वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

280 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 8.
ADH. 3.]
respect; but it never establishes any difference between the two in
every respect Hence, because of having Brahman as its soul, the
universe is existent even during its causal state.
Or an alternative explanation of the phrase "On account of
there being a negation merely". The statement, viz 'The universe
is non-existent' is a negation merely, i e without any meaning, in
accordance with the scriptural text. ' "The existent alone, my dear,
was this in the beginning" ' (Chānd. 6 2.1)
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different, viz · 'If it be said that (the effect) is
non-existent (prior to its actual creation), (we reply) No, since (it)
is a mere negation (without an object to be negatived)'. That is,
the negation by the opponent, viz. . 'The world is non-existent' has
no object, for it certainly cannot have for its object the existence of
the effect prior to its actual creation, as the effect always exists in its
cause, whether before or after its actual creation 1
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 8)
SŪTRA 8
“ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING THE CONSEQUENCE OF (BECOMING)
LIKE THAT DURING DISSOLUTION, (THE DOCTRINE OF THE CAUSALITY
OF BRAHMAN) IS INCONSISTENT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
An objection is raised: As at the time of dissolution, the cause,
like the effect, will become non-sentient, the view that Brahman is
the material cause of the universe is “inconsistent”.
Vedānta-kaustubha
An objection is raised once more.
It is objected. “Inconsistent”, indeed, is the view which admits
Brahman to be the material cause of the world—Brahman who
1 Ś.B. 2.1.7, 'Pratiṣedham hīdam nāsya pratiṣedhasya pratiṣedhyam asti',
p. 453.

[sū. 2. 1. 9.
ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 281
possesses the attributes of sentience, infinity, freedom from sins and
the rest, and is established by the scriptural texts 'Brahman is
truth, intelligence, infinite" (Tait. 2.1), "Free from sins, ageless,
deathless" (Chānd. 8.1.5, 8 7.1, 3; Maitrī. 7.7), "Who is omniscient,
all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1 1.9, 2.2.7) and so on. Why? "On account
of there being the consequence of (becoming) like that during dissolu-
tion." That is, because "during dissolution", or during reabsorption,
non-sentience, limitedness, impurity and the rest will occur on the
part of the material cause as well, "like that", i.e as on the part of
the effect The sense is that during dissolution, the world, possessing
non-sentience and the rest, and merged into its material cause in an
order reverse to that of creation, i.e merged into Brahman, possessing
the attribute of sentience and the rest, is sure to defile Him with its
own attributes, as does butter-milk dropped in milk
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 9-10)
SŪTRA 9
"BUT NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING PARALLEL IN-
STANCES."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The reply is as follows: There is indeed no "consequence of (be-
coming) like that". Just as the evolutes of the earth do not defile
it when dissolved into it, so the universe, the evolute of Brahman,
also does not.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author refutes the objection.
"But no", i.e. no such consequence follows, and hence our
view does not involve any inconsistency. Why? An effect does
not defile its material cause with its own attributes when dissolved
into it, there being parallel instances to this effect. Just as the evolutes
like bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, when dissolved, do not defile
the lump of gold with their own attributes; and just as the evolutes
of the earth, when dissolved into the earth, do not defile the earth
with their own attributes, so this universe, consisting of the sentient
and the non-sentient, when dissolved into Brahman, does not, indeed,

282 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ 2. 1. 10.
ADH. 3.]
defile Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His
powers.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 10
"AND ON ACOUNT OF OBJECTION TO HIS OWN VIEW."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The Sāṁkhya, maintaining a doctrine opposed to the Veda,
cannot raise any objection, since the stated objections apply to his
own view as well.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author points out that the Sāṁkhya cannot even object that
there is any inconsistency in our view which is based on the Veda.
There is no inconsistency in our view based as it is on Scripture.
It has been alleged by the Sāṁkhya, unacquainted as he is with the
settled conclusion of the Vedānta, firstly, that a cause-effect relation
between Brahman and the world is inappropriate, as there is a
difference between the cause and the effect in this case, secondly,
that, in our view, the effect becomes non-existent prior to creation,
and thirdly, that Brahman becomes like the world during the time of
dissolution. All these objections are of equal force against the
Sāṁkhya doctrine as well. The sense is. The origin of the effect,—
which possesses colour and the rest and possesses parts,—from pra-
dhāna, which is colourless and devoid of parts, is admitted. Hence,
a cause-effect relation between pradhāna and its effects is inappro-
priate, there being here a difference between the cause and the effect.
There being nothing gross prior to creation, the effect itself becomes
non-existent; and during dissolution, prakṛti, like the world, becomes
gross.
COMPARISON
All others, except Baladeva, read. "sapakṣa-doṣāc ca" ¹
¹ Ś B 2.1.10, p. 357; Śrī. B 2.1.10, p. 13, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.1.10, p. 91;
ŚK. B. 2.1 10, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2. 1. 11
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 283
SŪTRA 11
“IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT ALSO OF REASONING HAVING
NO SOLID GROUND, IT IS TO BE INFERRED OTHERWISE, (WE REPLY )
IN THAT WAY, TOO, THERE WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF NON-
RELEASE ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On account also of the instability of reasoning, there is no
inconsistency in the stated conclusion; since, if pradhāna and the rest
be inferred to be the cause of the world by means of a strong reasoning,
then a counter-argument is possible by means of another equally
strong reasoning. As there will be the “consequence of non-release
thus also”, owing to disagreement among the logicians, so, that alone
which is mentioned in the Veda is acceptable—this is established.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The word ‘api’ means ‘and’. There is no inconsistency in the
stated conclusion, which is based on Scripture. There is inconsistency
in the Sāṁkhya conclusion itself which is based on reasoning, since the
stated objections apply thereto, “on account also of reasoning having
no solid ground”, i.e on account of the instability of reasoning. The
sense is that the thing inferred by one expert logician is set aside by
another, proved to be otherwise by another,—on account of the
instability of reasoning in this way. But the thing mentioned in the
Vedānta in the beginning and the end cannot be refuted even by
hundreds of reasonings
If it be objected. Even though reasonings like ‘on account of
difference’ ¹ be refutable, having no solid ground, yet in order that
there may not be any infinite regress, it is perfectly proper to infer,
in that way, a non-sentient material cause of the non-sentient effects,
like the ether and the rest—
(We reply:) “in that way too”, the primacy of reasoning is
upheld, and hence the conclusion stated in the Veda is regarded as but
of a secondary importance. As a consequence, non-release will result
owing to the mutual opposition among Kapila, Kaṇāda and the
rest It cannot be said that if victory be won by one of them at
some time or other, there will be no non-release as a consequence,—
¹ Vide Br. Sū. 2.1 4

284 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 12.
ADH 4]
it being impossible for one among many persons to be ever-victorious.
If it be said that the Supreme Soul is such, you fall in with our view;
so be happy by giving up reasoning which is opposed to the Veda.
Thus the Lord Vāsudeva, the sole topic of all the Vedas, being
established to be the material cause of the world, no opposition, based
on reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is of any avail—this is
established.
Here ends the section entitled “Difference” (3).
COMPARISON
Śamkara
He reads: “Vimokṣa-prasaṅga” instead of “Anirmokṣa-pra-
saṅga”.¹
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They break it into two different sūtras—viz. “Tarkāpratiṣṭhānād
api” and “Anyathā . . . prasaṅgaḥ”.²
Adhikaraṇa 4. The section entitled “The Non-
acceptance of the rest”. (Sūtra 12)
SŪTRA 12
“HEREBY THE REMAINING (PERSONS) TOO WHO DO NOT ACCEPT
(THE VEDA) ARE EXPLAINED (I.E. REFUTED).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“Hereby”, i.e. by the refutation of the Sāṁkhya view, the
remaining ones, i.e. others who maintain a cause which is opposed to
the Veda, “too”, are refuted.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the author is extending the above refutation to the remaining
views.
“Hereby”, i.e. by the above refutation of the doctrine of pra-
dhāna as the cause of the world, “the remaining (persons) who do not
¹ Ś.B. 2.1.11, p. 458.
² Śrī. B., p. 13, Part 2, ŚK B., p. 14; Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2 1. 13.
ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 285
accept (the Veda)", too, should be known to be refuted The word
"śiṣṭāḥ" means 'the remaining ones', i.e persons other than Kapila ¹
and Patañjali ². The word "parigrahāḥ" means all who do not accept
the Veda.³
It is thus established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman
is not contradicted by their views as well.
Here ends the section entitled "The Non-acceptance of
the rest" (4)
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
According to them the word "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ" means (the doc-
trines like Atomism and the rest) which are not accepted by the wise ⁴
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Becoming
the enjoyer". (Sūtra 13)
SŪTRA 13
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF (BRAHMAN) BECOMING
AN ENJOYER, (THERE WILL BE) NON-DISTINCTION, (BETWEEN
BRAHMAN AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), WE REPLY, IT MAY BE
AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that if Brahman be the material cause, then
Brahman Himself will become an enjoyer of pleasures and pains in
the form of the individual soul, so that there will be no distinction
¹ The founder of the Sāṃkhya doctrine.
² The founder of the Yoga doctrine.
³ This explains the compound: "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ".
⁴ Hence they explain the compound as "Śiṣṭaiḥ aparigrahāḥ" and not as
śiṣṭhāś ca aparigrahāś ca", as done by Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa, Rāmānuja and
Baladeva. Vide ŚB. 2.1.11, p. 461; Bh. B. 2.1.12, p. 92; ŚK. B. 2.1.13, p. 18,
Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 13.
286 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.]
between the enjoyer (viz. the individual soul) and the controller (viz.
Brahman) as well-known from the Veda,—
(We reply:) In spite of there being a non-distinction, there is
a distinction as well between the two, as between the sea and the
wave, and between the sun and its ray.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, having apprehended an objection once more, the author
is disposing of that here.
If it be objected: If Brahman who is without an equal or a superior
be the material cause of the world, then there must be no distinction
between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. Why? “On account
of becoming the enjoyer” That is, all effects whatsoever being non-
different from their causes, the enjoyer, i.e. the individual soul, will
become the object enjoyed; and the object enjoyed, i.e. the body,
the sense-organs and the sense-objects, will become the enjoyer; and
hence, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed,
well-known in ordinary life and in the Veda, will not be possible on
this doctrine of the causality of Brahman. Moreover, there will not
be any distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, because
the group of enjoyers being non-different from the controller, the
enjoyer will become the controller, and the controller, the Supreme
Soul, will become the enjoyer. In ordinary life, to begin with, the
distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed is well-known,
thus ‘The individual soul is the enjoyer, the body and the rest are the
objects enjoyed’, and in the Veda too, thus: “Eats the sweet berry”
(Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6). Similarly, the distinction between the
enjoyer and the controller, too, is well-known in ordinary life, as is
evident from the conduct of the good who always regard their pleasures
and pains as dependent on the Lord, and in the Veda too; thus: “He
alone makes one do good deeds” (Kauṣ. 3.8), “The soul which is
without the Lord is bound, because of being an enjoyer” (Śvet. 1.8)
and so on. Thus, “on account of becoming an enjoyer, there is non-
distinction”; and hence the doctrine of the causality of Brahman
cannot be accepted,—
The author states the correct conclusion in the words “It may be,
as in ordinary life”. That is, on our view, too, there may, indeed,
be a distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, as well as
between the enjoyer and the controller, “as in ordinary life”. In

[sū. 2. 1. 13
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 287
ordinary life, although pots, dishes and the rest, having the lump of
clay as their material cause, bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, having
gold as their material cause; foams, waves and the rest, having the
sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the
tree as their material cause, are all non-different from their respective
causes, there is still a mutual distinction amongst the particular
effects themselves In exactly the same manner, there may be
a mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed,
although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman
as their material cause Similarly, in spite of their non-distinction,
there may still be a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller ,
just as pots, dishes and the rest, though by nature non-different from
the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay,
are yet by nature different, too, from the clay possessing as they do
their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks. The same should
be known to be the case with the gold and bracelets and the rest too.
Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference—non-difference
between Brahman and the individual soul. There is, indeed, no
inconsistency here. Hence it is established that the doctrine of the
causality of Brahman is not open to the above objections.¹
Here ends the section entitled “Becoming the enjoyer” (5).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation different, viz. they interpret the sūtra like Śrīni-
vāsa, although while Śrīnivāsa understands the word “bhoktrā-
patteḥ” to mean ‘because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed
and vice versa, as well because the enjoyer will become the controller
and vice versa’, they understand it to mean only ‘because the enjoyer
will become the object enjoyed and vice versa’. Each develops his
own peculiar theory in connection.²
¹ Note the different interpretations given by Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa.
² Ś.B. 2.1.13, pp. 461 et seq.; Bh. B. 2.1.13, p. 92.

288 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 14.
ADH. 6.]
Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "The begin-
ing" (Sūtras 14-19)
SŪTRA 14
"(THERE IS) NON-DIFFERENCE (OF THE EFFECT) FROM THAT
(VIZ THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE TEXTS) BEGINNING WITH
THE WORD 'BEGINNING' AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is "non-difference" between the effect and the cause, and
not absolute difference. Why? On account of the texts. '"The
effect having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the
clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4 ¹), '"All this has that for its soul. That is
true . . . Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3–
6.16.3 ²), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd 3.14.1 ³).
Vedānta-kaustubha
In the first chapter, Brahman has been described many times as
different from the sentient and the non-sentient, in order that there
may be a proper discrimination between the peculiar natures of these
three realities respectively.⁴ Here, on the other hand, the non-
difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, resulting
from the absence of separate existence, activity and the rest (on the
part of the former), has been established under the aphorism. "If
it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent,
(we reply:) no, on account of there being a negation merely" (Br
Sū. 2.1 7) and so on. Now, with a view to confirming the stated
conclusion, the author is refuting the view of the Vaiśeṣikas who hold
that the effect is not non-different from the cause, but is something
which originates (i.e. is an absolutely new creation).⁵
The compound ("tad ananyatvam") is to be explained as follows:
There is non-difference between the two, viz. the cause and the effect,
or, there is non-difference of that, viz. the world, the effect, from
¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ³ R.
⁴ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11; 1.1 18, p. 32; 1.1.22, p. 36; 1.2.3, p. 50, etc.
K S.S.
⁵ This is the doctrine of Asat-kāryya-vāda.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 14.
ADH. 6 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 289
Brahman, the cause; or, there is non-difference of the effect from that,
viz. the cause. That is, the effect, which is of the form of the sentient
and the non-sentient, which is limited, has many names and forms,
and is dependent, is non-different from Brahman, the Supreme
Cause, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers,
unlimited, denoted by words like 'one', 'without a second' and so
on, capable of abiding voluntarily in the causal state and in the effected
state, and prior to the entire universe. The author states the proof
with regard to it in the words: "on account of (the texts) beginning
with the word 'beginning' and the rest". (The compound "āram-
bhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ" is to be explained thus:) The texts of which
the beginning is the word 'beginning', on account of them. That is,
on account of the texts. '"The effect, having its beginning in speech,
is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd 6.1.4), '"The exis-
tent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second"'
(Chānd. 6.2.1), '"He thought, 'May I be many', may I procreate"
He created the light' (Chānd. 6.2.3), '"All that has this for its soul.
That is true. That is the soul. Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7,
etc.), "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing
into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "That was
unmanifest then. It became manifest by name and form" (Bṛh.
1.4.7) and so on. There are many texts of such kinds which establish
the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause,
but which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity.
Among these, the meaning of the text beginning with the word
'beginning' (ārambhaṇa) is as follows.
The Chāndogas, having made an initial statement to the effect
that through the knowledge of the material cause there arises the
knowledge of all the effects, in the passage: '"Whereby the unheard
becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known"'
(Chānd. 6.1.3), state a parallel instance to establish it, in the passage:
'"Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, everything made of
clay may be known,—the effect, having its beginning in speech is a
name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4¹). That is, just
as 'through one lump of clay' being known as clay, 'everything made
of clay', i.e. the group of the evolutes of clay, may be known, since
1 The passage is "Yathā saumya! ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛnmayaṁ
vijñātaṁ syāt, vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttikēty eva satyam".
19

290 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2 1. 14.
ADH. 6.]
they are all made of clay;—for such a group of evolutes 'has its
beginning in speech', i.e. is designated by speech. Speech is of two
kinds: 'effect', i e. meaning, and 'name', i.e word. The function
of speech rests on these two, viz meaning and word, e.g. we say:
'Fetch water by the pot'. Hence, 'the truth' is that the evolute,
characterized by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of
a belly, having the name 'pot', and conducive to the function of
fetching water and so on, is 'just clay'. That is, the view that the
effect is different from the cause, on account of the difference of
individuality and conception, is incorrect, for it is not possible to
attribute the individuality or the conception of a pot to the wind
and the rest which are different from clay.¹ If the effect is to originate
from the non-existent simply, then that would lead to the origin of
everything everywhere, as well as to the futility of the activity of
the agent. So desist from further arguments
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Each commentator develops his peculiar theory in this connection.
Śaṃkara understands the word "Ananyatva" as absolute identity,
interprets the word 'vācārambhaṇa' to mean 'that which begins
from speech only, but does not exist in reality', and thereby develops
his theory of Vivarta at great length ²
Rāmānuja
He understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference, like
Nimbārka, but connects it with his peculiar doctrine of the soul-body
relation between Brahman and the universe.³ He interprets the
phrase: "vācārambhaṇa" as follows: 'vācā' means: on account of
speech, i.e on account of activity preceded by speech; 'rambhaṇa'
means: what is touched. Hence the text means. On account of
speech, (i.e. for the sake of certain activities, like the fetching of
¹ If the effect were absolutely different from its cause, then any and every-
thing, e.g. wind, might very well have been conceived to be a pot. But this is
never the case, since clay alone, and nothing else, is conceived to be so.
² "Vācaiva kevalaṁ asti . . . . na tu vastu-vṛttena vikāraḥ kaścid asti",
etc. Ś.B. 2.1 14, p. 464.
³ Śrī. B. 2.1.15, pp. 39, 42, Part 2.

[Sū. 2. 1. 15.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 291
water and the rest,) there is touched (by the clay) an effect and a
name; i.e. clay is transformed into a particular effect having a special
name, in order that a certain activity may be accomplished.¹
Bhāskara
He, too, understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference.
He criticizes the Śaṁkarite view at length and insists on the reality
of difference,² and interprets the phrase “vācārambhaṇa” like
Śrīnivāsa.
Śrīkaṇṭha
He, too, understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference.³
He explains the phrase “vācārambhaṇa” in the next sūtra, and gives
two alternative explanations, viz. “That which is the beginning, i.e.
the cause, of speech, i.e. of speech and practical activity”.⁴ Hence,
the text means that an effect (vikāra) is a name (nāma-dheya) which
is the cause of speech and practical activity, i.e. of such expressions
‘Fetch water in a pot’ and so on. The second explanation is: “That
which has speech for its beginning”.⁵ Hence the text means that an
effect (vikāra) is simply the object of such expressions: ‘This is a pot’,
i.e. a special condition the clay has assumed for practical purposes,
but is not a separate substance from the clay.
SŪTRA 15
“AND BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION (OF THE EFFECT) ON THE
EXISTENCE (OF THE CAUSE).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is non-difference between the cause and the effect, because
the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent.
1 “Ārabhyate ālabhyate spṛśate,” etc. Śrī. B. 2.1.15, p. 40, Part 2.
2 Bh. B. 2 1.14, pp. 93 et seq.
3 ŚK. B. 2.1.15, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8.
4 “Vācāyāḥ abhilāpārtha-kriyā-rūpa-vyavahārasya niṣpādakaṁ bhavati.”
Op. cit. 2.1 16, p. 23, Parts 7 and 8.
5 Vāgārambha-viṣaya-mātram. Op. cit.

292 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1 16.
ADH. 6.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also, says the author, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause
between the effect and the cause
Whence is it known that there is non-difference between the effect
and the cause ? Because the effect is perceived, only when the cause
is existent, in accordance with the scriptural text '"These beings,
my dear, have the existent as their root"' (Chānd. 6.8 4).
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
They interpret the sūtra in just the opposite way, viz. "And
because of the perception (of the cause) on the existence (of the effect)"
That is, the gold, which is the cause, is perceived when the ear-ring
is present. That is, the gold alone is perceived in the ear-ring, and
not the clay.¹
SŪTRA 16
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE POSTERIOR."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"On account of the existence" of the effect,—belonging to a pos-
terior time,—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence
in the text: "Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning" (Bṛh.
1 4.10 ²), there is non-difference between the effect and the cause.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason too, there is non-difference between the effect
and the cause.
"On account of the existence" of the effect,—which is "posterior"
and denoted by the term 'this',—in the cause, owing to the designation
of their co-inherence, in the texts '"The existent alone, my dear, was
this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), "Brahman, verily, was this
¹ Śrī B. 2.1.16, p. 46, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2 1 16, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8; G.B
2.1.15, p. 45, Chap. 2.
² Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 1. 17.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 293
in the beginning” (Bṛh 1 4.10), the non-difference between the effect
and the cause is definitely ascertained
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 17 in both They read “aparasya” in place of
“avarasya” and take it to mean ‘an effect’.¹
SŪTRA 17
“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF
WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT, (THE EFFECT IS) NOT (EXISTENT PRIOR
TO CREATION) (WE REPLY:) NO, (SUCH A DESIGNATION IS) ON
ACCOUNT OF A DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTE, THIS IS KNOWN FROM THE
COMPLEMENTARY TEXT, FROM REASONING AND FROM ANOTHER
TEXT”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“If it be objected that on account of the designation of what is
non-existent” in the passage. “The non-existent, verily, was this in
the beginning” (Chānd. 3.19.1 ²), the effect does not exist prior to
creation,—
(We reply:) “no”. There is such a designation because of the
subtleness (of the world prior to creation). Whence is this known?
“From the complementary passage,” viz. “That was existent”
(Chānd. 3.19.1 ³), “from the reasoning”, viz. if a previously non-
existent effect does indeed arise, why is there no origin of a barley-
sprout from fire? “and from another text”, viz. ‘The existent alone,
my dear, was this in the beginning’ (Chānd 6.2.1 ⁴).
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected· The doctrine of pre-existent effect is not a
more reasonable one. Why? On account of the designation of its
¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.17, p.47, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.1.17, p. 28, Parts 7 and 8.
² Ś, R, Bh. Correct quotation: “Asad eva”. Vide Chānd. 3.19.1, p. 175.
³ Ś, Bh.
⁴ Ś, R, Bh, B.

294 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2 1. 17.
ADH. 6.]
non-existence prior to creation, in the text · "The non-existent,
verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19 1),—
(We reply ·) "no", why ? Because there is "such a designation"
"on account of a different attribute". That is, the attribute of having
name and form unmanifest is different from the attibute of having
name and form manifest, and it is because of this different attribute
that the world is designated thus in the text · "The non-existent,
verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd 3 19.1), but is never
denoted to be non-existent by nature
If it be asked Whence is this known ? We reply · 'From the
complementary passage.' For the complementary passage · "That
was existent" (Chānd. 3 19 1), refers to the topic of our discussion,
viz. the world, by the term 'that' and from this it is known that the
term 'non-existent' in the beginning denotes the subtle reality with
name and form unmanifest.
The author states another reason for the pre-existence of the
effect, viz "From reasoning" That is, the existence of the effect
is ascertained from reason as well. To the question: What is that
reason whereby the existence of the effect is ascertained ? We reply:
On our view, names and forms, knowable by means of the evidence
of direct perception and the rest, are all real, on account of being
perceived. An agent, viz a potter, makes a pot out of a lump of
clay that is existent Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the
pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence, the activity of
the agent, too, is not useless. If it be objected that as the pot already
exists, like the lump of clay, the activity of the agent has no meaning,—
(we reply .) not so, since its purpose is simply manifestation. The pot
which was unmanifest before is made manifest, hence the activity
of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the
Veda, are used just as they were before ¹ It should be known that,
on our view, the conventional usage of names and forms is not un-
precedented. The origin of a non-existent effect, on the other hand,
does not fit in, since the origin of a barley-sprout from fire is never seen.
It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such
an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks,—
for, in an effect, produced from gold and the rest of a known weight,
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ Vide V.K 1.3 28–30.

[sū. 2. 1. 17.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 295
a different weight is never found.¹ Likewise, the sparks of fire,
which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct
perception, are perceived by all,—there being no evidence for the
imaginary doctrine of a power producing unprecedented objects.
Hence the doctrine of a non-existent effect ² is unreasonable. The
activity of the agent, too, is meaningless on this view, since the
activities of an agent in connection with the making of a pot,—viz.
digging earth, pounding it, placing it and so on,—all relate to the
material cause. In the absence of the material cause, with regard
to what should the agent act, seeing that the effect, viz the pot and
the rest, are not produced then, and that, in that case, the conse-
quence will be the origin of the pot through mere activity, even in the
absence of the lump of clay? All this should be considered by the
wise.
The manifold controversies with regard to this point are not
mentioned here for fear of unduly tiring those who desire for release.
In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since Brahman
possesses infinite powers, everything is unobjectionable.
The author states once more another reason for the existence
of the effect, thus "And from another text". The other text is the
text aptly teaching the pre-existence of the effect, viz. " 'The existent
alone, my dear, was this in the beginning' " (Chānd. 6.2.1), which is
other than the above quoted text, viz: 'The non-existent, verily,
was the beginning" (Chānd 3.19.1) Because of this too, it is the
(pre-) existent effect alone that originates,—this is the sense
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva
They break this sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. "Asad-
vyapadeśāt . . vākya-śeṣāt" and "Yukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca".³
Interpretation same.
¹ I e. the weight of the gold ear-ring is the same as that of the gold from
which it is made. This shows that the cause and the effect are non-different.
² Asat-kārya-vāda.
³ Ś.B. 2.1.17 and 18, p. 475; Bh. B. 2.1.17 and 18. 100, 101; G.B. 2.1.17
and 18.

296 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 18-19.
ADH. 6 ]
SŪTRA 18
"AND LIKE A PIECE OF CLOTH."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Just as a piece of cloth is at first rolled up, and afterwards spread
out, so is the universe.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The sense is : Just as a piece of rolled up cloth, although not known
to be a piece of cloth, does not, for that reason, become non-existent,
but is indeed existent, existing in a different form, and when spread
out once more, is known to be a piece of cloth,—so, indeed, prior to
creation, the universe remains existent indeed, though not known
to be a universe, having its name and form unmanifest; and is clearly
known as the universe at the time of creation, having its name and
form manifest. Just as the drawn forth limbs of a tortoise are not
perceived, even though existent, but do not become non-existent
thereby and are known when stretched out again; and just as the
banyan tree, existent in the seed at all times indeed in a subtle form,
is manifested in a gross form, so it is the pre-existent universe alone
which originates, in accordance with the Mahā-bhārata passage:
"Just as a tortoise, having stretched out its limbs, draws them in
again, so the soul of beings, having created beings, destroys them
again" (Mahā 12.7072b-7073a 1) and the Viṣṇu-purāṇa passage
"Just as a gigantic banyan tree is contained in a small seed, so is
the entire universe in you, the seed, during (the state of) contraction
(viz dissolution)". (V.P 1 12.666–67a 2.)
SŪTRA 19
"AND JUST LIKE THE VITAL-BREATH AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Just as the vital-breath, having the prāṇa, apāna and the rest,
controlled by breath exercises, etc. remains in its real form; and
1 P. 615, lines 24-25, vol 3. Reading: "sṛṣṭāni harate". Vaṅgavāsī ed.
also, p. 1571.
2 P. 108.

[sū. 2. 1. 20.
ADH 7 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 297
when the control removed, is instantly known in those respective
forms,—so here too
Vedānta-kaustubha
The sense is Just as the vital-breath, having modes like the
prāṇa, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercises, is existent
indeed, though not known in the special forms of the prāṇa, apāna
and the rest, and when freed from the control is known clearly in
those respective forms,—so the effect, with its name and form un-
manifest prior to creation, is not known through those respective
names and forms Hence it is established that the world is true like
Brahman, having Him for its material cause, and is non-different
from Brahman, though different from Him.
Here ends the section entitled "The beginning" (6).
Adhikaraṇa 7. The section entitled "The desig-
nation of another". (Sūtras 20–22)
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 20)
SŪTRA 20
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF ANOTHER, THERE IS THE
CONSEQUENCE OF FAULTS LIKE NOT DOING WHAT IS BENEFICIAL
AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
An objection is raised. Since on the doctrine of the causality of
Brahman the individual soul is established to be Brahman in the pass-
age: "This soul is Brahman" (Bṛh. 2.5.9 ¹), there result "faults
like not doing what is beneficial and the rest" by reason of Brahman's
creating the world, which is an abode of all miseries
Vedānta-kaustubha
The view that there is an absolute difference between the cause
and the effect has been disposed of above. Now, since there can be no
¹ R. ŚK.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 20.
298 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 7.]
suspicion of an absolute non-difference between the Sentient Being
and the non-sentient, the author is here refuting only the view of those
who suppose that there is an absolute identity between Brahman
and the individual soul.¹
It may be objected: If Brahman be the creator of the world
which is the site of the three kinds of miseries, there must be the
"consequence of the fault of not doing what is beneficial". By the
term "and the rest" (in the sūtra) the fault of doing what is not bene-
ficial is understood. Why? "On account of the designation of
another," i.e. on account of the designation of the individual soul as
Brahman in the passage · ‘"Thou art that"’ (Chānd 6.8.7; 6.9.4,
etc.), "This soul is Brahman" (Bṛh. 2.5.9) and so on. The sense is
that the transmigratory soul, performing good and bad deeds and
undergoing threefold pains, is not other than Brahman. Hence
the stated faults must result on the part of Brahman, not subject to
transmigratory existence
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 21 in his commentary. Like Nimbārka, Baladeva
too begins a new adhikaraṇa here, but unlike Nimbārka continues
it up to sūtra 33 (32 in Nimbārka). He takes this adhikaraṇa as
concerned with showing that the Brahman, and not the individual
soul, is the cause of the world. Thus, first, he takes this sūtra as
setting forth the correct conclusion and not a prima facie view (as
according to Nimbārka), thus: "There will be the consequences of
faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest from the designation
of another (i.e. if the individual soul be designated as the creator
of the world)".² That is, if the individual soul were the creator of
the world, it would not have created a world so full of miseries. Hence,
Brahman, not the individual soul, must be the creator.
¹ I.e. the author is not trying to remove the suspicion of an absolute non-
difference between Brahman and the material world,—since none is so foolish
as to suppose that a Sentient Being and non-sentient object may be absolutely
identical—but he is disposing only of the not unnatural belief of an absolute
identity between Brahman and the individual soul
² G.B. 2.1.21, pp. 52-53, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 21.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 299
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 21-22)
SŪTRA 21
“BUT (BRAHMAN IS) SOMETHING MORE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE
INDICATION OF DIFFERENCE ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The refutation of this is as follows.
We hold that the creator of the world is Brahman, who is “some-
thing more” than, i.e. superior to, the embodied soul, the enjoyer
of pleasure and pain. “On account of the designation of difference”
in the passage “Who rules the soul within” (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30 ¹),
there is no absolute non-difference between the two. Hence there
cannot result the fault of not doing what is beneficial
Vedānta-kaustubha
With regard to this prima facie view, the author states the correct
conclusion.
The word “but” disposes of the prima facie view. Since we hold
that Brahman,—omniscient, omnipotent, the Lord of all, without
an equal or a superior, and the one identical material and efficient
cause of the world,—is “something more”, i.e. superior to the
embodied soul, the question of not doing what is beneficial does not
arise. The reason of His being something more is stated in the phrase:
“On account of the indication of difference”, i.e. on account of the
indication of a difference between Brahman and the individual soul
in the passages: ‘“O, the self, verily, should be seen”’ (Bṛh. 2.4.5;
4.5.6), “The knower of Brahman attains the highest” (Tait. 2.1),
‘Who rules the soul within’ (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30). The sense is
this: Just as in the passage: ‘All this, verily is Brahman’ (Chānd.
3.14.1), it being impossible for the group of the non-sentient to be
non-different from Brahman, its difference from Brahman is admitted
by the phrase ‘emanating from Him’ ² so it being impossible for the
¹ P 1074, line 18. R.
² The passage is: “All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him,
disappearing into Him and breathing in Him” (Chānd. 3.14.1).