पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 11
of the ill-clad and unadaptive Marathas. An average Maratha soldier of those
days wished to return home after eight month's service and very few were willing
to continue in foreign lands for more than two camping seasons. Their prepa-
ration, their equipment, their physical stamina, not to say home sickness, would
not possibly make their sojourn tolerable beyond that period. These were very
real and basic difficulties and unless the Marathas became successful colonizers in
distant lands their hope of ruling India was bound to fail. The Muslims spread
their rule over the whole continent by this method of establishing self sufficient
colonies, however small, in the provinces they entered, one by one. And still
they took centuries to spread over the whole continent. They were, moreover,
proselytising and intermarrying with the various local people, thus always
strengthening and increasing their outposts. The Marathas, on the other hand
had not shown any of these characteristic virtues nor were they endowed with
progressive ideas, methods, or instruments—in short a higher civilization like
that of the British. How could they, under these circumstances make them
selves good as successful conquerors in foreign climes?
To hold this new stretch of five hundred miles from Ambala to Peshawar
would have required a permanent garrison of one lakh of soldiers judiciously
distributed at the various key points. This stretch is itself geographically
divisible into two almost equal parts, one from Ambala to the Chinab and the
other from the Chinab to Peshawar. Up to the Chinab the land is a vast,
sandy, level plain. One can scarcely see any hill on the horizon unless one
goes north. Beyond the Chinab, hills begin on a small scale, and beyond the
Jehelum, the region is mountainous, rocky and comparatively barren, the pro-
portion of cultivable land becoming less and less. In the time of Akbar, the
whole of this western tract was included in the three Mughal Subahs of Lahore,
Multan (to include Sind), and Kabul which included both Kashmir and
Kandahar in those days. Afterwards, Sind or Thattha Kashmir and Kandahar
became separate governorships, due probably to their distance from the centre
and the exigencies of military defence. Anybody wanting to rule over these
territories would have required good cavalry with horses inured to hot and cold
climates, camel corps carrying guns to run through the arid deserts, as well
as good mountaineers to pass through dangerous and sometimes snow clad
regions. When Raghoba is found seriously discussing the sovereign rights of
the Mughal government or the correct policy for their agents, the Marathas,
in these regions, it is doubtful whether he had visualised all these prospects or
calculated their cost. The Marathas also employed camels in carrying express
despatches kettle drums as well as baggage, but they had never taken the
trouble to create an efficient, fighting camel corps, much less organise a mobile
artillery of swivel guns carried on these animals, like Abdali. In fact, Abdali's
chief and most successful innovation seems to be this mobile artillery which
was always handy when compared to guns carried on carts drawn by bul-
locks. In the camel corps, both the gunner as well as the driver were seated on
the same animal, there was absolutely no impediment to its movement. Bul-
lock drawn artillery, on the other hand needed a pioneer force of sappers and
miners to prepare a tolerably good road to carry these heavy guns, requiring
in many cases as many as fifty bullocks to draw each gun. The chief adviser

10 PANIPAT 1761
turned to Delhi after appointing Sadik Beg, a deputy of Adina Beg, as the
chief revenue collector in the regions around Sarhind There was an idea of
appointing Naro Shankar¹³ in place of Sabaji Shinde, but it never materialized
After camping at Bahlulpur and Machhiwada on the south bank of the Satlaj
for a month or so, the Shindes returned with Naro Shankar Their return this
time was also due like the return of Raghoba in the previous year, to the
Peshwas advice cum orders The Peshwa was overburdened with debts He
was writing letter after letter to Dattaji Shinde to take up some new venture
which would fill the Peshwas treasury and add a new province to the Maratha
dominions Lahore Allahabad Benares, Patna and lastly Bengal were to be
taken over one after the other This meant dealing with Najib Khan, Shuja-
ud daulah Ghazi ud din the Prince Ali Gauhar and last but not least, the
English Sitting at ease in his cosy citadel in Poona and ruminating over the
thoughts of conquest over the whole of India was all right as a chamber pas
time but the Peshwa never seems to have realized the actual difficulties in that
path That a man of Ahmad Shah's type would take the ousting of his son
from the Panjab lying down was obviously impossible, still, the Peshwa in
sisted on the Shindes returning to Delhi instead of proceeding to Attock and
holding that line against all attacks
The Marathas remained in the Panjab only for a brief period, from
April 1758 to October 1759 They were, constitutionally, acting as agents of
the Mughal Emperor and were normally trying to make use of the local ma
chinery of government in carrying on the administration and collecting the
revenues They had to dismiss the Afghan nominees, no doubt, but in their
place they generally appointed the Mughals Whether the Marathas had
acted wisely in taking upon themselves such a hazardous adventure as trying
to conquer the Panjab and hold it out against such an exceptional man as
Abdali must be judged by the result, which is history A thoughtful historian
will always consider that it was a wrong step for the Peshwas to cross the
Narmada without first taking possession of the south up to Rameshvaram
After having crossed that river, they should have at least stopped at the Chambal
and first secured the overwhelmingly Hindu provinces of Allahabad and Oudh
which were just adjoining to the north, instead of touching the hornet's nest
at Delhi The Peshwa thought of first grasping the reins of the central govern
ment at Delhi and thus getting legal control over the whole empire That it
was a wrong step, impossible of fulfilment on account of the selfish, unpatriotic
and pusillanimous attitude of the ruling Muslims is proved at the bar of his
tory and no amount of casuistry can take away the blame from the Marathas
for the fundamental mistake of choosing the wrong path
From the military point of view, it was no wise step for the Marathas to
lengthen their line of communication by five hundred miles at one stretch Al
ready the distance of one thousand miles from Poona to Ambala was long
enough for them to defend successfully To step beyond Sarhind was almost a
mad man's behaviour The climate of the regions, with its extremes of heat
and cold, was not very propitious and was well nigh beyond the endurance
¹³ SPD 2.100

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 11
of the ill-clad and unadaptive Marāthas. An average Maratha soldier of those
days wished to return home after eight month's service and very few were willing
to continue in foreign lands for more than two camping seasons. Their prepa-
ration, their equipment, their physical stamina, not to say home-sickness, would
not possibly make their sojourn tolerable beyond that period. These were very
real and basic difficulties and unless the Marathas became successful colonizers in
distant lands their hope of ruling India was bound to fail. The Muslims spread
their rule over the whole continent by this method of establishing self-sufficient
colonies, however small, in the provinces they entered, one by one. And still
they took centuries to spread over the whole continent. They were, moreover,
proselytising and intermarrying with the various local people, thus always
strengthening and increasing their outposts. The Marathas, on the other hand,
had not shown any of these characteristic virtues nor were they endowed with
progressive ideas, methods, or instruments,—in short a higher civilization like
that of the British. How could they, under these circumstances, make them-
selves good as successful conquerors in foreign climes?
To hold this new stretch of five hundred miles from Ambala to Peshawar
would have required a permanent garrison of one lakh of soldiers judiciously
distributed at the various key-points. This stretch is itself geographically
divisible into two almost equal parts; one from Ambala to the Chinab and the
other from the Chinab to Peshawar. Up to the Chinab the land is a vast,
sandy, level plain. One can scarcely see any hill on the horizon unless one
goes north. Beyond the Chinab, hills begin on a small scale, and beyond the
Jehelum, the region is mountainous, rocky and comparatively barren, the pro-
portion of cultivable land becoming less and less. In the time of Akbar, the
whole of this western tract was included in the three Mughal Subahs of Lahore,
Multan (to include Sind), and Kabul which included both Kashmir and
Kandahar in those days. Afterwards, Sind, or Thattha, Kashmir and Kandahar
became separate governorships, due probably to their distance from the centre
and the exigencies of military defence. Anybody wanting to rule over these
territories would have required good cavalry with horses inured to hot and cold
climates, camel corps carrying guns to run through the arid deserts, as well
as good mountaineers to pass through dangerous and sometimes snow-clad
regions. When Raghoba is found seriously discussing the sovereign rights of
the Mughal government or the correct policy for their agents, the Marathas,
in these regions, it is doubtful whether he had visualised all these prospects or
calculated their cost. The Marathas also employed camels in carrying express
despatches, kettle-drums as well as baggage; but they had never taken the
trouble to create an efficient, fighting camel-corps, much less organise a mobile
artillery of swivel-guns carried on these animals, like Abdali. In fact, Abdali's
chief and most successful innovation seems to be this mobile artillery which
was always handy when compared to guns carried on carts drawn by bul-
locks. In the camel-corps, both the gunner as well as the driver were seated on
the same animal; there was absolutely no impediment to its movement. Bul-
lock-drawn artillery, on the other hand, needed a pioneer force of sappers and
miners to prepare a tolerably good road to carry these heavy guns, requiring
in many cases as many as fifty bullocks to draw each gun. The chief adviser

12 PANIPAT 1761
of Raghunathrao in this far famed Panjab campaign was Sakharam Bapu
He seems to have developed a faculty for easily disposing of the twenty two
subahs of the Mughal Empire by his parlour calculations ¹⁴ Raghunathrao
also had developed a similar faculty from his early boyhood ¹⁵ Thus there
seems to have been some brain wave set in motion at the court of Poona
whereby all such problems of high imperial policy were quickly settled at one
sitting on the basis of theoretical or oral information supplied by Munshis!
When Raghunathrao went on his first expedition to Gujarat in 1753 ¹⁶ (when
he was only nineteen), he had already discussed from his base in Kathiawad
the possibility of proceeding to Sind and Multan via Bhujnagar, i e Cutch ¹⁷
Had he followed that idea and put it into an actual plan, he would have then
and there realized the necessity of organizing an efficient camel corps, for his
route would have taken him through the great Indian desert, between Marwad
and Sind As it was, the project never materialized, and Raghunathrao re
turned to pursue his way to Kumbher of Surajmal Jat to break his head there
There seems to be something fundamentally wrong in the plans of conquest
hatched in the hen coop of Shanwarwada (the Peshwa's palace in Poona),
for the Peshwa is found constantly ordering his generals to proceed on new
conquests and then as suddenly recalling them or transferring them to dif
ferent fields! Otherwise we cannot account for the miserable failure of that
decade of incessant activity preceding Panipat
Raghunathrao had left behind not more than ten thousand troops in
the Panjab when returning Afterwards, when Tukoji Holkar and Sabaji
Shinde arrived, the total number was perhaps twenty thousand This force,
with its shortcomings, was quite inadequate to keep back Abdali and govern
the Panjab against a number of rebellious adventurers with local support
Raghunathraos idea of setting up a rival claimant in the Kabul area and get
ting the necessary work of stopping Abdali done through him, was good on
paper, but a rival who would be able to make even a semblance of a stand
against the overpowering personality of Ahmad Shah Abdali was difficult to
find The only feasible plan in the circumstances then existing was to stop
at the river Jehelum and try to defend the line of Multan, Lahore and Jammu
by making a common cause with the Rajputs and Sikhs in those regions This
meant a departure from the policy of governing the Mughal provinces through
the old decrepit machinery of derelict officers, civil and military Men like
Ranjit Dev of Jammu and Alasingh Jat of Patiala would have been ready
to join such a front with an ideological basis different from the ideology of the
Mughal Empire But there was no personality of Shivaji's type amongst the
then existing Marathas That was the real difficulty of the Maratha Empire
if it was going to be built Ahmad Shah Abdali, it should not be forgotten,
was a Shivaji amongst his compatriots He had put the name of Afghanistan
on the map Before his advent the Afghans were divided into various inde-
pendent, warring and backward tribes, ready to accept service under any con-
¹⁴ Ibid 284
¹⁵ Purandare 1 158-9
¹⁶ SPD 21.38
¹⁷ Ibid. 21.58.

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 13
queror and work as his slaves Ahmad Shah not only freed his own tribe from
the clutches of a Persian ruler, but he freed the other Afghan clans also Then
he welded them into a nation Instead of seeking fortune as individual ad-
venturers in India and Persia, as they had done from the times of Mahmud
of Ghazni, the Afghans now thought of uniting amongst themselves and set-
ting out on conquering expeditions as a well knit nation To meet such a
personality and such a new nation was no easy task The Marathas should
have produced such a personality, or failing that, a combination of individuals
who could match it Unfortunately this could not happen, and the result
is recorded in the pages of history
In October 1759, Jahan Khan returned with a bigger army He
formed, in fact, the advance guard of Abdali's army in its new campaign
The Maratha army in the Panjab, at this time, was not more than fifteen thou-
sand strong Of this, five thousand under Bapuji Trimbak were in Multan,
five thousand under Tukoji garrisoned Lahore, while Sabaji had another five
thousand moving from place to place The only region of the Panjab which
was comparatively well settled and yielding any direct revenue, as distinguished
from tributes and ransoms, was the Sarhind—Jalandar area This had been
placed under Sadik Beg—wrongly copied as Sandip Beg in Marathi chronicles
He had consented of his own accord to pay five lakhs more than originally set-
tled with Adina Beg His Diwan Lakshmi Narayan had been won over to
the Maratha side The mutual relations between Tukoji Holkar and Sabaji
Shinde in the Panjab were none too good Sabaji treated Tukoji as a lower
official and kept the whole purse and power in his own hands ¹⁸ Tukoji at
this time was a junior officer and only a servant of Malharrao Holkar and not, as
is wrongly thought, one of his near relations, though he ultimately succeeded to
the Holkar's jagir Malharrao wrote to Tukoji to send Holkar's share in the
revenues of the Panjab to Indore Tukoji replied that Sabaji Patel had taken all
the money and had allowed him only the daily wages for his troops When
Tukoji remonstrated, Sabaji showed him a letter from Janakoji Shinde order-
ing Tukoji to draw only wages while the rest of the account would be settled
by Janakoji and Malharrao, the masters, amongst themselves As Tukoji had
no intention of impeding the government machinery and fighting a civil war,
he followed Janakoji's instructions According to Tukoji, without the help
of Malharrao the Shindes would never succeed in the Panjab Moreover,
Sabaji would never take Tukoji into confidence and settle the Maratha policy
in consultation with him Otherwise, complains Tukoji, it was possible to estab-
lish peace in the Panjab, had Sabaji followed his advice In his incomplete
letters¹⁹ (and only two such letters have unfortunately come into the hands of
historians) he clearly says that the Marathas had collected revenues from Sar-
hind, the (Jalandar) Doab, Lahore, Multan and Attock
From this description it is clear that the Marathas had spread up to
the Indus and beyond, and not stopped at the Chinab as emphatically stated
18 Chandrachuda Daftar I.49, II.4 (To be read together)
19 Ibid. I.49, II.4.

14 PANIPAT 1761
by Sir Jadunath²⁰ and copied on his authority by Dr Hari Ram Gupta and
others That they had gone to Peshawar is also clear from the contemporary
Persian Akhbars which clearly say that Tukoji had reached Peshawar in
October 1758, and that Sahibji (Sabaji) Patel had started from Peshawar and
reached Lahore in March 1759 It is no "ignorant boast" of the Marathas,
therefore, "that the Maratha standards were carried up to the Indus at Attock,"
as in fact they had not only reached that crossing but had, ignoring the so-
called bar for the Hindus not to cross it, actually reached Peshawar and lived
there for about six months ²¹ This was the zenith of Maratha expansion, and
it is not a sin, we think, if the Marathas feel some natural pride in that event
Raghunathrao had kept Adina Beg as the chief administrator in Lahore
and the Jalandar area because it was through his invitation and support that
the Marathas had entered the Panjab He is reported to have promised to
pay the Marathas in cash for their help at the rate of one lakh of rupees for
every day of marching and half a lakh for every day of halt,²² but it is doubtful
whether the Marathas did receive even a portion of such payment It is known,
on the whole, that Raghunathrao's campaign of Lahore had been anything but
profitable to the Peshwa's government Raghunathrao had presented a deficit
account of eighty lakhs to the Poona court and Sadashivrao Bhau had an oc
casion to reprimand him in that connection Nor does it seem that Adina Beg
ever paid the seventy-five lakhs a year as promised to the Marathas No doubt,
he died within four months of the event and during the interval he had to wage
incessant war against the Sikhs for whom he had no particular love, though he
had made use of them in his rebellion against the Afghan rule In fact, though
an able administrator, he had no scruples against changing sides and he may
be called a time server or an opportunist in politics After his death, his widow
and a boy-child succeeded to his office with Sadik Beg, who was already a
foujdar of Sarhind, as her deputy This seems to have weakened the admin
istration and become detrimental to the Maratha cause In short, the Peshwa's
idea of making use of the machinery of the Mughal government with all its en-
cumbrances proved fatal to the Maratha cause in the Panjab as it had proved
in other parts of India as well
After his return from the Panjab in May 1759, Dattaji Shinde thought
of going to Bengal through the territory of Shuja-ud daulah in order to exact
Chauth from the new Nawab Mir Jafar set up by the English and pay off the
Peshwa's debts. The Peshwa's letters to the Shindes in this connection do not
show him in the best light He had no scruples in choosing any side provided
money could be had out of it The Marathas seemed to be auctioning the Wazir-
ship of Delhi to the highest bidder ²³ Malharrao was directly responsible for
the 1754 revolution in Delhi with a new Emperor and a new Wazir But later
he was convinced that the Wazir was anything but a straightforward man So
he turned away from Ghazi ud din and naturally inclined towards Najib Khan
²⁰ Fall 2 76.
²¹ BISM (Persian Mss.) Nos. 696, 699, BISMQ No 93 (Marathas Beyond Attock)
²² GUPTA, Adina Beg Khan, p 33
²³ Ait., Patren Yadi Nos 166, 167, 171

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 17
When, after waiting for two months, Dattaji realized the impasse in
which he had been placed by Najib, he thought of punishing him. By this
time, however, Najib had formed his impregnable lines behind natural impedi-
ments on the bank of the Ganges at Sukartal and from that secure position
defied the might of the Shindes. From this place of refuge he built a causeway
for himself across the Ganges and thus kept open his line of communication
with the Ruhela regions beyond. From these he secured supplies and also
military help. He engaged Dattaji in this manner for four months, till the
latter was obliged to raise the siege in order to meet Abdali coming down from
the Panjab in December, 1759.
Sabaji was governing the Panjab with some ten thousand troops, a force
quite inadequate to hold the line against the Afghan tornado. Abdali had
sent his general Jahan Khan in advance with fifteen thousand troops from
Peshawar and himself followed by way of Shikarpur in Sind along the right
bank of the Indus. They had first to deal with the Sikh rebels. The Sikhs
defeated Jahan Khan's vanguard and killed two thousand of his troops. Seeing
that he could not possibly hold his own, Sabaji precipitately fell back from
Batala and returned by way of Ambala and Kunjpura to Dattaji's camp at
Sukartal on the Ganges. This was in the beginning of November 1759. Only
the corps of Bapuji Trimbak which had been stationed at Multan had no time
to run away and hence was caught in the Doab. It had come up to Firozpur
on the Satlaj, where it was overtaken by a party of the Afghans who cut it to
pieces. Only five hundred out of a total of six thousand returned on foot,
unclad and underfed, all their property including horses having been plun-
dered by the Afghans. They came a month and a half later and met Dat-
taji near Thaneshwar where he had proceeded to meet Abdali, by breaking
up his camp at Sukartal, in the last week of December 1759. The Bhau
Bakhar vividly describes the horror felt by Dattaji Shinde and his troops when
they saw their comrades returning in such a wretched condition. The en-
thusiasm for fighting with Abdali faded away and all thought it as an evil
omen of forthcoming disaster. This was the beginning of the end of the
Panjab episode in Maratha history. That episode had occupied only a brief
period of one and a half years and carried the Maratha standards up to Pesha-
war, but the cost of this glory was out of all proportion to the gains, and ended
with the great setback of Panipat a year later.

16 PANIPAT 1761
given a prejudicial colour by the author of the Bhau Bakhar, so as to make it
appear as a clandestine agreement between Govindpant and Najib to support
the latter When the Shindes entered the Doab, Najib Khan was brought to
the Maratha camp to discuss terms with Dattaji The author of the Bakhar
says of this interview that Janakoji, Naro Shankar, Antaji Mankeshwar and
other Sardars wanted to arrest Najib Khan this time, but Dattaji, through
the advice of Govindpant, at once forbade them from entertaining such a
treacherous thought This was in conformity with the whole Maratha tradi-
tion as exemplified in history and in accord with their general feeling Had
the Marathas ever taken to what they themselves called "Moglai lava" or
"Moglai maslat," meaning thereby the politics of treacherous arrests and mur-
ders, their whole history would have perhaps been written otherwise, though
it is a moot point in history whether they would not have been more successful
—barring the moral stigma—in their undertakings thereby
Najib, however, got a new lease of life by his double dealings in this
affair Had he flatly refused to help the Marathas in building a bridge over
the Ganges, they would have possibly found out some other means of gaining
their ends Dattaji had the intention of proceeding to Bengal post haste be-
fore the monsoon had set in and the rivers flooded He had planned to canton
in Patna²⁵ and thence to bring pressure on Bengal during the monsoon His
plan was completely foiled by the delaying and promising tactics of Najib
When a month passed and the monsoon actually set in, he pleaded his in
ability to do the needful, and promised to build the bridge after the rains Side
by side he was hatching a conspiracy of driving away the Marathas from the
north It seems that Emperor Alamgir II was himself a party to this con-
spiracy, being fed up with the tyrannical Wazir Malika Zamani, the Dowager
Empress, was whole heartedly behind the idea or, perhaps, she herself was the
originator of it, as depicted in all the Marathi chronicles Najib Khan is
depicted as following her orders and wishes Madhosingh of Jaipur and
Bijesingh of Marwad were also whole heartedly supporting Najib in his invi-
tation to Abdali to come back to India and drive the Marathas south of the
Narmada once for all Najib was so clever in keeping the whole project secret
that even Govindpant Bundele,²⁶ who was a near neighbour of his and always
on the alert for news of any kind, was unaware of this internal correspondence
carried on for two years between these parties, and even sending of special en-
voys to the court of Abdali at Kandahar The Marathas came to know of this
secret only when Abdali actually entered the Panjab and began to drive away
the Maratha outposts in that province, in October 1759 This bespeaks of
great looseness in the management of Maratha affairs That they should have
no information of projects for ousting them and should not have properly ap-
praised the characters of the various persons engaged in activities against their
rule, shows that their intelligence department had none of that efficiency that
it had in the times of Shivaji and Rajaram in the previous century This weak-
ness was fatal to the Maratha Empire.
²⁵ Ibid. 2.101.
²⁶ Ibid. 60.126.

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 17
When, after waiting for two months, Dattaji realized the impasse in
which he had been placed by Najib, he thought of punishing him. By this
time, however, Najib had formed his impregnable lines behind natural impedi-
ments on the bank of the Ganges at Sukartal and from that secure position
defied the might of the Shindes. From this place of refuge he built a causeway
for himself across the Ganges and thus kept open his line of communication
with the Ruhela regions beyond. From these he secured supplies and also
military help. He engaged Dattaji in this manner for four months, till the
latter was obliged to raise the siege in order to meet Abdali coming down from
the Panjab in December, 1759.
Sabaji was governing the Panjab with some ten thousand troops, a force
quite inadequate to hold the line against the Afghan tornado. Abdali had
sent his general Jahan Khan in advance with fifteen thousand troops from
Peshawar and himself followed by way of Shikarpur in Sind along the right
bank of the Indus. They had first to deal with the Sikh rebels. The Sikhs
defeated Jahan Khan's vanguard and killed two thousand of his troops. Seeing
that he could not possibly hold his own, Sabaji precipitately fell back from
Batala and returned by way of Ambala and Kunjpura to Dattaji's camp at
Sukartal on the Ganges. This was in the beginning of November 1759. Only
the corps of Bapuji Trimbak which had been stationed at Multan had no time
to run away and hence was caught in the Doab. It had come up to Firozpur
on the Satlaj, where it was overtaken by a party of the Afghans who cut it to
pieces. Only five hundred out of a total of six thousand returned on foot,
unclad and underfed, all their property including horses having been plun-
dered by the Afghans. They came a month and a half later and met Dat-
taji near Thaneshwar where he had proceeded to meet Abdali, by breaking
up his camp at Sukartal, in the last week of December 1759. The Bhau
Bakhar vividly describes the horror felt by Dattaji Shinde and his troops when
they saw their comrades returning in such a wretched condition. The en-
thusiasm for fighting with Abdali faded away and all thought it as an evil
omen of forthcoming disaster. This was the beginning of the end of the
Panjab episode in Maratha history. That episode had occupied only a brief
period of one and a half years and carried the Maratha standards up to Pesha-
war, but the cost of this glory was out of all proportion to the gains, and ended
with the great setback of Panipat a year later.

CHAPTER II
SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER
BEFORE proceeding to Bahlulpur¹ on the Satlaj to arrange for the govern-
ment of the Punjab in February 1759, Dattaji had already forfeited the confi-
dence of the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din by his policy of initiating things on his own au-
thority without paying any attention to the Wazir's interests and susceptibilities.
The Wazir complained that even after giving his all, the Empire was not able
to keep its prestige. All who had taken part in the business had lost their all
with nothing left to fall back upon.² This was a true indictment. As the
Wazir had found the Maratha power to be a broken reed in times of need,
he had perforce to open negotiations with others and try to have something in
his own power. Abdali, when he returned in 1757, had tried to establish a
sort of balance of power at the Delhi court. He had restored the deposed
Emperor to his place and therefore the Wazir was no more free to do away
with him or to over ride him when he liked.³ Najib Khan had been ap-
pointed Mir Bakshi thus placing the military power in his hands as a check
on the Wazir. Ahmad Shah had also shown the wisdom of deposing Intizam-
ud-daulah (on whom he had at first bestowed the Wazirship) and restoring
Ghazi-ud-din to his office. When the Marathas returned, they had to do away
with Najib as the one real representative of Abdali's cause in India. But he
was not arrested and put into prison as he ought to have been, if the
Marathas wished to rule over Delhi. On the contrary, he was allowed to keep
the districts under him, and to act as a collector for the Marathas! This
meant that Najib had still left to him both the means and the freedom to
create mischief. When Dattaji returned, he found a stalemate in the Delhi
politics due to this position. While the Wazir had all the legal power of the
Empire, of appointing and dismissing, of granting and resuming, centred in
him there was no sanction behind his decrees as the military power rested with
Najib. Dattaji by his high handedness alienated the Wazir, but did not, by
any means, win over his rival for power, Najib. Dattaji discovered this fact
when it was too late. As stated in the previous chapter, he confidently tried to
make Najib join him in his cause through the mediation of Govindpant Bun-
dele. But Najib completely foiled his project by procrastination. Dattaji,
angered by this deceit and insult, at once besieged Najib with an overwhelming
force. But even this overwhelming force was ineffective before the cunning and
the ability of Najib.
There are certain natural impediments which it is impossible to over-
come even with greater force. Najib's camp at Sukartal had the Ganges on
three sides and on the fourth side the ground was so uneven that to approach
Najib's camp with artillery or even with cavalry was well-nigh impossible, espe-
cially during the rains. The plains in the Gangetic Doab become so muddy
1 BISM (Persian Mss.) No 699
2 SPD 27.140
3 Purandhare 3.205
[ 18 ]

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 19
during the rains that a horse running at full speed would bury itself chest-
deep in a few steps. The riverside land becomes boggy and too treacherous
to be entered. Thick undergrowth of rushes and thorny bushes makes pene-
tration by infantry also very difficult. While these were the difficulties which
the Maratha army had to face, Najib's line of communications in the rear
always remained open even during the rains, as due to a bend in the river,
the force of the current there becomes the least troublesome. The trans-
Gangetic region was peopled and controlled by his own kith and kin, the
Ruhelas. There was never any difficulty in fetching grain and fodder, am-
munition and other war necessaries. Added to these were, of course, the in-
domitable spirit, the singleness of purpose and personal bravery of his troops
who were the best infantry trained on the European model in those days
Dattaji was camping some two miles from Sukartal near the. village
Miranpur, which was the centre of the famous Sayyads. These Sayyads be-
longed to the Shia sect and hence hated the Sunni Ruhelas. Dattaji had
built a temporary mud fort for his camp. Thence the Maratha troops would
sally out and try to come into direct contact with the Ruhelas. But this had
been made difficult for the Maratha cavalry, and it seems the Maratha foot-
men in the 18th century had none of the virtues of pluck and resourcefulness
which were the most enviable and noticeable features of Shivaji's Mavlas.
During a siege which lasted for more than four months, there were scarcely
any actions as such. The Bhau Bakhar gives a vivid description of the condi-
tions during these months. The exchange of artillery fire between the two
armies was indecisive, because the shots from the Maratha side could not hit
Najib's camp under any circumstances. At a lower angle the shot would fall
into the surrounding ravines and at a higher angle the shot would go whistling
across Najib's camp and fall into the Ganges. On the other hand, fire from
Najib's camp was very effective and would daily kill a few who tried to
approach. Dattaji had this time some forty thousand troops with him in-
cluding the contingents of Govindpant, Antaji Manakeshwar's son Bahiropant
and the local levies of the Sayyads. Najib had possibly not more than ten
thousand troops, though it is quite impossible to be sure of the figures of those
days. But though the troops actually staying in Najib's camp were com-
paratively few, beyond the Ganges the whole clan of the Ruhelas, some fifty
thousand strong, was helping him in all possible ways. While the Maratha
troops suffered from scarcity, Najib always had access to all the things he
wanted. Besides, the climate of those muddy and boggy low lands was found
unsuitable to the health of the Maratha troops and the animals of the south-
ern breed. Whenever Dattaji tried to assault, he was repulsed at heavy cost.
Two such offensive actions seem to have taken place during these months with
more than a thousand casualties. Jivaji Shinde and his son Hanmantrao were
killed in one of these actions.
As the siege was dragging on, Najib Khan's diplomacy was winning
greater successes for him. Ahmad Shah had already started from Kandahar
and was thinking of entering-the Panjab from the southern side via Bhakkar
and Multan. But he could not cross the Indus at any point and had to come

20 PANIPAT: 1761
north to Attock along the right bank of the river via Mithankot, Dera Ghazi
Khan and Dera Ismail Khan. His general, Jahan Khan, entered the Panjab
in October 1759 by way of Peshawar. Madhosingh of Jaipur, who was a party
to the anti-Maratha conspiracy, made a firm stand against the troops of Malhar-
rao Holkar who had been ordered by the Peshwa to go to Dattaji's help.
Shuja-ud-daulah had been sounded by Najib, though their earlier relations
were none of the best. Najib impressed on Shuja the gravity of the situa-
tion in which Shuja would find himself if the Marathas were ever able to cross
the Ganges and enter Oudh. Feeling the impending danger, Shuja consented to
help Najib in every way to hold the line of the Ganges.
When October came in, Dattaji devised a new strategy of squeezing
out Najib. Getting the help of one Jeta Gujar who pointed out a ford higher
up the Ganges, Govindpant Bundele with ten thousand troops crossed the
river⁴ at the back of Najib and attacked Jalalabad, the Ruhela fort, around
which a town had also grown. There were no troops worth the name there, but
at the call of Zabeta Khan, Najib's son, the Afghan clansmen all over Rohil-
khand came to help him. They held the fort while the Maratha troops plun-
dered and burnt their property and houses in the southern plain. Govindpant
next turned due south to the bridge-head on the eastern bank of the Ganges,
opposite Sukartal. The Marathas succeeded in cutting off the bridge-head and
thus threatened Najib's line of communication by the bridge of boats. Hafiz
Rahmat, the grand old man amongst the Ruhelas, advised Najib to come to
terms with the Marathas, but Najib would not leave Sukartal under any cir-
cumstances and bided his time. His Ruhela troops were alarmed and began
to waver, but Najib clenched his teeth and pulled on as best as he could, till
he was relieved by the vanguard of the Oudh army sent by Shuja under
Umraogir Gosawi. The rumours of Abdali's quick and near approach through
the Panjab were also circulated by Najib to frighten the Marathas. As a mat-
ter of fact, Abdali was still far away. But the Maratha troops under Govind-
pant lost heart and precipitately returned without crossing swords with the
Gosawi troops. The rumour of Abdali's coming to the Panjab and Janakoji's
chit to return hastened Govindpant's sudden flight.⁵ Thus the advantage
which might have been gained by the Maratha side was lost by this sudden
development. Though the troops returned in a hurry and as a result some
were actually killed or drowned, Sir Jadunath's estimate that half of their
number were drowned is very wide of the mark. This can be seen from Govind-
pant's letter to Sadashivrao Bhau.⁶ Najib Khan was almost on the point of
running away from Sukartal as most of his troops had left to defend their
homes, but in all these affairs destiny ultimately is found going against the
Marathas. Because Umraogir entered the scene just in time and rumours
were circulated by Najib that Shuja was himself following with thirty-thou-
sand troops, Janakoji thought it necessary to send a note to Govindpant to re-
turn at once. Similarly the early rumours of Abdali's march had their effect on
⁴ Raj. I 140, 141, 142.
⁵ Ibid. 1.143.
⁶ SPD 40.126

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 21
Dattaji's removing his camp from Sukartal Sabaji actually reached Dat-
taji's camp on 10th November, 1759, but the news of his coming back was
circulated a month earlier so as to loosen Dattaji's grip over Sukartal Abdali
was still near Lahore and his troops had not penetrated up to Thaneshwar till
the last week of December, but Ghazi ud din, who was chicken hearted, was
frightened when he caught certain news carriers carrying letters to and from
the Emperor Alamgir at Delhi Therein the Emperor was found writing in
vitations to Shuja ud daulah on the one hand and Ahmad Shah Abdali on the
other, and they were assuring him of their imminent arrival Seeing the danger,
the Wazir, who was quick in decision and had no qualms of conscience, got
the Emperor and Intizam ud daulah (his rival for Wazirship) murdered on
November 29, 1759, through Balabash Khan, his captain, and unceremoniously
flung their corpses on the river bank Next, the Wazir's assistants produced a
prince from the house of Taimur and crowned him as Emperor under the
title of Shah Jahan III This prince was a grandson of Kam Bakhsh,⁷ the
youngest son of Aurangzib, and was dragging his life out in the imperial prison
Thus the Wazir thought that he had taken precautions against Abdali's making
use of the old Emperor and his possible Wazir As a matter of fact, this
event sent a thrill of horror through the Muslims of Hindusthan and the Wazir,
who was already hated as a tool of the Marathas, lost what little respect was
still felt for him As the Marathas did not seem to have protested against this
act, they were naturally held morally responsible for this butchery It took
away the sympathy for the Marathas and had a worse effect on Sadashivrao
Bhau's campaign the following year
Dattaji being thoroughly disappointed at the siege and at the negotia-
tions for tribute and help from Shuja ud daulah, ultimately raised the siege
on 15th December and divided his army into two parts He placed the camp,
the bazar and their inmates, together with his family, under the charge of
Rupram Kothari and asked him to go back to Delhi with his Jat troops He
himself with his select troops proceeded to meet Abdali beyond the Jamuna so
as to stop him from entering the Doab and joining Najib He had perhaps
twenty five thousand chosen horsemen under him He proceeded to Karnal by
crossing the Jamuna south of Kunjpura at the Andhera Ghat on 18th Decem
ber, 1759, and sent scouts to find out Abdali's movements He learnt that
Abdali s son, Taimur Shah, with forty thousand troops and all his Sardars had
arrived north of Ambala and were camping at Laldu, Banora and Chhat⁸ on
Saturday, the 15th of December, and that Ahmad Shah was himself following
The first skirmish between the vanguards of the two armies took place on 20th
December Dattaji himself proceeded north with his chosen twenty five thou
sand troops without any camp equipment, carrying only as much luggage as
a soldier could carry on his horse He had ordered Janakoji Shinde and the
Wazir Ghazi ud din to remain at Karnal some fifteen miles behind his ad-
vance line, with their parks of artillery, in order to check any surprise party of
the Durrani troops proceeding south to attack the main camp and the bazar,
⁷ Ibid. 2 107
⁸ Ibid 2.109

22 PANIPAT: 1761
from proceeding further south towards Delhi with Govindpant Bundele. Hear-
ing that Dattaji was advancing with his unencumbered troops to cut him off
before reaching the Jamuna, Abdali changed his intention of crossing the river
by the easier crossing, south of Kunjpura, so as to proceed straight through
Shamli and Muzaffarnagar to Sukartal. Instead, he kept close to the moun-
tain side and arrived at Jagadhri on the 23rd. He himself with his select troops
and a park of mobile artillery stopped to engage the advancing Dattaji, and
ordered his camp with its heavy baggage to begin crossing at once. Dattaji
advanced vigorously, but to his dismay found that he had been anticipated by
the Durrani and thus was unable to cut off and loot his camp equipage. On
the other hand, he had to face the sharp fire of Shutarnals which killed his
troops en masse. Thus no effect could be produced on Abdali's army, while
the loss on the Maratha side was considerable, amounting to some four thou-
sand killed and wounded. There was no corresponding gain in obstructing
Abdali's advance. On the night of that battle of 24th December, Abdali de-
camped with his whole camp crossing the river by the Budhia Ghat on his way
to Saharanpur. Next morning, when Dattaji saw the number of killed and
wounded, he must have felt deeply for his error of judgment in keeping his
artillery behind. This was the first occasion on which the Marathas discovered
the weakness of their traditional mode of warfare, which was found inade-
quate in dealing with the new mode based on artillery and musketry.
Dattaji now retreated to Delhi, arriving there about the 5th January,
1760. Thence he detached his camp and sent it back under the protection of
Ruparam Kothari to the Jat territory. He himself was preparing to go to
Meerut and attack Abdali and the Ruhelas combined. The Peshwa had long
ago ordered Malharrao Holkar to leave Rajputana and proceed to Sukartal
to help the Shindes. But his life-long habits of procrastination and perhaps
his unwillingness to join his forces with those of the Shindes, especially in the
work of completely crushing Najib against his will, delayed his march from
Balwada which he was besieging then. As a matter of fact, Balwada was an
insignificant fort under a captain of Jaipur. But it held out this time for some
two months. This seems to be due to Madhosingh's policy of engaging the
Maratha generals separately till the arrival of Ahmad Shah Abdali. As Najib
Khan and Madhosingh of Jaipur were the two most important conspirators in
the conspiracy of driving the Marathas south of the Narbada with the help
of Abdali, it was but natural that Madhosingh should, in furtherance of their
cause, try to pin down Malharrao to Rajputana so as to frustrate his plans of
proceeding to help Dattaji. Anyway, Malharrao's conduct on this occasion
had the effect of putting the whole brunt of meeting Abdali on the Shindes.
Dattaji was trying now to postpone a trial of strength with the combined Dur-
rani and Ruhela troops till the arrival of Malharrao. Malharrao in extenua-
tion of his delaying conduct is found putting the plea that the Shindes⁹ had
cancelled their first call for help from Sukartal, when they found they had
enough troops with them after the arrival of the Panjab troops under Sabaji
and Tukoji. But after the first battle near the Budhia Ghat, Janakoji sent
⁹ Ibid. 2.117

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 23
an express call for help to Malharrao who started at once on the first of Janu-
ary, 1760. Had there been a man of Bajirao's type, he would have possibly
covered the distance from Jaipur to Delhi just in time to join Dattaji. But
Ahmad Shah probably knowing the speed of Malharrao's advance, decided
to forestall him.
Ahmad Shah left Sukartal within a week and advanced by way of
Meerut to Luni on the Jamuna. This place is about seven miles to the north-
east of Delhi and opposite to it is the ferry of Jagatpur. Abdali was trying to
find the least defended part on the opposite bank of the Jamuna so as to cross
the river without giving any chance to the enemy to attack his force while
crossing. It was impossible for him to cross near Delhi, because the fire from
the Delhi fort could have been effectively used against him by the Wazir.
The ghats just to the north of Delhi were guarded by Dattaji's scouts. Dat-
taji himself was camping in the vicinity of Majnu's hillock, two miles to the
north of Delhi. He had so distributed his army as to meet any surprise cross-
ing by the Durrani troops at any point. But the river was fordable at many
points, and it was difficult to keep watch in a low land with the dense fog of
January covering it. As Dattaji could have no intimation of Abdali's intentions,
he had to depend on mere guess work. Three days passed in manoeuvring for
a crossing, and Abdali ultimately chose to cross opposite the village of Buradi,
where the terrain was most uneven and difficult. This place is some seven miles
to the north of Delhi. Dattaji had guarded the crossings to the south of this
place well. In order to mislead the Marathas, Abdali sent small parties to
each of the crossings and with the main army he went to Badarpur and tried
to cross thence. He crossed over to Buradi because that was probably the least
guarded part. The river there had separated into two streams with a sandy
low island between. It was overgrown with thick rushes which attain in these
parts a height of ten feet. If soldiers lie in ambush interspersed in these rushes,
it would be impossible to see or locate them within a few yards. Till one
actually arrives on the edge of the river, one cannot see it from any point in the
vicinity. Nor can the crossing at this point be seen from any southern point
on the bank, because the land there bulges out a little and shuts the view to the
north. Though the Marathi chronicle indulges in vivid description, it is not
known whether Dattaji had actually placed a force at this particular point.
. Perhaps he had not, and he seems to have been informed of the crossing when
half the army of Abdali had already crossed. This was on the morning of 10th
January, 1760.
Early that morning, Dattaji received news, one after the other, of his
guards at various points on the river being simultaneously attacked by the cross-
ing parties of Durrani and Ruhela soldiers and being very roughly handled by
them. This was Abdali's ruse to send Dattaji on the wrong scent. But Dat-
taji would not move unguardedly and would not call in the help from his
whole camp which was spread over a vast plain, each part being separated
from the other by a considerable distance. In fact he had no mind to engage
the enemy till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar for whom he was waiting and
perhaps wanted to fall back on the city in case of need. His only intention

24 PANIPAT: 1761
was to keep the enemy at a distance from the city till Holkar's arrival so as
not to be besieged within the city walls. But this was the very reason why the
Durrani made haste and crossed over simultaneously at various points. It
seems that none of the parties placed by Dattaji with a few thousand troops
each could stand against the enemy's advance with fire from the light cannon
placed on the elephants, who swam across in front. Practically the whole of
the Shinde contingent was composed of horsemen used to sword and lance,
unlike the Ruhelas who were footmen armed with muskets and rifles. The
result was that in fights from a distance the Marathas were always at a dis-
advantage. When almost all the Maratha parties had been completely routed
with heavy loss of life, Dattaji received news from Janrao Wable, a veteran
captain of horse, that half the army of the enemy had crossed the river. Dat-
taji sent Bayaji Shinde to help Janrao in holding the ghat at Buradi, which is
some three miles away from the village of that name. Receiving the news
that Bayaji was worsted with his three thousand horse, and he himself killed
by a bullet-shot, Dattaji ordered his whole contingent to follow him to the river-
bank. He tried to go to the Buradi Ghat not from the west side but from the
south-west along the village of Jagatpur. He crossed first an ordinary nullah
and then the lake-like inner stream. When he entered the part overgrown with
rushes, his cavalry could not keep any line or move in any close formation.
The Ruhela infantry, which was lying in ambush in the rushes, opened fire
from here, there and everywhere, and made it impossible for Dattaji to proceed.
Janakoji who was accompanying Dattaji though forbidden, received a bullet-
wound on the right upper arm. The news of this incident had the effect of still
more demoralising the Maratha troops, and each tried to turn back to escape
what seemed certain death. Dattaji was advised by those near him to order a
retreat. But before anything could be done, he himself fell down with a bullet-
wound in his ribs. The Afghans then rushed out and completed the rout of the
Maratha army with a heavy massacre. The story of the wounded Dattaji being
taunted and kicked by Mian Qutb Shah and his cutting off Dattaji's head after
some talk, seems more dramatic than true and an invention of the author of the
chronicle. We have no belief in it.
There was no regular battle at Buradi Ghat and the two armies were
never drawn together in battle array, nor is the number of casualties known.
Yashvantrao Jagdale, Bayaji Shinde and Maloji Shinde were the noted persons
who lost their lives in this action. Govindpant Bundele does not seem to have
taken any part in guarding the ghats as written in the chronicle, though he
was not far away from the field of battle. Perhaps he was in the camp of
Janakoji a few miles away from Delhi. On the Afghan side, Shuja-ud-daulah
does not seem to have been present in Abdali's camp nor any of his troops
like the Gosawi corps. Therefore, the story given in the Bhau Bakhar of
Shuja begging for the head of Dattaji and Umraogir Gosawi buying it for two
lakhs and afterwards attending to his full funeral rites must be treated as pure
fiction written to console the Shinde family and recommend Ragho Ram Page
and Rajaram Chobdar to their attention. The action was fought mainly be-
tween the Ruhelas of Najib and Qutb Shah, and Dattaji, though the Dur-
ranis followed soon after to turn it into a rout and pursue the Shinde contin-

KARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 25
gent to a long distance. Purushottam Mahadev Hingne¹⁰ who was present in
the battle and received a bullet-wound on his thigh, writes that the action was
a short and swift one, turning into a rout on account of the general's ac-
cidental death in the very first round and the leader receiving a bullet-wound
himself. No battle could be fought because the place was unsuitable on ac-
count of the thick rushes, and because there was no intention either of offer-
ing one till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar. In fact, the main part of the
Maratha army was at a distance from the river-bank and not ready for a
fight. The division under Dattaji was not sufficient to meet the combined
forces of Abdali and Najib with any hope of success. That is why Dattaji had
asked Govindpant Bundele with his small brigade to continue with him all
along and invited help from Surajmal Jat, who was the only ally left to the
Marathas in Northern India. The Wazir's contingent was not more than five
thousand strong this time, and was not very helpful or wholeheartedly with
the Marathas.
The Durranis pursued Janakoji for twenty-five miles and then re-
turned. Malharrao who had started on the 1st of January was still at a dis-
tance of some one hundred and fifty miles from Delhi! Janakoji followed
in the direction of Rewadi towards which place his camp had been despatched
with Ruparam Kothari and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar, the Shinde's Diwan.
It was impossible for Janakoji to ride a horse with his aching wound which
had become worse by the first day's headlong flight. As the whole baggage had
been looted by the pursuers or left behind as heavy, there was no palanquin
with carriers in the whole army. A char-pai (cot) was taken as a substitute
and Janakoji was carried on it by the soldiers themselves acting as carriers,
leaving their horses in the charge of others. After covering thirty miles in this
manner, with great trouble Janakoji reached his camp with the remnants of
his broken army after midnight that day. Bhagirathibai, who seems to be a
second wife of Dattaji, was in advanced pregnancy and went with the retreat-
ing camp. As soon as Janakoji arrived in the camp, his wife Kashibai and
Bhagirathibai came out of their tent to see what had happened. Coming to
know of Dattaji's death and the defeat of his army, the whole camp was
plunged into grief, and there was a great uproar and wailing. From the
dramatic description of the Bakhar, Bhagirathibai who was not more than
sixteen in age (having been married to Dattaji in March 1758) seems to have
been a woman of exceptional self-composure and precociously wise. Instead
of indulging in useless crying, she reprimanded others for not taking courage
and acting as was necessary under the circumstances. She ordered a halt till
the morning and stopped the march of the army so as to dress Janakoji's
wounds and afford him rest after a run of twenty hours; but the camp which
was terrified by what they had heard and afraid of being caught by the
pursuing Durrani troops, started at once in the small hours of the morning in
the direction of Rewadi. Disobeying her orders, the whole civil camp started,
and as a consequence it became difficult for the leaders to continue the halt
without the help of camp-followers. The officers in the Shinde contingent
10 Ibid. 2.114.

26 PANIPAT: 1761
found it an extremely difficult problem to carry the heavy baggage, including
stores of cloth, grain and fodder. They sought counsel with the two women
who were now in place of their masters, and after a short consultation, took
with them the most necessary and light equipment only, setting fire to the
rest for fear of its falling into the hands of the enemy. They placed Janakoji
in the lady's palanquin and began to search for horses for the use of the two
women. Meanwhile, under the stress of panic, the camp-followers had caught
all the available horses and run away with them. With difficulty two ponies
were secured and the women started on them. Rupram Kothari, who was
accompanying the party, suggested, in order to mislead the Durrani pursuers
and to put them on the wrong scent, that the two women and Janakoji should
separate themselves from the disorderly camp and go secretly to Kumbher.
But Kashibai, for fear of falling into the Jat's hands should they turn traitors
in this calamity, disapproved the plan and they continued with the broken
camp and the army as best as they could. After four days of continuous trou-
ble, the fore-runners of the army came into touch with the advance party of
the Holkar's contingent and stopped there. • On the 15th January, 1760,
Malharrao came and joined the party to the north of Kot Putali. Then only
the panic subsided and men found time to think of what had happened and
to plan the future in accordance with it.
• It seems from Janakoji's letter¹¹ to the Peshwa that the plight of the
Shinde army was exaggerated by the Bakhar writer. The Shinde division
though defeated, was not as helpless as the author of the chronicle would paint
it to be. The action at the Buradi Ghat was fought on the 10th of January,
and not on the 9th, as the day was Thursday.¹² Malharrao and his Diwan
Gangadharpant Chandrachud were men of quite a different type from Janakoji
Shinde and his Diwan Ramaji Anant Dabholkar. Cautiousness and far-sighted-
ness were the chief virtues of Malharrao, and these fully coincided with the
traditional habits and temper of the Marathas. Malharrao's whole policy was
based on opportunism and not on any fixed principles. He would take no
risk which would land him into a disaster. If the Marathas got something with-
out much effort and little risk, that was sufficient and good. If they could
not get the desired fruit and had to return without it, it was no dishonour to
them, so thought Malharrao. And it was the guiding philosophy of his life.
The Shinde family, on the other hand, was of a different temper. They were
straightforward and would not mince matters in their dealings with friend
or foe. They were more loyal servants trying to obey the Peshwa's commands
as best as they could, and would shirk no risk in gaining their ends. The result
is exemplified in the careers of the members of that illustrious family, which
was mainly responsible for the Maratha activities in the north for three quar-
ters of a century. Malharrao, on the contrary, would, in the greatest diffi-
culties, first think of the safety of his life and property and then of everything
else. With such a frame of mind, he was honest to himself but not necessarily
to others with different principles, tempers and standards of conduct. This
11 Ibid. 21.182.
12 Ibid. 27.247.

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 27
somewhat rough man with blunt manners looked out of place and bizarre in
a mixed company of polished men with suave manners. At the same time
there was always a substratum of truth in his mode of thinking, and others had
to fall in line with it in times of difficulty. The present was such a time and
Janakoji had to keep his family-dash in the background and follow Malharrao.
Malharrao sent back the families with the baggage and the bazar to
their homes through the friendly territory of the Raja of Keravli to Gwalior
under the guardianship of Govindpant Bundele. He started from Kot Putali
on the 23rd February. Bhagirathibai gave birth to a posthumous son¹³ of Dat-
taji that night, but he seems to have died soon after. Malharrao and Janakoji
then started back towards Delhi with a view to check Abdali's progress and
counteract his plans. The Marathas do not seem to have lost courage after
the recent untoward happenings. They were still confident of being able to
checkmate Abdali and the Ruhelas. Malharrao knew "that Najib Khan and
Madhosingh were the chief wirepullers in inviting Ahmad Shah" and, contrary
to the common belief, was ready now to reshuffle his former policy of befriend-
ing Najib and the Wazir, whom he himself had put on the pedestal. He had
thoroughly understood that "Ghazi-ud-din was not acting in consonance with
the dignity of his high office and was fickle to a degree. Even though weak
himself, he would still indulge in vile machinations and back-door politics. He
would do what he liked and on meeting others, humble himself to such an ex-
tent as to take away all wrath against his conduct and thus try to wipe out¹⁴
the evil effects of his behaviour." The Peshwa, Nanasaheb, on the other hand,—
and in this case acting on the information and the prejudices of Raghunathrao¹⁵
----wished to stick up for a person up to the last, after once having taken his
side, and would not change his position unless an open and sufficient cause
obliged him to do so. He had instructed Dattaji to act accordingly, but Ghazi-
ud-din would neither grant what the Marathas wanted nor issue imperial
sanads bestowing Allahabad and Benares on the Marathas.¹⁶ though Shuja-
ud-daulah, his rival, would have been the loser. "You can conquer and take
possession of the places you want as you are strong. Why do you want sanads
for the same?" he would argue with the Marathas. Simultaneously he would
write to Shuja-ud-daulah asking him never to grant or hand over these holy
cities to the Marathas, but to prepare himself to defend them to the last. To
which Shuja¹⁷ would reply that he would do the needful. Thus the two rivals
for the chancellorship of the Empire were simultaneously acting hand in glove
with the Marathas and also trying to defend the Muslim dominions at all
costs and by every subterfuge. Najib had already deceived; fooled and ruined
Dattaji, and the Wazir was now following in his wake. But after his late as-
sassinations, it was impossible for the Marathas to back him any more and they
had to re-orient their policy.
13 RAJ 1.162.
14 SPD 2 117.
15 Ait. Patra, Yadi 171
16 SPD 27.240
17 Ibid 27.240

28 PANIPAT: 1761
The Peshwa had, in his dire need of money, permitted¹⁸ Dattaji to ap-
point Shuja to the office of the Wazir if he would grant the Maratha claims
and pay down cash. Surajmal Jat was on good terms with Shuja as he was
his friend's son and their interests also would not clash. On the one hand the
Peshwa wanted these two allies to check-mate the Wazir in case he was not
amenable to Maratha interests. On the other hand, he feared their combina-
tion as likely to prove too strong for the Maratha power and, therefore, he
was willing to support Ghazi-ud-din at all costs, as there was no fear of his
becoming powerful enough to defy the Marathas. Dattaji had, therefore,
chosen the path of placating Najib while keeping the question of the Chancel-
lorship pending. Now that that alternative had disappeared, Malharrao had
definitely decided to do away with the double-dealing and ambitious Wazir
and invest¹⁹ Shuja with that office. Both Shuja and the Jat feared the Afghan
union, as they were likely to be the next victims of that combination. Besides,
Surajmal had the ambition of profiting and aggrandizing himself at the cost
of the Ruhelas by spreading his power beyond the Jamuna and even the Ganges.
Already the Jats had spread in the Doab and colonised certain parts of it. It
was but natural, therefore, that they should rally round Surajmal as the "Lord
of Braj." Just as Surajmal had made his power unassailable by building,
strengthening and storing his forts of Deeg, Kumbher and Bharatpur, similarly
he took the fortalice of Sabitgad, near Kol, re-named it Ramgad, and
began to turn it into a second Kumbher. From this base he was trying to
dominate the upper Doab and Rohilkhand beyond the Ganges. Malharrao
had now established friendship²⁰ with the Jat Raja, forgetting the siege of
Kumbher and his son's death. As it was in the interest of Surajmal to combat
the Afghan power, he made common cause with the Marathas and helped them
in this guerilla warfare.
From Kot Putali, Malharrao and Janakoji began their new plan of
making sudden raids on the enemy's undefended depots and roving round the
flanks so as to sieze every opportunity of spoliation. Ahmad Shah was now
camping south of Delhi and thence despatching letters to the various chiefs
asking them to pay him tribute and join their forces with his in his efforts to
drive the Marathas²¹ from northern India. But they knew his ways as well
as his power and, therefore, chose to sit on the fence playing the game of
procrastination, by neither acceding to nor refusing his demands, but merely .
pleading their inability to do anything. Ahmad Shah had to visit their ter-
ritories personally in order to squeeze any money out of them. First he moved
south and besieged Deeg near Mathura. He drove away the small parties
of the Marathas hovering round him. He was not able to make any im-
pression on Deeg and had to move in pursuit of the threatening Marathas.
Malharrao, accompanied by Janakoji and Naro Shankar, was reported to be
at Narnol,²² whither Abdali moved next.
18 Ait. Patren Yadi 167.
19 SPD 21 183.
20 Ibid. 2 121.
21 Ibid. 21 186.
22 Ibid. 21.186.