their new plan of
making sudden raids on the enemy's undefended depots and roving round the
flanks so as to sieze every opportunity of spoliation. Ahmad Shah was now
camping south of Delhi and thence despatching letters to the various chiefs
asking them to pay him tribute and join their forces with his in his efforts to
drive the Marathas²¹ from northern India. But they knew his ways as well
as his power and, therefore, chose to sit on the fence playing the game of
procrastination, by neither acceding to nor refusing his demands, but merely .
pleading their inability to do anything. Ahmad Shah had to visit their ter-
ritories personally in order to squeeze any money out of them. First he moved
south and besieged Deeg near Mathura. He drove away the small parties
of the Marathas hovering round him. He was not able to make any im-
pression on Deeg and had to move in pursuit of the threatening Marathas.
Malharrao, accompanied by Janakoji and Naro Shankar, was reported to be
at Narnol,²² whither Abdali moved next.
18 Ait. Patren Yadi 167.
19 SPD 21 183.
20 Ibid. 2 121.
21 Ibid. 21 186.
22 Ibid. 21.186.

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 29
Leaving Deeg, Ahmad Shah proceeded south-west into the Jaipur ter-
ritory plundering wherever he went. He ransomed the small local Rajas of
Kadhake and Khobari (Kurke and Khohari?). He was thinking of proceed-
ing against the non-committing Madhosingh to Jaipur. On the road he
slaughtered the inhabitants of the resisting town of Mahwah²³ (twenty miles
east of Bandikui), but spared the residents of Baswa²⁴ (ten miles north of
Bandikui), as they offered ransom for their town. This was in the third week
of February. There he received the news that the Marathas were looting the
districts to the west of Delhi and had taken Rs. 10,000 as tribute from Kanaud.²⁵
Ahmad Shah, therefore, swerved north through Alwar territories,²⁶ leaving
the direction of Jaipur. But before he could arrive near Delhi, Malharrao
had formed another plan, depending upon Abdali's intended move against
Jaipur which, had it been put into execution, would have engaged the Afghans
there for at least a month or two. As Najib Khan and most of the other
Ruhelas were accompanying Abdali on his march, Malharrao and his shrewd
Diwan Gangoba Chandrachud thought of attacking the Ruhela lands in the
Doab and beyond, in the absence of their proprietors. The Maratha army
crossed the Jamuna to the south of Delhi on 20th February, 1760, and de-
scended upon the rich town of Sikandrabad. There they halted and com-
pletely looted the town on the Holi Day i.e. 1st March, 1760. They should
have moved from the place the next day and proceeded farther, but there
they heard that Najib Khan's treasure of ten lakhs was coming into the Doab
on its way to the Abdali camp. It had come up to the bank of the Ganges
opposite to the town of Anup Shahar. Getting this clue, they sent pickets to
see where the Ganges could be crossed. In the meanwhile, Ahmad Shah hear-
ing this move of Holkar, suddenly changed his direction and ran to the south
of Delhi. Thence he detached Jahan Khan and Najib Khan with 35,000
troops unencumbered with any artillery or camp equipage. Surajmal Jat who
in this guerilla war was helping the Marathas, came to know of this sudden
move of Abdali and sent information of the same to Gangoba Chandrachud
to warn him in time. The Maratha army had, therefore, already divided
itself.
The Shinde contingent under Janakoji as well as old Malharrao Holkar
had fallen back towards Mathura and Agra. Rupram, the Jat envoy, accom-
panied them. But the rest of Holkar's troops who never had any acquaintance
with the Durrani ways and no experience of battling against them, laughed
at the idea of running away on mere news of the enemy, and taunted the
Shinde's troops as being faint-hearted. Janakoji, therefore, separated from
Holkar and started towards Mathura. Malharrao himself personally followed
him and ordered Gangoba Tatya to check the Durrani advance. But his
corps was surprised, caught unprepared and massacred with heavy slaughter

²³ KHARE 1.21
²⁴ Ibid.
²⁵ SPD 2.118.
²⁶ Ibid. 21.186.
²⁷ Ibid. 2.121.

30 PANIPAT: 1761
by Jahan Khan. Gangoba, who was personally alert, was able to run away
and save himself; but Anandrao Ram Yadav, Shetyaji Kharade and his son
were killed in the running fight,²³ and the broken remnant of the frightened
army crossed the Jamuna back into the Jat territory, wherever it could. The
experiment of checkmating the Durrani forces by guerilla tactics thus ended
in failure.
The Maratha forces, therefore, retreated to the borders of the Jaipur
territory and encamped in the vicinity of Bayana. The Maratha tactics, how-
ever, had saved not only the Jats but also the Rajput princes. Abdali had to
turn back from Jaipur because the Marathas had swept towards Delhi, and
now his army had to be stationed in the Doab to ward off the Maratha raids
against the Ruhelas. The Marathas now reached a complete understanding
with Surajmal Jat and renewed their former agreements with him. Surajmal
promised to follow the Maratha policy in all respects. His own territories in
the Doab were now directly threatened and he concentrated his strength on
the defence of Ramgad (the modern Aligarh), which, however, surrendered
to Abdali's overwhelming forces within a month. As all the Ruhelas were
not on good terms and in full accord with Najib, the Marathas now tried to
divide them by entering into a separate arrangement with Hafiz Rahmat, the
grand old man amongst the trans-Gangetic Ruhelas. He agreed to join his
forces with the Marathas, send back Abdali after detaching him from Najib and
not to help Najib in his fight against the Marathas. The Marathas agreed, on
the other hand, not to invade the other Ruhelas but to content themselves with
the cis-Gangetic territories. Abdali would have now left for Afghanistan, had
not Najib induced him to remain in India for protecting him against the chafing
wrath of the Marathas. His stay in India gave a new turn to the Maratha
politics in the north.
²³ Ibid. 2.121.

CHAPTER III
SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA
WHEN the tidings of Dattaji's death reached the Peshwa's camp at
Ahmadnagar in the south, none in the Deccan was prepared for such a bolt
from the blue. All had full confidence in the military talents of Dattaji Shinde.
They expected him at least to stem the tide of the Durrani invasion if not to
defeat Abdali and drive him back. Besides, the Peshwa had ordered Malharrao
Holkar to proceed to Dattaji's help and he was expected to be on the route
towards the Panjab. This was in the middle of November 1759, after Sabaji's
return to Sukartal. At that time, it was expected that the Nizam in the Dec-
can would be cowed down by ordinary manoeuvring of troops and be prepared
to part with the north-western portion of his dominions. It seems that the
Nizam had consented to grant Ahmadnagar and Parenda forts together with
the revenue of the surrounding territories amounting to ten lakhs, to the
Peshwa.¹ But afterwards, due to the advice of his brothers, he tried to
equivocate about the grant of Ahmadnagar which was not only a strong fort
in the military sense, but was a place of prestige for the Muslims, being the
old seat of the Nizamshahi Kingdom. The Peshwa was not in a mood at
that time to tolerate any delaying tactics. His position at the hour was thought
to be almost that of a dictator in India. Since the Maratha standards were
carried beyond the Attock² in the previous year, the Peshwa's fame had spread
not only throughout the length and breadth of India, but had travelled beyond
the boundaries to Iran and Turan.³ In the south his generals Balvantrao
Mehendale, Gopalrao Patwardhan, Malhar Naik Raste and Visaji Krishna
Biniwale had established the Maratha suzerainty south of the river Krishna.⁴
In the north his brother Raghunnathrao and his generals Dattaji and Mal-
harrao had created such awe that none in those parts was willing to cross
swords with the Marathas. Even the chiefs not conquered by the Marathas
were ready to send ambassadors and try to negotiate terms for their existence
and continuance.⁵ Shuja-ud-daulah had paid tribute⁶ and the English in Bengal,
though they had slyly usurped the power by a silent revolution without pro-
claiming themselves the masters, were still in need of the Peshwa's goodwill and
forbearance towards them, and actually sent emissaries to the Poona Court to
ward off Raghunathrao's proposed advance into Bengal.⁷ The Peshwa had,
it seems, actually assured Clive of his support, and Clive made political use of
that assurance in imposing himself upon the Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah.⁸ Simi-
larly, the English advance through Orissa to Masulipatam and the occupation
¹ RAJ. 1 154.
² BISM (Persian Mss) No. 696, dated 20-12 1758
³ Aitihasika Sphuta Lekh 411
⁴ SPD 28.200-02, 204, 210, 216, 217, 266
⁵ BISM (Persian Mss.) No 699
⁶ K. Patre Yadi No. 166
⁷ JIHQ 15.3.388.
⁸ Hill 2.387, 388, 400
[ 31 ]

32 PANIPAT: 1761
of the French jagirs by Colonel Forde was made possible by Maratha for-
bearance and the Peshwa's pressure on the Nizam Salabat Jang, the grantor
of these jagirs. Naturally the Peshwa was thinking himself as suzerain in all
these parts of India occupied by the English, for both the Deccan and Bengal
as well as Arcot were paying chauth to the Marathas and the English had
still not remonstrated against or interfered with this right.
Bussy who had been recalled from the court of Hyderabad by Lally,
had left for Pondicherry in July 1758. The result was that the fruit of his
occupation of Daulatabad and of the assassination of Shah Nawaz Khan who
was a protege of the Peshwa had been snatched away by others after his de-
parture. Thus ended the French influence at the Nizam's Court. The Peshwa
had succeeded in detaching Ibrahim Khan Gardi, pupil of Bussy, from the
Nizam's service and engaging him himself.⁹ Thus strengthened, the Peshwa
sent his cousin Sadashivrao Bhau, with forty thousand troops to occupy Ahmad-
nagar as promised by the Nizam. He was saved the trouble of besieging that
strong fort as Kavi Jang, its keeper, agreed to deliver it to the Marathas in con-
sideration for a jagir with an annual revenue of Rs. fifty thousand.¹⁰ Visaji
Krishna took possession of it on 9th November, 1759. Thence Sadashivrao
Bhau proceeded towards Beed and Dharur and commenced hostilities with
the Nizam by fomenting and strengthening internal quarrels amongst the
Nizam brothers. Basalat Jang separated himself from the Nizam and marched
towards the south. The Maratha sardars of the Nizam, Nimbalkars and Khan-
dagle, were sitting sulkily at home and not joining their forces with those of
Nizam Ali, who had taken the lead after the departure of the French.
Sadashivrao hoped for a quick decision in the campaign and after its suc-
cessful termination intended to send Raghunathrao into the north to help
Dattaji.
But Nizam Ali would not part with the territories demanded by the
Peshwa without a trial of strength. Skirmishes began from the 20th January,
1760, and gradually the Maratha armies surrounded the Nizam and his
brother. The Nizam wanted to reach the fort of Dharur and make a stand
there, but the Marathas would not allow him to escape from Udgir and con-
tinuously followed close at his heels. By forming a hollow square, the Nizam
marched out in the French fashion from Udgir and slowly moved towards
Ausa, skirmishing all along the way. When the fort of Dharur remained some
fifteen miles ahead, the Marathas held up his march by completely surround-
ing him on all sides and attacking him in the rear. In the battle of 3rd Febru-
ary, 1760, the Nizam was completely defeated and hemmed in, and there-
fore sued for peace. By the terms of the peace, the Nizam ceded to the
Marathas practically the half of his remaining dominions. Nizam Ali, the
chief instigator, was to go back to his jagir in Berar and the Nizam Salabat
Jang was to remain in Hyderabad. His Maratha sardars¹¹ were to leave the
Nizam's service. The foreign relations of the Nizam were to be guided by the
⁹ Purandare 1.382.
¹⁰ Ibid. 1.382.
¹¹ Raj. 1.165.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 33
Maratha policy, especially his dealings with the French.¹² Bijapur, Ahmad-
nagar, Burhanpur and Daulatabad, all four former capitals of the Muslim
dominions, were surrendered together with the important forts of Asher and
Mulher.¹³ Sadashivrao Bhau had become the hero of the day. He writes
that but for the new danger in the north, the whole of the south would have
come under the rule of the Peshwa.
Unfortunately he reckoned without his host. Already the English had
stolen a march politically, and now militarily also they loomed large on the
horizon. Bussy had already been made a prisoner by them, and Haider Ali had
so firmly set foot in Mysore as never to be ousted. While the Peshwa had just
then taken possession of Underi and Kansa from the Sidi,¹⁴ Janjira and Surat
never became Maratha possessions. Even the Nizam brothers, though de-
feated with heavy loss and deprived of half their dominions, were only biding
their time. They had given their consent to the treaty because they had to,
but there was no intention in their mind of fulfilling the terms in the real
spirit.¹⁵ By the treaty they had merely played for time to reshuffle their mat-
ters, gain over their disaffected Maratha sardars to their side, seek help from
the Pathans of Karnool, the Bedars of Surapur and also Murarrao Ghorpade.
Their whole army had not been completely crushed and, in fact, they had sought
peace at once to keep it intact. All these points had been placed before Bhau
and he should have thought of them seriously. But the Peshwa thought more
of recovering the prestige lost in north India as a result of the fall of Shinde
Consequently he ordered preparations to be made for despatching a strong force
to the north to drive out Abdali.
Throughout the Udgir campaign, the Peshwa who had stopped at
Ahmadnagar, and directed the movements from that place, now proceeded to-
wards Paithan on his way to Patdur, southeast of Jalna, where he had sum-
moned the Bhosle brothers from Nagpur to settle their quarrels. Sadashivrao
Bhau himself proceeded north to that place, after crossing the Godavari, to
meet him and thrash out the future policy through corsultations with all.
They met there in the first week of March 1760, and first celebrated their vic-
tory by playing the Rangapanchami festival with zest. Then began the dis-
cussions. All the three cousins were there, and it was the declared intention
of the Peshwa and also of Bhau to send Raghunathrao to the north as
originally arranged.
It should be remembered that up to that time the final route of Mal-
harrao Holkar by Abdali at Sikandrabad, which took place in the first week
of March, had not been reported to the Peshwa, as news travelled very slowly
in those days. If the news had reached the Peshwa's camp at Padtur in time,
that would have perhaps given a different turn to the whole affair. It seems
that the discussions assumed the form of family bickerings in the Peshwa's
family. Personal opinions, long cherished prejudices, partiality and selfish-
¹² SPD 40.123.
¹³ Raj. 1.166.
¹⁴ Ibid. 1.157
¹⁵ SPD 1.86.
P. F.—3

34 PANIPAT 1761
ness had played their role in what should have been purely political discus-
sions. The Peshwa had always shown his predilection towards his brother
Raghunathrao, and had somehow formed a good opinion about his ability
Sadashivrao Bhau, for all his ability and wisdom, was still a cousin and there-
fore not on a par with Raghunathrao He could have no legal share in the
Peshwa's dominions and estates, and was only the first servant of the state.
Gopikabai, the wife of the Peshwa, was supposed to be the chief instigator
against the superior claims of Sadashivrao to high office due to his ability
When Raghunathrao was ordered¹⁶ to take the command of the north, he put
in a plea that he would not accept the responsibility¹⁷ unless provided with
ample funds Sadashivrao Bhau who was a strict accountant and auditor gen-
eral held Raghunathrao responsible for the debts of the Panjab campaign and
he strongly resented the charge Raghunathrao had taken the past lesson to
heart and, therefore, wished to absolve himself from the results of the forth
coming campaign
After much recriminative discussion, the Peshwa ordered Bhau him
self to shoulder the responsibility and lead the campaign ¹⁸ The Peshwa was
rather unwilling to spare such a consummate, able and all round administrator
as Bhau for a long time, but there was no help for it, as Bhau had been stung
to the quick by a challenge from his cousin to prove his own valour and ability
to add ample funds to the central treasury by going on the campaign himself
But Gopikabai feared the consequence of Bhau's going to the north, accom-
panied by his wife and with a big army His prestige had already risen very
high by the Udgir campaign If he became equally successful in the north and
were to establish a separate kingdom for himself, who was there to check him?
It was necessary, therefore, to keep some constitutional check on his conduct and
with this view Vishwasrao, the eldest son of the Peshwa, was placed at the
head of the forces, with Bhau acting as his deputy From the correspondence
in the whole Panipat campaign, it is clear that Bhau was not free to settle
anything on his own responsibility Every time he referred the matter to and
sought the previous sanction of the Peshwa. This was a false position in the
then circumstances for a supreme authority like Bhau It appears to have had
a dilatory and derogatory effect on Bhau's conduct of affairs, making it im-
possible for him to free himself from the entanglement at Panipat later on, when
need for a quick, decisive step arose This point should constantly be borne in
mind when reading the forthcoming account of Panipat.
While the suspicions and the prejudices of the Peshwa and his personal
circle affected the Maratha policy throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau's
personal predilections also shaped it to a great extent If Raghunathrao was
always dependent on his assistants for shaping his policy, Bhau had a tendency
towards the other extreme of acting on his own responsibility after abruptly
cutting short the discussion on any subject and dictating the final thing him
16 Ibid 40 129
17 KHARE 1 14 For the previous debts contracted by him the Peshwa had been
obliged to impose a new debt-contribution on all his jagirdars. Vide Satara 2.292.
18 RAJ 1 168.

self. The result was that he seemed, which he was actually not, proud or
even haughty. This was a virtue as far as administrative efficiency—which
depends upon quick and final decision—was concerned, but it cannot be said
to be helpful when policy is to be shaped amongst equals. Over-riding opinion
is always possible for a higher authority, but it is not always conducive to the
best results, as ultimately the working out of the decisions devolves upon the
subordinates. A commander-in-chief can scarcely act against the combined
opinion and will of his generals.
Bhau selected his own assistants and corps from amongst the as-
semblage gathered in the Nizam's dominions. To begin with, his army was
not more than twenty-five thousand strong, besides the infantry under Ibrahim
Khan, which was nine thousand. Though Raghunathrao did not join, some
of the corps subordinate to him were included in the army which accompanied
Bhau to the north. The Maratha army was made up of the feudal divisions
under the main sardars. These sardars employed subordinate corps under indi-
vidual captains. The sardar was responsible for the conduct, training, equip-
ment and payment of the corps employed by him. Certain revenue districts
were assigned to him as jagirs for the expenditure thereof. Not all the noted
captains in the Maratha army were sardars. Certain corps were directly em-
ployed by the Peshwa who paid them from the central treasury. There was
no one fixed scale of payment, certain sardars being paid more favourably than
'others. The bigger sardars, like Shinde and Holkar, were treated more as
partners in the state than as mere subordinates. They had specified per-
centages of the total revenues in certain regions permanently assigned to them
as their inalienable share. It should be particularly noted that throughout the
Panipat campaign, the payment of the whole army did not devolve on Sa-
dashivrao Bhau. The divisions of Shinde and Holkar and also of a few other
sardars were expected to be paid by the sardars themselves. Bhau was re-
sponsible for the payment of the Peshwa's own troops, called "Huzarat," and
directly paid corps like those under Ibrahim Khan Gardi. The inconvenience
felt by the non-receipt of revenues called in by Sadashivrao Bhau from men
like Govindpant Bundele mainly affected the Peshwa's own divisions and not
the divisions under Shinde and Holkar. The normal Maratha practice was for
the moving army to subsist on its own earnings in the regions through which
it passed. When the army was warring in a foreign territory, it would automati-
cally subsist on tributes, ransoms and spoils, but when passing through its own
dominions or the dominions of its allies, it had to buy everything it needed.
In the Panipat campaign this was the condition in the main. Khandesh,
Malwa, the Jat country, the Delhi region, were all non-belligerent territories.
Besides, due to the continuance of almost constant war in the territories sur-
rounding Delhi for almost a decade, the regions had become depopulated, non-
agricultural and insecure. Unless there was good cash in one's pocket and
one could keep the line of communication safe for caravans bringing supplies,
it was impossible to go on for any length of time. There was no government
commissariat department giving free rations or selling things at fixed prices
in those days. The bazar which accompanied a moving army was chartered,
guaranteed and given the necessary protection by the army commander no

36 PANIPAT 1761
doubt, but the merchants were not responsible for the continuous supply as
such, nor were the prices fixed This was a constant source of difficulty for a
moving army There was no assurance of supply nor certainty about the cost,
which led not only to slackness and even obstruction in the war effort, but to
the bankruptcy of the soldiers and the authorities as well
Sadashivrao Bhau's progress was very slow if he had the intention of
joining Shinde and Holkar before the rains These generals had been prac-
tically driven out of the Delhi area, and were then camping at a safe distance
from the Durrani forces behind the Jat principality, using Surajmal as a mid
dleman in their diplomatic negotiations 19 Ahmad Shah Abdali had sent
emissaries to both Madhosingh of Jaipur and Surajmal Jat, ordering them to
unite their forces with his and send monies to aid him in his work of driving
out the Marathas,21 but both pleaded their inability to do anything in the mat-
ter and tried the game of procrastination and equivocation Surajmal was the
more cunning of the two He would always call himself a mere zamindar,
or even a tenant, and not a prince He replied that he would pay the ac-
knowledged Emperor the revenues due to him If Ahmad Shah would him-
self assume that position and remain permanently in India, he would pay him
as the legal sovereign Till then he could not possibly do what he had been
asked, especially as his territories had been ravaged by the movements of both
the Maratha and the Durrani armies 22 As the Indian summer advanced,
Abdali encamped in the vicinity of Ramgad in the mid Doab, exhausted by the
three months' incessant running after the elusive Marathas of the Shinde-
Holkar contingents Each party now expected the other to renew the fight
first, and would not start it themselves This stalemate could have been broken
only by the junction of the forces under Sadashivrao Bhau and the exhausted
generals in the north
Bhau started from Patdur on the 14th of March, 1760, but had only
crossed the Narmada after a month, covering a distance of not more than two
hundred miles The delay was due to the preparation and joining in of the
various corps with equipment for a long and distant campaign Sadashivrao
Bhau's Panipat campaign was, in fact, on the model of the Mughal Emperors
and not like that of Shivaji or Bajirao I The Maratha army had large tents,
screens for women's apartments, and the various departments to look after
the convenience of the leaders and the army The chiefs rode on superb Arab
or Central Asian chargers and wore gorgeous dresses of gold brocades Their
weapons and other equipment were also of the best type, and the brigades
under Ibrahim Khan Gardi, trained after the French model, were the envy of
Indian potentates of those times The presence of these infantry corps with
their cannon, regulated the whole movement of the army, and the daily
marches would cover but a few miles The heavy siege-guns which accom-
panied the army, together with the light field artillery, slowed the rate of
progress, as the long rows of bulls necessary to draw them would move but
slowly over the rugged country and narrow passes in the Satpura and Vindhya
19 SPD 2 121
21 Ibid 21 186.
22 Ibid.

TO FACE PAGE 36
MAP SHOWING
PÂNIPAT ROUTE MARCH
ABDALI'S ROUTE ····
MAHRATHAS' ROUTE ––––
SCALE
Foot-note:—Baghpat to the west of Meerut on the bank of the Jamuna and the village
of Gauripur five miles to the north of Baghpat have been inadvertently omitted from this
map. Ahmad Shah crossed the Jamuna at Gauripur and went to Sonepat.

38 PANIPAT: 1761
lessened his expenditure. There was rumour of his personal return to Afghan-
istan³³ after appointing Shuja as the Wazir, Najib as Mir Bakshi and pro-
claiming the fugitive Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor, thus doing away with
the puppet Shah Jahan III, brought on the throne by the regicide Ghazi-ud-
din. The Panjab would, of course, be surrendered to Abdali, who would be of
help to the Delhi Emperor in times of difficulty. The Dowager Empress,
Malika Zamani, had been specially deputed to induce Shuja by a personal in-
terview, but she does not seem to have succeeded in her efforts. Shuja's mother
was still alive and influenced the affairs of Oudh with prescience and wisdom.
She knew that there was nothing common between the Sunni Afghans and
the Irani Shias to which group her family belonged. The old officers of Safdar
Jang's time knew the difficulties of the Delhi politics and feared to antagonise
the Marathas, who surrounded the Oudh territory. Shuja was thinking of
giving the slip to Abdali without directly saying "no" by proceeding towards
Bihar to back up the Emperor Shah Alam II. But Najib Khan was support-
ing Abdali and directing all his affairs. He himself proceeded towards Oudh
with Jahan Khan, the Durrani general. With a suavity equalled by his cun-
ning, he impressed the Oudh Court by discussing threadbare the pros and
cons of Oudh policy, and finally prevailed upon Shuja to put in his lot on
the side of Abdali. Najib Khan personally stood surety against any possible
harm to Shuja in the Afghan camp. The unsteadiness of Maratha policy in
its dealings with Safdar Jang had now borne fruit. The Peshwa and his
sardars had forsaken Safdar Jang in his need, and gone over to the side of
his opponent, Ghazi-ud-din. The late Wazir had been left to die of a broken
heart after his discomfiture before Delhi and his son Shuja had always to be
on his guard lest the attention of the Marathas be directed against his dominions,
which contained the chief holy places of the Hindus, namely, Benares, Al-
lahabad and Ayodhya.
In his dealings with Shuja, Sadashivrao had put his chief confidence in
Govindpant Bundele as he was a near neighbour, having known the ins and
outs of the Oudh Court for a long time. This man had kept himself out-
wardly on good terms with Shuja and was credited with a sweet tongue, use-
ful in prevailing upon an acquaintance. Sadashivrao Bhau had begun³⁴ to
write to Govindpant from the Nizam's dominions long before the result of
Udgir. When it was finally decided to send him to the north, he at
once wrote to Govindpant to bring over Shuja to the Maratha side in the im-
pending struggle against Abdali.³⁵ From his first letter of the 15th of March,
1760, up to the last disaster of Panipat, ten months later, Bhau is found put-
ting too much faith in the goodness of Shuja. After coming to know his final
decision to join Abdali in the first week of July, Bhau should have left the
matter at that point and should have completely stopped his correspondence
with Shuja. The only result of Bhau's importunities seems to have been to
convince Abdali and Najib of the Maratha weakness. This conviction strength-
ened their resolution of fighting to the last. The Maratha diplomacy during
33 Raj. I.191, 222, 236, 246
34 Ibid. I 154.
35 Ibid. I,167.