पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

38 PANIPAT: 1761
lessened his expenditure. There was rumour of his personal return to Afghan-
istan³³ after appointing Shuja as the Wazir, Najib as Mir Bakshi and pro-
claiming the fugitive Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor, thus doing away with
the puppet Shah Jahan III, brought on the throne by the regicide Ghazi-ud-
din. The Panjab would, of course, be surrendered to Abdali, who would be of
help to the Delhi Emperor in times of difficulty. The Dowager Empress,
Malika Zamani, had been specially deputed to induce Shuja by a personal in-
terview, but she does not seem to have succeeded in her efforts. Shuja's mother
was still alive and influenced the affairs of Oudh with prescience and wisdom.
She knew that there was nothing common between the Sunni Afghans and
the Irani Shias to which group her family belonged. The old officers of Safdar
Jang's time knew the difficulties of the Delhi politics and feared to antagonise
the Marathas, who surrounded the Oudh territory. Shuja was thinking of
giving the slip to Abdali without directly saying "no" by proceeding towards
Bihar to back up the Emperor Shah Alam II. But Najib Khan was support-
ing Abdali and directing all his affairs. He himself proceeded towards Oudh
with Jahan Khan, the Durrani general. With a suavity equalled by his cun-
ning, he impressed the Oudh Court by discussing threadbare the pros and
cons of Oudh policy, and finally prevailed upon Shuja to put in his lot on
the side of Abdali. Najib Khan personally stood surety against any possible
harm to Shuja in the Afghan camp. The unsteadiness of Maratha policy in
its dealings with Safdar Jang had now borne fruit. The Peshwa and his
sardars had forsaken Safdar Jang in his need, and gone over to the side of
his opponent, Ghazi-ud-din. The late Wazir had been left to die of a broken
heart after his discomfiture before Delhi and his son Shuja had always to be
on his guard lest the attention of the Marathas be directed against his dominions,
which contained the chief holy places of the Hindus, namely, Benares, Al-
lahabad and Ayodhya.
In his dealings with Shuja, Sadashivrao had put his chief confidence in
Govindpant Bundele as he was a near neighbour, having known the ins and
outs of the Oudh Court for a long time. This man had kept himself out-
wardly on good terms with Shuja and was credited with a sweet tongue, use-
ful in prevailing upon an acquaintance. Sadashivrao Bhau had begun³⁴ to
write to Govindpant from the Nizam's dominions long before the result of
Udgir. When it was finally decided to send him to the north, he at
once wrote to Govindpant to bring over Shuja to the Maratha side in the im-
pending struggle against Abdali.³⁵ From his first letter of the 15th of March,
1760, up to the last disaster of Panipat, ten months later, Bhau is found put-
ting too much faith in the goodness of Shuja. After coming to know his final
decision to join Abdali in the first week of July, Bhau should have left the
matter at that point and should have completely stopped his correspondence
with Shuja. The only result of Bhau's importunities seems to have been to
convince Abdali and Najib of the Maratha weakness. This conviction strength-
ened their resolution of fighting to the last. The Maratha diplomacy during
33 Raj. I.191, 222, 236, 246
34 Ibid. I 154.
35 Ibid. I,167.