द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

CHAPTER XI
THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER (1931)
TOWARDS the end of 1930 and the beginning of 1931, the
atmosphere was once again favourable for an understanding
between the Government and the Congress. In the first
place, the Labour Party was in power and Capt. Wedgwood-
Benn was at the India Office. Secondly, Mahatma Gandhi
by his very absence had exerted a great influence on the
Round Table Conference. Talking and discussing with
non-descripts and self-appointed leaders while the only
representative party in India was engaged in a bitter struggle
with their Government, the British politicians had felt the
unreality of the first Round Table Conference. Hence the
determination of the Labour politicians to come to a com-
promise with the Congress, if only the latter would not ask
for too much. Thirdly, Lord Irwin was the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India and he was far-sighted enough
to realise that if an understanding was to be arrived at between
the Government and the Congress, it was desirable to do so
while the Mahatma was the leader of the latter body, for
according to sane Britishers, ‘Gandhi was the best policeman
the Britisher had in India.’¹ The third factor was undoubtedly
the most important. If there had been an intransigent
Viceroy at the helm of affairs in India, no understanding with
the Congress would have been possible, however sympathetic
might have been the attitude of Whitehall at the time.
But why was Lord Irwin so agreeable to an understanding
with the Congress? No doubt his vision was broader than
that of the average British politician and he had an innate
sense of fairness and justice, so characteristically lacking in
the latter. The late Moulana Mohammed Ali had once
described him as ‘that tall thin Christian.’ A true Christian
¹ This was the opinion expressed by Miss Ellen Wilkinson, Ex-M.P.,
after her visit to India in 1932 as a member of the India League Deputation.
225 P

226 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
he undoubtedly was. Nevertheless, Lord Irwin would never
have been able to carry with him either the 'steel frame' in
India or Mr. Baldwin and the Conservative leaders in England,
but for the serious developments in India. Bombay, the
gateway of India, was the storm centre of the movement.
The no-tax campaign was very strong in Gujerat, the United
Provinces and parts of Bengal. Throughout India the boycott
of British goods was effective and civil disobedience in some
form or other was going on in every province. In Bengal,
terrorist activities had become a serious menace. Last but
not least, in the North-West Frontier Province, the situation
was alarming—and the situation in that province was affecting
seriously the attitude of the frontier tribes, who ordinarily
are quite indifferent to political developments in India.
Several of these tribes had told the British authorities that
they would make peace with them if only the latter would
release the naked fakir (meaning Mahatma Gandhi) and Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan (the leader of the Frontier Province) and
concede Swaraj to India. Though the abdication of King
Amanulla in Afghanistan had eased the situation there, by
ushering in a Government more friendly to Great Britain, the
Government had not forgotten how the Afghan king had
taken advantage of their preoccupations in 1919 by declaring
war on them and had succeeded in extracting a favourable
treaty. The Government were therefore feeling uneasy over
the attitude adopted by the frontier tribes towards the
developments in India.
On the day that the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Mac-
donald, delivered his closing speech at the Round Table
Conference, the Viceroy made a public appeal for the co-
operation of the Congress in his address before the Indian
Legislative Assembly. Within a week of this appeal, Mahatma
Gandhi and the other members of the Working Committee
were unconditionally released in order to give them an
opportunity to consider the Premier's statement at the Round
Table Conference. The Premier, after referring to the offer
of responsibility with Federation and Safeguards had ended
with the following words: 'Finally I hope and I trust and I
pray that by our labours together, India will come to possess

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 227
the only thing which she now lacks to give her the status of
a Dominion amongst the British Commonwealth of Nations
—what she now lacks for that—the responsibilities and the
cares, the burdens and the difficulties, but the pride and the
honour of responsible government.' The Indian Liberal
leaders who were on their way to India, sent a cablegram
requesting Mahatma Gandhi not to come to a final decision
about the Government's offer without giving them a hearing
and they were evidently afraid that the Working Committee
would summarily reject the Premier's offer. Their apprehen-
sion was not unfounded. The members of the Working
Committee, soon after their release, met at Allahabad, where
Pandit Motilal Nehru was lying seriously ill. The first
reactions to the offer were anything but favourable. On Feb-
ruary 6th, the Liberal leaders, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and
the Right Hon. V. S. Sastri and Mr. M. R. Jayakar arrived
and proceeded straight to Allahabad. Pandit Motilal Nehru,
in spite of his failing health, had taken up a strong attitude,
but the Liberal leaders persuaded the Mahatma not to reject
finally the offer without having a talk with the Viceroy who
had made a generous gesture. Allahabad, at that time, was
full of peacemakers and sensation-mongers, some of whom
had no other business but to carry tales from one side to the
other. On February 14th, the Mahatma applied for an
interview with Lord Irwin and then proceeded to Delhi to
meet him. Most of the members of the Working Committee
accompanied him but Pandit Motilal Nehru could not, as he
was too ill. This was a great misfortune.
At Delhi, the Mahatma was surrounded by wealthy aris-
tocrats and by politicians who were dying for a settlement
and on the side of the Working Committee there was no one
with sufficient personality who could force his views on the
Mahatma. Even Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who could have
done so, failed on this occasion and as for the other members
of the Working Committee, most, if not all, of them were
more anxious for a settlement than the Mahatma himself.
The negotiations between the Viceroy and the Mahatma
dragged on from day to day and the Mahatma kept the
Working Committee informed of all the developments. On

228 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
March 4th, the negotiations came to an end and when the
Mahatma put before the Working Committee the terms of
the Pact, he made it quite clear that he would not proceed
one step further without their unanimous support. At this
juncture the responsibility of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was
very great. Besides being the President of the Congress, he
was the only member of the Working Committee who could
be expected to understand and advocate the Left-Wing point
of view and his refusal would have been sufficient to prevent
the final acceptance of the Pact by the Mahatma and the
Working Committee. Unfortunately he gave in and so the
Pact was approved by the Working Committee and the next
day, March 5th, the Mahatma and Lord Irwin put their
signature to it. When the publication of the Pact created
an uproar in the country, Pandit Jawaharlal came out with the
statement that he did not approve of some of the terms of
the Pact—but as an obedient soldier he had to submit to the
leader. But the country had regarded him as something
more than an obedient soldier.
The Pact—called the Delhi Pact or the Gandhi-Irwin Pact
—was published the next morning in all the papers. It was a
lengthy document and from the Congress point of view the
drafting was faulty, because it did not give the impression
that the Congress had scored a victory. The perusal of the
terms of the Pact had a damping effect on all ‘Congressite’
readers. The writer was in the Alipore Central Jail in Calcutta
at the time. For days the papers had published substantially
correct forecasts of the terms of the coming Pact. Even the
blind followers of the Mahatma, when they read the forecasts,
invariably remarked that it was unthinkable that their leader
—meaning the Mahatma—would agree to those terms.
Nevertheless, what was unthinkable came to be actual. The
Mahatma was not blind to the realities of the situation, and
in a Press statement issued simultaneously with the Pact, he
stressed the point that the settlement did not imply a victory
for either party and that he would strain every nerve to make
final what was provisional, so that the Pact would prove to be
a precursor of the goal, to attain which the Congress had been
striving. The terms of the Pact were briefly as follows:

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 229
Mahatma Gandhi on behalf of the Congress agreed:

1. To suspend the Civil-Disobedience Movement.
2. To participate in the deliberations of the forthcoming
   Round Table Conference for drafting a Constitution
   for India on the basis of (a) Federation; (b) Respon-
   sibility and (c) adjustments and safeguards that may
   be necessary in the interests of India.
3. To forego the demand for an investigation into the
   allegations of police atrocities in different parts of
   India.
   The Viceroy on behalf of the Government agreed:
4. To release simultaneously all political prisoners
   incarcerated in connection with the non-violent
   movement.
5. To restore confiscated property and land to the
   owners where it had not been already sold or auctioned
   by the Government.
6. To withdraw the emergency ordinances.
7. To permit people who live within a certain distance
   of the seashore to collect or manufacture salt free of
   duty.
8. To permit peaceful picketing of liquor, opium and
   foreign-cloth shops, the last item designed not as a
   discrimination against British goods but as an
   encouragement to the Swadeshi movement (i.e.,
   indigenous industries).
   The politically trained section of the people could analyse
   the terms of the Pact and to them it was a great disappoint-
   ment. Youth organisations in the country, taken as a whole,
   were also dissatisfied. But to the mass of the people, it
   appeared as a great victory for the Congress. Only in Bengal
   was there no public enthusiasm and for reasons which will
   be presently explained. With the announcement of the armis-
   tice, the official machinery of the Congress began to work
   expeditiously and with great efficiency. The Working Com-
   mittee decided to hold the annual session of the Congress
   at Karachi and suspending the constitutional procedure for

230 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
the election of the President, it elected Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel, than whom a stauncher follower of the Mahatma it was
difficult to find, as the President. Every member of the
Working Committee felt that his prestige was at stake and
strained every nerve to get the largest number of supporters
from his province to attend the Karachi Congress. Besides the
members of the Working Committee, all the leaders of the
Right Wing felt called upon to exert themselves in order to
secure the ratification of the Pact at the Karachi Congress.
All the monied interests also desired to see the armistice
followed up by a permanent peace, so that they could settle
down to business peacefully. Consequently, there was no
dearth of funds for those who wanted to go to Karachi to
support the Mahatma. On the other hand, the oppositionists
were at a great disadvantage. Many of their adherents were
still in prison and did not get the benefit of the amnesty which
the Pact had promised. Defections among their leaders
had weakened their position in the country and even those
who were in a position to attend the Karachi Congress, were.
handicapped by want of necessary funds. After the Lahore
Congress, Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar had retired from public
activity. Along with other Left-Wing leaders, he had been
treated shabbily by the President of the Lahore Congress and
by the Mahatma, who was instrumental in excluding him
from the Working Committee, though he was the most
outstanding leader from Madras and was an ex-President of
the Congress. This insult he had taken to heart so much
that he had vowed he would have nothing to do with the
Congress so long as Mahatma Gandhi remained the leader.
Besides Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar, there was another defection
in the person of Dr. Mohammed Alam of Lahore who had
played a prominent part at the Lahore Congress, but who
became a supporter of the Mahatma after the Gandhi-
Irwin Pact. Of all the provinces, Bengal was most hostile to
the Pact but even there, there was a party led by the late
Mr. Sengupta pledged to support the Mahatma.
In these circumstances, what could the Left-Wingers do?"
Before my release from prison on March 8th, I ascertained
that the political prisoners as a rule, were hostile to the Pact,

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 231
and I naturally shared their feelings. But after coming out,
I realised that the Pact was a settled fact and there was no
possibility of preventing its ratification at the Karachi Con-
gress. The only question that we had to decide was whether
we should put up an insignificant opposition at Karachi, or
whether we should refrain from dividing the House while
disapproving of the Pact. Before coming to a decision, I
considered it advisable to meet the Mahatma personally. I
therefore undertook a journey to Bombay which also enabled
me to gauge public feeling in the provinces through which I
passed. At Bombay I had long conversations with the
Mahatma. After criticising the Pact, the point that I urged
was that we would be prepared to support him as long as he
stood for independence—but the moment he gave up that
stand, we would consider it our duty to fight him. At the
end, the Mahatma gave me the following assurances:¹

1. He would ask the Karachi Congress for a mandate to
   bind the hands of the Congress Deputation to the
   Round Table Conference.
2. That mandate would contain nothing that was not
   consistent with the status of independence for which
   the Lahore Congress had declared.
3. He would use all his influence and strain every nerve
   to secure amnesty for those who had been left out
   in the Pact.
   From Bombay the Mahatma left for Delhi and I travelled
   in the same train with him. This gave me a further oppor-
   tunity not only of supplementing our talks at Bombay but
   also of observing how the public were reacting to the Pact.
   From the ovation he received everywhere, it was quite apparent
   that his popularity had reached the high-water mark. It had
   surpassed even the record of 1921. At Delhi, no sooner did
   we arrive than we received a bombshell in the shape of news
   to the effect that the Government had decided to execute
   Sardar Bhagat Singh and two of his comrades in the Lahore
   ¹ I also learnt from the Mahatma that he had voluntarily withdrawn
   the demand for an inquiry into the police atrocities,

232 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE .
Conspiracy Case. Pressure was brought to bear upon the
Mahatma to try to save the lives of these young men and it
must be admitted that he did try his very best. On this
occasion, I ventured the suggestion that he should, if necessary,
break with the Viceroy on the question, because the execution
was against the spirit, if not the letter, of the Delhi Pact. I
was reminded of a similar incident during the armistice
between the Sinn Fein Party and the British Government,
when the strong attitude adopted by the former, had secured
the release of an Irish political prisoner sentenced to the
gallows. But the Mahatma who did not want to identify
himself with the revolutionary prisoners, would not go so
far and it naturally made a great difference when the Viceroy
realised that the Mahatma would not break on that question.
However, at that time, Lord Irwin told the Mahatma that he
had received a largely-signed petition asking for the com-
mutation of the death-sentence passed on the three Lahore
prisoners. He would postpone their execution for the time
being and give serious consideration to the matter, but beyond
that he did not want to be pressed at the moment. The
conclusion which the Mahatma and everybody else drew
from this attitude of the Viceroy, was that the execution would .
be finally cancelled and there was a jubilation all over the
country and especially in Bengal, where some revolutionary
prisoners were also going to be executed.
About ten days after this incident the Congress was to
meet at Karachi. The general expectation being that the
execution would be cancelled, it was a most painful and
unexpected surprise when on March 24th, while we were on
our way to Karachi from Calcutta, the news was received
that Sardar Bhagat Singh and his comrades had been hanged
the night before. Gruesome reports were also afloat in the
Punjab about the manner in which their dead bodies had
been disposed of. It is impossible to understand at this
distant date the poignant grief which stirred the country
from one end to the other. Somehow or other, Bhagat Singh
had become the symbol of the new awakening among the
youths. People did not stop to inquire if he was really guilty
of the murder charge brought against him. It was enough

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 233
for them to know, that he was the father of the Naujawan
Bharat Sabha (the Youth Movement) in the Punjab—that one
of his comrades, Jatin Das, had died the death of a martyr
and that he and his comrades had maintained a fearless
attitude while they were in the dock. Every one felt that the
Congress was meeting under the shadow of a bereavement.
The President-elect, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, gave orders
that the usual festivities on the first day of the Congress
would be suspended. Nevertheless, when the Mahatma
alighted near Karachi, there was a hostile demonstration,
and several young men received him with black flowers and
black garlands. The feeling among a considerable section
of the youths was that the Mahatma had betrayed the cause
of Bhagat Singh and his comrades.
The All-India Congress Committee was to meet on March
26th and the plenary session of the Congress on the 29th.
The execution having taken place on March 23rd, caused a
great deal of nervousness among the supporters of the Pact
and they apprehended an open split in the Congress. But
the official party machinery had worked with great thorough-
ness and from all the provinces supporters of the Pact had
been elected as delegates in large numbers. The Left Wing,
to which I belonged, had resolved previously to come to
Karachi, survey the situation there, consider carefully what
the Mahatma had communicated to me in Bombay as to his
future attitude and then make their final decision. At Karachi
it was quite clear that they would not have much support from
the elected delegates who alone could vote at the Congress
—though among the general public and particularly the
youths—they had larger support. There was another factor
which had to be considered. If we were consistent and honest,
it would not do to merely oppose the Pact and then go back
home. We would have to give notice to the Government and
start the movement again. What support would we get if
we did so? There was no doubt that the response in men and
money would be disappointing. There was therefore no
possibility that if we continued the fight, we would achieve
better results than the Mahatma had done. In the circum-
stances, what would we gain by dividing the House? If we

234 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
were defeated as we were sure to be, our opposition would be
futile. If we succeeded in throwing out the Pact—which was
unlikely in the circumstances—but failed to carry on a more
vigorous campaign, the country would not gain by our
opposition. Moreover, the execution of Sardar Bhagat Singh
and his comrades had to be considered. The Government
had sufficient cognisance of the situation in the country to
realise that the execution on the eve of the Congress was
likely to create a split in the Congress and would considerably
strengthen the position of the anti-Pact Party. If the
Government were so anxious to create a split, there was
something to be said in favour of avoiding it. In times of
crises, a party has sometimes to stand by its leaders even when
it is known that they are committing a blunder. This was
the first occasion for an agreement between the Nationalist
leaders and the Government. If the rank and file of the
Party repudiated the leaders after they had entered into an
agreement, that would be damaging to the prestige not only
of the leaders, but also of the Party itself. The Government
would in future be able to say that it is of no use to have
any negotiations with the leaders because they are likely to
be repudiated by their followers. After duly weighing all
these considerations, we decided that a statement should be
made to the effect that the Left Wing of the Congress did not
approve of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, but that in view of the
circumstances prevailing at the time, they would refrain
from dividing the House. This statement was made by me
before the Subjects Committee of the Congress and was
received with great jubilation by the supporters of the Pact,
while it caused disappointment to our more enthusiastic
supporters.
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel presided over the Congress. In
his opening speech he gave the go-by to the Lahore resolution
on Independence and advocated Dominion Status for India.
Much of his speech was devoted to agrarian grievances and to
social and economic reforms, necessary for the uplift of the
country. Among the resolutions adopted at the Congress was
one appreciating the courage and self-sacrifice of Sardar
Bhagat Singh and his comrades, while condemning all acts of

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 235
violence. This resolution was on the same lines as the
'Gopinath Saha resolution' adopted by the Bengal Provincial
Conference in 1924, of which the Mahatma had strongly dis-
approved. The circumstances at Karachi were such that this
resolution had to be swallowed by people who, under ordinary
circumstances, would not have come within miles of it. So
far as the Mahatma was concerned, he had to make his con-
science somewhat elastic. But that was not enough. To
perfect the stage-management, Sardar Kishen Singh, the
father of the late Sardar Bhagat Singh, was brought to the
rostrum and made to speak in support of the Congress
leaders. The tactics of the official party were superb. The
other resolutions passed at the Congress referred to:

1. The ratification of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact.
2. The mandate given to the Congress delegation to the
   Round Table Conference; and
3. The fundamental rights of the Indian people for
   which the Congress would strive.
   The mandate given to the Congress delegation was in keeping
   with the assurance given by the Mahatma to the writer in
   Bombay. The 'fundamental rights resolution' was meant to
   placate the Socialist elements in the Congress. As for the
   personnel of the Congress delegation, the Working Com-
   mittee was empowered to make the selection. Towards the
   end of the session, the Working Committee for the next year
   was chosen and, as at the Lahore Congress, only such men
   were selected as would be inclined to follow the Mahatma
   blindly. During the Congress session, the Mahatma used to
   hold a public prayer in the morning and unprecedented
   crowds attended it. No propaganda could be more effective
   in drawing public support.
   Simultaneously with the Congress, a session of the All-
   India Naujawan Bharat Sabha (All-India Youth Congress)
   was held in Karachi over which the writer was called upon to
   preside. At that time there was a distinct tendency among
   the youths in Punjab and Sindh to break away from the
   Indian National Congress and run a separate organisation.

236 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
I pleaded strongly against this viewpoint and urged the
capture of the official Congress machinery in place of boycott.
With regard to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact I made the following
criticism:

1. The Pact had gone into many petty and unnecessary
   details but had avoided the main issue of Swaraj.
2. The Conference was really no Round Table Con-
   ference because there was no finality about the
   decisions of the Conference and the whole matter
   would be considered de novo by the British Parlia-
   ment. In a real Round Table Conference, as the
   South Africans and the Irish had, the decisions are
   always final and binding on both parties. The name
   Round Table Conference had been used only to hood-
   wink foolish Indian politicians.
3. The Indian delegates to the Round Table Conference
   would be selected not by the Indian people but by
   the British Government.
4. The Conference would not be confined to the repre-
   sentatives of the two belligerent parties. Non-descripts
   of all kinds who had nothing to do with the fight for
   Swaraj, would be there to throw obstacles in the path
   of the real Nationalists.
5. The proposal of a Federation between nationalist
   British India and the autocratic Indian Princes was
   an absurd one. The Princes or their nominees would
   act as a dead weight against the national forces.
6. ‘Safeguards’ take away what ‘responsibility’ gives. It
   was a gross error on the part of the Mahatma to talk
   of ‘safeguards’ in the interests of India. The only
   safeguard that the Indians want is liberty. The actual
   ‘safeguards’ are demanded by Britishers and are
   against the interests of Indians. It is wrong to induce
   the Indian people to accept such safeguards by
   saying that they are in the interests of India.
7. The amnesty provided under the Pact was inadequate
   because the following classes of political prisoners
   were excluded:
   (a) The state prisoners and ‘detenus’ imprisoned
   without trial, of whom there were about one
   thousand in Bengal alone.

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 237
(b) Prisoners convicted of revolutionary offences.
(c) Prisoners under trial for alleged revolutionary
offences.
(d) The under-trial prisoners in the Meerut Con-
spiracy Case.
(e) Prisoners incarcerated in connection with labour
strikes and other labour disputes.
(f) The Garhwali soldiers who had been court-
martialled and given heavy sentences for refusing
to fire on unarmed citizens.
(g) Prisoners sentenced in connection with the civil-
disobedience movement, the charges against
whom referred to violence of some sort.
8. The demand originally made by Mahatma Gandhi
for an inquiry into police atrocities during the period
of the civil-disobedience movement was excluded
from the Pact.
The above criticism met with general approval at the
Youth Congress and a resolution was adopted condemning
the Delhi Pact.
The Delhi Pact, as we shall see later on, proved to be not
a blessing but a curse. The time was not opportune for an
understanding of the sort attempted. The struggle should
have been continued for some time longer. The Pact, as
drafted, contained nothing of value. Ever since the nego-
tiations started in 1929, the Congress leaders had always
insisted on an assurance from the Government, regarding
the grant of Dominion Status. Because that assurance was
not forthcoming, the fight had to be launched in 1930. For
the same reason, the peace-negotiations prior to the First
Round Table Conference in 1930, had proved abortive. How
the fight could be suspended without such an assurance, passes
one's comprehension. The only reason one can suggest is that
there was no one in the Working Committee to point out the
correct thing to the Mahatma and with the lamented death
of Pandit Motilal Nehru, the last intellectual stalwart of the
Congress had disappeared. Though he lacked the emotional
appeal necessary in a front-rank leader, the Pandit was never-
theless a leader among men. He towered head and shoulders

238 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
above his contemporaries and in 1931, he was the one man
in the Congress Working Committee who could have in-
fluenced the Mahatma for good. It was therefore a mis-
fortune that at the time of the Delhi negotiations he was on
his deathbed and it was nothing short of a national calamity
that he passed away early in March 1931.
Inopportune as the Pact was, lack of diplomacy was also
responsible for some of its shortcomings. For instance, on the
demand for an inquiry into the police atrocities, the Mahatma
had been informed that if he stuck to it till the breaking-
point, the Government would yield. Nevertheless, he
voluntarily gave up the demand on an appeal from the
Viceroy. With better bargaining, even in March 1931, one
could have extracted more from the Government, because
they were really anxious for a settlement. But men with
fixed ideas are not well-qualified for political bargaining. So
far as the Mahatma is concerned, he alternates between
obstinacy and leniency and moreover, he is too susceptible
to personal appeals—and with such habits of mind, it is
difficult to get the better of one's opponent in political bar-
gaining. The Delhi truce was a great help to the Government.
It gave them time to inquire more deeply into the tactics of
the Congress and thereafter to perfect their machinery for
dealing with that body in future. In the case of the Congress,
the Pact had a soporific effect. The enthusiasm of the people
began to evaporate and it is out of public enthusiasm that
one gets men and money for a non-violent mass movement.
While the Government could resume their activity at any
time because they had no dearth of men or money, the
Congress would have to wait till public enthusiasm could be
worked up once again. During the period of the Delhi
truce while the Round Table Conference was sitting in
London, the Government were perfecting their plans for
striking at the Congress. For instance, by October 1931, the
emergency ordinances for the next year had been already
prepared. Dr. M. A. Ansari, the Nationalist Moslem leader
of Delhi, had unquestionable proofs of this and he duly
passed them on to the Congress President, Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel. It was easy for the Government to prophesy future

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 239
developments because they knew that nothing substantial
would be offered to the Congress. But the Congress guided
by the honest and straightforward policy of the Mahatma,
made no preparations for the coming fight. In fact, before
he left for London, the Mahatma assured Lord Irwin that
he would try his level best for a settlement there and when he
left London, he assured the Premier, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald,
that he would endeavour till the last to avoid a resumption of
hostilities and if that was impossible, he would at least strive
to avoid bitterness as far as possible.¹ Further, the day before
Mahatma Gandhi landed in Bombay, he sent by radio an
exceedingly conciliatory message which was immediately
published in all the papers. But that had no effect on the new
Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, who had already perfected his
arrangements and was spoiling for a fight in order to avenge
himself for the slight humiliation which the Government
had to face in agreeing to an armistice with the Congress.
In spite of the inadequate provisions of the Pact, if it had
provided for an inquiry into the alleged atrocities, it would
have had a very healthy check on such misdeeds in future.
During the preceding twelve months there had been excesses
committed by the police and the military in Peshawar,
Gujerat, the United Provinces and the Midnapore District in
Bengal, in connection with which the public had demanded
redress. We have already referred to the shooting in Pesha-
war. In Gujerat, the United Provinces and Midnapore,
excesses had been committed by the forces of the Crown in
trying to suppress the no-tax campaign and in the United
Provinces there had been allegations of assault on women of
a revolting description. In addition to these, a recent incident
which was still fresh in the public mind was the assault by
the police on a peaceful procession in Calcutta on Independence
Day (January 26th, 1931). This procession which was being
led by the writer who was then the Mayor of Calcutta, was
suddenly attacked without warning by British mounted
police armed with lathis (powerful sticks covered with leather)
¹ True to his assurance, on the eve of his arrest under Regulation 25
of 1827 on January 4th, 1932, the Mahatma issued an appeal in which
he said, 'Discard every trace of violence from your heart; give abso-
lute protection to every English man, woman and child.'

240 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
and mercilessly belaboured. The writer and a number of
other processionists, including Mr. Chattopadhyaya, the
Education Officer, and Mr. Ghoshal, the Deputy Licence
Officer of the Calcutta Municipality, were seriously injured in
the assault, though the procession remained peaceful and
non-violent till the end. The next day the writer was sentenced
to six months' imprisonment for rioting,¹ by the Chief
Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta. That the Mayor of the
first city in India could be treated by the police in this fashion
was something which even the Indian public could not stand.
The police, on the other hand, felt that they could do just as
they liked because they would never be called upon to appear
before the bar of public opinion.
The restricted scope of the amnesty promised under the
Pact, caused considerable disappointment among certain
sections of the people and alienated the Mahatma still more
from the revolutionaries and from trade-union circles,
including the friends and followers of the Meerut prisoners.
If the Mahatma could have secured amnesty for all these
classes of prisoners, he would have stood out not only as the
representative of the Nationalists but also of the trade-
unionists and the revolutionaries, and he could have exerted
his influence on them for good. The Government, too, if
they had taken courage in both hands and opened wide the
gates of the prison-house, would have made a magnanimous
gesture which would have gone straight into the hearts of the
people. And they would have lost nothing thereby—because
if anyone happened to abuse his liberty, he could again be put
back in prison through the help of the Regulation and the
Ordinances. Since the Mahatma confined himself to the cause
of the Satyagrahis, the revolutionaries in prison addressed a
letter to Lord Irwin stating that a settlement with Mahatma
¹ On this occasion the writer had to spend 24 hours in the Lalbazar
Central Police Station without food and drink and without change. There
was only a small quantity of Tincture of Iodine available at the station
for application to his injuries. This was soon exhausted and when he asked
for more, he did not get any. The next day he had to appear in Court
with his clothes covered with blood and his arm in a sling. He made
a statement before the Magistrate regarding his treatment in the Police
Station which was duly recorded. After his removal to prison he was
X-rayed and it was then found that two of the fingers in his right hand
had been fractured.

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 241
Gandhi would not necessarily be binding on them and that if
'His Excellency desired a real settlement of the Indian question,
the Government should come to a separate understanding
with the Revolutionary Party. This letter reached the
Viceroy’s hands through a prominent Indian politician.¹
This representation was not altogether useless, because a
few months later, the Governor of Bengal, Sir Stanley Jackson,
made an effort to come to an understanding with the revolu-
tionaries. At his instance the late Mr. J. M. Sengupta went to
Buxa Detention Camp in North Bengal and interviewed some
of the leaders. The result was not unsatisfactory. The inter-
viewed prisoners said that they were prepared to discuss
terms, but they insisted that the negotiations should be carried
on direct with the Government and not through any police-
officer. They also gave a preliminary outline of the terms
which the late Mr. Sengupta duly conveyed to the Governor.
Thereafter, a reference was made by the Government to the
prisoners through the Superintendent of the Camp, who was
a police-officer. But they refused to move further in the
matter, if the negotiations were not carried on direct with
them. As the Government were not agreeable to that, the
negotiations fell through.
In spite of all that has been written above, to the un-
sophisticated masses, the Delhi Pact appeared to be a victory
for the Mahatma. Only with the lapse of time were they to
be gradually disillusioned. Many intelligent people seriously
believed that besides the written, there were other unwritten
terms which would be disclosed later on and many of those
who were against the Pact maintained that the Mahatma
should be given a free hand till the end of the Second Round
Table Conference. The Karachi Congress undoubtedly
represented the pinnacle of the Mahatma’s popularity and
prestige. I travelled with him for some days and was able to
observe the unprecedented crowds that greeted him every-
where. I wonder if such a spontaneous ovation was ever
given to a leader anywhere else. He stood out before the
people not merely as a Mahatma but as the hero of a political
¹ I came to know these facts after my release from prison in March
1931.
Q

242 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
fight. The question that stirred me at the time was as to how
he would utilise the unique position he had been able to
attain. Would he be able to move from one victory to another,
or would the anti-climax begin? The first shock came when
the news was announced that the Working Committee on
April 2nd, had selected Mahatma Gandhi as the sole represen-
tative of the Congress at the Round Table Conference and
that he had accepted that decision. What really was behind
that decision I have never been able to understand. Was it
due to the vanity of the Mahatma who wanted to appear
before the world as the sole representative of the dumb
millions of India? Or was it merely one more error of
judgment on the part of the Working Committee? Or was
there some other motive behind the decision? It is impossible
to accept the first explanation. Whatever the real explanation
may be, the decision itself was a thoroughly wrong one. Alone
in an assembly of about one hundred men, with all kinds of
non-descripts, flunkeys and self-appointed leaders arrayed
against him like a solid phalanx, he would be at a great
disadvantage. Moreover, he would have nobody at his side
to back him up in the fight that he would have with the
reactionary Moslem leaders. But there was no help for it.
The blind followers of the Mahatma could not be expected to
criticise him and those who were not his orthodox followers
had no influence on him regardless of their character, wisdom,
or experience.
While the first move of the Mahatma after the Karachi
Congress was not a wise one, the second move was a positive
blunder. In private and in public, he began to say that his
going to the Round Table Conference depended on his ability
to solve the Hindu-Moslem question beforehand. Along with
this statement he also began to say that if the Moslems made
a united demand on the question of representation, electorate,
etc., in the new Constitution, he would accept the demand.
The effect of these statements was a most tragic one. After
the Delhi Pact, the reactionary Moslems had been somewhat
overawed by the strength and power of the Congress and they
were in a mood to come to terms with that body on a reasonable
basis. The first statement of the Mahatma immediately

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 243
changed that mood and made them feel that they held the
key position, since if they refused to come to an understanding
with him, they could prevent his attending the Round Table
Conference. The second statement of the Mahatma made the
reactionary Moslems feel that if only they would remain firm
and secure the support of the Nationalist Moslems, the
Mahatma could be forced to accept all their extreme demands.
After the above statements had been made, the Mahatma had
a conference with some reactionary Moslem leaders in Delhi
in April. I was in Delhi at the time and I went to see him
the same evening, after the conference. He seemed to be in a
depressed mood, because they had presented him with the
fourteen demands made by Mr. Jinnah (known in India as
Jinnah's fourteen points) and he felt that an agreement would
not be possible on that basis. Thereupon I remarked that the
Congress should only care for an agreement between
Nationalist Hindus and Nationalist Moslems and that the
agreed solution should be placed before the Round Table
Conference as the Nationalist demand and that the Congress
need not bother what other anti-Nationalist elements thought
or said. The Mahatma then asked me if I had any objection
to separate electorates since it could be argued that in the
absence of the third party the different communities would
live and work in concord. To this I replied that separate
electorates were against the fundamental principle of
Nationalism and that I felt so strongly on the subject that even
'Swaraj on the basis of separate electorates was, in my opinion,
not worth having. While we were engaged in this discussion,
Dr. Ansari and some of the Nationalist Moslem leaders
including Mr. Sherwani, arrived on the scene and joined in
the discussion. They said that if for any reason the Mahatma
gave up the demand for a common electorate for both Hindus
and Moslems and accepted the demand of the reactionaries for
a separate electorate for each community, they would oppose
the reactionary Moslems and also the Mahatma, because they
were convinced that separate electorates were bad not only
for the country as a whole, but also for the different com-
munities. The strong attitude of the Nationalist Moslems on
this occasion was largely responsible for preventing the

244 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Mahatma from agreeing to separate electorates and forced
him to wriggle out of the uncomfortable situation in which
he had placed himself.¹ Soon after this, the Mahatma issued
a public statement saying that he could not accept the
demands made by the communalist Moslem leaders, since the
Nationalist Moslems were opposed to them.
The atmosphere in Delhi was then (i.e., in April 1931) full
of intrigue. Though Lord Irwin was inspired by a sincere
desire for a settlement, there were many officials who were
against it. These diehard elements were encouraged by the
impending departure of Lord Irwin from India and the
advent of Lord Willingdon, who had the reputation of being
a strong man. While we were in Delhi, information reached
us from a reliable source as to the tactics that the British
Government would follow at the Round Table Conference.
We were told that every effort would be made to drag Mahatma
Gandhi at the very outset into minor issues with a view to
getting the Indians to fight among themselves, so that they
would not be able to combine against the British Government
over the major issues. I duly conveyed to the Mahatma this
information for what it was worth. He said in reply that
his plan was to meet the authorities concerned soon after his
arrival in London and try to obtain satisfaction from them
on the major issues. If he felt satisfied, he would go into the
minor issues—otherwise his work in England would end
there and then. Unfortunately, when Mahatma Gandhi was
in England, the minorities problem assumed the greatest
importance and all the major problems were put aside.
Events took place exactly as it had been prophesied in April
at Delhi.
On April 18th, Lord Irwin's tenure of office came to an
end. Before leaving Delhi he made an exceedingly conciliatory
speech at the Chelmsford Club. Though a prominent member
of the Conservative Party, he had proved himself to be a
well-wisher of India. After Lord Ripon, no Viceroy had
adopted such a friendly attitude towards the Indian people
as he had. That he could not do more for India was due
¹ In the light of these facts, the attitude of the Nationalist Moslems in
1934 to the Prime Minister's Communal Award is inexplicable.