द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

242 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
fight. The question that stirred me at the time was as to how
he would utilise the unique position he had been able to
attain. Would he be able to move from one victory to another,
or would the anti-climax begin? The first shock came when
the news was announced that the Working Committee on
April 2nd, had selected Mahatma Gandhi as the sole represen-
tative of the Congress at the Round Table Conference and
that he had accepted that decision. What really was behind
that decision I have never been able to understand. Was it
due to the vanity of the Mahatma who wanted to appear
before the world as the sole representative of the dumb
millions of India? Or was it merely one more error of
judgment on the part of the Working Committee? Or was
there some other motive behind the decision? It is impossible
to accept the first explanation. Whatever the real explanation
may be, the decision itself was a thoroughly wrong one. Alone
in an assembly of about one hundred men, with all kinds of
non-descripts, flunkeys and self-appointed leaders arrayed
against him like a solid phalanx, he would be at a great
disadvantage. Moreover, he would have nobody at his side
to back him up in the fight that he would have with the
reactionary Moslem leaders. But there was no help for it.
The blind followers of the Mahatma could not be expected to
criticise him and those who were not his orthodox followers
had no influence on him regardless of their character, wisdom,
or experience.
While the first move of the Mahatma after the Karachi
Congress was not a wise one, the second move was a positive
blunder. In private and in public, he began to say that his
going to the Round Table Conference depended on his ability
to solve the Hindu-Moslem question beforehand. Along with
this statement he also began to say that if the Moslems made
a united demand on the question of representation, electorate,
etc., in the new Constitution, he would accept the demand.
The effect of these statements was a most tragic one. After
the Delhi Pact, the reactionary Moslems had been somewhat
overawed by the strength and power of the Congress and they
were in a mood to come to terms with that body on a reasonable
basis. The first statement of the Mahatma immediately