वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 1. 4.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 275
And the difference is to be known also "from the text", viz. 'He
became knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2 6 1).
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, the objection based on Smṛtis has been disposed of by the
preceding two sections. Now, the objection based on reasoning is
being disposed of.
It has been stated under the aphorism: 'From whom (arise) its
origin and the rest' (Br. Sū 1 1.2) that it (viz. the world) has
Brahman for its material cause. The prima facie objector objects to
it on the ground of reason thus: 'no'. This world has not Brahman
for its material cause Why? "On account of difference " That
is, Brahman possesses the attributes of sentience, non-grossness,
infinity, purity, and the rest, while the world possesses just the
opposite attributes of non-sentience, grossness and so on,—on account
of such a dissimilarity between the two. Whatever is different from
something has not that for its material cause, just as the pot, which is
different from the ether, has not the ether as its material cause; just
as the pot. the dish and the rest, which are different from the potter,
have not the potter as their material cause.
If it be objected. It is found that the attributes of a material
cause recur in its effects as well. Similarly, in the case under discussion,
too, Brahman is the material cause; and the universe, His effect,
consisting of sentient beings like men, animals and the rest, must
be similar to Him. Hence the reason (viz.: "On account of difference ")
does not hold good,—
(We reply) No, because that there do exist the attributes of
non-sentience, grossness and the rest in the effect, viz. in stones, wood
and the rest, is known from the evidence of direct perception.
If it be objected: It is possible to imagine that there is sentience
in them, too, though unmanifest; hence there is no difference.
(We reply:) No, because it is unreasonable to take what is known
through direct perception to be otherwise on the ground of mere
imagination.
The difference is known "from the text" as well,—this is stated
by the phrase: "its being so", i.e. "its being so", or its difference,
is known "from the text" as well, i.e. from the following texts: 'He
1 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.