पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 27
somewhat rough man with blunt manners looked out of place and bizarre in
a mixed company of polished men with suave manners. At the same time
there was always a substratum of truth in his mode of thinking, and others had
to fall in line with it in times of difficulty. The present was such a time and
Janakoji had to keep his family-dash in the background and follow Malharrao.
Malharrao sent back the families with the baggage and the bazar to
their homes through the friendly territory of the Raja of Keravli to Gwalior
under the guardianship of Govindpant Bundele. He started from Kot Putali
on the 23rd February. Bhagirathibai gave birth to a posthumous son¹³ of Dat-
taji that night, but he seems to have died soon after. Malharrao and Janakoji
then started back towards Delhi with a view to check Abdali's progress and
counteract his plans. The Marathas do not seem to have lost courage after
the recent untoward happenings. They were still confident of being able to
checkmate Abdali and the Ruhelas. Malharrao knew "that Najib Khan and
Madhosingh were the chief wirepullers in inviting Ahmad Shah" and, contrary
to the common belief, was ready now to reshuffle his former policy of befriend-
ing Najib and the Wazir, whom he himself had put on the pedestal. He had
thoroughly understood that "Ghazi-ud-din was not acting in consonance with
the dignity of his high office and was fickle to a degree. Even though weak
himself, he would still indulge in vile machinations and back-door politics. He
would do what he liked and on meeting others, humble himself to such an ex-
tent as to take away all wrath against his conduct and thus try to wipe out¹⁴
the evil effects of his behaviour." The Peshwa, Nanasaheb, on the other hand,—
and in this case acting on the information and the prejudices of Raghunathrao¹⁵
----wished to stick up for a person up to the last, after once having taken his
side, and would not change his position unless an open and sufficient cause
obliged him to do so. He had instructed Dattaji to act accordingly, but Ghazi-
ud-din would neither grant what the Marathas wanted nor issue imperial
sanads bestowing Allahabad and Benares on the Marathas.¹⁶ though Shuja-
ud-daulah, his rival, would have been the loser. "You can conquer and take
possession of the places you want as you are strong. Why do you want sanads
for the same?" he would argue with the Marathas. Simultaneously he would
write to Shuja-ud-daulah asking him never to grant or hand over these holy
cities to the Marathas, but to prepare himself to defend them to the last. To
which Shuja¹⁷ would reply that he would do the needful. Thus the two rivals
for the chancellorship of the Empire were simultaneously acting hand in glove
with the Marathas and also trying to defend the Muslim dominions at all
costs and by every subterfuge. Najib had already deceived; fooled and ruined
Dattaji, and the Wazir was now following in his wake. But after his late as-
sassinations, it was impossible for the Marathas to back him any more and they
had to re-orient their policy.
13 RAJ 1.162.
14 SPD 2 117.
15 Ait. Patra, Yadi 171
16 SPD 27.240
17 Ibid 27.240