द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

238 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
above his contemporaries and in 1931, he was the one man
in the Congress Working Committee who could have in-
fluenced the Mahatma for good. It was therefore a mis-
fortune that at the time of the Delhi negotiations he was on
his deathbed and it was nothing short of a national calamity
that he passed away early in March 1931.
Inopportune as the Pact was, lack of diplomacy was also
responsible for some of its shortcomings. For instance, on the
demand for an inquiry into the police atrocities, the Mahatma
had been informed that if he stuck to it till the breaking-
point, the Government would yield. Nevertheless, he
voluntarily gave up the demand on an appeal from the
Viceroy. With better bargaining, even in March 1931, one
could have extracted more from the Government, because
they were really anxious for a settlement. But men with
fixed ideas are not well-qualified for political bargaining. So
far as the Mahatma is concerned, he alternates between
obstinacy and leniency and moreover, he is too susceptible
to personal appeals—and with such habits of mind, it is
difficult to get the better of one's opponent in political bar-
gaining. The Delhi truce was a great help to the Government.
It gave them time to inquire more deeply into the tactics of
the Congress and thereafter to perfect their machinery for
dealing with that body in future. In the case of the Congress,
the Pact had a soporific effect. The enthusiasm of the people
began to evaporate and it is out of public enthusiasm that
one gets men and money for a non-violent mass movement.
While the Government could resume their activity at any
time because they had no dearth of men or money, the
Congress would have to wait till public enthusiasm could be
worked up once again. During the period of the Delhi
truce while the Round Table Conference was sitting in
London, the Government were perfecting their plans for
striking at the Congress. For instance, by October 1931, the
emergency ordinances for the next year had been already
prepared. Dr. M. A. Ansari, the Nationalist Moslem leader
of Delhi, had unquestionable proofs of this and he duly
passed them on to the Congress President, Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel. It was easy for the Government to prophesy future