वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

368 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 32.
ADH. 5.]
With regard to it we reply The doctrine of universal void does
not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine
of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if
real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition.
"And on account of the inconsistency, in every way," of the doctrine
of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,—
because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant
and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it
is in conflict with the Buddha's doctrine, establishing the existence of
momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas
who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the
process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl
not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous
in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour
of contradiction in the view of Scripture.
Here ends the section entitled "Inconsistency in every way" (5).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the
Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of
universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third
school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside
by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate
refutation.¹
Bhāskara
This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at
the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine
of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of
the sole reality of cognitions.²
¹ Vide Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 558.
² Bh. B. 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with Śaṁkara's number),
p. 125.