पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 19
during the rains that a horse running at full speed would bury itself chest-
deep in a few steps. The riverside land becomes boggy and too treacherous
to be entered. Thick undergrowth of rushes and thorny bushes makes pene-
tration by infantry also very difficult. While these were the difficulties which
the Maratha army had to face, Najib's line of communications in the rear
always remained open even during the rains, as due to a bend in the river,
the force of the current there becomes the least troublesome. The trans-
Gangetic region was peopled and controlled by his own kith and kin, the
Ruhelas. There was never any difficulty in fetching grain and fodder, am-
munition and other war necessaries. Added to these were, of course, the in-
domitable spirit, the singleness of purpose and personal bravery of his troops
who were the best infantry trained on the European model in those days
Dattaji was camping some two miles from Sukartal near the. village
Miranpur, which was the centre of the famous Sayyads. These Sayyads be-
longed to the Shia sect and hence hated the Sunni Ruhelas. Dattaji had
built a temporary mud fort for his camp. Thence the Maratha troops would
sally out and try to come into direct contact with the Ruhelas. But this had
been made difficult for the Maratha cavalry, and it seems the Maratha foot-
men in the 18th century had none of the virtues of pluck and resourcefulness
which were the most enviable and noticeable features of Shivaji's Mavlas.
During a siege which lasted for more than four months, there were scarcely
any actions as such. The Bhau Bakhar gives a vivid description of the condi-
tions during these months. The exchange of artillery fire between the two
armies was indecisive, because the shots from the Maratha side could not hit
Najib's camp under any circumstances. At a lower angle the shot would fall
into the surrounding ravines and at a higher angle the shot would go whistling
across Najib's camp and fall into the Ganges. On the other hand, fire from
Najib's camp was very effective and would daily kill a few who tried to
approach. Dattaji had this time some forty thousand troops with him in-
cluding the contingents of Govindpant, Antaji Manakeshwar's son Bahiropant
and the local levies of the Sayyads. Najib had possibly not more than ten
thousand troops, though it is quite impossible to be sure of the figures of those
days. But though the troops actually staying in Najib's camp were com-
paratively few, beyond the Ganges the whole clan of the Ruhelas, some fifty
thousand strong, was helping him in all possible ways. While the Maratha
troops suffered from scarcity, Najib always had access to all the things he
wanted. Besides, the climate of those muddy and boggy low lands was found
unsuitable to the health of the Maratha troops and the animals of the south-
ern breed. Whenever Dattaji tried to assault, he was repulsed at heavy cost.
Two such offensive actions seem to have taken place during these months with
more than a thousand casualties. Jivaji Shinde and his son Hanmantrao were
killed in one of these actions.
As the siege was dragging on, Najib Khan's diplomacy was winning
greater successes for him. Ahmad Shah had already started from Kandahar
and was thinking of entering-the Panjab from the southern side via Bhakkar
and Multan. But he could not cross the Indus at any point and had to come