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सर्वकोश
वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

Vedanta Parijata Saurabha of Nimbarkacharya with Commentary

भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य (टीकाकार: श्रीश्रीनिवासचार्य - वेदान्तकौस्तुभ सहित) द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished906 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 384, कुल 906 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 384

[SŪ. 2. 2. 29.
364 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4 ]
it errs in cognizing objects in birth after birth, as well as in one birth
even. And it knows once more the sun and the rest, installed by the
Highest Self, as well as the objects collected by its father and fore-
fathers, which are all already existent, from the surrounding company
of people. The sense is that, hence, there is no non-existence of the
objects which are different from knowledge, the sun and the moon,
fire, mountain, the earth, water, cow, horse and the rest being
established on the ground of direct perception.
The argument,—viz. It is to be admitted certainly even by
the maintainers of the reality of external objects that cognitions
arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects
have the forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all
practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what
is the use of imagining external objects?—is not tenable, since in the
absence of objects, the cognitions of the objects cannot have forms
similar to them. Thus, an external object is other than knowledge
and its knowledge is other than it.
The argument—viz. that owing to their being uniformly perceived
together, there is no difference between blue and its perception,—too,
is not tenable, for there is an admission of difference through this
very admission of a simultaneous perception.¹
SŪTRA 29
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF DISSIMILARITY, (THE WAKING COGNITIONS
ARE) NOT LIKE DREAMS AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state cannot be
established on the analogy of the dream-cognitions and the rest, on
account of there being no parallelism between the two cases; as well
as on account of dream-consciousness too, having a basis.
1 That is, to say that A and B are perceived together is to say that there
is a difference between them. Otherwise there is no sense in saying that A and
B are perceived together.