पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 23
an express call for help to Malharrao who started at once on the first of Janu-
ary, 1760. Had there been a man of Bajirao's type, he would have possibly
covered the distance from Jaipur to Delhi just in time to join Dattaji. But
Ahmad Shah probably knowing the speed of Malharrao's advance, decided
to forestall him.
Ahmad Shah left Sukartal within a week and advanced by way of
Meerut to Luni on the Jamuna. This place is about seven miles to the north-
east of Delhi and opposite to it is the ferry of Jagatpur. Abdali was trying to
find the least defended part on the opposite bank of the Jamuna so as to cross
the river without giving any chance to the enemy to attack his force while
crossing. It was impossible for him to cross near Delhi, because the fire from
the Delhi fort could have been effectively used against him by the Wazir.
The ghats just to the north of Delhi were guarded by Dattaji's scouts. Dat-
taji himself was camping in the vicinity of Majnu's hillock, two miles to the
north of Delhi. He had so distributed his army as to meet any surprise cross-
ing by the Durrani troops at any point. But the river was fordable at many
points, and it was difficult to keep watch in a low land with the dense fog of
January covering it. As Dattaji could have no intimation of Abdali's intentions,
he had to depend on mere guess work. Three days passed in manoeuvring for
a crossing, and Abdali ultimately chose to cross opposite the village of Buradi,
where the terrain was most uneven and difficult. This place is some seven miles
to the north of Delhi. Dattaji had guarded the crossings to the south of this
place well. In order to mislead the Marathas, Abdali sent small parties to
each of the crossings and with the main army he went to Badarpur and tried
to cross thence. He crossed over to Buradi because that was probably the least
guarded part. The river there had separated into two streams with a sandy
low island between. It was overgrown with thick rushes which attain in these
parts a height of ten feet. If soldiers lie in ambush interspersed in these rushes,
it would be impossible to see or locate them within a few yards. Till one
actually arrives on the edge of the river, one cannot see it from any point in the
vicinity. Nor can the crossing at this point be seen from any southern point
on the bank, because the land there bulges out a little and shuts the view to the
north. Though the Marathi chronicle indulges in vivid description, it is not
known whether Dattaji had actually placed a force at this particular point.
. Perhaps he had not, and he seems to have been informed of the crossing when
half the army of Abdali had already crossed. This was on the morning of 10th
January, 1760.
Early that morning, Dattaji received news, one after the other, of his
guards at various points on the river being simultaneously attacked by the cross-
ing parties of Durrani and Ruhela soldiers and being very roughly handled by
them. This was Abdali's ruse to send Dattaji on the wrong scent. But Dat-
taji would not move unguardedly and would not call in the help from his
whole camp which was spread over a vast plain, each part being separated
from the other by a considerable distance. In fact he had no mind to engage
the enemy till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar for whom he was waiting and
perhaps wanted to fall back on the city in case of need. His only intention