वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 2. 28.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 363
have forms of those objects respectively If this be so, then all
practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what
is the use of imagining external objects ? It (viz a cognition) being
self-manifesting like a lamp, is directly perceived If what is non-
perceived be cognized, then there will be non-distinction between one’s
own cognitions and the cognitions of others But there is indeed
a distinction (between them). A man acts or refrains from acting on
the basis of his own cognitions. This has been declared by Viprabhikṣu
as well thus: 'There is no understanding of the meaning of what is
non-perceived The cognitive self, though non-divided, is yet looked
upon by men of perverted understanding to be possessed of the
differences of object perceived, the perceiver and consciousness'.
Thus, the object-form is the object to be known, the perceiver-form is
the act of knowledge, and his consciousness is the result, and thus
these three are imagined in one and the same process of consciousness
Hence there are no external objects
For this reason also (there are no external objects—viz.). On
account of being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference
between 'blue' and its cognition. Whenever there is the cognition of
blue, blue, too, is cognized at the very same moment Hence, there is
no difference between these two
For this reason, too, (there are no external objects, viz ) : The
cognitions in our waking state are devoid of (i.e. do not correspond to)
external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-
cognitions and the rest
If it be asked: How can there be a variety of cognitions in the
absence of external objects ? We reply: owing to the variety of the
past impressions The variety (of cognitions) is explicable by reason
of the fact that the cognitions and the past impressions stand in the
relation of mutual causes and effects, like the seed and the shoot.
(Correct conclusion ) On this suggestion, we reply The non-
existence of external objects is not possible. Why ? “On account of
perception,” i e. because of the direct perception of external objects,
other than cognitions. Although the individual soul, having the
stated marks, is eternal knowledge by nature and its attribute of
knowledge, too, is indeed eternal like the ray of the sun, yet since
it has its knowledge veiled by nescience due to the beginningless māyā,¹
1 I e. prakṛti or matter.