पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 29
Leaving Deeg, Ahmad Shah proceeded south-west into the Jaipur ter-
ritory plundering wherever he went. He ransomed the small local Rajas of
Kadhake and Khobari (Kurke and Khohari?). He was thinking of proceed-
ing against the non-committing Madhosingh to Jaipur. On the road he
slaughtered the inhabitants of the resisting town of Mahwah²³ (twenty miles
east of Bandikui), but spared the residents of Baswa²⁴ (ten miles north of
Bandikui), as they offered ransom for their town. This was in the third week
of February. There he received the news that the Marathas were looting the
districts to the west of Delhi and had taken Rs. 10,000 as tribute from Kanaud.²⁵
Ahmad Shah, therefore, swerved north through Alwar territories,²⁶ leaving
the direction of Jaipur. But before he could arrive near Delhi, Malharrao
had formed another plan, depending upon Abdali's intended move against
Jaipur which, had it been put into execution, would have engaged the Afghans
there for at least a month or two. As Najib Khan and most of the other
Ruhelas were accompanying Abdali on his march, Malharrao and his shrewd
Diwan Gangoba Chandrachud thought of attacking the Ruhela lands in the
Doab and beyond, in the absence of their proprietors. The Maratha army
crossed the Jamuna to the south of Delhi on 20th February, 1760, and de-
scended upon the rich town of Sikandrabad. There they halted and com-
pletely looted the town on the Holi Day i.e. 1st March, 1760. They should
have moved from the place the next day and proceeded farther, but there
they heard that Najib Khan's treasure of ten lakhs was coming into the Doab
on its way to the Abdali camp. It had come up to the bank of the Ganges
opposite to the town of Anup Shahar. Getting this clue, they sent pickets to
see where the Ganges could be crossed. In the meanwhile, Ahmad Shah hear-
ing this move of Holkar, suddenly changed his direction and ran to the south
of Delhi. Thence he detached Jahan Khan and Najib Khan with 35,000
troops unencumbered with any artillery or camp equipage. Surajmal Jat who
in this guerilla war was helping the Marathas, came to know of this sudden
move of Abdali and sent information of the same to Gangoba Chandrachud
to warn him in time. The Maratha army had, therefore, already divided
itself.
The Shinde contingent under Janakoji as well as old Malharrao Holkar
had fallen back towards Mathura and Agra. Rupram, the Jat envoy, accom-
panied them. But the rest of Holkar's troops who never had any acquaintance
with the Durrani ways and no experience of battling against them, laughed
at the idea of running away on mere news of the enemy, and taunted the
Shinde's troops as being faint-hearted. Janakoji, therefore, separated from
Holkar and started towards Mathura. Malharrao himself personally followed
him and ordered Gangoba Tatya to check the Durrani advance. But his
corps was surprised, caught unprepared and massacred with heavy slaughter

²³ KHARE 1.21
²⁴ Ibid.
²⁵ SPD 2.118.
²⁶ Ibid. 21.186.
²⁷ Ibid. 2.121.

30 PANIPAT: 1761
by Jahan Khan. Gangoba, who was personally alert, was able to run away
and save himself; but Anandrao Ram Yadav, Shetyaji Kharade and his son
were killed in the running fight,²³ and the broken remnant of the frightened
army crossed the Jamuna back into the Jat territory, wherever it could. The
experiment of checkmating the Durrani forces by guerilla tactics thus ended
in failure.
The Maratha forces, therefore, retreated to the borders of the Jaipur
territory and encamped in the vicinity of Bayana. The Maratha tactics, how-
ever, had saved not only the Jats but also the Rajput princes. Abdali had to
turn back from Jaipur because the Marathas had swept towards Delhi, and
now his army had to be stationed in the Doab to ward off the Maratha raids
against the Ruhelas. The Marathas now reached a complete understanding
with Surajmal Jat and renewed their former agreements with him. Surajmal
promised to follow the Maratha policy in all respects. His own territories in
the Doab were now directly threatened and he concentrated his strength on
the defence of Ramgad (the modern Aligarh), which, however, surrendered
to Abdali's overwhelming forces within a month. As all the Ruhelas were
not on good terms and in full accord with Najib, the Marathas now tried to
divide them by entering into a separate arrangement with Hafiz Rahmat, the
grand old man amongst the trans-Gangetic Ruhelas. He agreed to join his
forces with the Marathas, send back Abdali after detaching him from Najib and
not to help Najib in his fight against the Marathas. The Marathas agreed, on
the other hand, not to invade the other Ruhelas but to content themselves with
the cis-Gangetic territories. Abdali would have now left for Afghanistan, had
not Najib induced him to remain in India for protecting him against the chafing
wrath of the Marathas. His stay in India gave a new turn to the Maratha
politics in the north.
²³ Ibid. 2.121.

CHAPTER III
SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA
WHEN the tidings of Dattaji's death reached the Peshwa's camp at
Ahmadnagar in the south, none in the Deccan was prepared for such a bolt
from the blue. All had full confidence in the military talents of Dattaji Shinde.
They expected him at least to stem the tide of the Durrani invasion if not to
defeat Abdali and drive him back. Besides, the Peshwa had ordered Malharrao
Holkar to proceed to Dattaji's help and he was expected to be on the route
towards the Panjab. This was in the middle of November 1759, after Sabaji's
return to Sukartal. At that time, it was expected that the Nizam in the Dec-
can would be cowed down by ordinary manoeuvring of troops and be prepared
to part with the north-western portion of his dominions. It seems that the
Nizam had consented to grant Ahmadnagar and Parenda forts together with
the revenue of the surrounding territories amounting to ten lakhs, to the
Peshwa.¹ But afterwards, due to the advice of his brothers, he tried to
equivocate about the grant of Ahmadnagar which was not only a strong fort
in the military sense, but was a place of prestige for the Muslims, being the
old seat of the Nizamshahi Kingdom. The Peshwa was not in a mood at
that time to tolerate any delaying tactics. His position at the hour was thought
to be almost that of a dictator in India. Since the Maratha standards were
carried beyond the Attock² in the previous year, the Peshwa's fame had spread
not only throughout the length and breadth of India, but had travelled beyond
the boundaries to Iran and Turan.³ In the south his generals Balvantrao
Mehendale, Gopalrao Patwardhan, Malhar Naik Raste and Visaji Krishna
Biniwale had established the Maratha suzerainty south of the river Krishna.⁴
In the north his brother Raghunnathrao and his generals Dattaji and Mal-
harrao had created such awe that none in those parts was willing to cross
swords with the Marathas. Even the chiefs not conquered by the Marathas
were ready to send ambassadors and try to negotiate terms for their existence
and continuance.⁵ Shuja-ud-daulah had paid tribute⁶ and the English in Bengal,
though they had slyly usurped the power by a silent revolution without pro-
claiming themselves the masters, were still in need of the Peshwa's goodwill and
forbearance towards them, and actually sent emissaries to the Poona Court to
ward off Raghunathrao's proposed advance into Bengal.⁷ The Peshwa had,
it seems, actually assured Clive of his support, and Clive made political use of
that assurance in imposing himself upon the Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah.⁸ Simi-
larly, the English advance through Orissa to Masulipatam and the occupation
¹ RAJ. 1 154.
² BISM (Persian Mss) No. 696, dated 20-12 1758
³ Aitihasika Sphuta Lekh 411
⁴ SPD 28.200-02, 204, 210, 216, 217, 266
⁵ BISM (Persian Mss.) No 699
⁶ K. Patre Yadi No. 166
⁷ JIHQ 15.3.388.
⁸ Hill 2.387, 388, 400
[ 31 ]

32 PANIPAT: 1761
of the French jagirs by Colonel Forde was made possible by Maratha for-
bearance and the Peshwa's pressure on the Nizam Salabat Jang, the grantor
of these jagirs. Naturally the Peshwa was thinking himself as suzerain in all
these parts of India occupied by the English, for both the Deccan and Bengal
as well as Arcot were paying chauth to the Marathas and the English had
still not remonstrated against or interfered with this right.
Bussy who had been recalled from the court of Hyderabad by Lally,
had left for Pondicherry in July 1758. The result was that the fruit of his
occupation of Daulatabad and of the assassination of Shah Nawaz Khan who
was a protege of the Peshwa had been snatched away by others after his de-
parture. Thus ended the French influence at the Nizam's Court. The Peshwa
had succeeded in detaching Ibrahim Khan Gardi, pupil of Bussy, from the
Nizam's service and engaging him himself.⁹ Thus strengthened, the Peshwa
sent his cousin Sadashivrao Bhau, with forty thousand troops to occupy Ahmad-
nagar as promised by the Nizam. He was saved the trouble of besieging that
strong fort as Kavi Jang, its keeper, agreed to deliver it to the Marathas in con-
sideration for a jagir with an annual revenue of Rs. fifty thousand.¹⁰ Visaji
Krishna took possession of it on 9th November, 1759. Thence Sadashivrao
Bhau proceeded towards Beed and Dharur and commenced hostilities with
the Nizam by fomenting and strengthening internal quarrels amongst the
Nizam brothers. Basalat Jang separated himself from the Nizam and marched
towards the south. The Maratha sardars of the Nizam, Nimbalkars and Khan-
dagle, were sitting sulkily at home and not joining their forces with those of
Nizam Ali, who had taken the lead after the departure of the French.
Sadashivrao hoped for a quick decision in the campaign and after its suc-
cessful termination intended to send Raghunathrao into the north to help
Dattaji.
But Nizam Ali would not part with the territories demanded by the
Peshwa without a trial of strength. Skirmishes began from the 20th January,
1760, and gradually the Maratha armies surrounded the Nizam and his
brother. The Nizam wanted to reach the fort of Dharur and make a stand
there, but the Marathas would not allow him to escape from Udgir and con-
tinuously followed close at his heels. By forming a hollow square, the Nizam
marched out in the French fashion from Udgir and slowly moved towards
Ausa, skirmishing all along the way. When the fort of Dharur remained some
fifteen miles ahead, the Marathas held up his march by completely surround-
ing him on all sides and attacking him in the rear. In the battle of 3rd Febru-
ary, 1760, the Nizam was completely defeated and hemmed in, and there-
fore sued for peace. By the terms of the peace, the Nizam ceded to the
Marathas practically the half of his remaining dominions. Nizam Ali, the
chief instigator, was to go back to his jagir in Berar and the Nizam Salabat
Jang was to remain in Hyderabad. His Maratha sardars¹¹ were to leave the
Nizam's service. The foreign relations of the Nizam were to be guided by the
⁹ Purandare 1.382.
¹⁰ Ibid. 1.382.
¹¹ Raj. 1.165.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 33
Maratha policy, especially his dealings with the French.¹² Bijapur, Ahmad-
nagar, Burhanpur and Daulatabad, all four former capitals of the Muslim
dominions, were surrendered together with the important forts of Asher and
Mulher.¹³ Sadashivrao Bhau had become the hero of the day. He writes
that but for the new danger in the north, the whole of the south would have
come under the rule of the Peshwa.
Unfortunately he reckoned without his host. Already the English had
stolen a march politically, and now militarily also they loomed large on the
horizon. Bussy had already been made a prisoner by them, and Haider Ali had
so firmly set foot in Mysore as never to be ousted. While the Peshwa had just
then taken possession of Underi and Kansa from the Sidi,¹⁴ Janjira and Surat
never became Maratha possessions. Even the Nizam brothers, though de-
feated with heavy loss and deprived of half their dominions, were only biding
their time. They had given their consent to the treaty because they had to,
but there was no intention in their mind of fulfilling the terms in the real
spirit.¹⁵ By the treaty they had merely played for time to reshuffle their mat-
ters, gain over their disaffected Maratha sardars to their side, seek help from
the Pathans of Karnool, the Bedars of Surapur and also Murarrao Ghorpade.
Their whole army had not been completely crushed and, in fact, they had sought
peace at once to keep it intact. All these points had been placed before Bhau
and he should have thought of them seriously. But the Peshwa thought more
of recovering the prestige lost in north India as a result of the fall of Shinde
Consequently he ordered preparations to be made for despatching a strong force
to the north to drive out Abdali.
Throughout the Udgir campaign, the Peshwa who had stopped at
Ahmadnagar, and directed the movements from that place, now proceeded to-
wards Paithan on his way to Patdur, southeast of Jalna, where he had sum-
moned the Bhosle brothers from Nagpur to settle their quarrels. Sadashivrao
Bhau himself proceeded north to that place, after crossing the Godavari, to
meet him and thrash out the future policy through corsultations with all.
They met there in the first week of March 1760, and first celebrated their vic-
tory by playing the Rangapanchami festival with zest. Then began the dis-
cussions. All the three cousins were there, and it was the declared intention
of the Peshwa and also of Bhau to send Raghunathrao to the north as
originally arranged.
It should be remembered that up to that time the final route of Mal-
harrao Holkar by Abdali at Sikandrabad, which took place in the first week
of March, had not been reported to the Peshwa, as news travelled very slowly
in those days. If the news had reached the Peshwa's camp at Padtur in time,
that would have perhaps given a different turn to the whole affair. It seems
that the discussions assumed the form of family bickerings in the Peshwa's
family. Personal opinions, long cherished prejudices, partiality and selfish-
¹² SPD 40.123.
¹³ Raj. 1.166.
¹⁴ Ibid. 1.157
¹⁵ SPD 1.86.
P. F.—3

34 PANIPAT 1761
ness had played their role in what should have been purely political discus-
sions. The Peshwa had always shown his predilection towards his brother
Raghunathrao, and had somehow formed a good opinion about his ability
Sadashivrao Bhau, for all his ability and wisdom, was still a cousin and there-
fore not on a par with Raghunathrao He could have no legal share in the
Peshwa's dominions and estates, and was only the first servant of the state.
Gopikabai, the wife of the Peshwa, was supposed to be the chief instigator
against the superior claims of Sadashivrao to high office due to his ability
When Raghunathrao was ordered¹⁶ to take the command of the north, he put
in a plea that he would not accept the responsibility¹⁷ unless provided with
ample funds Sadashivrao Bhau who was a strict accountant and auditor gen-
eral held Raghunathrao responsible for the debts of the Panjab campaign and
he strongly resented the charge Raghunathrao had taken the past lesson to
heart and, therefore, wished to absolve himself from the results of the forth
coming campaign
After much recriminative discussion, the Peshwa ordered Bhau him
self to shoulder the responsibility and lead the campaign ¹⁸ The Peshwa was
rather unwilling to spare such a consummate, able and all round administrator
as Bhau for a long time, but there was no help for it, as Bhau had been stung
to the quick by a challenge from his cousin to prove his own valour and ability
to add ample funds to the central treasury by going on the campaign himself
But Gopikabai feared the consequence of Bhau's going to the north, accom-
panied by his wife and with a big army His prestige had already risen very
high by the Udgir campaign If he became equally successful in the north and
were to establish a separate kingdom for himself, who was there to check him?
It was necessary, therefore, to keep some constitutional check on his conduct and
with this view Vishwasrao, the eldest son of the Peshwa, was placed at the
head of the forces, with Bhau acting as his deputy From the correspondence
in the whole Panipat campaign, it is clear that Bhau was not free to settle
anything on his own responsibility Every time he referred the matter to and
sought the previous sanction of the Peshwa. This was a false position in the
then circumstances for a supreme authority like Bhau It appears to have had
a dilatory and derogatory effect on Bhau's conduct of affairs, making it im-
possible for him to free himself from the entanglement at Panipat later on, when
need for a quick, decisive step arose This point should constantly be borne in
mind when reading the forthcoming account of Panipat.
While the suspicions and the prejudices of the Peshwa and his personal
circle affected the Maratha policy throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau's
personal predilections also shaped it to a great extent If Raghunathrao was
always dependent on his assistants for shaping his policy, Bhau had a tendency
towards the other extreme of acting on his own responsibility after abruptly
cutting short the discussion on any subject and dictating the final thing him
16 Ibid 40 129
17 KHARE 1 14 For the previous debts contracted by him the Peshwa had been
obliged to impose a new debt-contribution on all his jagirdars. Vide Satara 2.292.
18 RAJ 1 168.

self. The result was that he seemed, which he was actually not, proud or
even haughty. This was a virtue as far as administrative efficiency—which
depends upon quick and final decision—was concerned, but it cannot be said
to be helpful when policy is to be shaped amongst equals. Over-riding opinion
is always possible for a higher authority, but it is not always conducive to the
best results, as ultimately the working out of the decisions devolves upon the
subordinates. A commander-in-chief can scarcely act against the combined
opinion and will of his generals.
Bhau selected his own assistants and corps from amongst the as-
semblage gathered in the Nizam's dominions. To begin with, his army was
not more than twenty-five thousand strong, besides the infantry under Ibrahim
Khan, which was nine thousand. Though Raghunathrao did not join, some
of the corps subordinate to him were included in the army which accompanied
Bhau to the north. The Maratha army was made up of the feudal divisions
under the main sardars. These sardars employed subordinate corps under indi-
vidual captains. The sardar was responsible for the conduct, training, equip-
ment and payment of the corps employed by him. Certain revenue districts
were assigned to him as jagirs for the expenditure thereof. Not all the noted
captains in the Maratha army were sardars. Certain corps were directly em-
ployed by the Peshwa who paid them from the central treasury. There was
no one fixed scale of payment, certain sardars being paid more favourably than
'others. The bigger sardars, like Shinde and Holkar, were treated more as
partners in the state than as mere subordinates. They had specified per-
centages of the total revenues in certain regions permanently assigned to them
as their inalienable share. It should be particularly noted that throughout the
Panipat campaign, the payment of the whole army did not devolve on Sa-
dashivrao Bhau. The divisions of Shinde and Holkar and also of a few other
sardars were expected to be paid by the sardars themselves. Bhau was re-
sponsible for the payment of the Peshwa's own troops, called "Huzarat," and
directly paid corps like those under Ibrahim Khan Gardi. The inconvenience
felt by the non-receipt of revenues called in by Sadashivrao Bhau from men
like Govindpant Bundele mainly affected the Peshwa's own divisions and not
the divisions under Shinde and Holkar. The normal Maratha practice was for
the moving army to subsist on its own earnings in the regions through which
it passed. When the army was warring in a foreign territory, it would automati-
cally subsist on tributes, ransoms and spoils, but when passing through its own
dominions or the dominions of its allies, it had to buy everything it needed.
In the Panipat campaign this was the condition in the main. Khandesh,
Malwa, the Jat country, the Delhi region, were all non-belligerent territories.
Besides, due to the continuance of almost constant war in the territories sur-
rounding Delhi for almost a decade, the regions had become depopulated, non-
agricultural and insecure. Unless there was good cash in one's pocket and
one could keep the line of communication safe for caravans bringing supplies,
it was impossible to go on for any length of time. There was no government
commissariat department giving free rations or selling things at fixed prices
in those days. The bazar which accompanied a moving army was chartered,
guaranteed and given the necessary protection by the army commander no

36 PANIPAT 1761
doubt, but the merchants were not responsible for the continuous supply as
such, nor were the prices fixed This was a constant source of difficulty for a
moving army There was no assurance of supply nor certainty about the cost,
which led not only to slackness and even obstruction in the war effort, but to
the bankruptcy of the soldiers and the authorities as well
Sadashivrao Bhau's progress was very slow if he had the intention of
joining Shinde and Holkar before the rains These generals had been prac-
tically driven out of the Delhi area, and were then camping at a safe distance
from the Durrani forces behind the Jat principality, using Surajmal as a mid
dleman in their diplomatic negotiations 19 Ahmad Shah Abdali had sent
emissaries to both Madhosingh of Jaipur and Surajmal Jat, ordering them to
unite their forces with his and send monies to aid him in his work of driving
out the Marathas,21 but both pleaded their inability to do anything in the mat-
ter and tried the game of procrastination and equivocation Surajmal was the
more cunning of the two He would always call himself a mere zamindar,
or even a tenant, and not a prince He replied that he would pay the ac-
knowledged Emperor the revenues due to him If Ahmad Shah would him-
self assume that position and remain permanently in India, he would pay him
as the legal sovereign Till then he could not possibly do what he had been
asked, especially as his territories had been ravaged by the movements of both
the Maratha and the Durrani armies 22 As the Indian summer advanced,
Abdali encamped in the vicinity of Ramgad in the mid Doab, exhausted by the
three months' incessant running after the elusive Marathas of the Shinde-
Holkar contingents Each party now expected the other to renew the fight
first, and would not start it themselves This stalemate could have been broken
only by the junction of the forces under Sadashivrao Bhau and the exhausted
generals in the north
Bhau started from Patdur on the 14th of March, 1760, but had only
crossed the Narmada after a month, covering a distance of not more than two
hundred miles The delay was due to the preparation and joining in of the
various corps with equipment for a long and distant campaign Sadashivrao
Bhau's Panipat campaign was, in fact, on the model of the Mughal Emperors
and not like that of Shivaji or Bajirao I The Maratha army had large tents,
screens for women's apartments, and the various departments to look after
the convenience of the leaders and the army The chiefs rode on superb Arab
or Central Asian chargers and wore gorgeous dresses of gold brocades Their
weapons and other equipment were also of the best type, and the brigades
under Ibrahim Khan Gardi, trained after the French model, were the envy of
Indian potentates of those times The presence of these infantry corps with
their cannon, regulated the whole movement of the army, and the daily
marches would cover but a few miles The heavy siege-guns which accom-
panied the army, together with the light field artillery, slowed the rate of
progress, as the long rows of bulls necessary to draw them would move but
slowly over the rugged country and narrow passes in the Satpura and Vindhya
19 SPD 2 121
21 Ibid 21 186.
22 Ibid.

TO FACE PAGE 36
MAP SHOWING
PÂNIPAT ROUTE MARCH
ABDALI'S ROUTE ····
MAHRATHAS' ROUTE ––––
SCALE
Foot-note:—Baghpat to the west of Meerut on the bank of the Jamuna and the village
of Gauripur five miles to the north of Baghpat have been inadvertently omitted from this
map. Ahmad Shah crossed the Jamuna at Gauripur and went to Sonepat.

38 PANIPAT: 1761
lessened his expenditure. There was rumour of his personal return to Afghan-
istan³³ after appointing Shuja as the Wazir, Najib as Mir Bakshi and pro-
claiming the fugitive Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor, thus doing away with
the puppet Shah Jahan III, brought on the throne by the regicide Ghazi-ud-
din. The Panjab would, of course, be surrendered to Abdali, who would be of
help to the Delhi Emperor in times of difficulty. The Dowager Empress,
Malika Zamani, had been specially deputed to induce Shuja by a personal in-
terview, but she does not seem to have succeeded in her efforts. Shuja's mother
was still alive and influenced the affairs of Oudh with prescience and wisdom.
She knew that there was nothing common between the Sunni Afghans and
the Irani Shias to which group her family belonged. The old officers of Safdar
Jang's time knew the difficulties of the Delhi politics and feared to antagonise
the Marathas, who surrounded the Oudh territory. Shuja was thinking of
giving the slip to Abdali without directly saying "no" by proceeding towards
Bihar to back up the Emperor Shah Alam II. But Najib Khan was support-
ing Abdali and directing all his affairs. He himself proceeded towards Oudh
with Jahan Khan, the Durrani general. With a suavity equalled by his cun-
ning, he impressed the Oudh Court by discussing threadbare the pros and
cons of Oudh policy, and finally prevailed upon Shuja to put in his lot on
the side of Abdali. Najib Khan personally stood surety against any possible
harm to Shuja in the Afghan camp. The unsteadiness of Maratha policy in
its dealings with Safdar Jang had now borne fruit. The Peshwa and his
sardars had forsaken Safdar Jang in his need, and gone over to the side of
his opponent, Ghazi-ud-din. The late Wazir had been left to die of a broken
heart after his discomfiture before Delhi and his son Shuja had always to be
on his guard lest the attention of the Marathas be directed against his dominions,
which contained the chief holy places of the Hindus, namely, Benares, Al-
lahabad and Ayodhya.
In his dealings with Shuja, Sadashivrao had put his chief confidence in
Govindpant Bundele as he was a near neighbour, having known the ins and
outs of the Oudh Court for a long time. This man had kept himself out-
wardly on good terms with Shuja and was credited with a sweet tongue, use-
ful in prevailing upon an acquaintance. Sadashivrao Bhau had begun³⁴ to
write to Govindpant from the Nizam's dominions long before the result of
Udgir. When it was finally decided to send him to the north, he at
once wrote to Govindpant to bring over Shuja to the Maratha side in the im-
pending struggle against Abdali.³⁵ From his first letter of the 15th of March,
1760, up to the last disaster of Panipat, ten months later, Bhau is found put-
ting too much faith in the goodness of Shuja. After coming to know his final
decision to join Abdali in the first week of July, Bhau should have left the
matter at that point and should have completely stopped his correspondence
with Shuja. The only result of Bhau's importunities seems to have been to
convince Abdali and Najib of the Maratha weakness. This conviction strength-
ened their resolution of fighting to the last. The Maratha diplomacy during
33 Raj. I.191, 222, 236, 246
34 Ibid. I 154.
35 Ibid. I,167.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 39
Balaji Bajirao's rule is always inexplicable, and it was much more so during
the Panipat campaign
Looking to the political condition then existing in India, and the
strength of the Marathas, it was a first rate mistake to have left the south
Indian tangle to take its own shape, and proceed to north India after Udgir,
especially after knowing the complete defeat of the Shinde Holkar forces
There were at least four fronts on which the Maratha attention was necessary
then The Abdali front in the north, the Haider Ali front in the south, the
Nizam front in the Deccan and the English front—for such it was though the
,Peshwa was completely unaware of it—along the whole Indian coast The
Maratha power seemed to be at its zenith at the end of 1758,³⁶ but the funda-
mental weakness of their unplanned spreading became apparant soon By the
end of 1759 they were completely driven out of the Panjab and suffered a
major defeat owing to the death of Dattaji soon after In the south, Haider
Ali who was strengthening himself silently, had slyly set aside the all conquer-
ing Marathas, establishing himself, finally in September 1759 by defeating
Nanjraj³⁷ and imprisoning him with the puppet Mysore ruler The English
had established their power in Bengal equally firmly, and had, taking advan-
tage of the Maratha support, occupied the best districts in the Nizam's dominion
on the eastern sea board by driving out the French What Sadashivrao Bhau
could conquer from the Nizam after his far famed victory of Udgir, the Brit-
ish had taken away from the Nizam by merely marching a few thousand
troops, under Colonel Forde,³⁸ from Bengal to the Northern Sarkars' The
result of Bhau's going to the north at this juncture after the French defeat
at Wandiwash in January 1760, was exemplified not only in the far reverberat
ing defeat of Panipat on 14th January, 1761, but, simultaneously or quickly fol-
lowing on its heels, in the occupation of Pondicherry by the English on 16th
January, 1761, and the defeat of the Emperor Shah Alam by Colonel Car-
nack in Bihar on 15th January, 1761, that is, a day after the Panipat disaster ³⁹
By these events, little noticed or thought of then, the future of India was
decided, more than by the defeat at Panipat Sadashivrao Bhau was fighting
for the preservation of the Mughal Empire for the descendant of Taimur who
actually became a prisoner and a tool in the hands of the English' Bhau
thought that but for Abdali the whole south would have come into the pos-
. session of the Marathas'⁴⁰ But by the defeat of the French in the south and
the occupation of the Northern Sarkars, the English became powerful enough
in the south to defy all others The Peshwa had planned the capture of Janjira
from the Sidi this year (1760), but by the covert action⁴¹ of the English it
never came to pass' Even the lands conquered from the Nizam at the be
ginning of 1760 had to be returned when he threatened Poona after Panipat.
How can a historian account for these results but on the one supposition that
36 BISM (Persian Mss ) No 696, dated 20-12 1758, No 699, dated 15-4-1^759
37 RAJ 1 138.
38 Cambridge History of India 5 162
39 Fall 2.542
40 RAJ 1 166.
41 SPD 40.136

40 PANIPAT. 1761
the Peshwa had miscalculated the forces and had attempted a wrong solution
of the problems?
From Sironj, Bhau proceeded towards Gwalior via Arun,⁴² Malan,⁴³
Pohari and Kaledhar,⁴⁴ arriving there on the 30th of May, 1760 He took
stock of the Maratha forces and tried to strengthen them in every possible way
But his efforts were wasted on men whom he wished to propitiate The fault
was not Sadashivrao's but of the times By the middle of the 18th century,
the dissolution of the Mughal Empire was practically complete and what an
English historian has called "The Great Anarchy" began This anarchy which
lasted almost for a century, ended finally after the great mutiny of 1857 The
various fragments of the Mughal Empire, great and small, powerful and weak,
had entered into a general scramble for power and pelf, and none was think-
ing in terms of principles, nor was anyone in a mood to think of Indian unity
Only the Peshwa was thinking in terms of the whole of India ruled from one
centre and following a common policy But Sadashivrao Bhau's appeal fell
on deaf ears and hence produced no result All the previous sins of commission
and omission by the three Peshwas raised their heads as ghosts from their
graves Everybody who had once been helped by the Marathas forgot all
moral obligation to show gratitude or at least sympathy, while all who had any
sense of having been badly treated sit on the fence in expectancy of the Mara-
thas receiving a good drubbing at the hands of the Durrani king The con-
sciousness of having all the surrounding people against the Marathas must have
had a demoralising influence on the Maratha army Great battles are never
won by despondent soldiers!
The Marathi Chronicles of Sadashivrao Bhau report that Bhau had
sought the opinion of Malharrao Holkar and Janakoji Shinde, and they had
advised Bhau not to come personally, but to send armies for their help on the
strength of which they would defeat Abdali Their opinion was based on the
idea that the prestige of a nation is lowered when the chief himself is obliged
to enter the arena of the battle, because it is thought as a sort of comment on
the (in)capacity of his subordinates and if by chance or through ill luck the
chief is defeated, it becomes difficult for the army to hold out afterwards On
the other hand, the authors of the chronicles report the discussions in the privy
council of Sadashivrao Bhau Therein Bhau's supporters, like Balvantrao
Mehendale, saw more than was obvious in the advice of Holkar and Shinde "
"Because these sardars and mamlatdars in the north had up till then lived in
perfect freedom without feeling the pressure of the chief's control, and feared
that their misdeeds would be revealed in the presence of a strict man like
Sadashivrao Bhau, they are advising Bhau not to advance any farther," they
thought When Bhau proceeded in spite of these remonstrances, the veteran
Malharrao Holkar was reported to have let loose his tongue in wild rage at his
advice being brushed aside with scant respect, and abused the advisers of Bhau
He wrote again that Bhau should at least stop at Gwalior and not cross the
⁴² Raj 1 186
⁴³ Ibid 1 188
⁴⁴ Khare 1.22

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 41

Chambal, at which Bhau's councillors laughed again and said, "Shinde and
Holkar, Antaji Manakeshvar, Govindpant Bundele, Vitthal Shivdeo and Naro
Shankar who had acted as officers with full powers in these parts, are now
ill at ease at our coming and can never feel happy at the event" We reproduce
these lines not because we believe in their truth but because they show an un-
dercurrent of thought diametrically opposite to that of Bhau's policy There
was a good substratum of truth in Holkar's advice To proceed against
Abdali with heavy camp equipage and the encumbrances of women and chil-
dren with a paraphernalia of private servants on a lavish scale, was certainly
a mistake Delhi could never have been a secure base for the Marathas in the
circumstances then existing In all previous campaigns of the Marathas in
the Delhi region, they had suffered from want of food and fodder, not to say
money The circumstances had grown even worse now, as Bhau experienced
to his cost later on There was no valid reason to believe that the circumstances
would have been different in the present campaign But Bhau felt confident
of overcoming any difficulty and crossed the Chambal to Dholpur,⁴⁵ which in
those times was not a Jat capital but a place of pilgrimage

The Maratha army crossed the Chambal on 8th June, and encamped
near the Muchakunda tirth⁴⁶ near Dholpur The whole army went through
the ceremony of a holy bath and sojourned for a few days there An eclipse
of the sun on the 13th of June⁴⁷ added to the merit of the pilgrimage in this
holy place The delay caused by the performance of the rites of pilgrimage
frustrated Bhau's original plan of crossing over the Jamuna before the rains
near Agra into Govindpant Bundeles districts and attacking Abdali from that
base Agra was only some twenty five miles distant from the Maratha camp
between the Chambal and the Gambhira, alias Banaganga, river But Bhau
was unable to cross that small river and reach Agra for about a month more
The monsoon had set in somewhat early that year, and the small river was in
spate On his left hand was the Parvati, in front the Gambhira and at the
back the Chambal The region is extremely uneven At every hundred yards
there is a ravine, a continuous up and down The land is sandy and the rivers
and streams, though shallow, spread over for miles across the banks It is dif-
ficult to set foot in the bed of the river and there is not enough water for boats
to cross In fact, no boats are available on those streams, for after a few days
the water is completely drained away and only level sands, yellow and white
in colour, are left to act as witnesses for the temporary floods The whole camp
must have suffered terribly because camping in those regions looked almost
impossible

Though Sadashivrao Bhau could not cross the insignificant river
Gambhira, he was able to meet Shinde and Holkar and discuss with them the
future problems and line of action, as both of them were encamping on the
same side of the Gambhira in the vicinity of Keraoli The first to see Bhau
was Gangoba Chandrachud, Holkar's Diwan, on 15th June ⁴⁸ Gangoba be

45 Raj 1 199
46 Bhau Bakhar p 113
47 13th of June was 30 Jyestha, Autobiography of Nana Phadnis, K. Patre Yadi 192.
48 Raj 1.203

42 PANIPAT 1761
longed to that generation of the Marathas which grew up with Bajirao's con
quests in Malwa He was the confidential man of Malharrao and had perfect
faith⁴⁹ in the wisdom of his master
Malharrao Holkar seems to have purposely sent Gangoba to meet Bhau
first and sound him in respect of his future policy and temper Malharrao him-
self met Bhau along with Janakoji Shinde, a week later, on the 22nd of June ⁵⁰
No difference of opinion is reported at this meeting which seems to have ended
amicably, thus belying the purposive colourful writing of the Marathi chroni-
cles At the end of the month, Surajmal Jat and the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din saw
Sadashivrao Bhau and discussed the future line of action ⁵¹ The plan at the
beginning of July was still to cross over the Jamuna into the Doab by build-
ing a bridge of boats But even this plan failed because of the rising waters of
the Jumuna In fact Bhau's slow march from the Deccan added four addi-
tional months of the monsoon to the Panipat campaign, and lowered the
vitality and morale of the Maratha army thereby From the tone of a letter
written at this juncture, there does not seem to be any difference of opinion
between Bhau and his sardars or Surajmal Jat ⁵² The total strength of the
Maratha army is given as seventy to eighty thousand while Abdali-Ruhela
strength is reported as sixty thousand The balance was to be decided by the
joining in of Shuja ud daulah to either side Shuja's army is reported as
twenty thousand, with a very strong park of artillery Besides, his army was
one on permanent footing and therefore best trained, best equipped and al
together more efficient than that of the others It was regularly well paid and
therefore contented Naro Shankar and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar,⁵³ Jana-
koji's Diwan, had been despatched as special ambassadors to Shuja as a last
resort to induce him to come over to the Maratha side by offering him any
terms he would choose to ask ⁵⁴ But he finally decided against the Marathas
and proceeded to meet Abdali at Ramgad Bhau at once changed his plan
of crossing into the Doab and arrived at Gau Ghat to the north east of Sikandara
where the great Akbar lies buried This place is some ten miles to the north
west of Agra on the bank of the Jamuna There the Maratha army halted
and bathed in the holy waters on the new moon day of Ashadha, which fell
on 12th July, 1760 ⁵⁵ Thence Bhau proceeded to Mathura where he encamped
on the 15th of July ⁵⁶ Thence he sent advanced troops to lay siege to Delhi,
then commanded by Yakub Ali Khan, a cousin of the Durrani Wazir Shah
Wali Khan ⁵⁷ He had only a small force, not more than two thousand strong
The rest of the camp with women in it went on performing the pilgrim's rites at
Mathura and Brindavan Nana Fadnis, who was accompanying Bhau with
his wife and mother, indulged in the holy pilgrimage to his heart's content,
⁴⁹ SPD 2 116
⁵⁰ Raj 1 217, SPD 2 127
⁵¹ Purandare 1.387
⁵² Ibid
⁵³ Raj 1 208
⁵⁴ Purandare 1 387
⁵⁵ Bhau Kaifiyat p 9
⁵⁶ Raj 1.217
⁵⁷ Ibid. 1.222, 223

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 43
and rapturously describes it in his "Autobiography" 58 Bhau's wife Parvati-
bai, Mehendale's wife Lakshmibai, and some other women of high status had
accompanied the army mainly with a view to perform the pilgrimages in the
great safety of big camps fully provided with every necessity of life. The time
of Maratha encampment at Mathura coincided with the Hindu intercalary
month of Shravana, deemed the most holy especially near the scene of Krishna's
childhood.
As discussed previously, Surajmal Jat and Ghazi-ud-din were of the
same opinion as that of Malharrao Holkar in not proceeding to Delhi with the
whole camp, but to keep the base of operations behind and to carry on the
campaign against Abdali with unencumbered troops. But Bhau had decided,
probably with the full concurrence of the Peshwa, to follow the new mode of
warfare based on infantry tactics. He prepared to take Delhi and make it a
base. Surajmal was not against the idea of occupying Delhi but he wanted
it to be handed over to him as a keeper, and wished Ghazi ud din to be made
a Wazir. After the assassination of Alamgir II, his son, the fugitive prince
Ali Gauhar had crowned himself as Emperor in Bihar. He had naturally dis-
missed Ghazi ud din from the chancellorship and offered it to Shuja, for he
could not allow his father's murderer to continue in the high office. Ghazi ud-
din had tried to strengthen his hands by the expedient of taking a young
prince out of the imperial prison and crowning him Emperor with the title
of Shah Jahan Sani and getting himself appointed as his Wazir. But his plan
was miscarried by Dattaji's defeat and death in the preceding year, and he was
now a fugitive at Surajmal's Court. Bhau had to act cautiously and take
into account the general voice of the populace in the Mughal dominions. The
Peshwa had not directly protested against Ghazi ud din's acts of foul murder
and to that extent tried not to antagonise him as he had been a creation of
the Marathas. But it was necessary to guard against Najib's propaganda and,
therefore, Bhau could not approve of Surajmal's proposal to acknowledge
Ghazi ud din as Wazir. Bhau also wanted to keep the office open in order
to tempt Shuja to the Maratha side, if he could by any means be won over.
Bhau, therefore, asked the Jat Raja and Ghazi ud din to accompany him to
Delhi and help him in conquering and settling it. He sent Janakoji Shinde,
Balvantrao Mehendale and Malharrao Holkar with eight thousand troops in
advance on 21st July, 1760. This party reached Delhi on the 25th and at
once took possession of the city without firing a shot. In the first surprise on-
slaught some fifty Marathas even succeeded in entering the inner citadel by
scaling the walls, but instead of at once proceeding to the gates and trying to
open them so as to make the whole army enter in, they foolishly engaged in
loot and therefore gave time to Yakub Ali Khan, Abdali's keeper, to bring
his forces to the scene and drive them out. Balvantrao's pride and impetuous-
ness are illustrated in this event. He seems to have at once despatched a
courier to Bhau who was following, with the main Maratha camp, to inform
him of his victory, and Bhau rewarded the camel rider for bringing in the good
news. At the end of the day, however, Balvantrao had to retreat to his camp.
58 Autobiography of Nana Phadnis, Patre Yadi, 192.

44 PANIPAT: 1761
outside the city and place guns around the citadel. Bhau himself had ad-
vanced by this time from Mathura and was encamping at the famous serai at
Chhatah Now he advanced in haste via Hodal and Palwal and reached
Delhi on 31st July By this time the small party of Afghans under Yakub Ali
Khan had been battered in the citadel and now with the coming of Ibrahim
Khan's park of artillery, they found it impossible to continue the struggle and
sued for peace. They were allowed to march out and go back to Abdali with
their arms and baggage Their number was only eight hundred.⁵⁹ The Mara-
thas occupied the Red Fort on the 1st of August and celebrated their first vic-
tory amidst jubilations Bhau himself seems to have sojourned there for a
few days to arrange for the administration of the palace, city and the fort
till he moved to Shalimar Gardens to the north-west of Delhi. He appointed
Naro Shankar as the guardian of the palace and the city with six thousand
troops made up of cavalry and infantry. Baloji Palhande was made the
keeper of the fort.
Sadashivrao Bhau's camp at Delhi after the first fortnight was near
the Shalimar Gardens watered by the famous Ali Mardan Khan canal. The
place is still very charming, filled with the fragrance of the blossoms of the
lucat trees during September and October. The water pavilions of the lux-
urious Mughal Emperors are still to be seen there with their mural paintings
of birds and flowers, though in a dilapidated condition. Already three con-
querors, namely, Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah and Raghunathrao, had lived in
them during two decades Now Bhau had occasion to halt there.
Though from the military point of view the possession of Delhi was
no great gain, it restored the prestige of the Maratha name. Ahmad Shah was,
at this time, camping at Anupshahar on the Ganges but he was unable to send
any succour to his nominee, Yakub Ali Khan.⁶⁰ Shuja-ud-daulah was ac-
tually encamping just on the opposite side of the Jamuna⁶¹ but he was also
helpless to do anything in the matter. Perhaps they knew that it was impos-
sible to face Ibrahim Khan's artillery and therefore remained silent. In the
popular mind, however, the Maratha prestige, lost and lowered by the previous
year's events, was completely restored. Shuja, who had willingly joined Abdali,
began to waver in his resolution.⁶² He began to exert himself in the peace-
move. The Indian allies of Ahmad Shah Abdali in this campaign had joined
their forces with his as a lesser evil only. The trans-Gangetic Ruhelas under
the leadership of the sagacious Hafiz Rahmat had no love lost for Najib Khan,
whose faithlessness and unscrupulous dealings they would not approve. The
lame Ahmad Khan Bangash was always shaky in his resolution, never being
sure which side to choose. His situation was always precarious as his district
of Farukkhabad was situated amidst the more powerful states of Oudh, the
Ruhelas, the Marathas and the Jats. Though weak, Ahmad Khan was not
unselfish either. He would side with the Marathas with a view to gain some
⁵⁹ Bhau Kaifiyat p 9 Raj. 1.223
⁶⁰ Illiot. 8 147
⁶¹ Raj. 1.224.
⁶² Ibid. 1.191

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 45
portion of Shuja's dominions or the land of the Ruhelas. When not threatened
by Shuja and when the Maratha armies were not in his neighbourhood, he
would not shirk from invading and occupying the Maratha districts in the
lower Doab.⁶³ He would never offend any party by his words and always
tried to keep himself on speaking terms with all. Ahmad Khan had come to
Abdali's camp but seeing that there was no work there for three months of
the rains he and also the Ruhelas, except Najib, left for their homes with
Abdali's permission.⁶⁴ From their homes they kept on writing to Bhau that
they had joined Abdali under duress. Bhau seems to have misjudged their
motives as they were always keeping up a correspondence with Bhau and
promising to join him under certain conditions. It is difficult to say whether
they actually feared the consequences of joining Abdali as against the Mara-
thas or were merely fooling him this time so as to save their dominions from
the armies of Govindpant Bundele and Gopalrao Ganesh Barve. But Bhau was
trying his best to take advantage of the enforced delay and hoping to separate
some of his allies from Abdali. Many Afghan sardars wrote to Bhau that they
would detach themselves from Abdali as soon as they found an opportunity
to do so. But Abdali kept a strict watch over them and never once allowed
them to move away from his camp. Bhau even tried to detach some of the
Afghan tribes who were accompanying Abdali with the hope of loot but were
not directly employed by him, and were actually starving. Ahmad Shah's
Durrani troops were at this time living on loot. Najib was supplying Abdali
with 200 maunds of grain and 15,000 rupees cash every day for his aid. But
this was sufficient for his personal slaves only. Bhau had ordered Govindpant to
engage them if they came over to his side and to send them to Bhau's camp
if necessary.⁶⁵ He had asked Govindpant to remain where he was and try to
move in such a way as to make Shuja and the Ruhelas leave Abdali's camp
for defending their threatened territories.⁶⁶ But the terror of Abdali's forces
was such that it made any move on Govindpant's part well-nigh impossible.
The Maratha officials in the Doab seem to have been completely demoralised
by the experience of the past four years, and no one was ready to take any
risk in the matter. This is clear from Sadashivrao Bhau's order to Govind-
pant in the middle of August to forbid any Maratha employed under him to
send back his effects to the Deccan, as Bhau had come to know of such a
move.⁶⁷ It meant that the Marathas living in those regions were not very
sanguine about the outcome of the war and feared the worst. This explains
the cause of the non-compliance of Sadashivrao Bhau's orders by Govindpant
and Gopalrao Barve. They were unable to do anything vigorously or enthu-
siastically because the overwhelming majority of the Maratha employees had
completely lost heart.
Notwithstanding such sombre atmosphere Sadashivrao Bhau was going
on with his plans of meeting Abdali after the rains. Though the hope of solv-
ing the political problem of the governance of India without resort to arms was
⁶³ Ibid. 1.236.
⁶⁴ Ibid. 1.237.
⁶⁵ Ibid. 1.257
⁶⁶ Ibid. 1.242
⁶⁷ Ibid. 1.223.

46 PANIPAT 1761
very remote, still peace parleys continued throughout. Najib Khan's proposal
forwarded through Shuja was to hand over the regions beyond Sarhind to
Abdali and hand over the Delhi affairs into his hands Shuja wanted the
Chancellorship as well as the command over the army of the Mughal Em
pire ⁶⁸ But Najib would never allow the military command to pass out of his
hands Bhau's idea was to fix the boundary at Attock, leaving Peshawar and
Kabul to Abdali, while the imperial defence would be left as it was, meaning
through the agency of the Marathas But Bhau was not obstinate on any
point. He knew that no one could have everything his own way In diplo
macy "give and take" is necessary and inevitable, and therefore he still hoped
to find a via media out of the impasse
The condition in the middle of September was as follows There was
no money left in the government treasury nor was any forthcoming from the
revenue collectors like Govindpant Bundele Bhau knew the economic con
dition of the region surrounding Delhi very well and understood the difficulties
of recovering government dues in the then conditions of northern India Be
sides the military trouble due to war with Abdali, nature also had some say
in the affair Hail storms and certain pests had that year destroyed the crops
in many parts and there was a consequent deficit in revenue collection ⁶⁹ The
dismissal of old collectors like Naro Shankar and his brother and recently of
Mahadaji Govind Kakirde⁷⁰ appointed in his place, had adversely affected the
Maratha revenues in Bundelkhand Bhau also suspected the sincerity of the
collectors who, he thought, were withholding payments with a view to take
advantage of the difficulties of the government ⁷¹ They would pay after the
event instead of before it, as they were not sure of the result of the war and
hoped to profit thereby As the army was starving and not even a week's
payment out of the month could be made to them, Bhau had recourse to the
politically disastrous action of taking out the silver ceiling of the Diwan i khas,
and minting it into money He was able to secure only nine lakhs by this
process and thereby feed his army for one month only It seems this action
was tom tomed as insulting to the Mughal throne by the Muslim partisans of
Najib, and it inflamed the Muslim population in the surrounding regions
against the Marathas As a matter of fact, the Wazir Ghazi ud din had already
taken out a part of that very ceiling previously when he was in need of money,
and Bhau was not the first vandal to touch it as made out by partisan his-
torians ⁷² But none seemed to have noticed the Wazir's act while all flared
up against Bhau's behaviour When the famous peacock throne of Shah Jahan
was taken away by Nadir Shah or when the whole palace and its inmates
were completely stripped of their effects by Abdali, none seemed to have thought
these as an insult to the Mughal throne then, possibly because the spoliators
were devout Muslims
68 Purandare 1.389
69 Shinde 1.222 Purandare 1.386.
70 Satara 2.291 Dabholkar Mss. 152.
71 SPD 27.234.
72 Ibid 27.257

SADASHIVRAO’S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 47
Bhau’s difficulties were increased by the Peshwa’s ignorance of northern
Indian affairs. It was customary for the Maratha army to subsist on the land
they marched through; but, after experience, the people of the regions through
which they marched had become wiser than before, and left nothing on the
spot to be carried away by the Marathas. Bhau had himself taken Raghunath-
rao to task for not being able to defray the expenditure of his campaign, and
now he could not possibly ask for funds from the Deccan. The stress of cir-
cumstances, however, obliged even the proud Bhau to beg for funds. The
Peshwa first ordered the revenue collectors in the north to pay half the revenues
to Bhau. This order only facilitated equivocation by the delaying collectors
They would write to the Peshwa that Bhau had taken the whole revenue from
them and write to Bhau that they had sent the whole money to the Deccan.
Bhau, therefore, over-riding the Peshwa’s orders, asked the collectors to send
the whole amount to him only. Still no money was forthcoming from anybody
Bhau had received two lakhs’from Govindpant and eighty thousand from Babu-
rao Koner of Jhansi. This was all he was able to receive at Delhi. While
Bhau was besieged at Panipat, Govindpant brought four lakhs and twenty
thousand to Delhi at the beginning of December, only a quarter of which
reached Bhau’s camp in safety. Besides Govindpant, some other collectors
like Gopal Keshav of Bhander (SPD, 29-12) also seem to have forwarded
their collections to Delhi after Bhau’s move to Kunjpura. The capture of
Delhi had placed an additional burden on Bhau’s depleted treasury because he
had now to provide for the palace-expenditure which came to more than a
lakh per month.
There is some ground for suspicion that Bhau’s plans were being ob-
structed by certain forces in Poona, antagonistic to him. Gopikabai, the wife
of the Peshwa, always feared, it seems, the complete usurpation of power by
Bhau as he was already the sole administrator. The Peshwa was every day
growing weaker and weaker both physically and morally. This fact also en-
hanced the lady’s fears. She, as well as the Peshwa’s advisers in Poona, espe-
cially the wily Sakharam Bapu, who it should be noted, was with the Peshwa in
the Deccan and had not accompanied Vishwasrao to the north, as wrongly
stated by Sir Jadunath,⁷³ seem to have been responsible for advising the
Peshwa to withhold any more help to Bhau for fear of his increasing power.
Sakharam Bapu was perhaps the cleverest brain in the Poona Court of those
times. He was from very early days a sort of rival to Bhau in diplomatic
matters. The Peshwa seems to have used Bapu as a tool to keep a balance
of power at the Poona Court. Bhau’s ways were open and straightforward.
Bapu’s conduct was exactly the reverse. The two could not go together with
these contrary dispositions. Sakharam Bapu had, therefore, always sided with
the party opposite to Bhau. He accompanied Raghunathrao in his north
Indian campaigns as his chief adviser and administrator. Though Raghunath-
rao as the master cannot be absolved from the blame, the chief responsibility
for the financial mismanagement of his campaigns should be properly placed
on Sakharam Bapu’s shoulders. Being conscious of his share in the guilt,
⁷³ Fall 2.240 (foot note)

48 PANIPAT 1761
Bapu naturally must have come to loggerheads with Bhau when the final ac-
counts of the campaigns came to be settled
Peculation was quite rampant in those days in official circles and the
Maratha state was no exception to the rule Profiteering at the cost of govern-
ment was thought to be no sin and was a normal part of a wise man's living
While some of the generals and diplomats and administrators waxed fat, the
state languished for want of money The Peshwa's government perhaps suf-
fered more than the other governments through this mischief, because the ruder
Maratha generals were more grabbing and the selfish and brainy Brahmin ac-
countants and collectors were clever at figures To spite Bhau now, Bapu must
have taken full advantage of his difficulties in tutoring the Peshwa against him
Bhau's advisers and assistants in this campaign were also rivals of Bapu at the
Poona Court Trimbak Sadashiv alias Nana Purandare and Balvantrao
Mehendale were not well disposed towards him, Nana Purandare was on al-
most inimical terms with Bapu 74 In short Sakharam Bapu belonged to the
party of critics of Sadashivrao's policy One is, therefore, led to believe in
the truth of that one line commentary copied and reproduced in Khare I,75
which also explains to some extent the attitude of the Peshwa towards the
Delhi campaign of Sadashivrao Bhau as reported by Naro Gangadhar from
the Peshwa's camp in the Deccan 76
Sadashivrao Bhau, writing from Delhi in the middle of September 1760
to his intimate friend, Dhondo Malhar Purandare, states that there is no dif-
ference of opinion between him and the two sardars Shinde and Holkar It
means that the dramatic episode of Surajmal described in detail in the Bakhar
is all imaginary and an after thought Honest difference of opinion about the
policy to be followed against Abdali might be there, but the cause of his ab-
ruptly leaving Delhi without taking leave of Bhau must be his disappointment
Bhau would not place the city in the charge of the Jat, but appointed Naro
Shankar as the guardian of the city and the palace, instead Surajmal was,
no doubt, very shrewd and cautious His advice to keep the main camp with
its heavy encumbrances back in the Gwalior region was sound But he was
personally very selfish and always tried to secure his ends under the cloak of
humbleness. This time he wished to follow the same path and set himself
up as a regent in Delhi with the help of the Marathas His past behaviour
towards the Marathas was neither very honest nor consistent After Raghu-
nathrao's campaign against him in 1754, he occupied the lands in the Doab
surrounding Kol Ramgad during their absence from the north in 1755 77 In
1756 he would not risk his troops against Abdali by joining Antaji Manakesh-
war, though he took full advantage of Antaji's cover to guard his dominions
and save his forts When Raghunathrao again returned to the north, he still
kept himself studiously aloof and saved his skin Meanwhile he had reaped
the harvest out of Maratha weakness due to Jayapa's assassination He sud-
denly descended upon the strong imperial hill fort of Alwar which guarded
74 Purandare 3.82.
75 Khare, 1.25
6 SI D 2.133
77 Hingne 1.159.