द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

CHAPTER XI
THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER (1931)
TOWARDS the end of 1930 and the beginning of 1931, the
atmosphere was once again favourable for an understanding
between the Government and the Congress. In the first
place, the Labour Party was in power and Capt. Wedgwood-
Benn was at the India Office. Secondly, Mahatma Gandhi
by his very absence had exerted a great influence on the
Round Table Conference. Talking and discussing with
non-descripts and self-appointed leaders while the only
representative party in India was engaged in a bitter struggle
with their Government, the British politicians had felt the
unreality of the first Round Table Conference. Hence the
determination of the Labour politicians to come to a com-
promise with the Congress, if only the latter would not ask
for too much. Thirdly, Lord Irwin was the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India and he was far-sighted enough
to realise that if an understanding was to be arrived at between
the Government and the Congress, it was desirable to do so
while the Mahatma was the leader of the latter body, for
according to sane Britishers, ‘Gandhi was the best policeman
the Britisher had in India.’¹ The third factor was undoubtedly
the most important. If there had been an intransigent
Viceroy at the helm of affairs in India, no understanding with
the Congress would have been possible, however sympathetic
might have been the attitude of Whitehall at the time.
But why was Lord Irwin so agreeable to an understanding
with the Congress? No doubt his vision was broader than
that of the average British politician and he had an innate
sense of fairness and justice, so characteristically lacking in
the latter. The late Moulana Mohammed Ali had once
described him as ‘that tall thin Christian.’ A true Christian
¹ This was the opinion expressed by Miss Ellen Wilkinson, Ex-M.P.,
after her visit to India in 1932 as a member of the India League Deputation.
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