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पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Panipat 1761 with Historical Commentary

टी. एस. शेजवलकर / शास्त्रीय अनुवाद द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished197 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 49, कुल 197 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 49

20 PANIPAT: 1761
north to Attock along the right bank of the river via Mithankot, Dera Ghazi
Khan and Dera Ismail Khan. His general, Jahan Khan, entered the Panjab
in October 1759 by way of Peshawar. Madhosingh of Jaipur, who was a party
to the anti-Maratha conspiracy, made a firm stand against the troops of Malhar-
rao Holkar who had been ordered by the Peshwa to go to Dattaji's help.
Shuja-ud-daulah had been sounded by Najib, though their earlier relations
were none of the best. Najib impressed on Shuja the gravity of the situa-
tion in which Shuja would find himself if the Marathas were ever able to cross
the Ganges and enter Oudh. Feeling the impending danger, Shuja consented to
help Najib in every way to hold the line of the Ganges.
When October came in, Dattaji devised a new strategy of squeezing
out Najib. Getting the help of one Jeta Gujar who pointed out a ford higher
up the Ganges, Govindpant Bundele with ten thousand troops crossed the
river⁴ at the back of Najib and attacked Jalalabad, the Ruhela fort, around
which a town had also grown. There were no troops worth the name there, but
at the call of Zabeta Khan, Najib's son, the Afghan clansmen all over Rohil-
khand came to help him. They held the fort while the Maratha troops plun-
dered and burnt their property and houses in the southern plain. Govindpant
next turned due south to the bridge-head on the eastern bank of the Ganges,
opposite Sukartal. The Marathas succeeded in cutting off the bridge-head and
thus threatened Najib's line of communication by the bridge of boats. Hafiz
Rahmat, the grand old man amongst the Ruhelas, advised Najib to come to
terms with the Marathas, but Najib would not leave Sukartal under any cir-
cumstances and bided his time. His Ruhela troops were alarmed and began
to waver, but Najib clenched his teeth and pulled on as best as he could, till
he was relieved by the vanguard of the Oudh army sent by Shuja under
Umraogir Gosawi. The rumours of Abdali's quick and near approach through
the Panjab were also circulated by Najib to frighten the Marathas. As a mat-
ter of fact, Abdali was still far away. But the Maratha troops under Govind-
pant lost heart and precipitately returned without crossing swords with the
Gosawi troops. The rumour of Abdali's coming to the Panjab and Janakoji's
chit to return hastened Govindpant's sudden flight.⁵ Thus the advantage
which might have been gained by the Maratha side was lost by this sudden
development. Though the troops returned in a hurry and as a result some
were actually killed or drowned, Sir Jadunath's estimate that half of their
number were drowned is very wide of the mark. This can be seen from Govind-
pant's letter to Sadashivrao Bhau.⁶ Najib Khan was almost on the point of
running away from Sukartal as most of his troops had left to defend their
homes, but in all these affairs destiny ultimately is found going against the
Marathas. Because Umraogir entered the scene just in time and rumours
were circulated by Najib that Shuja was himself following with thirty-thou-
sand troops, Janakoji thought it necessary to send a note to Govindpant to re-
turn at once. Similarly the early rumours of Abdali's march had their effect on
⁴ Raj. I 140, 141, 142.
⁵ Ibid. 1.143.
⁶ SPD 40.126