सामग्री पर जाएँ
सर्वकोश
द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

The Indian Struggle 1920-1934 by Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose

नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished339 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 239, कुल 339 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 239

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 241
Gandhi would not necessarily be binding on them and that if
'His Excellency desired a real settlement of the Indian question,
the Government should come to a separate understanding
with the Revolutionary Party. This letter reached the
Viceroy’s hands through a prominent Indian politician.¹
This representation was not altogether useless, because a
few months later, the Governor of Bengal, Sir Stanley Jackson,
made an effort to come to an understanding with the revolu-
tionaries. At his instance the late Mr. J. M. Sengupta went to
Buxa Detention Camp in North Bengal and interviewed some
of the leaders. The result was not unsatisfactory. The inter-
viewed prisoners said that they were prepared to discuss
terms, but they insisted that the negotiations should be carried
on direct with the Government and not through any police-
officer. They also gave a preliminary outline of the terms
which the late Mr. Sengupta duly conveyed to the Governor.
Thereafter, a reference was made by the Government to the
prisoners through the Superintendent of the Camp, who was
a police-officer. But they refused to move further in the
matter, if the negotiations were not carried on direct with
them. As the Government were not agreeable to that, the
negotiations fell through.
In spite of all that has been written above, to the un-
sophisticated masses, the Delhi Pact appeared to be a victory
for the Mahatma. Only with the lapse of time were they to
be gradually disillusioned. Many intelligent people seriously
believed that besides the written, there were other unwritten
terms which would be disclosed later on and many of those
who were against the Pact maintained that the Mahatma
should be given a free hand till the end of the Second Round
Table Conference. The Karachi Congress undoubtedly
represented the pinnacle of the Mahatma’s popularity and
prestige. I travelled with him for some days and was able to
observe the unprecedented crowds that greeted him every-
where. I wonder if such a spontaneous ovation was ever
given to a leader anywhere else. He stood out before the
people not merely as a Mahatma but as the hero of a political
¹ I came to know these facts after my release from prison in March
1931.
Q