वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 2. 20.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 353
rest), (aggregation is possible), (we reply:) no, because of (their) being
the causes of the origin only (of the immediately subsequent effects,
and not of aggregation)”.¹
Bhāskara
Reading slightly different, viz.: “Itaretara-pratyaya-manyat-
vāt . . . .” ²
—————
SŪTRA 20
“AND BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PRIOR ON THE
PRODUCTION OF THE SUBSEQUENT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
For this reason, too, this doctrine is not reasonable,—since “on
the production of the subsequent”, there results the destruction of the
prior, it being momentary.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued that as the prior is the cause of the production of
the later, so our doctrine is consistent,—(we reply:) no “Because
of the cessation of the prior on the production of the subsequent.”
In ordinary life, causality is observed to belong only to an existent
lump of clay, the prior, at the time of the production of a pot, the
subsequent. But on your view, on account of the momentariness of
all existing objects, the prior moment is destroyed and cannot, there-
fore, be the cause of the subsequent moment. Here a momentary
existence is said to be ‘moment’. Now, to begin with, does the prior
moment of the pot ³ give rise to the subsequent effect which exists
at the same time, or as itself unoriginated, or as itself destroyed ?
The first alternative is not tenable, because that (viz the effect) also
(will give rise to) another effect existing at the same time, that,
too, to another and so on, and thus everything will last only for a
moment simultaneously; and because the conventional distinction
between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. The

¹ S.B. 2.2.19, p. 537; G.B. 2.2.19, pp. 113-114, Chap. 2
² Bh. B. 2.2.19, p. 117.
³ I.e. the prior momentary existence pot.
23

[SŪ 2. 2. 21.
354 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible More-
over, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but
its non-existence, and if it (viz non-existence) be a cause, then by
reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of
everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable
because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of
everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary
existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary
existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned.
SŪTRA 21
"(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE
CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF
THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS-
NESS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non-
existent, there must result the "contradiction of the initial proposi-
tion", viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz.
sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the
admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there
must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior
momentary existence is still present, and thus there must be
"simultaneousness" according to your view, the maintainers of the
doctrine of momentariness!
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author condemns the causeless origin of effects.
If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent
(effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot
be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of
the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the
"contradiction of the initial proposition". Thus, there must be the
"contradiction", i.e abandonment, of your initial proposition that
in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main
cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest, the auxiliary
cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;

[sū. 2. 2. 22.
ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 355
and the supporting cause, viz the sense-objects ¹ Moreover, even if
the causeless origin of effect be admitted, the above-mentioned fault,
viz. the origin of everything everywhere, remains unavoidable. If,
again, to avoid this difficulty, the case be admitted to be "otherwise",
i e if it be admitted that the effect originates when the cause is existent,
then there must be "simultaneousness", i e. there must be simulta-
neous existence of the cause and the effect. That is, the above-
mentioned objection remains in force. Thus, does the prior momentary
existence pot come to be the cause of another momentary existence
pot at the time when it (the prior) itself exists, or does it become the
cause of the subsequent moment,—which is being generated,—by
lasting till the time of its production ? In either case, there is simul-
taneousness. On the first alternative, all the momentary existences
will come to be perceived at the same time, and the conventional
distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end.
On the second alternative, their momentariness will be abolished,
and owing to the persistence of two momentary existences, there
must follow a simultaneous perception of two momentary existences
in the same place.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
The meaning of the phrase "pratijñoparodhaḥ" different, viz.
contradiction of the initial proposition (viz. that the world originates
from the skandhas) ²
——————
SŪTRA 22
"(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSCIOUS AND
UNCONSCIOUS DESTRUCTION ³ ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-INTERRUP-
TION (OF THE STREAM OF COGNITIONS) "
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction,⁴
because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous
series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series.
————————————————————————————————————————————
¹ Adhipati, sahakārin, samanantara, ālambana.
² G.B. 2.2.21, pp 115-16, Chap 2.
³ Prati-saṁkhyā and aprati-saṁkhyā.
⁴ For explanation, see below V.K.

356 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 22.
ADH. 3.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents,
has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted
by them, is being disposed of
The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is
"conscious destruction"; destruction not so preceded is "unconscious
destruction". These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them.
Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by
the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination
of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable
and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruc-
tion of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless
and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every
moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is
the "non-establishment", i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of
destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members
of the series. Why? "On account of the non-interruption of the
series." First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus,
it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment
of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is
admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it
of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent
indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the
series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and
the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of
the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being
possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the
case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction
are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed
existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series
is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times—
this is the sense.
Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the
series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction
of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the percep-
tion of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also
that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every
moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the

[sū. 2. 2. 23.
ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 357
above objection cannot be raised,—for then such a destruction being
possible on the part of the last member of the series, a causal destruction
becomes meaningless. It cannot be said also that there is the origin
of a series of dissimilar momentary existences through (the blow of) a
hammer and the rest too, and as such the above objection cannot be
raised,—because when the prior member is destroyed by a hammer
and so on, too, there resulting the origin of a subsequent one, similar
to it, by reason of the absence of contrary circumstances, there is no
possibility for a series of dissimilar existences; and because of the
absence of any reason for the origination of a series of dissimilar
existences.
A causeless destruction of the series, too, is not possible, for then
the disappearance of the entire universe will result
In the same manner, these two (viz. the causeless and causal
destructions) are not possible with regard to the single members of the
series,—for if here the causeless destruction of particular members
be admitted, then the destruction once more of the momentary
members by the hammer and the rest will be impossible. A causeless
destruction, too, cannot become the annihilator of existent objects,
since single members of the series, like pots and the rest, are recognized ¹
COMPARISON
Bhāskara
Reading different, viz "asambhavāḥ" in place of "avicchedāt".²
SŪTRA 23
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because the series has no existence beyond the single members
of the series, and because single members themselves are momentary,
¹ I.e. there can be no complete destruction of that which is, e.g. when
a vessel of clay is smashed to pieces, we still perceive and recognize the material,
viz. clay, which continues to exist.
² Bh. B. 2.2.22, p. 120.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 23
358 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.]
their view, viz. that salvation is the cessation of nescience, too, is
inconsistent
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also, the Buddhistic view is inconsistent. Why?
Because there is "fault" in their view of salvation even "in both
ways". Thus, salvation is held by them to be the cessation of nescience
and the rest Is this (a cessation) of the series or of the single members
of the series? Not the first, because as the series has no existence
beyond the single members, it (viz the cessation of the series) is
incapable of (bringing about) salvation. Not the second, because the
single members are momentary
Moreover, is salvation, consisting in the cessation of nescience
and the rest, due to a cause or not? If the first, i.e. on the view :
Salvation arises from the repeated practice of four-fold truths, viz
the truth that there is a cause, the truth that there is cessation, the
truth that there is suffering and the truth that there is a path ¹ The
truth that there is a cause means the knowledge, i e. ascertainment,
that everything has an origin. The truth that there is cessation means
that everything is momentary. The truth that there is suffering
means that everything is full of suffering. The truth that there is a
path means that everything is void, everything is soulless,--on this
view, the cessation of attachment and the rest being admitted to arise
from these, the initial proposition, viz that there is a causeless destruc-
tion, is set aside. If the second, the teaching of the means will become
futile. And thus there is fault in both the ways
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja
This is sūtra 22 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz.. "Because there is fault in both ways", i.e. the Buddhistic views
of origination from nothing and passing away into nothing are both
open to objections.²
Bhāskara
This sūtra is not found in the commentary of Bhāskara

¹ Samudāya, nirodha, duḥkha, mārga.
² Śrī. B. 2.2.22, p. 93.

[sū. 2. 2. 24.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 359
Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 22 in his commentary too His interpretation is also
very similar to that of Rāmānuja, viz on the Buddhist view, the
originated effect is unreal, (since it passes away as soon as it arises);
also the effect arises from non-existent cause (since the cause which is
momentary is no more, when the effect comes to be) Hence the
Buddhist view is untenable ¹
SŪTRA 24
“AND IN THE ETHER TOO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And the initial proposition enunciated by them was that there
is non-existence “in the ether”; ² and this is not reasonable, “on
account of (its) non-distinction” from the earth and the rest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
They maintain that the destruction of existing objects which is
preceded by an act of thought, the destruction which is not preceded
by an act of thought, and the ether,—these three are non-entities,
and as such, non-definable, causeless and unreal. Among these, the
two kinds of destruction have been disposed of Incidentally, salva-
tion, consisting in the cessation of nescience, has been condemned.
Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms, maintaining the demon-
strated conclusion of Scripture, is condemning the (doctrine of) the
non-definableness of the ether, the remaining one.
The initial proposition of the non-substantiality of the ether is
not reasonable, “on account of the non-distinction” of the ether,
in point of substantiality, from the earth and the rest,—and just as
terrestrial animals move on the earth, and the acquatic animals in
water, so do the flying animals in the sky,—and also on account
of the scriptural declaration of the producibleness of the ether, like
other positive entities,—this is indicated by the particle “and” (in
the sūtra),—in the passage: “From him arise the vital-breath, the
¹ ŚK. B. 2 2.22, p. 86, Parts 7 and 8.
² I.e. the ether is a non-entity.

[SŪ. 2 2. 25-26.
360 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3]
mind, and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, the light, water and
the earth, the supporter of all” (Muṇḍ. 2.1 3) The substantiality of the
ether was approved by the Buddha as well, who said out of compassion:
‘As long as there is the existence of the ether, and as long as there
is the existence of the world, so long may there be the existence of
me, the destroyer of the sufferings of the world’.
COMPARISON
Bhāskara
This is sūtra 23 in Bhāskara ¹ Interpretation of the word
“aviśeṣāt” different; viz. “from the same (scriptural text, viz. Tait.
2 1)” it is known that the ether like the air and the rest, arises from
the soul.²
SŪTRA 25
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And on account of the recognition, viz ‘This is that’, this doctrine
is untrue.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this too the doctrine of momentariness is not reasonable.
Why? “On account of remembrance”, i.e on account of the remem-
brance of an entity, perceived by one. Hence an eternal soul, the
experiencer, must of necessity be acknowledged, otherwise the cessation
of all practical activities will result.
——————
SŪTRA 26
“(THERE CAN BE NO ORIGINATION) FROM THE NON-EXISTENT,
BECAUSE OF NON-OBSERVATION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
An entity does not arise from a non-entity, “on account of non-
observation”.
¹ Written as sūtra 2.2.24 in conformity with Śaṃkara’s number.
² Bh. B. 2.2.23, p. 121.

[sū. 2. 2. 27.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 361
Vedānta-kaustubha
It is assumed by the Buddhists that there is the origin of an
entity from a non-entity. This is not reasonable. Why? Because
the origin of pots and the rest from non-existent clay, etc is never
observed,—on the contrary, their origin from existent clay and the
rest alone is observed.
COMPARISON
Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 25 in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. He begins a
new adhikarana here, ending with the next sūtra, concerned with the
refutation of the Sautrāntika school of the realist Buddhists.
According to him, the preceding sūtras are concerned with the
refutation of the Vaibhāṣika school only But Nimbārka refutes
these two schools together.
Baladeva also takes this sūtra as concerned specially with the
refutation of the Sautrāntika school, though he does not begin a new
adhikarana since he takes the next sūtra to be referring to both the
schools equally.
They interpret the sūtra in the same manner, viz. ("There is no
origin of things from) the non-existent, on account of non-perception".
That is, the Sautrāntika view that an object is inferred from the
impressions left on our mind by it is absurd, for a momentary, and as
such a non-existent, something cannot produce any impressions.¹
SŪTRA 27
"AND THUS (THERE WILL BE) ACCOMPLISHMENT ON THE PART OF
THE INACTIVE AS WELL."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Otherwise, there may be the "accomplishment" of ends like
knowledge and the rest on the part of one who has not resorted to
any means.
¹ ŚK. B. 2.2.25, p. 92, Parts 7 and 8, G.B. 2.2.26. p. 122, Chap. 2.

362 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 2. 28.
ADH. 4.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Moreover, just as it is admitted by you that there is the origin
of entity from non-entity, so there will result the "accomplishment"
of the desired-for effects, through the mere non-existence of implements,
even "on the part of the inactive", i.e. on the part of those who have
discarded the implements leading to their desired ends. But there is
never any attainment of knowledge and the rest by one who is inactive,
and a perpetual religious student, leading a life of chastity ¹ and
unmarried, never gets a son. Hence, it is established that the
demonstrated conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the views
of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, based on a mere semblance
of (and not real) reason
Here ends the section entitled "The aggregate" (3).
Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Percep-
tion". (Sūtras 28-31)
SŪTRA 28
“(THERE IS) NO NON-EXISTENCE (OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS), ON
ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is "no non-existence" of external objects as held by the
maintainers of the reality of consciousness alone; but they are, indeed,
existent. Why? "On account of perception"
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the view of the Yogācāra is being disposed of.
The Yogācāra Buddhist, the maintainer of the reality of
consciousness alone, holds that those objects which are other than
consciousness are all non-existent. Thus, to think that manifold
external objects exist is an error. There are only manifold cognitions
which are momentary, variegated, perceptible and have definite forms.
Only cognitions like 'blue', 'yellow', which have definite forms, are
revealed (directly to the mind). It must be admitted certainly even
by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that the cognitions
arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects
¹ Naiṣṭhika.

[sū. 2. 2. 28.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 363
have forms of those objects respectively If this be so, then all
practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what
is the use of imagining external objects ? It (viz a cognition) being
self-manifesting like a lamp, is directly perceived If what is non-
perceived be cognized, then there will be non-distinction between one’s
own cognitions and the cognitions of others But there is indeed
a distinction (between them). A man acts or refrains from acting on
the basis of his own cognitions. This has been declared by Viprabhikṣu
as well thus: 'There is no understanding of the meaning of what is
non-perceived The cognitive self, though non-divided, is yet looked
upon by men of perverted understanding to be possessed of the
differences of object perceived, the perceiver and consciousness'.
Thus, the object-form is the object to be known, the perceiver-form is
the act of knowledge, and his consciousness is the result, and thus
these three are imagined in one and the same process of consciousness
Hence there are no external objects
For this reason also (there are no external objects—viz.). On
account of being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference
between 'blue' and its cognition. Whenever there is the cognition of
blue, blue, too, is cognized at the very same moment Hence, there is
no difference between these two
For this reason, too, (there are no external objects, viz ) : The
cognitions in our waking state are devoid of (i.e. do not correspond to)
external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-
cognitions and the rest
If it be asked: How can there be a variety of cognitions in the
absence of external objects ? We reply: owing to the variety of the
past impressions The variety (of cognitions) is explicable by reason
of the fact that the cognitions and the past impressions stand in the
relation of mutual causes and effects, like the seed and the shoot.
(Correct conclusion ) On this suggestion, we reply The non-
existence of external objects is not possible. Why ? “On account of
perception,” i e. because of the direct perception of external objects,
other than cognitions. Although the individual soul, having the
stated marks, is eternal knowledge by nature and its attribute of
knowledge, too, is indeed eternal like the ray of the sun, yet since
it has its knowledge veiled by nescience due to the beginningless māyā,¹
1 I e. prakṛti or matter.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 29.
364 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4 ]
it errs in cognizing objects in birth after birth, as well as in one birth
even. And it knows once more the sun and the rest, installed by the
Highest Self, as well as the objects collected by its father and fore-
fathers, which are all already existent, from the surrounding company
of people. The sense is that, hence, there is no non-existence of the
objects which are different from knowledge, the sun and the moon,
fire, mountain, the earth, water, cow, horse and the rest being
established on the ground of direct perception.
The argument,—viz. It is to be admitted certainly even by
the maintainers of the reality of external objects that cognitions
arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects
have the forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all
practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what
is the use of imagining external objects?—is not tenable, since in the
absence of objects, the cognitions of the objects cannot have forms
similar to them. Thus, an external object is other than knowledge
and its knowledge is other than it.
The argument—viz. that owing to their being uniformly perceived
together, there is no difference between blue and its perception,—too,
is not tenable, for there is an admission of difference through this
very admission of a simultaneous perception.¹
SŪTRA 29
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF DISSIMILARITY, (THE WAKING COGNITIONS
ARE) NOT LIKE DREAMS AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state cannot be
established on the analogy of the dream-cognitions and the rest, on
account of there being no parallelism between the two cases; as well
as on account of dream-consciousness too, having a basis.
1 That is, to say that A and B are perceived together is to say that there
is a difference between them. Otherwise there is no sense in saying that A and
B are perceived together.

[sū. 2. 2. 30.
ADH. 4 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 365
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the argument, viz. The cognitions in the waking state do not
correspond to external objects, because they are mere cognitions,
like the dream-cognitions and the rest, we reply.
It cannot be said that the cognitions in the waking state are
without a basis "like dreams and the rest", i.e. like the dream-
cognitions and the illusory cognitions. Why? "On account of
dissimilarity," i. e. because there is dissimilarity between the cognitions
in the waking state and the dream-cognitions, as the former are due
to attentive sense-organs, while the latter to inattentive sense-organs;
also because—as indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra)—
even the dream-cognitions have bases.
—————
SŪTRA 30
"THE EXISTENCE (OF PAST IMPRESSIONS) NOT (POSSIBLE), ON
ACCOUNT OF NON-PERCEPTION"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Moreover, the "existence" of past impressions is admitted by
you in order that there may be variety in knowledge; this is not
possible, since according to your view, external objects are not
perceived.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Moreover, if knowledge be without a basis, then its varieties,
such as the knowledge of a pot, the knowledge of blue, the knowledge
of yellow and so on, are not possible. If it be said that past impressions
are the cause of the variety of knowledge,—(we reply). "the existence"
of past impressions is not possible on your view. Why? "On account
of non-perception", i.e. because of the non-perception of the cause of
past impressions, or, because no such cause is possible on your view.
The direct perception of external objects is the cause of past
impressions, and that is not possible in your case, owing to your
non-admission of external objects

366 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 31.
ADH. 4.]
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation slightly
different, viz. “The existence (of cognition devoid of corresponding
things) is not (possible), because of non-perception”.¹
SŪTRA 31
“ON ACCOUNT OF MOMENTARINESS ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is no existence of past impressions, “on account of the
momentariness” of their substratum on your view.
Vedanta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, the existence of past impressions is not
possible. Why? “On account of the momentariness” of their sub-
stratum, the receptacle-consciousness,² viz. the ‘I’, as well as of the
single members of the uninterrupted series. Hence, the variety of
knowledge is due to the variety of objects. Therefore, it is established
that the settled conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the
Yogācāra view which is but a childish prattle.
Here ends the section entitled “Perception” (4)
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Baladeva
They add a “ca” at the end ³
1 Śrī. B. 2.2.29, p. 102, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.29, pp. 97-98, Parts 7 and 8.
2 Ālaya-vijñāna. The Vijñāna-skandha consists of vijñānas or cognitions
of two kinds, ālaya-vijñāna and pravṛtti-vijñāna. The former consists of cogni-
tions which refer to the ‘I’, the ego, while the latter those that refer to the so-
called external objects.
3 Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 557, G.B. 2.2.31.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 32.
ADH 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 367
Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
This sūtra is not found in their commentaries
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Incon-
sistency in every way". (Sūtra 32)
SŪTRA 32
“AND BECAUSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY (OF THE DOCTRINE OF A
UNIVERSAL VOID) IN EVERY WAY.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The doctrine of void, too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent
“in every way”, being opposed to the evidence of direct perception
and the rest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now the doctrine of universal void, as held by the Mādhyamikas,
is being disposed of
(The view is as follows·) All the objects mentioned in the sacred
works composed by the omniscient one (viz the Buddha), are simply
for the sake of suiting the intellectual capacities of his disciples, but
are not really existent, owing to the impossibility of the origin and
destruction (of things). The origin of entity from non-entity is
inappropriate (And if an entity arises from another entity, the
question is.) Is the entity which arises from another entity dissimilar
to the latter or similar ? If the first, then there will be the origin of
everything everywhere. If the second, then fruitlessness would result
like the grinding of what has already been ground ¹ Owing to such
inexplicability of origin, destruction, too, is inexplicable Hence, the
doctrine of void is to be accepted. Thus, salvation consists in attaining
a state of void,—such is the view of the Buddha. And this is perfectly
reasonable, since void is not proved by anything else, (but is self-
proved). The conventional distinctions of perceiver and the object
perceived and so on are mere errors.
1 I e. on the first alternative a gold ring may arise from clay; on the second,
there is no sense in producing something already existent, gold (ring) from gold.

368 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 32.
ADH. 5.]
With regard to it we reply The doctrine of universal void does
not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine
of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if
real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition.
"And on account of the inconsistency, in every way," of the doctrine
of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,—
because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant
and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it
is in conflict with the Buddha's doctrine, establishing the existence of
momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas
who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the
process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl
not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous
in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour
of contradiction in the view of Scripture.
Here ends the section entitled "Inconsistency in every way" (5).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the
Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of
universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third
school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside
by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate
refutation.¹
Bhāskara
This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at
the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine
of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of
the sole reality of cognitions.²
¹ Vide Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 558.
² Bh. B. 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with Śaṁkara's number),
p. 125.

[sū. 2. 2. 33.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 369
Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "Impossible
in one". (Sūtras 33-36)
SŪTRA 33
"(THE JAINA DOCTRINE IS) NOT (TENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE
IMPOSSIBILITY (OF CONTRADICTORY ATTRIBUTES) IN ONE (AND
THE SAME THING)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The Jainas ascribe contradictory attributes like existence and
non-existence and so on to all things. This does not stand to reason,
because the co-existence of contradictory attributes, like existence and
non-existence and the rest, is impossible, like that of shadow and
light.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The view of the Buddhists, who leave the hem of their lower
garment loose and untucked, has been disposed of. Now the view of
the Jainas, the naked, are being disposed of
They hold that the universe comprises souls and non-souls, and
is without a Lord. They maintain also that atoms are the causes
of the world. They imagine couples of contradictory attributes, like
existence and non-existence, in all the categories. Thus, according to
them, there are seven categories, summing up all scriptural teachings,
viz. soul, non-soul, influx (of foreign matter into the soul), (its)
stoppage, freedom from decay, bondage and release.1
Among these, the souls are sentient, and endowed with the
attributes of knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. Thus,
knowledge means the apprehension of the real nature of objects through
the right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. Perception
means cognizing objects, being free from attachment and detachment
The souls in bondage have worldly happiness, while the freed souls
have the happiness which inheres in themselves. Likewise strength
means proper endurance. These souls are possessed of parts, and are
of the size of the body. Among them, some are souls in bondage,
some are freed souls, some are ever-perfect The freed souls are
omniscient and possessed of unsurpassed happiness.
1 Jīva, ajīva, āsrava, saṁvara, nirjara, bandha and mokṣa.
24

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33.
370 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 6.]
The non-soul is the group of objects to be enjoyed by the souls.
It is divided into merit, demerit, matter, time and space.¹ Thus,
merit is a special kind of substance, inferrible from proper actions.
Demerit is the cause of the existence of the non-freed Matter is a
substance possessed of colour, smell, taste and touch. It is of two
kinds, viz. atoms, and their aggregates. The atoms are the causes
of the earth and the rest; and they are not of four kinds, as held by
the logicians, but are identical in nature. The distinctions of the
earth and the rest are due to the modifications of these atoms. The
four-fold elements beginning with the earth, as well as the body,
the worlds and so on, are their aggregates Time, on the other hand,
is a special kind of substance which is the cause of the conventional
distinctions of long, quick and fast and so on, and is atomic in form
Space is the absence of covering. It is of two kinds, viz. worldly-
space which is mundane, and non-worldly-space,² which is the abode of
the freed souls.
Influx means the activity of the sense-organs which causes a person
to know ³ sense-objects. Or else, influx means karma which complies
to,⁴ i.e. follows after, pervading the agent (i.e. pertains to him).
Stoppage means that which stops ⁵ the activities of the sense-
organs, i.e. the stoppage of the sense-organs, consisting in a deep
meditation.
Freedom from decay means that which destroys ⁶ the prior-
accumulated sins, i.e. austerities known from the teaching of the
Arhatas, consisting in not bathing, not speaking, squatting on the
thighs with the lower legs crossed over each other,⁷ eating what is spit
out from the mouth, mounting on heated stone, plucking out the
hairs on the head and so on.
Bondage means karma, and is of eight kinds. Among these,
there are four destructive-karmas,⁸---viz. relating to the obscuration of
knowledge, relating to the mental blindness of perception, relating to
delusion, and relating to what hinders ⁹---which obstruct the attributes
of the souls, viz. knowledge, perception, happiness and strength.
¹ Dharma, adharma, pudgala, kāla and ākāśa.
² Lokākāśa and alokākāśa. ³ Āsrāvayati iti āsrava.
⁴ Āsravati iti āsrava. ⁵ Saṁvṛṇoti iti saṁvara.
⁶ Nirjarayati iti Nirjara. ⁷ Vīrāsana.
⁸ Ghāti-karma.
⁹ Jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, mohanīya and antarīya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 371
And, there are four non-destructive karmas,¹—viz. relating to the
knowable, relating to the name, relating to family descent and relating
to life,²—which are the causes of the body, its sense of egoity, regard
and disregard for the happiness and the rest due thereto
On the cessation of bondage, there is salvation, or the manifestation
of the natural and real nature of the soul through the grace of the ever-
perfect Arhatas.
They have also a set of different categories, consisting in five
ontological categories,³ viz. the category of the soul, the category of
matter, the category of merit, the category of demerit and the category
of space ⁴ The term ontological category (astikāya) is denotative of
conventional objects occupying many places. (The compound
‘jīvāstikāya’ is to be explained as) a Karma-dhāraya thus. The soul
is the category,⁵ and so on in all other cases too To all these, they
apply the system of seven paralogisms,⁶ viz. May be it is, may be it
is not, may be it is not predicable, may be it is and is not, may be it is
and is not predicable, may be it is not and is not predicable, may be
it is, it is not, and is not predicable.⁷ (The compound ‘Sapta-bhaṅgī-
naya’ is to be explained thus:) The aggregate of the seven dialectical
formulæ is ‘sapta-bhaṅgī,⁸ its reasoning’ (sapta-bhaṅgī-naya). The
word ‘may’ (syāt) is an indeclinable represented by a verbal ending,
and should be understood to have the meaning of ‘littleness’. Thus,
it is to be construed as—It exists partly and does not exist partly,
and so on. The sense is this: The whole mass of object, consisting of
substances and modifications ⁹ is variable. The form of the substance
being one, permanent and conceivable as existent, existence, oneness,
permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to it. The modifica-
tions are the particular states of the substance, having the forms
of pots, pieces of cloth and the rest. And they being many,
¹ Aghāti-karma.
² Vedanīya, nāmika, gotrika, āyuska. ³ Astikāya.
⁴ Jīvāstikāya, pudgalāstikāya, adharmāstikāya, ākāśāstikāya.
⁵ Jīvaś cāsau astikāyaś ca. ⁶ Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya.
⁷ Syād asti, syān nāsti, syād avyaktavya, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād asti
cāvyaktavyaś ca, syān nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca, syād asti ca nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca.
⁸ Here the ending ‘ī’ is in accordance with Pāṇ. 2.4.17; SD. K. 821, as
modified by the Vārttika-sūtra of Kātyāyana 1556, “Akārāntottarapado dviguḥ
striyāṁ iṣṭaḥ”. Vide B.M., p 548, vol. 1.
⁹ Dravya and paryyāya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33.
372 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 6.]
non-permanent and conceivable as non-existent, non-existence, non-
permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to them.
With regard to it we reply. This cannot be said Why ?
Because the seven-fold reasoning, like partly existent, partly
non-existent and the rest, is not possible "in one object". The
simultaneous co-existence of darkness and light is never seen or
heard. In the same manner, couples of contradictory attributes like
existence and non-existence and so on are indeed impossible in
the same place.
If it be objected: Your own view, too, admits couples of
contradictory attibutes in one and the same substratum, e.g. in the
text "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), Unity is
established, while in the texts: "The Lord of matter and soul, the
Controller of the gunas" (Śvet 6.16), "Two birds" (Muṇḍ 3.1.1;
Śvet. 4.6), plurality is established,—(we reply.) No, because this view
is not based on reasoning,¹ since the real view can be determined, as
mutually non-contradictory, through Scripture alone. Thus, it being
impossible for the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the
non-sentient, to be non-different from Brahman by nature, it is non-
different from Him only as having its existence and activity under
His control (and not by nature), as indicated by the phrase 'emanating
from Him' and so on.² But there is indeed a difference of nature
between the categories, viz. the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman,
because the texts designating duality, too, are no less authoritative,—
just as leaves, flowers and the rest are different by nature from the
tree and are non-different from it on account of having no separate
existence; and just as in spite of the difference of the sense-organs
from the vital-breath by nature, their non-difference from it, as being
under its control, is not incompatible. In the same manner, the
difference and non-difference between the Universe and Brahman are
natural and established in Scripture and Smṛti. What contradiction
is there? In the very same manner, the complementary passage
confirms the relation of difference-non-difference between the Universe
and Brahman. The phrase 'emanating from Him' (tajjātān) is
denotative of the reason, (meaning) because it emanates from that
¹ So that it might be controverted by reason.
² The text is: "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, dis-
appearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1).