वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

260 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 4. 24-25.
ADH. 7.]
SŪTRA 24
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF REFLECTION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"On account of the teaching of reflection" in the text: 'He
perceived (i.e thought): "May I be many"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), the fact
that Brahman is the creator (i.e. the efficient cause) and the material
cause is established.
Vedānta-kaustubha
"On account of the teaching of reflection," i.e. on account of
the teaching of resolution, in the passage: 'He wished' (Tait. 2.6),
as well as on account of the teaching of resolution in the passage
'"May I be many"' (Tait. 2.6, Chānd. 6.2.3), the Supreme Soul
alone can appropriately be the creator (or the efficient cause) and the
material cause respectively)
COMPÁRISON
All others read 'ca' in the end.¹
SŪTRA 25
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIRECT MENTION OF BOTH IN THE
SACRED TEXT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On account of the direct mention of Brahman as the efficient
and material cause in the sacred text: 'Brahman was the wood,
Brahman the tree from which they carved out the heaven and the
earth. O wise men, ask through the mind whereon it stood supporting
the worlds' ² (Tait. Br. 2.8.9.6-7 ³), Brahman alone is of the two-fold
forms.
¹ The reading in the C.S.S. ed. of V.P S., however, adds 'ca' at the end,
p. 23. But the Brindaban ed. (vol. I) omits the 'ca', p. 354.
² Last line of the quotation incorrect. For the correct quotation see below
V.K. The C.S.S. ed. gives the correct quotation, p. 23, which is translated here.
³ P. 360, lines 5–7, vol. 2.
R, Bh, B.

[SŪ. 1. 4. 26.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 261
Vedānta-kaustubha
The particle "and" implies affirmation. Brahman is, indeed,
both the material and the efficient cause Why? "On account of
the direct mention of both in the sacred text." Thus, to the question,
viz. 'What was the wood, what was the tree from which they carved
out the heaven and the earth? O wise men, ask through the mind
whereon it stood supporting the worlds' (Tait. Br. 2.8.9 6¹; Ṛg.V.
10 81.4²), the answer: 'Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree
from which they carved out the heaven and the earth. O wise men,
I tell you through the mind, it stood on Brahman supporting the
worlds' (Tait. Br. 2.8.9.6-7), directly records 'both', i.e the fact
that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause
COMPARISON
Bhāskara
This is Sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz. 'On account of the direct mention of both (viz. origin and dissolu-
tion) by the sacred text'. That is, in Chāndogya 1.9 1 it is said that
all beings arise from and disappear into the ether. Now, here the term
'ether' stands for Brahman (as shown in Br. Sū. 1 1.22). Hence the
above passage means that all things arise from and disappear into
Brahman. But things disappear into their material cause from which
they have arisen. Hence the above passage proves that Brahman is
the material cause of everything.³
SŪTRA 26
"ON ACCOUNT OF CREATING HIMSELF, ON ACCOUNT OF TRANS-
FORMATION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Brahman alone is the efficient and the material cause of the world.
Why? "On account of creating Himself," as known from the passage:
'That itself created itself' (Tait. 2.7⁴). If it be objected: How can
the Creator be Himself the object of creation?—(We reply:) 'On
¹ P. 360, lines 2-5, vol. 2. ² P. 336, lines 8-10.
³ Bh. B. 1.4.24, p. 85. ⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[SŪ. 1. 4. 26.
262 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 7.]
account of transformation'. The omniscient and omnipotent Brah-
man, having transformed Himself into the form of the world by the
projection of His power, becomes transformed, indeed, through His
own nature, undeveloped, and possessing powers like creatorship, etc.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Brahman alone is the efficient and the material cause. Why?
"On account of creating himself " That is, in the text: 'That itself
created itself' (Tait. 2.7), He Himself is indicated as the creator of
Himself, the object of creation,—the word 'kṛti' means creation,—
on account of this. If it be objected: How can the fact that the
Creator Himself is the object of His own creation be reconcilable?—
the author replies: "On account of transformation". The omniscient
and omnipotent Supreme Soul, non-deviating in nature, transforms
Himself into the form of the world through the projection of His own
powers, consisting in His own self and superintended by Him; on
account of such a transformation everything is faultless. His powers
are infinite and natural, as established by the following scriptural
and Smṛti texts, viz. 'His supreme power is declared to be of various
kinds indeed, and natural is the operation of his knowledge and power'
(Śvet. 6.8). 'The ancient Person is possessed of a variety of powers,
and the powers of others cannot be like them', 'Hundreds of positive
powers, like creation and the rest, which are inconceivable to the com-
prehension of all beings, may belong to Brahman, O best among the
ascetics, as heat to fire' (V.P. 1.3.2 ¹). He projects them in the
beginning of creation. The best among the sacred texts of the Śvetā-
śvataras proves His non-dependence on another at the beginning of
creation, as well as His being without an equal or a superior, thus:
'His action and organ do not exist, His equal or superior is not seen'
(Śvet. 6.8). And the following scriptural and Smṛti texts are evidences
with regard to His transformation or the projection of powers: 'Just
as a spider creates and takes' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7), 'Having entered into
pradhāna (i.e. matter) and puruṣa (i.e. soul) through His own wish,
Hari stirred up the mutable (viz. matter) and the immutable (viz.
soul) when the time of creation arrived' (V.P. 1.2.29 ²), 'Just as a
tortoise, having stretched forth its limbs, draws them in again, so the

¹ P. 22. ² P. 16.

[sū. 1. 4. 27.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 263
soul of beings swallows up again the created beings' (Mahā. 12.
7072b–7073a¹).
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They break the sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. 'Ātmakṛteḥ'
and 'Pariṇāmāt' ²
SŪTRA 27
"AND BECAUSE (BRAHMAN) IS CELEBRATED TO BE THE SOURCE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And in the texts 'The source of beings which the wise see'
(Muṇḍ. 1.1.6 ³), 'The creator, the Lord, the person, the source of
Brahmā' (Muṇḍ 3.1.3 ⁴), Brahman "is celebrated" by the word
"source". Hence, Brahman alone is the material cause.
Vedānta-kaustubha
"Because" in the texts: 'The source of beings which the wise
see' (Muṇḍ. 1.1 6), 'The creator, the Lord, the person, the source
of Brahmā' (Muṇḍ. 3.1 3), 'This is the source of all' (Māṇḍ. 6),
Brahman "is celebrated" by the word "source", denoting the material
cause,—the material cause is none but Brahman,—this is the sense.
Hence, the doctrine of the Sāṁkhyas is not to be accepted, being
opposed as it is to the Veda. It is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa alone,
the sole topic of all the Vedas, different and non-different from the
universe, the Highest Person, the Lord, and the Lord of all, is to be
meditated on by one desirous of salvation as the non-different material
and efficient cause of the universe.
Here ends the section entitled 'The material cause' (7).
1 P 615, lines 24-25, vol. 3. Reading: 'Harate' instead of 'grasate'.
Vaṅgavāsī ed. too reads 'harate', p. 1571.
2 Śrī. B. p. 404, Part 1 ; Śk. B., pp. 564-65, Part 6.
3 Ś, R, Bh, B.
4 Op. cit.

[SŪ. 1. 4. 28.
264 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 8.]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Śrīkaṇṭha
As before they do not take this adhikarana to be directly connected
with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, as Nimbārka does.¹
Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled 'The expla-
nation of all' (Sūtra 28)
SŪTRA 28
"HEREBY ALL IS EXPLAINED, EXPLAINED."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"Hereby", i.e. by the totality of the sections, 'all' the Vedāntas
'are explained' as referring to Brahman, "explained".
Here ends the fourth quarter of the first chapter of the Vedānta-
pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā
texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing the con-
cordance of all the Vedāntas with regard to Brahman by means of
extended and analogical application² "Hereby", i.e. through the
above mode of concordance, "all" Vedāntas, mentioned or non-
mentioned, should be known to be "explained" as referring to Brahman.
It should be known that the Vedas also are in concordance with
regard to Brahman alone, in accordance with the scriptural text:
'The word which all the Vedas record' (Katha 2.15); and in accordance
with the Smṛti text: '"I alone am to be known through all the
Vedas"' (Gītā 15.15). The repetition shows the end of the chapter.
Hence it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the cause of the origin
and the rest of the universe, the sole topic of all the Vedas, and
¹ Vide V.K. 1.4.28, p. 142 and 1.4.27, p. 145. K.S.S. ed.
² Atideśa. For the explanation of 'atideśa' see V.K. 2.1.3.

[sū. 1. 4. 28.
ADH. 8.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 265
denoted by the terms ‘Brahman’, ‘Nārāyaṇa’ and the rest, is to be
worshipped by one, desirous of salvation, through hearing, thinking,
meditating and so on.
Here ends the section entitled ‘The explanation of all’ (8)
Here ends the fourth quarter of the first chapter of the Vedānta-
kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā, and composed
by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the holy lotus-feet
of Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the venerable
Sanatkumāra.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation different, viz they connect this adhikaraṇa more
directly with the refutation of the Sāṁkhya doctrine, which Nimbārka
does not. Thus, the meaning of the sūtra according to Śaṁkara and
Bhāskara is: ‘Hereby’ (i.e. by the mode of refuting the Sāṁkhya
view), all (i.e. other doctrine like Atomism and the rest) are explained
(as negated), explained’.¹
Baladeva
Interpretation different, viz. ‘Hereby (viz. by the method indi-
cated above) all (the words like pradhāna, Śiva and the rest) are
explained (as denoting Brahman alone), explained’.²
Thus, we find that Nimbārka, Rāmānuja and Baladeva direct
the entire pāda, except the last adhikaraṇa, to the refutation of the
Sāṁkhya view, but surprisingly enough make no reference to the
Sāṁkhya view in the last adhikaraṇa, bringing in different topics.
Nimbārka and Rāmānuja speak of the general concordance of the
Vedānta texts in the last section, while Baladeva speaks of the signi-
ficance of all names.
No less surprising is the procedure of Śaṁkara and Bhāskara.
Śaṁkara finishes with the refutation of the Sāṁkhya doctrine in
adhikaraṇa 3, and takes the intervening four adhikaraṇa as concerned,
not with the refutation of the Sāṁkhya doctrine, but with the general
concordance of the Vedānta texts, etc. Then, all of a sudden, he
refers to the Sāṁkhya doctrine in the last adhikaraṇa.
¹ Ś.B. 1.4.28, p. 436; Bh. B. 1.4.27, p. 86.
² G.B. 1.4.28.

266 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 4. 28.
ADH. 8.]
Bhāskara closely follows Śaṁkara. He too finishes with the
refutation of the Sāṁkhya doctrine in adhikaraṇa 3, takes the inter-
vening three adhikaraṇas as concerned with the general concordance
of texts, but takes the last two adhikaraṇas as referring to the
Sāṁkhya doctrine.
Śrīkaṇṭha is the most consistent of all. He finishes with the
refutation of the Sāṁkhya doctrine in adhikaraṇa 3, once for all,
and directs the remaining adhikaraṇas to other topics.
Résumé
The fourth section of the first chapter consists of:—

1. 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka.
2. 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara.
3. 29 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja.
4. 27 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara.
5. 29 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha
   6 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.
   Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha split sūtra 26 in Nimbārka-bhāṣya into
   two separate sūtras, while Bhāskara takes the sūtras 17 and 18 in
   Nimbārka-bhāṣya as one sūtra.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)
FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)
Adhikarana 1 The section entitled 'Smṛti'.
(Sūtras 1-2)
SŪTRA 1
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THERE WILL RESULT THE FAULT OF
NOT LEAVING A ROOM FOR SMRTI, (WE REPLY.) NO, FOR THERE WILL
RESULT THE FAULT FOR LEAVING NO ROOM FOR (OTHER) SMRTIS."
The interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras entitled: 'Vedānta-pāri-
jāta-saurabha', composed by the reverend Nimbārka.
Now, it is being demonstrated in details how the stated concord-
ance is free from all contradictions. If it be objected: There does
exist a need for Smrtis for confirming Scripture. Among these, the
Sāṁkhya-Smṛti is to be accepted. It is not to be said that it,
designating as it does a non-sentient cause, is not to be accepted for
that reason—for, then, "there will result the fault of leaving no room
for Smṛti"—(we reply) 'no', for, then, there will result the contra-
diction of other Smṛtis which deal with a sentient cause mentioned
in the Veda—such is the meaning of the text.
The commentary entitled 'Vedānta-kaustubha', composed by
the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.
With a view to inducing one desiring salvation to the repeated
practice of the hearing, thinking and the like of the Vedānta, revealing
the qualities, nature and so on of Brahman,—which practice is con-
ducive to the meditation on Brahman, the exclusive cause of a direct
vision of Him,—the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard
to Brahman,—the Highest Person, different and non-different from
all, free by nature from all faults, the one abode of a mass of auspicious
qualities and the cause of the world,—has been shown in the previous
chapter. Now, in this second chapter, contradictions are being
removed. Thus, in the first quarter, the faults found by the opponents
with our own view are refuted. In the second quarter, faults are
found with the views of the opponents, based on a semblance of reason,
(and not on real reason), with a view to inducing people to our own
view. In the third quarter, it is shown in details how the scriptural

[SŪ. 2. 1. 1.
268 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
texts, regarding the origin of the great elements like the ether and the
rest, are all free from contradictions; and, further, the order of creation
and destruction, and the nature of the individual soul, are determined.
In the fourth quarter, again, the contradictions among the texts,
demonstrating the organs of the individual soul, are removed. Now,
first, it is being demonstrated that our view is consistent with the
Smṛtis as well.
It has been stated in the section treating of proof ¹ that Brahman,
the cause of the world, has the Veda as His sole proof, since He cannot
be known through any other source. And in the section, treating of
concordance ², it has been established that there is concordance of all
the Vedas with regard to Brahman alone. And, likewise, the meaning
of the Veda being very difficult to be grasped without the help of Smṛtis,
composed by those who are versed in the Veda, there is a need for
Smṛtis as well. It has been declared by Smṛti itself that one, who is
without the Smṛti, to be a one-eyed man, thus: 'Scripture and Smṛti
are celebrated to be the two eyes of the wise. Deprived of one, one
is said to be "one-eyed"; deprived of both, "blind"'. Hence, on
the doubt, viz whether the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti and the rest are to be
accepted as true for the sake of making the Veda clear, or the Manu-
Smṛti and the like,—if it be argued: The Sāṁkhya-Smṛti is to be
accepted for the sake of making the Veda clear, the aim of the Veda
being to impart self-knowledge to all. If unable to give rise to self-
knowledge, the collected Vedic texts must all be simply fruitless like
a cow yielding no milk. So why should a Smṛti, which is concerned
with teaching self-knowledge, be disregarded by any seeker after
knowledge? The Manu-Smṛti and the rest, on the other hand, aim
simply at demonstrating the works which lead to results, here or
hereafter. The Śvetāśvataras record the omniscience of Kapila in
the passage: 'Who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the sage
Kapila, the born, and sees him while being born' (Śvet 5.2). Hence
the Smṛti which is composed by an omniscient person must be accepted
for knowing the principle of the soul. That part of Veda which teaches
the principle of the soul should be understood in accordance with
the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti alone. Thus, as the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti teaches a
non-sentient cause, the doctrine of a sentient cause cannot be accepted.
Otherwise, "there will result the fault of leaving no room for the Smṛti",
¹ Vide Br. Sū. 1.1 3. ² Vide Br. Sū. 1.1 4.

[Sū. 2. 1. 1.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 269
i e. there must result the fault of leaving no room for a Smṛti which
designates a non-sentient cause and is composed by an omniscient
sage, celebrated in the Veda,—
(We reply:) 'no', such a prima facie view is not reasonable.
Why? "Because there will result the fault of not leaving room for
other Smṛtis", i.e. because there will result the fault of leaving no
room for the Smṛtis other than it, viz. the Manu-Smṛti and the rest
which establish Brahman to be the sole cause and are based on
Scripture. The opponent who is shouting on the ground of Smṛti
can be silenced by that very Smṛti itself. Thus, the reverend
Manu says: 'He appeared as possessing effective powers, like the
great elements and the rest, dispelling darkness' (Manu 1.6¹), 'He
having intended (to be many), and desirous of creating various
kinds of beings, created water in the beginning and left his power
in it' (Manu 1 8²). Āpastamba too says 'Living beings are the
abode of him who dwells in all caves (viz. hearts), who is not killed
and who is stainless' (Āp. D S. 1.22.4³), 'From him arise all bodies.
He alone is the source, constant, he is eternal' (Āp. D.S. 1 23.2⁴).
It is said in the Bhārata (i.e. Mahā-bhārata) in the Rāja-dharma:
'"You are its origin and the dissolution, O Kṛṣṇa! You alone create
this universe in the beginning. And this universe is under your
control, O Source of the Universe! Obeisance to you, O (Lord)
with the bow, disc and sword in hands!"' (Mahā. 12.1514⁵). In
the Mokṣa-dharma⁶, it is said: '"For he is the inner soul of beings,
and called the knower of the field⁷. He is Nārāyaṇa, having the
universe as his form, infinite, constant⁸. From him arose the un-
manifest, having three guṇas, O best among the twice-born!"'
(Mahā. 12.12680⁹). In that very section, to the question. '"O
reverend Father! O supremely wise one! I wish to hear, in truth,
¹ P. 5 ² P. 5. ³ P 39, lines 3-4.
⁴ P. 40, line 2. ⁵ P. 419, line 5, vol. 3.
⁶ The name of a section of the 12th book of the Mahā-bhārata, from
Chap. 174 to the end.
⁷ I.e. the knower of the body.
⁸ This line is not found either in the Asiatic Society ed, or in the Vaṅgavāsī
ed. Both read instead the line: 'Triguṇa-vyatirikto vai puruṣaś ceti kalpitaḥ'.
Vide Asiatic Society ed., p. 812, line 5, vol. 3 Vaṅgavāsī ed., p. 1800, lines
14-15.
⁹ P. 812, lines 5-6, vol. 3, Asiatic Society ed.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 1.
270 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
about Viṣṇu, with eyes like lotus, unchangeable, the creator who is
not created, the origin and dissolution of beings, about Nārāyaṇa,
Hṛṣīkeśa, Govinda, the unconquered, about Keśava, O best among
the Bhāratas!'" (Mahā. 12.7518-19 1), (the answer given was:)
'"The Highest Person, the great-souled one, the soul of beings, fashion-
ed the great elements, the air, the light and likewise the water, and
the ether and the sky"' (Mahā. 12.7825 2). In the Dāna-dharma,
Śiva says: '"Higher than even the reverend Father (i.e. Brahmā)
is Hari, the eternal Person, Kṛṣṇa, of a golden appearance and arisen
like the sun in the cloudless sky, designated as Śrīvatsa, Hṛṣīkeśa
worshipped by all the deities. Brahmā has sprung up from his belly,—
likewise I from his forehead, the lights from the hairs on his head, the
gods and the demons from his body-hairs, the sages have arisen from
his body, likewise, the eternal worlds. He is the veritable abode of
the reverend Father (i e. Brahmā), as well as the abode of all the
gods. He is the creator of this entire world, the Lord of all the three
worlds, the destroyer of all beings, of the immobile as well as of the
mobile. He is directly perceived at all times indeed by one who has
conquered his passions. He is the Lord of the gods and higher
than the high, omniscient, connected with all, moving everywhere
and turned towards all. He is the Supreme Soul, Hṛṣīkeśa, all-
pervading, the Supreme Lord"' (Mahā. 13.6507–6512 3). In that
very section, the omniscient Devavrata, too, says, beginning '"For
I know Kṛṣṇa in truth"' (Mahā. 13.7659 4) and continuing: '"Know
everything, the movable, as well as the immovable, all souls and the
universe as Kṛṣṇa.5 Whatever is honoured in the worlds as a
meritorious act, whatever is auspicious or inauspicious,—all that is
Keśava, the inconceivable, everything else is the reverse. Such a
Keśava is self-born, He is Nārāyaṇa supreme and unchangeable;
the middle, the beginning and the end of the universe which existed;
knowable by all; the origin as well as the dissolution of beings"'
1 P. 631, lines 18-19, vol. 3. 2 Op. cit., line 25.
3 Pp. 237-238, vol. 4. Reading different in some places, viz. ‘Sa hi deva-
varaḥ sākṣād deva-nāthaḥ parantapaḥ. Sarvajñaḥ sa hi saṁśliṣṭaḥ . . .’
Vaṅgavāsī ed. reads sarva-saṁśliṣṭaḥ otherwise it is the same as the above.
P. 2006, vol. 2.
4 P. 256, line 26, vol. 4.
5 Reading: 'Sarvaṁ kṛtsnaṁ . . viśvam enam . . ', P. 258, line 7
Reading in the Vaṅgavāsī ed. exactly similar. P. 2017.

[sū. 2. 1. 1.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 271
(Mahā. 13.7391; 7399–7400¹). And the statements by Him whose
feet are worshipped by all the composers of Smṛtis are as follows:
‘“I am the source of all, from me everything arises”’ (Gītā 10.8),
‘“I am the source, likewise, the dissolution of the entire universe”’
(Gītā 7.6). Parāśara, too, declares: ‘“The universe has arisen from
Viṣṇu, and in Him alone it is grounded. He is the cause of the sub-
sistence and control of the universe and He is the universe”’ (V.P.
1.1.35²). The sense is that if the view of Kapila be accepted as
conducive to the Vedānta, then all those above and other texts must
be contradicted. But the Manu-Smṛti and others are acceptable, since
they establish religious duties, which are meant to the knowledge of
Brahman, designated in the Veda, since they establish the qualities,
nature and the rest of Brahman, and since they are composed by those
who know the Veda. And in the Veda the cause of the world is
designated to be a sentient principle, in fact, none but Brahman.
Because of their opposition to this, the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti and the rest
are not acceptable. As the reverend Manu says: ‘Whatever Smṛtis
are outside the pale of the Veda, whatever heterodox doctrines there
are,—all of them are fruitless after death; these Smṛtis are given to
ignorance’ (Manu 12.95³). Further, the composer, too, of the Smṛti
which is opposed to the Veda (viz. the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti) is a certain
sage, called Kapila, like Kaṇāda and the rest, but is not the lord Kapila,
called Vāsudeva. As is declared by the Padma-purāṇa: ‘Kapila, called
Vāsudeva, told the principle of the Sāṁkhya, supported by the meaning
of all the Vedas, to the gods like Brahmā and the rest, and likewise
to Bhṛgu and others, likewise to Āsuri. Another Kapila told the
Sāṁkhya, opposed to all the Vedas and supported by false arguments,
to another Āsuri’. Kapila, mentioned in the scriptural text, should
be known to be Hiraṇyagarbha.
――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ P. 258, lines 7, 18-19. Reading: ‘Etādṛśaḥ, Keśavo’taś ca bhūyo Nārā-
yaṇaḥ . . sambabhūsatāṁ . . . .’. Vaṅgavāsī ed. exactly similar,
only ‘babhūsatāṁ’ in place of ‘sambabhūsatāṁ’. P. 2017.
² P. 8.
³ P. 483.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 2.
272 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
SŪTRA 2
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF
OTHERS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"And on account of the non-perception on the part of others",
i.e. on the part of Manu and the rest, that the Veda is concerned with
pradhāna, Smṛti which is opposed to the Veda is unauthentic.
Vedānta-kaustubha
"And on account of the non-perception on the part of others",—
i.e. on the part of men like Manu and the rest, other than Kapila and
best among those versed in the Vedas,¹—that the Veda is concerned
with pradhāna, the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is to be disregarded. Hence,
it is established that the rejection of the Smṛti which is opposed to
the Veda is not in conflict with the stated concordance.
Here ends the section entitled 'Smṛti' (1).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation different, viz. 'On account of the non-perception
(in Scripture and ordinary experience) of others (viz. of the principles
of mahat and the rest, other than pradhāna), (the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti
is not to be accepted)'.²
Baladeva
His interpretation too is very similar to the above one;
viz. 'On account of the non-perception (in Scripture) of others (viz.
of many other doctrines found in the Sāṃkhya system, such as, the
doctrine that the souls are pure consciousness and all-pervasive, and
so on)'.³
¹ I.e. as men like Manu and others reject pradhāna, pradhāna cannot be
the cause of the world.
² Ś.B. 2.1.2, p. 443 ; Bh. B. 2.1.2, p. 88.
³ G.B. 2.1 2, p. 11, Chap. 1.

[sū. 2. 1. 3.
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 273
Adhikaraṇa 2. The section entitled: 'The re-
futation of the Yoga'. (Sūtra 3)
SŪTRA 3
"HEREBY THE YOGA IS REFUTED."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
By the refutation of the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti, the Yoga-Smṛti, too
is refuted.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the author points out the unauthenticity of the Yoga-
Smṛti.
This aphorism is of the form of a formal extension (atideśa).
A formal extension means the intimation of similarity when such
a similarity is not known. Thus, at first, the Yoga-Smṛti is taken
to be concerned with making the Veda clear, accepting as it does
the word 'Yoga', which is accepted by Scripture, too, in the text:
'This they think to be the Yoga, the firm holding back of the senses'
(Kaṭha 6.11); and hence its similarity to the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti is not
known. Therefore, this aphorism intimates the similarity of the
Yoga-Smṛti to the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti. "Hereby", i.e. by this very
refutation of the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti which establishes a non-sentient
cause, the Yoga-Smṛti, too, should be known to be refuted. In the
statement. "The Yoga is refuted", by the term "yoga", the Smṛti
which establishes it is understood. The purpose of the mention of the
term "Yoga" in the statement: 'The Yoga-Smṛti is refuted' is this:
Although the Lord is admitted in the Yoga doctrine, yet He is not
established primarily, as He is in the aphorism and texts like: "Then,
therefore, an enquiry into Brahman' (Br. Sū. 1.1.1), '"O, the soul,
verily, should be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4 5; 4.5.6); The primacy of the
Yoga alone is found in the beginning: 'Now, an instruction with regard
to the Yoga' (Y S. 1.1), and in the aphorism, laying down its definition,
viz.: 'The Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the mind'
(Y.S. 1.2¹). And, this mere suppression of the functions of the mind,
devoid of any connection with the Lord, is, indeed, of no avail in
crossing the world, any more than a dog's tail is in crossing the ocean.
¹ P. 4.
18

274 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 4.
ADH. 3.]
So, it is to be rejected, opposed as it is to Scriptural and Smṛti texts
like '"O, the soul, verily, should be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5 6), 'The
knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2 1), '"By knowing
me, one attains peace"' (Gītā 5.29), 'The binder with the noose
of the world, and the liberator from the noose of the world', 'This
one thing is well-established that the object to be worshipped is
Nārāyaṇa, Hari' and so on. Salvation being impossible through
a mere suppression of the functions of the mind, the Yoga doctrine
which deals with the primacy of that only is, indeed, non-acceptable.
Its view is that pradhāna, devoid of any connection with Brahman,
is the material cause of the world, and the Lord is merely the efficient
cause of the world, and this, too, being opposed to the Veda, is certainly
unreasonable. There are many other faults in the Yoga doctrine,
but they are not quoted here needlessly. And the term 'Yoga'
found in Scripture and Smṛti, refers to the meditation and the rest
on the Lord. The eulogizing statement in the Mokṣa-dharma, etc.,
on the contrary, is intended only for referring to that portion of Yoga,
etc. which is not opposed to Scripture. Hence, it is established that
the stated concordance, indicating the causality of Brahman, is not
contradicted by the Yoga-Smṛti.
Here ends the section entitled 'The refutation of the Yoga' (2).
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'Difference'
(Sūtras 4-11). Prima facie view (Sūtras 4-5)
SŪTRA 4
"(THERE IS) NO (HAVING BRAHMAN AS THE CAUSE) ON ITS PART,
ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE, (ITS) BEING SO (IS KNOWN) FROM
THE TEXT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
We object ¹ to your view on the ground of reason. The world
has not Brahman as its material cause "on account of difference".
¹ Correct reading: 'pratyavatiṣṭhate' which is translated here. Vide C.S.S.
ed., p. 24 and Brindaban ed., p. 378.

[sū. 2. 1. 4.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 275
And the difference is to be known also "from the text", viz. 'He
became knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2 6 1).
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, the objection based on Smṛtis has been disposed of by the
preceding two sections. Now, the objection based on reasoning is
being disposed of.
It has been stated under the aphorism: 'From whom (arise) its
origin and the rest' (Br. Sū 1 1.2) that it (viz. the world) has
Brahman for its material cause. The prima facie objector objects to
it on the ground of reason thus: 'no'. This world has not Brahman
for its material cause Why? "On account of difference " That
is, Brahman possesses the attributes of sentience, non-grossness,
infinity, purity, and the rest, while the world possesses just the
opposite attributes of non-sentience, grossness and so on,—on account
of such a dissimilarity between the two. Whatever is different from
something has not that for its material cause, just as the pot, which is
different from the ether, has not the ether as its material cause; just
as the pot. the dish and the rest, which are different from the potter,
have not the potter as their material cause.
If it be objected. It is found that the attributes of a material
cause recur in its effects as well. Similarly, in the case under discussion,
too, Brahman is the material cause; and the universe, His effect,
consisting of sentient beings like men, animals and the rest, must
be similar to Him. Hence the reason (viz.: "On account of difference ")
does not hold good,—
(We reply) No, because that there do exist the attributes of
non-sentience, grossness and the rest in the effect, viz. in stones, wood
and the rest, is known from the evidence of direct perception.
If it be objected: It is possible to imagine that there is sentience
in them, too, though unmanifest; hence there is no difference.
(We reply:) No, because it is unreasonable to take what is known
through direct perception to be otherwise on the ground of mere
imagination.
The difference is known "from the text" as well,—this is stated
by the phrase: "its being so", i.e. "its being so", or its difference,
is known "from the text" as well, i.e. from the following texts: 'He
1 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

|sū. 2. 1. 5.
276 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
became Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6), 'On the same
tree, a person, immersed, grieves for his impotence, bewildered'
(Muṇḍ. 3 1 2, Śvet 4 7), 'And the soul, which is without the Lord,
is bound, because of being an enjoyer' (Śvet. 1.8) and so on.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation absolutely different He takes this sūtra as
forming one adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with demonstrating the
eternity and infallibility of the Veda. He thus does not take this
sūtra as representing a prima facie view. Thus, this sūtra means,—
according to him,—'(The Veda is) not (unauthoritative like the
Sāṁkhya and the rest), on account of (its) difference (from them),
(i.e. because it is a non-human origin unlike the Sāṁkhya and the
rest), (its) being so (i e its eternity) (is known) from the text '.¹
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)
SŪTRA 5
"BUT (THERE IS) THE DESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDING (DEITIES)
ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIALITY AND FOLLOWING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"But" in the texts. 'The earth spoke' (Tait Saṁ 5 5 2, 3²),
'These sense-organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahma'
(Bṛh. 6 1 7 ³) and so on, there is the designation of their presiding' ⁴
deities, 'on account of the specification', mentioned in the passage.
'"Very well, let me enter into these three divinities"' (Chānd.
6 3.2 ⁵); and 'on account of the following', or entering, mentioned
in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth' (Ait.
2.4 ⁶).
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz : From the scriptural texts: 'The earth
spoke to him' (Tait. Saṁ 5.5 2, 3), 'The earth spoke' (Śat. Br.

¹ G.B 2.1.4, p 18, Chap. 2.
² P. 76, line 9, vol. 2. ³ Ś, R, B.
⁴ C.S.S. ed. reads 'tat-tat', meaning 'their respective deities', p. 24.
⁵ R, ŚK, B. ⁶ Ś, R, Bh, SK

[sū. 2. 1. 5.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 277
6 1 3, 4¹), 'The waters spoke' (Śat. Br. 6 1.3, 2²), 'These sense-
organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahmā' (Bṛh
6 1 7), 'They said to speech "Do you sing for us"' (Bṛh 1.3.2)
and so on, it is known that of the effects too are sentient; and hence
they have no difference from the material cause—
We reply: The word "but" disposes of the stated objection.
There is no designation of sentience on the part of the effects, and
so they cannot have Brahman for their material cause; but there
is the designation of only the presiding deities of earth and the
rest in the passages, 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Sam. 5.5.2, 3)
and so on. Why? "On account of speciality and following", i e.
on account of the specification of the earth and the rest by the word
'deity' in the passage "'Very well, let me enter into these three
deities'" (Chānd. 6.3.2), and on account of the specifications of the
sense-organs by the word 'deity' in the passages 'These deities,
verily, disputing about self-supremacy' (Kauṣ. 2.14), 'These deities,
verily, having known superiority in the vital breath' (Kauṣ 2 14),
as well as 'on account of the following' of fire and the rest as the
presiding deities of speech and the rest, i.e on account of the scrip-
tural mention of following, or entering, in the passage: 'Fire, becoming
speech, entered the mouth,—the sun, becoming sight, the eyes
(Ait. 2 4) Hence the world being different from Brahman, Brahman
is not its material cause.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Literal interpretation same, but import different, since he takes
this Sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, not laying down a prima facie
view, but the correct conclusion. Thus, the Sūtra means according
to him "(If it be objected: How to reconcile the absurd sayings of
the Vedas, such as 'Fire willed to be many' and so on?). We reply: (In
those passages) there is the designation of the presiding (deities) (of
fire and the rest), on account of speciality and following (i.e. entering
into)".³
¹ P. 505, line 12.
² Op. cit., line 9.
³ G.B. 2.1.5, p. 18, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 6-7.
278 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 3 ]
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sutras 6-7)
SŪTRA 6
“ BUT (IT) IS SEEN.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
With regard to it, we reply: “It is seen” that there is the origin
of hairs on the head and so on from a person from whom they are
different, and of dung-beetles from the cow-dung from which they are
different. Hence it is not to be said that the universe, because of
being different from Brahman, has not Him as its material cause.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author points out that such a prima facie view is based on a
fallacious reason (viz. ‘on account of difference’).
The word “but” is for disposing of the prima facie view The
statement that this universe has not Brahman as its material cause
on account of being different from Him, is not tenable, since it “is
seen” that there is the origin of nails, body-hairs and the rest from a
person from whom they are different, and that of the dung-beetles
from the cow-dung, from which they are different,—on account of
this,—this is the sense.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation same, but he takes this sūtra as forming an
adhikaraṇa by itself.
—————
(CORRECT CONCLUSION (end))
SŪTRA 7
“ IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IN THAT CASE THE EFFECT MUST BE)
NON-EXISTENT (WE REPLY :) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING A
NEGATION MERELY ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected: If the effect be different from its material cause,
it must be “non-existent” prior to its origination,—(we reply.) No
such objection can be raised, “on account of there being a negation

{SŪ. 2. 1. 7}
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 279
merely ”, in the previous aphorism, of the rule that there is a similarity
between the material cause and its effect in every respect
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected : Having admitted an absolute similarity between
the material cause and its effect in the aphorism : ‘(There is) no
(having Brahman for its cause) on its part, on account of difference ’
(Br. Sū 2.1.4), it has been objected by the opponent that the world
being different from Brahman, He is not its material cause with a
view to disposing of that objection, it has been established in the
aphorism. ‘But (it) is seen’ (Br Sū. 2.1 6) that there can be a cause-
effect relation even between two different objects. With regard to
it, the question is whether prior to creation the universe was non-
different from its cause, or different. What is your opinion ? If you
say, Non-different,—then, just as the origin of a different world is
admitted, like the origin of hairs on the head and body hairs from a
person from whom they are different, so why there may not be the
origin of a similar world, like the origin of a gold-bracelet and the rest
from gold ?
If you say : Different,—then, the world must have a material
cause different from Brahman, and hence pradhāna must be the
cause of the world. If it be said that this cannot be admitted, as
pradhāna has been already refuted,—(we point out) in the texts.
‘Brahman ¹ is one only, without second’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘There
was, verily, Nārāyana, the one’ (Mahā. Up. 1 2), ‘Then there was
Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts’,—there is the mention of a single
reality; and hence, it follows that there was the absence of anything
else prior to creation. Therefore, the world must be non-existent
prior to creation.
(Here ends the original prima facie view)
(Author’s conclusion.)
(We reply :) ‘No’. Why ? “On account of there being a
negation merely.” The aphorism ‘But (it) is seen’ (Br. Sū. 2.1.6)
negates merely,—by way of mentioning the difference between the
material cause and its effect,—the rule, admitted by the opponent, viz.
that there is similarity between a material cause and its effect in every

¹ The word ‘Brahman’ is not included in the original text.