पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

22 PANIPAT: 1761
from proceeding further south towards Delhi with Govindpant Bundele. Hear-
ing that Dattaji was advancing with his unencumbered troops to cut him off
before reaching the Jamuna, Abdali changed his intention of crossing the river
by the easier crossing, south of Kunjpura, so as to proceed straight through
Shamli and Muzaffarnagar to Sukartal. Instead, he kept close to the moun-
tain side and arrived at Jagadhri on the 23rd. He himself with his select troops
and a park of mobile artillery stopped to engage the advancing Dattaji, and
ordered his camp with its heavy baggage to begin crossing at once. Dattaji
advanced vigorously, but to his dismay found that he had been anticipated by
the Durrani and thus was unable to cut off and loot his camp equipage. On
the other hand, he had to face the sharp fire of Shutarnals which killed his
troops en masse. Thus no effect could be produced on Abdali's army, while
the loss on the Maratha side was considerable, amounting to some four thou-
sand killed and wounded. There was no corresponding gain in obstructing
Abdali's advance. On the night of that battle of 24th December, Abdali de-
camped with his whole camp crossing the river by the Budhia Ghat on his way
to Saharanpur. Next morning, when Dattaji saw the number of killed and
wounded, he must have felt deeply for his error of judgment in keeping his
artillery behind. This was the first occasion on which the Marathas discovered
the weakness of their traditional mode of warfare, which was found inade-
quate in dealing with the new mode based on artillery and musketry.
Dattaji now retreated to Delhi, arriving there about the 5th January,
1760. Thence he detached his camp and sent it back under the protection of
Ruparam Kothari to the Jat territory. He himself was preparing to go to
Meerut and attack Abdali and the Ruhelas combined. The Peshwa had long
ago ordered Malharrao Holkar to leave Rajputana and proceed to Sukartal
to help the Shindes. But his life-long habits of procrastination and perhaps
his unwillingness to join his forces with those of the Shindes, especially in the
work of completely crushing Najib against his will, delayed his march from
Balwada which he was besieging then. As a matter of fact, Balwada was an
insignificant fort under a captain of Jaipur. But it held out this time for some
two months. This seems to be due to Madhosingh's policy of engaging the
Maratha generals separately till the arrival of Ahmad Shah Abdali. As Najib
Khan and Madhosingh of Jaipur were the two most important conspirators in
the conspiracy of driving the Marathas south of the Narbada with the help
of Abdali, it was but natural that Madhosingh should, in furtherance of their
cause, try to pin down Malharrao to Rajputana so as to frustrate his plans of
proceeding to help Dattaji. Anyway, Malharrao's conduct on this occasion
had the effect of putting the whole brunt of meeting Abdali on the Shindes.
Dattaji was trying now to postpone a trial of strength with the combined Dur-
rani and Ruhela troops till the arrival of Malharrao. Malharrao in extenua-
tion of his delaying conduct is found putting the plea that the Shindes⁹ had
cancelled their first call for help from Sukartal, when they found they had
enough troops with them after the arrival of the Panjab troops under Sabaji
and Tukoji. But after the first battle near the Budhia Ghat, Janakoji sent
⁹ Ibid. 2.117