वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

356 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 22.
ADH. 3.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents,
has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted
by them, is being disposed of
The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is
"conscious destruction"; destruction not so preceded is "unconscious
destruction". These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them.
Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by
the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination
of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable
and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruc-
tion of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless
and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every
moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is
the "non-establishment", i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of
destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members
of the series. Why? "On account of the non-interruption of the
series." First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus,
it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment
of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is
admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it
of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent
indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the
series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and
the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of
the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being
possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the
case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction
are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed
existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series
is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times—
this is the sense.
Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the
series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction
of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the percep-
tion of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also
that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every
moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the