पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 23
an express call for help to Malharrao who started at once on the first of Janu-
ary, 1760. Had there been a man of Bajirao's type, he would have possibly
covered the distance from Jaipur to Delhi just in time to join Dattaji. But
Ahmad Shah probably knowing the speed of Malharrao's advance, decided
to forestall him.
Ahmad Shah left Sukartal within a week and advanced by way of
Meerut to Luni on the Jamuna. This place is about seven miles to the north-
east of Delhi and opposite to it is the ferry of Jagatpur. Abdali was trying to
find the least defended part on the opposite bank of the Jamuna so as to cross
the river without giving any chance to the enemy to attack his force while
crossing. It was impossible for him to cross near Delhi, because the fire from
the Delhi fort could have been effectively used against him by the Wazir.
The ghats just to the north of Delhi were guarded by Dattaji's scouts. Dat-
taji himself was camping in the vicinity of Majnu's hillock, two miles to the
north of Delhi. He had so distributed his army as to meet any surprise cross-
ing by the Durrani troops at any point. But the river was fordable at many
points, and it was difficult to keep watch in a low land with the dense fog of
January covering it. As Dattaji could have no intimation of Abdali's intentions,
he had to depend on mere guess work. Three days passed in manoeuvring for
a crossing, and Abdali ultimately chose to cross opposite the village of Buradi,
where the terrain was most uneven and difficult. This place is some seven miles
to the north of Delhi. Dattaji had guarded the crossings to the south of this
place well. In order to mislead the Marathas, Abdali sent small parties to
each of the crossings and with the main army he went to Badarpur and tried
to cross thence. He crossed over to Buradi because that was probably the least
guarded part. The river there had separated into two streams with a sandy
low island between. It was overgrown with thick rushes which attain in these
parts a height of ten feet. If soldiers lie in ambush interspersed in these rushes,
it would be impossible to see or locate them within a few yards. Till one
actually arrives on the edge of the river, one cannot see it from any point in the
vicinity. Nor can the crossing at this point be seen from any southern point
on the bank, because the land there bulges out a little and shuts the view to the
north. Though the Marathi chronicle indulges in vivid description, it is not
known whether Dattaji had actually placed a force at this particular point.
. Perhaps he had not, and he seems to have been informed of the crossing when
half the army of Abdali had already crossed. This was on the morning of 10th
January, 1760.
Early that morning, Dattaji received news, one after the other, of his
guards at various points on the river being simultaneously attacked by the cross-
ing parties of Durrani and Ruhela soldiers and being very roughly handled by
them. This was Abdali's ruse to send Dattaji on the wrong scent. But Dat-
taji would not move unguardedly and would not call in the help from his
whole camp which was spread over a vast plain, each part being separated
from the other by a considerable distance. In fact he had no mind to engage
the enemy till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar for whom he was waiting and
perhaps wanted to fall back on the city in case of need. His only intention

24 PANIPAT: 1761
was to keep the enemy at a distance from the city till Holkar's arrival so as
not to be besieged within the city walls. But this was the very reason why the
Durrani made haste and crossed over simultaneously at various points. It
seems that none of the parties placed by Dattaji with a few thousand troops
each could stand against the enemy's advance with fire from the light cannon
placed on the elephants, who swam across in front. Practically the whole of
the Shinde contingent was composed of horsemen used to sword and lance,
unlike the Ruhelas who were footmen armed with muskets and rifles. The
result was that in fights from a distance the Marathas were always at a dis-
advantage. When almost all the Maratha parties had been completely routed
with heavy loss of life, Dattaji received news from Janrao Wable, a veteran
captain of horse, that half the army of the enemy had crossed the river. Dat-
taji sent Bayaji Shinde to help Janrao in holding the ghat at Buradi, which is
some three miles away from the village of that name. Receiving the news
that Bayaji was worsted with his three thousand horse, and he himself killed
by a bullet-shot, Dattaji ordered his whole contingent to follow him to the river-
bank. He tried to go to the Buradi Ghat not from the west side but from the
south-west along the village of Jagatpur. He crossed first an ordinary nullah
and then the lake-like inner stream. When he entered the part overgrown with
rushes, his cavalry could not keep any line or move in any close formation.
The Ruhela infantry, which was lying in ambush in the rushes, opened fire
from here, there and everywhere, and made it impossible for Dattaji to proceed.
Janakoji who was accompanying Dattaji though forbidden, received a bullet-
wound on the right upper arm. The news of this incident had the effect of still
more demoralising the Maratha troops, and each tried to turn back to escape
what seemed certain death. Dattaji was advised by those near him to order a
retreat. But before anything could be done, he himself fell down with a bullet-
wound in his ribs. The Afghans then rushed out and completed the rout of the
Maratha army with a heavy massacre. The story of the wounded Dattaji being
taunted and kicked by Mian Qutb Shah and his cutting off Dattaji's head after
some talk, seems more dramatic than true and an invention of the author of the
chronicle. We have no belief in it.
There was no regular battle at Buradi Ghat and the two armies were
never drawn together in battle array, nor is the number of casualties known.
Yashvantrao Jagdale, Bayaji Shinde and Maloji Shinde were the noted persons
who lost their lives in this action. Govindpant Bundele does not seem to have
taken any part in guarding the ghats as written in the chronicle, though he
was not far away from the field of battle. Perhaps he was in the camp of
Janakoji a few miles away from Delhi. On the Afghan side, Shuja-ud-daulah
does not seem to have been present in Abdali's camp nor any of his troops
like the Gosawi corps. Therefore, the story given in the Bhau Bakhar of
Shuja begging for the head of Dattaji and Umraogir Gosawi buying it for two
lakhs and afterwards attending to his full funeral rites must be treated as pure
fiction written to console the Shinde family and recommend Ragho Ram Page
and Rajaram Chobdar to their attention. The action was fought mainly be-
tween the Ruhelas of Najib and Qutb Shah, and Dattaji, though the Dur-
ranis followed soon after to turn it into a rout and pursue the Shinde contin-

KARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 25
gent to a long distance. Purushottam Mahadev Hingne¹⁰ who was present in
the battle and received a bullet-wound on his thigh, writes that the action was
a short and swift one, turning into a rout on account of the general's ac-
cidental death in the very first round and the leader receiving a bullet-wound
himself. No battle could be fought because the place was unsuitable on ac-
count of the thick rushes, and because there was no intention either of offer-
ing one till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar. In fact, the main part of the
Maratha army was at a distance from the river-bank and not ready for a
fight. The division under Dattaji was not sufficient to meet the combined
forces of Abdali and Najib with any hope of success. That is why Dattaji had
asked Govindpant Bundele with his small brigade to continue with him all
along and invited help from Surajmal Jat, who was the only ally left to the
Marathas in Northern India. The Wazir's contingent was not more than five
thousand strong this time, and was not very helpful or wholeheartedly with
the Marathas.
The Durranis pursued Janakoji for twenty-five miles and then re-
turned. Malharrao who had started on the 1st of January was still at a dis-
tance of some one hundred and fifty miles from Delhi! Janakoji followed
in the direction of Rewadi towards which place his camp had been despatched
with Ruparam Kothari and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar, the Shinde's Diwan.
It was impossible for Janakoji to ride a horse with his aching wound which
had become worse by the first day's headlong flight. As the whole baggage had
been looted by the pursuers or left behind as heavy, there was no palanquin
with carriers in the whole army. A char-pai (cot) was taken as a substitute
and Janakoji was carried on it by the soldiers themselves acting as carriers,
leaving their horses in the charge of others. After covering thirty miles in this
manner, with great trouble Janakoji reached his camp with the remnants of
his broken army after midnight that day. Bhagirathibai, who seems to be a
second wife of Dattaji, was in advanced pregnancy and went with the retreat-
ing camp. As soon as Janakoji arrived in the camp, his wife Kashibai and
Bhagirathibai came out of their tent to see what had happened. Coming to
know of Dattaji's death and the defeat of his army, the whole camp was
plunged into grief, and there was a great uproar and wailing. From the
dramatic description of the Bakhar, Bhagirathibai who was not more than
sixteen in age (having been married to Dattaji in March 1758) seems to have
been a woman of exceptional self-composure and precociously wise. Instead
of indulging in useless crying, she reprimanded others for not taking courage
and acting as was necessary under the circumstances. She ordered a halt till
the morning and stopped the march of the army so as to dress Janakoji's
wounds and afford him rest after a run of twenty hours; but the camp which
was terrified by what they had heard and afraid of being caught by the
pursuing Durrani troops, started at once in the small hours of the morning in
the direction of Rewadi. Disobeying her orders, the whole civil camp started,
and as a consequence it became difficult for the leaders to continue the halt
without the help of camp-followers. The officers in the Shinde contingent
10 Ibid. 2.114.

26 PANIPAT: 1761
found it an extremely difficult problem to carry the heavy baggage, including
stores of cloth, grain and fodder. They sought counsel with the two women
who were now in place of their masters, and after a short consultation, took
with them the most necessary and light equipment only, setting fire to the
rest for fear of its falling into the hands of the enemy. They placed Janakoji
in the lady's palanquin and began to search for horses for the use of the two
women. Meanwhile, under the stress of panic, the camp-followers had caught
all the available horses and run away with them. With difficulty two ponies
were secured and the women started on them. Rupram Kothari, who was
accompanying the party, suggested, in order to mislead the Durrani pursuers
and to put them on the wrong scent, that the two women and Janakoji should
separate themselves from the disorderly camp and go secretly to Kumbher.
But Kashibai, for fear of falling into the Jat's hands should they turn traitors
in this calamity, disapproved the plan and they continued with the broken
camp and the army as best as they could. After four days of continuous trou-
ble, the fore-runners of the army came into touch with the advance party of
the Holkar's contingent and stopped there. • On the 15th January, 1760,
Malharrao came and joined the party to the north of Kot Putali. Then only
the panic subsided and men found time to think of what had happened and
to plan the future in accordance with it.
• It seems from Janakoji's letter¹¹ to the Peshwa that the plight of the
Shinde army was exaggerated by the Bakhar writer. The Shinde division
though defeated, was not as helpless as the author of the chronicle would paint
it to be. The action at the Buradi Ghat was fought on the 10th of January,
and not on the 9th, as the day was Thursday.¹² Malharrao and his Diwan
Gangadharpant Chandrachud were men of quite a different type from Janakoji
Shinde and his Diwan Ramaji Anant Dabholkar. Cautiousness and far-sighted-
ness were the chief virtues of Malharrao, and these fully coincided with the
traditional habits and temper of the Marathas. Malharrao's whole policy was
based on opportunism and not on any fixed principles. He would take no
risk which would land him into a disaster. If the Marathas got something with-
out much effort and little risk, that was sufficient and good. If they could
not get the desired fruit and had to return without it, it was no dishonour to
them, so thought Malharrao. And it was the guiding philosophy of his life.
The Shinde family, on the other hand, was of a different temper. They were
straightforward and would not mince matters in their dealings with friend
or foe. They were more loyal servants trying to obey the Peshwa's commands
as best as they could, and would shirk no risk in gaining their ends. The result
is exemplified in the careers of the members of that illustrious family, which
was mainly responsible for the Maratha activities in the north for three quar-
ters of a century. Malharrao, on the contrary, would, in the greatest diffi-
culties, first think of the safety of his life and property and then of everything
else. With such a frame of mind, he was honest to himself but not necessarily
to others with different principles, tempers and standards of conduct. This
11 Ibid. 21.182.
12 Ibid. 27.247.

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 27
somewhat rough man with blunt manners looked out of place and bizarre in
a mixed company of polished men with suave manners. At the same time
there was always a substratum of truth in his mode of thinking, and others had
to fall in line with it in times of difficulty. The present was such a time and
Janakoji had to keep his family-dash in the background and follow Malharrao.
Malharrao sent back the families with the baggage and the bazar to
their homes through the friendly territory of the Raja of Keravli to Gwalior
under the guardianship of Govindpant Bundele. He started from Kot Putali
on the 23rd February. Bhagirathibai gave birth to a posthumous son¹³ of Dat-
taji that night, but he seems to have died soon after. Malharrao and Janakoji
then started back towards Delhi with a view to check Abdali's progress and
counteract his plans. The Marathas do not seem to have lost courage after
the recent untoward happenings. They were still confident of being able to
checkmate Abdali and the Ruhelas. Malharrao knew "that Najib Khan and
Madhosingh were the chief wirepullers in inviting Ahmad Shah" and, contrary
to the common belief, was ready now to reshuffle his former policy of befriend-
ing Najib and the Wazir, whom he himself had put on the pedestal. He had
thoroughly understood that "Ghazi-ud-din was not acting in consonance with
the dignity of his high office and was fickle to a degree. Even though weak
himself, he would still indulge in vile machinations and back-door politics. He
would do what he liked and on meeting others, humble himself to such an ex-
tent as to take away all wrath against his conduct and thus try to wipe out¹⁴
the evil effects of his behaviour." The Peshwa, Nanasaheb, on the other hand,—
and in this case acting on the information and the prejudices of Raghunathrao¹⁵
----wished to stick up for a person up to the last, after once having taken his
side, and would not change his position unless an open and sufficient cause
obliged him to do so. He had instructed Dattaji to act accordingly, but Ghazi-
ud-din would neither grant what the Marathas wanted nor issue imperial
sanads bestowing Allahabad and Benares on the Marathas.¹⁶ though Shuja-
ud-daulah, his rival, would have been the loser. "You can conquer and take
possession of the places you want as you are strong. Why do you want sanads
for the same?" he would argue with the Marathas. Simultaneously he would
write to Shuja-ud-daulah asking him never to grant or hand over these holy
cities to the Marathas, but to prepare himself to defend them to the last. To
which Shuja¹⁷ would reply that he would do the needful. Thus the two rivals
for the chancellorship of the Empire were simultaneously acting hand in glove
with the Marathas and also trying to defend the Muslim dominions at all
costs and by every subterfuge. Najib had already deceived; fooled and ruined
Dattaji, and the Wazir was now following in his wake. But after his late as-
sassinations, it was impossible for the Marathas to back him any more and they
had to re-orient their policy.
13 RAJ 1.162.
14 SPD 2 117.
15 Ait. Patra, Yadi 171
16 SPD 27.240
17 Ibid 27.240

28 PANIPAT: 1761
The Peshwa had, in his dire need of money, permitted¹⁸ Dattaji to ap-
point Shuja to the office of the Wazir if he would grant the Maratha claims
and pay down cash. Surajmal Jat was on good terms with Shuja as he was
his friend's son and their interests also would not clash. On the one hand the
Peshwa wanted these two allies to check-mate the Wazir in case he was not
amenable to Maratha interests. On the other hand, he feared their combina-
tion as likely to prove too strong for the Maratha power and, therefore, he
was willing to support Ghazi-ud-din at all costs, as there was no fear of his
becoming powerful enough to defy the Marathas. Dattaji had, therefore,
chosen the path of placating Najib while keeping the question of the Chancel-
lorship pending. Now that that alternative had disappeared, Malharrao had
definitely decided to do away with the double-dealing and ambitious Wazir
and invest¹⁹ Shuja with that office. Both Shuja and the Jat feared the Afghan
union, as they were likely to be the next victims of that combination. Besides,
Surajmal had the ambition of profiting and aggrandizing himself at the cost
of the Ruhelas by spreading his power beyond the Jamuna and even the Ganges.
Already the Jats had spread in the Doab and colonised certain parts of it. It
was but natural, therefore, that they should rally round Surajmal as the "Lord
of Braj." Just as Surajmal had made his power unassailable by building,
strengthening and storing his forts of Deeg, Kumbher and Bharatpur, similarly
he took the fortalice of Sabitgad, near Kol, re-named it Ramgad, and
began to turn it into a second Kumbher. From this base he was trying to
dominate the upper Doab and Rohilkhand beyond the Ganges. Malharrao
had now established friendship²⁰ with the Jat Raja, forgetting the siege of
Kumbher and his son's death. As it was in the interest of Surajmal to combat
the Afghan power, he made common cause with the Marathas and helped them
in this guerilla warfare.
From Kot Putali, Malharrao and Janakoji began their new plan of
making sudden raids on the enemy's undefended depots and roving round the
flanks so as to sieze every opportunity of spoliation. Ahmad Shah was now
camping south of Delhi and thence despatching letters to the various chiefs
asking them to pay him tribute and join their forces with his in his efforts to
drive the Marathas²¹ from northern India. But they knew his ways as well
as his power and, therefore, chose to sit on the fence playing the game of
procrastination, by neither acceding to nor refusing his demands, but merely .
pleading their inability to do anything. Ahmad Shah had to visit their ter-
ritories personally in order to squeeze any money out of them. First he moved
south and besieged Deeg near Mathura. He drove away the small parties
of the Marathas hovering round him. He was not able to make any im-
pression on Deeg and had to move in pursuit of the threatening Marathas.
Malharrao, accompanied by Janakoji and Naro Shankar, was reported to be
at Narnol,²² whither Abdali moved next.
18 Ait. Patren Yadi 167.
19 SPD 21 183.
20 Ibid. 2 121.
21 Ibid. 21 186.
22 Ibid. 21.186.

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 29
Leaving Deeg, Ahmad Shah proceeded south-west into the Jaipur ter-
ritory plundering wherever he went. He ransomed the small local Rajas of
Kadhake and Khobari (Kurke and Khohari?). He was thinking of proceed-
ing against the non-committing Madhosingh to Jaipur. On the road he
slaughtered the inhabitants of the resisting town of Mahwah²³ (twenty miles
east of Bandikui), but spared the residents of Baswa²⁴ (ten miles north of
Bandikui), as they offered ransom for their town. This was in the third week
of February. There he received the news that the Marathas were looting the
districts to the west of Delhi and had taken Rs. 10,000 as tribute from Kanaud.²⁵
Ahmad Shah, therefore, swerved north through Alwar territories,²⁶ leaving
the direction of Jaipur. But before he could arrive near Delhi, Malharrao
had formed another plan, depending upon Abdali's intended move against
Jaipur which, had it been put into execution, would have engaged the Afghans
there for at least a month or two. As Najib Khan and most of the other
Ruhelas were accompanying Abdali on his march, Malharrao and his shrewd
Diwan Gangoba Chandrachud thought of attacking the Ruhela lands in the
Doab and beyond, in the absence of their proprietors. The Maratha army
crossed the Jamuna to the south of Delhi on 20th February, 1760, and de-
scended upon the rich town of Sikandrabad. There they halted and com-
pletely looted the town on the Holi Day i.e. 1st March, 1760. They should
have moved from the place the next day and proceeded farther, but there
they heard that Najib Khan's treasure of ten lakhs was coming into the Doab
on its way to the Abdali camp. It had come up to the bank of the Ganges
opposite to the town of Anup Shahar. Getting this clue, they sent pickets to
see where the Ganges could be crossed. In the meanwhile, Ahmad Shah hear-
ing this move of Holkar, suddenly changed his direction and ran to the south
of Delhi. Thence he detached Jahan Khan and Najib Khan with 35,000
troops unencumbered with any artillery or camp equipage. Surajmal Jat who
in this guerilla war was helping the Marathas, came to know of this sudden
move of Abdali and sent information of the same to Gangoba Chandrachud
to warn him in time. The Maratha army had, therefore, already divided
itself.
The Shinde contingent under Janakoji as well as old Malharrao Holkar
had fallen back towards Mathura and Agra. Rupram, the Jat envoy, accom-
panied them. But the rest of Holkar's troops who never had any acquaintance
with the Durrani ways and no experience of battling against them, laughed
at the idea of running away on mere news of the enemy, and taunted the
Shinde's troops as being faint-hearted. Janakoji, therefore, separated from
Holkar and started towards Mathura. Malharrao himself personally followed
him and ordered Gangoba Tatya to check the Durrani advance. But his
corps was surprised, caught unprepared and massacred with heavy slaughter

²³ KHARE 1.21
²⁴ Ibid.
²⁵ SPD 2.118.
²⁶ Ibid. 21.186.
²⁷ Ibid. 2.121.

30 PANIPAT: 1761
by Jahan Khan. Gangoba, who was personally alert, was able to run away
and save himself; but Anandrao Ram Yadav, Shetyaji Kharade and his son
were killed in the running fight,²³ and the broken remnant of the frightened
army crossed the Jamuna back into the Jat territory, wherever it could. The
experiment of checkmating the Durrani forces by guerilla tactics thus ended
in failure.
The Maratha forces, therefore, retreated to the borders of the Jaipur
territory and encamped in the vicinity of Bayana. The Maratha tactics, how-
ever, had saved not only the Jats but also the Rajput princes. Abdali had to
turn back from Jaipur because the Marathas had swept towards Delhi, and
now his army had to be stationed in the Doab to ward off the Maratha raids
against the Ruhelas. The Marathas now reached a complete understanding
with Surajmal Jat and renewed their former agreements with him. Surajmal
promised to follow the Maratha policy in all respects. His own territories in
the Doab were now directly threatened and he concentrated his strength on
the defence of Ramgad (the modern Aligarh), which, however, surrendered
to Abdali's overwhelming forces within a month. As all the Ruhelas were
not on good terms and in full accord with Najib, the Marathas now tried to
divide them by entering into a separate arrangement with Hafiz Rahmat, the
grand old man amongst the trans-Gangetic Ruhelas. He agreed to join his
forces with the Marathas, send back Abdali after detaching him from Najib and
not to help Najib in his fight against the Marathas. The Marathas agreed, on
the other hand, not to invade the other Ruhelas but to content themselves with
the cis-Gangetic territories. Abdali would have now left for Afghanistan, had
not Najib induced him to remain in India for protecting him against the chafing
wrath of the Marathas. His stay in India gave a new turn to the Maratha
politics in the north.
²³ Ibid. 2.121.

CHAPTER III
SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA
WHEN the tidings of Dattaji's death reached the Peshwa's camp at
Ahmadnagar in the south, none in the Deccan was prepared for such a bolt
from the blue. All had full confidence in the military talents of Dattaji Shinde.
They expected him at least to stem the tide of the Durrani invasion if not to
defeat Abdali and drive him back. Besides, the Peshwa had ordered Malharrao
Holkar to proceed to Dattaji's help and he was expected to be on the route
towards the Panjab. This was in the middle of November 1759, after Sabaji's
return to Sukartal. At that time, it was expected that the Nizam in the Dec-
can would be cowed down by ordinary manoeuvring of troops and be prepared
to part with the north-western portion of his dominions. It seems that the
Nizam had consented to grant Ahmadnagar and Parenda forts together with
the revenue of the surrounding territories amounting to ten lakhs, to the
Peshwa.¹ But afterwards, due to the advice of his brothers, he tried to
equivocate about the grant of Ahmadnagar which was not only a strong fort
in the military sense, but was a place of prestige for the Muslims, being the
old seat of the Nizamshahi Kingdom. The Peshwa was not in a mood at
that time to tolerate any delaying tactics. His position at the hour was thought
to be almost that of a dictator in India. Since the Maratha standards were
carried beyond the Attock² in the previous year, the Peshwa's fame had spread
not only throughout the length and breadth of India, but had travelled beyond
the boundaries to Iran and Turan.³ In the south his generals Balvantrao
Mehendale, Gopalrao Patwardhan, Malhar Naik Raste and Visaji Krishna
Biniwale had established the Maratha suzerainty south of the river Krishna.⁴
In the north his brother Raghunnathrao and his generals Dattaji and Mal-
harrao had created such awe that none in those parts was willing to cross
swords with the Marathas. Even the chiefs not conquered by the Marathas
were ready to send ambassadors and try to negotiate terms for their existence
and continuance.⁵ Shuja-ud-daulah had paid tribute⁶ and the English in Bengal,
though they had slyly usurped the power by a silent revolution without pro-
claiming themselves the masters, were still in need of the Peshwa's goodwill and
forbearance towards them, and actually sent emissaries to the Poona Court to
ward off Raghunathrao's proposed advance into Bengal.⁷ The Peshwa had,
it seems, actually assured Clive of his support, and Clive made political use of
that assurance in imposing himself upon the Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah.⁸ Simi-
larly, the English advance through Orissa to Masulipatam and the occupation
¹ RAJ. 1 154.
² BISM (Persian Mss) No. 696, dated 20-12 1758
³ Aitihasika Sphuta Lekh 411
⁴ SPD 28.200-02, 204, 210, 216, 217, 266
⁵ BISM (Persian Mss.) No 699
⁶ K. Patre Yadi No. 166
⁷ JIHQ 15.3.388.
⁸ Hill 2.387, 388, 400
[ 31 ]

32 PANIPAT: 1761
of the French jagirs by Colonel Forde was made possible by Maratha for-
bearance and the Peshwa's pressure on the Nizam Salabat Jang, the grantor
of these jagirs. Naturally the Peshwa was thinking himself as suzerain in all
these parts of India occupied by the English, for both the Deccan and Bengal
as well as Arcot were paying chauth to the Marathas and the English had
still not remonstrated against or interfered with this right.
Bussy who had been recalled from the court of Hyderabad by Lally,
had left for Pondicherry in July 1758. The result was that the fruit of his
occupation of Daulatabad and of the assassination of Shah Nawaz Khan who
was a protege of the Peshwa had been snatched away by others after his de-
parture. Thus ended the French influence at the Nizam's Court. The Peshwa
had succeeded in detaching Ibrahim Khan Gardi, pupil of Bussy, from the
Nizam's service and engaging him himself.⁹ Thus strengthened, the Peshwa
sent his cousin Sadashivrao Bhau, with forty thousand troops to occupy Ahmad-
nagar as promised by the Nizam. He was saved the trouble of besieging that
strong fort as Kavi Jang, its keeper, agreed to deliver it to the Marathas in con-
sideration for a jagir with an annual revenue of Rs. fifty thousand.¹⁰ Visaji
Krishna took possession of it on 9th November, 1759. Thence Sadashivrao
Bhau proceeded towards Beed and Dharur and commenced hostilities with
the Nizam by fomenting and strengthening internal quarrels amongst the
Nizam brothers. Basalat Jang separated himself from the Nizam and marched
towards the south. The Maratha sardars of the Nizam, Nimbalkars and Khan-
dagle, were sitting sulkily at home and not joining their forces with those of
Nizam Ali, who had taken the lead after the departure of the French.
Sadashivrao hoped for a quick decision in the campaign and after its suc-
cessful termination intended to send Raghunathrao into the north to help
Dattaji.
But Nizam Ali would not part with the territories demanded by the
Peshwa without a trial of strength. Skirmishes began from the 20th January,
1760, and gradually the Maratha armies surrounded the Nizam and his
brother. The Nizam wanted to reach the fort of Dharur and make a stand
there, but the Marathas would not allow him to escape from Udgir and con-
tinuously followed close at his heels. By forming a hollow square, the Nizam
marched out in the French fashion from Udgir and slowly moved towards
Ausa, skirmishing all along the way. When the fort of Dharur remained some
fifteen miles ahead, the Marathas held up his march by completely surround-
ing him on all sides and attacking him in the rear. In the battle of 3rd Febru-
ary, 1760, the Nizam was completely defeated and hemmed in, and there-
fore sued for peace. By the terms of the peace, the Nizam ceded to the
Marathas practically the half of his remaining dominions. Nizam Ali, the
chief instigator, was to go back to his jagir in Berar and the Nizam Salabat
Jang was to remain in Hyderabad. His Maratha sardars¹¹ were to leave the
Nizam's service. The foreign relations of the Nizam were to be guided by the
⁹ Purandare 1.382.
¹⁰ Ibid. 1.382.
¹¹ Raj. 1.165.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 33
Maratha policy, especially his dealings with the French.¹² Bijapur, Ahmad-
nagar, Burhanpur and Daulatabad, all four former capitals of the Muslim
dominions, were surrendered together with the important forts of Asher and
Mulher.¹³ Sadashivrao Bhau had become the hero of the day. He writes
that but for the new danger in the north, the whole of the south would have
come under the rule of the Peshwa.
Unfortunately he reckoned without his host. Already the English had
stolen a march politically, and now militarily also they loomed large on the
horizon. Bussy had already been made a prisoner by them, and Haider Ali had
so firmly set foot in Mysore as never to be ousted. While the Peshwa had just
then taken possession of Underi and Kansa from the Sidi,¹⁴ Janjira and Surat
never became Maratha possessions. Even the Nizam brothers, though de-
feated with heavy loss and deprived of half their dominions, were only biding
their time. They had given their consent to the treaty because they had to,
but there was no intention in their mind of fulfilling the terms in the real
spirit.¹⁵ By the treaty they had merely played for time to reshuffle their mat-
ters, gain over their disaffected Maratha sardars to their side, seek help from
the Pathans of Karnool, the Bedars of Surapur and also Murarrao Ghorpade.
Their whole army had not been completely crushed and, in fact, they had sought
peace at once to keep it intact. All these points had been placed before Bhau
and he should have thought of them seriously. But the Peshwa thought more
of recovering the prestige lost in north India as a result of the fall of Shinde
Consequently he ordered preparations to be made for despatching a strong force
to the north to drive out Abdali.
Throughout the Udgir campaign, the Peshwa who had stopped at
Ahmadnagar, and directed the movements from that place, now proceeded to-
wards Paithan on his way to Patdur, southeast of Jalna, where he had sum-
moned the Bhosle brothers from Nagpur to settle their quarrels. Sadashivrao
Bhau himself proceeded north to that place, after crossing the Godavari, to
meet him and thrash out the future policy through corsultations with all.
They met there in the first week of March 1760, and first celebrated their vic-
tory by playing the Rangapanchami festival with zest. Then began the dis-
cussions. All the three cousins were there, and it was the declared intention
of the Peshwa and also of Bhau to send Raghunathrao to the north as
originally arranged.
It should be remembered that up to that time the final route of Mal-
harrao Holkar by Abdali at Sikandrabad, which took place in the first week
of March, had not been reported to the Peshwa, as news travelled very slowly
in those days. If the news had reached the Peshwa's camp at Padtur in time,
that would have perhaps given a different turn to the whole affair. It seems
that the discussions assumed the form of family bickerings in the Peshwa's
family. Personal opinions, long cherished prejudices, partiality and selfish-
¹² SPD 40.123.
¹³ Raj. 1.166.
¹⁴ Ibid. 1.157
¹⁵ SPD 1.86.
P. F.—3

34 PANIPAT 1761
ness had played their role in what should have been purely political discus-
sions. The Peshwa had always shown his predilection towards his brother
Raghunathrao, and had somehow formed a good opinion about his ability
Sadashivrao Bhau, for all his ability and wisdom, was still a cousin and there-
fore not on a par with Raghunathrao He could have no legal share in the
Peshwa's dominions and estates, and was only the first servant of the state.
Gopikabai, the wife of the Peshwa, was supposed to be the chief instigator
against the superior claims of Sadashivrao to high office due to his ability
When Raghunathrao was ordered¹⁶ to take the command of the north, he put
in a plea that he would not accept the responsibility¹⁷ unless provided with
ample funds Sadashivrao Bhau who was a strict accountant and auditor gen-
eral held Raghunathrao responsible for the debts of the Panjab campaign and
he strongly resented the charge Raghunathrao had taken the past lesson to
heart and, therefore, wished to absolve himself from the results of the forth
coming campaign
After much recriminative discussion, the Peshwa ordered Bhau him
self to shoulder the responsibility and lead the campaign ¹⁸ The Peshwa was
rather unwilling to spare such a consummate, able and all round administrator
as Bhau for a long time, but there was no help for it, as Bhau had been stung
to the quick by a challenge from his cousin to prove his own valour and ability
to add ample funds to the central treasury by going on the campaign himself
But Gopikabai feared the consequence of Bhau's going to the north, accom-
panied by his wife and with a big army His prestige had already risen very
high by the Udgir campaign If he became equally successful in the north and
were to establish a separate kingdom for himself, who was there to check him?
It was necessary, therefore, to keep some constitutional check on his conduct and
with this view Vishwasrao, the eldest son of the Peshwa, was placed at the
head of the forces, with Bhau acting as his deputy From the correspondence
in the whole Panipat campaign, it is clear that Bhau was not free to settle
anything on his own responsibility Every time he referred the matter to and
sought the previous sanction of the Peshwa. This was a false position in the
then circumstances for a supreme authority like Bhau It appears to have had
a dilatory and derogatory effect on Bhau's conduct of affairs, making it im-
possible for him to free himself from the entanglement at Panipat later on, when
need for a quick, decisive step arose This point should constantly be borne in
mind when reading the forthcoming account of Panipat.
While the suspicions and the prejudices of the Peshwa and his personal
circle affected the Maratha policy throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau's
personal predilections also shaped it to a great extent If Raghunathrao was
always dependent on his assistants for shaping his policy, Bhau had a tendency
towards the other extreme of acting on his own responsibility after abruptly
cutting short the discussion on any subject and dictating the final thing him
16 Ibid 40 129
17 KHARE 1 14 For the previous debts contracted by him the Peshwa had been
obliged to impose a new debt-contribution on all his jagirdars. Vide Satara 2.292.
18 RAJ 1 168.

self. The result was that he seemed, which he was actually not, proud or
even haughty. This was a virtue as far as administrative efficiency—which
depends upon quick and final decision—was concerned, but it cannot be said
to be helpful when policy is to be shaped amongst equals. Over-riding opinion
is always possible for a higher authority, but it is not always conducive to the
best results, as ultimately the working out of the decisions devolves upon the
subordinates. A commander-in-chief can scarcely act against the combined
opinion and will of his generals.
Bhau selected his own assistants and corps from amongst the as-
semblage gathered in the Nizam's dominions. To begin with, his army was
not more than twenty-five thousand strong, besides the infantry under Ibrahim
Khan, which was nine thousand. Though Raghunathrao did not join, some
of the corps subordinate to him were included in the army which accompanied
Bhau to the north. The Maratha army was made up of the feudal divisions
under the main sardars. These sardars employed subordinate corps under indi-
vidual captains. The sardar was responsible for the conduct, training, equip-
ment and payment of the corps employed by him. Certain revenue districts
were assigned to him as jagirs for the expenditure thereof. Not all the noted
captains in the Maratha army were sardars. Certain corps were directly em-
ployed by the Peshwa who paid them from the central treasury. There was
no one fixed scale of payment, certain sardars being paid more favourably than
'others. The bigger sardars, like Shinde and Holkar, were treated more as
partners in the state than as mere subordinates. They had specified per-
centages of the total revenues in certain regions permanently assigned to them
as their inalienable share. It should be particularly noted that throughout the
Panipat campaign, the payment of the whole army did not devolve on Sa-
dashivrao Bhau. The divisions of Shinde and Holkar and also of a few other
sardars were expected to be paid by the sardars themselves. Bhau was re-
sponsible for the payment of the Peshwa's own troops, called "Huzarat," and
directly paid corps like those under Ibrahim Khan Gardi. The inconvenience
felt by the non-receipt of revenues called in by Sadashivrao Bhau from men
like Govindpant Bundele mainly affected the Peshwa's own divisions and not
the divisions under Shinde and Holkar. The normal Maratha practice was for
the moving army to subsist on its own earnings in the regions through which
it passed. When the army was warring in a foreign territory, it would automati-
cally subsist on tributes, ransoms and spoils, but when passing through its own
dominions or the dominions of its allies, it had to buy everything it needed.
In the Panipat campaign this was the condition in the main. Khandesh,
Malwa, the Jat country, the Delhi region, were all non-belligerent territories.
Besides, due to the continuance of almost constant war in the territories sur-
rounding Delhi for almost a decade, the regions had become depopulated, non-
agricultural and insecure. Unless there was good cash in one's pocket and
one could keep the line of communication safe for caravans bringing supplies,
it was impossible to go on for any length of time. There was no government
commissariat department giving free rations or selling things at fixed prices
in those days. The bazar which accompanied a moving army was chartered,
guaranteed and given the necessary protection by the army commander no

36 PANIPAT 1761
doubt, but the merchants were not responsible for the continuous supply as
such, nor were the prices fixed This was a constant source of difficulty for a
moving army There was no assurance of supply nor certainty about the cost,
which led not only to slackness and even obstruction in the war effort, but to
the bankruptcy of the soldiers and the authorities as well
Sadashivrao Bhau's progress was very slow if he had the intention of
joining Shinde and Holkar before the rains These generals had been prac-
tically driven out of the Delhi area, and were then camping at a safe distance
from the Durrani forces behind the Jat principality, using Surajmal as a mid
dleman in their diplomatic negotiations 19 Ahmad Shah Abdali had sent
emissaries to both Madhosingh of Jaipur and Surajmal Jat, ordering them to
unite their forces with his and send monies to aid him in his work of driving
out the Marathas,21 but both pleaded their inability to do anything in the mat-
ter and tried the game of procrastination and equivocation Surajmal was the
more cunning of the two He would always call himself a mere zamindar,
or even a tenant, and not a prince He replied that he would pay the ac-
knowledged Emperor the revenues due to him If Ahmad Shah would him-
self assume that position and remain permanently in India, he would pay him
as the legal sovereign Till then he could not possibly do what he had been
asked, especially as his territories had been ravaged by the movements of both
the Maratha and the Durrani armies 22 As the Indian summer advanced,
Abdali encamped in the vicinity of Ramgad in the mid Doab, exhausted by the
three months' incessant running after the elusive Marathas of the Shinde-
Holkar contingents Each party now expected the other to renew the fight
first, and would not start it themselves This stalemate could have been broken
only by the junction of the forces under Sadashivrao Bhau and the exhausted
generals in the north
Bhau started from Patdur on the 14th of March, 1760, but had only
crossed the Narmada after a month, covering a distance of not more than two
hundred miles The delay was due to the preparation and joining in of the
various corps with equipment for a long and distant campaign Sadashivrao
Bhau's Panipat campaign was, in fact, on the model of the Mughal Emperors
and not like that of Shivaji or Bajirao I The Maratha army had large tents,
screens for women's apartments, and the various departments to look after
the convenience of the leaders and the army The chiefs rode on superb Arab
or Central Asian chargers and wore gorgeous dresses of gold brocades Their
weapons and other equipment were also of the best type, and the brigades
under Ibrahim Khan Gardi, trained after the French model, were the envy of
Indian potentates of those times The presence of these infantry corps with
their cannon, regulated the whole movement of the army, and the daily
marches would cover but a few miles The heavy siege-guns which accom-
panied the army, together with the light field artillery, slowed the rate of
progress, as the long rows of bulls necessary to draw them would move but
slowly over the rugged country and narrow passes in the Satpura and Vindhya
19 SPD 2 121
21 Ibid 21 186.
22 Ibid.

TO FACE PAGE 36
MAP SHOWING
PÂNIPAT ROUTE MARCH
ABDALI'S ROUTE ····
MAHRATHAS' ROUTE ––––
SCALE
Foot-note:—Baghpat to the west of Meerut on the bank of the Jamuna and the village
of Gauripur five miles to the north of Baghpat have been inadvertently omitted from this
map. Ahmad Shah crossed the Jamuna at Gauripur and went to Sonepat.

38 PANIPAT: 1761
lessened his expenditure. There was rumour of his personal return to Afghan-
istan³³ after appointing Shuja as the Wazir, Najib as Mir Bakshi and pro-
claiming the fugitive Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor, thus doing away with
the puppet Shah Jahan III, brought on the throne by the regicide Ghazi-ud-
din. The Panjab would, of course, be surrendered to Abdali, who would be of
help to the Delhi Emperor in times of difficulty. The Dowager Empress,
Malika Zamani, had been specially deputed to induce Shuja by a personal in-
terview, but she does not seem to have succeeded in her efforts. Shuja's mother
was still alive and influenced the affairs of Oudh with prescience and wisdom.
She knew that there was nothing common between the Sunni Afghans and
the Irani Shias to which group her family belonged. The old officers of Safdar
Jang's time knew the difficulties of the Delhi politics and feared to antagonise
the Marathas, who surrounded the Oudh territory. Shuja was thinking of
giving the slip to Abdali without directly saying "no" by proceeding towards
Bihar to back up the Emperor Shah Alam II. But Najib Khan was support-
ing Abdali and directing all his affairs. He himself proceeded towards Oudh
with Jahan Khan, the Durrani general. With a suavity equalled by his cun-
ning, he impressed the Oudh Court by discussing threadbare the pros and
cons of Oudh policy, and finally prevailed upon Shuja to put in his lot on
the side of Abdali. Najib Khan personally stood surety against any possible
harm to Shuja in the Afghan camp. The unsteadiness of Maratha policy in
its dealings with Safdar Jang had now borne fruit. The Peshwa and his
sardars had forsaken Safdar Jang in his need, and gone over to the side of
his opponent, Ghazi-ud-din. The late Wazir had been left to die of a broken
heart after his discomfiture before Delhi and his son Shuja had always to be
on his guard lest the attention of the Marathas be directed against his dominions,
which contained the chief holy places of the Hindus, namely, Benares, Al-
lahabad and Ayodhya.
In his dealings with Shuja, Sadashivrao had put his chief confidence in
Govindpant Bundele as he was a near neighbour, having known the ins and
outs of the Oudh Court for a long time. This man had kept himself out-
wardly on good terms with Shuja and was credited with a sweet tongue, use-
ful in prevailing upon an acquaintance. Sadashivrao Bhau had begun³⁴ to
write to Govindpant from the Nizam's dominions long before the result of
Udgir. When it was finally decided to send him to the north, he at
once wrote to Govindpant to bring over Shuja to the Maratha side in the im-
pending struggle against Abdali.³⁵ From his first letter of the 15th of March,
1760, up to the last disaster of Panipat, ten months later, Bhau is found put-
ting too much faith in the goodness of Shuja. After coming to know his final
decision to join Abdali in the first week of July, Bhau should have left the
matter at that point and should have completely stopped his correspondence
with Shuja. The only result of Bhau's importunities seems to have been to
convince Abdali and Najib of the Maratha weakness. This conviction strength-
ened their resolution of fighting to the last. The Maratha diplomacy during
33 Raj. I.191, 222, 236, 246
34 Ibid. I 154.
35 Ibid. I,167.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 39
Balaji Bajirao's rule is always inexplicable, and it was much more so during
the Panipat campaign
Looking to the political condition then existing in India, and the
strength of the Marathas, it was a first rate mistake to have left the south
Indian tangle to take its own shape, and proceed to north India after Udgir,
especially after knowing the complete defeat of the Shinde Holkar forces
There were at least four fronts on which the Maratha attention was necessary
then The Abdali front in the north, the Haider Ali front in the south, the
Nizam front in the Deccan and the English front—for such it was though the
,Peshwa was completely unaware of it—along the whole Indian coast The
Maratha power seemed to be at its zenith at the end of 1758,³⁶ but the funda-
mental weakness of their unplanned spreading became apparant soon By the
end of 1759 they were completely driven out of the Panjab and suffered a
major defeat owing to the death of Dattaji soon after In the south, Haider
Ali who was strengthening himself silently, had slyly set aside the all conquer-
ing Marathas, establishing himself, finally in September 1759 by defeating
Nanjraj³⁷ and imprisoning him with the puppet Mysore ruler The English
had established their power in Bengal equally firmly, and had, taking advan-
tage of the Maratha support, occupied the best districts in the Nizam's dominion
on the eastern sea board by driving out the French What Sadashivrao Bhau
could conquer from the Nizam after his far famed victory of Udgir, the Brit-
ish had taken away from the Nizam by merely marching a few thousand
troops, under Colonel Forde,³⁸ from Bengal to the Northern Sarkars' The
result of Bhau's going to the north at this juncture after the French defeat
at Wandiwash in January 1760, was exemplified not only in the far reverberat
ing defeat of Panipat on 14th January, 1761, but, simultaneously or quickly fol-
lowing on its heels, in the occupation of Pondicherry by the English on 16th
January, 1761, and the defeat of the Emperor Shah Alam by Colonel Car-
nack in Bihar on 15th January, 1761, that is, a day after the Panipat disaster ³⁹
By these events, little noticed or thought of then, the future of India was
decided, more than by the defeat at Panipat Sadashivrao Bhau was fighting
for the preservation of the Mughal Empire for the descendant of Taimur who
actually became a prisoner and a tool in the hands of the English' Bhau
thought that but for Abdali the whole south would have come into the pos-
. session of the Marathas'⁴⁰ But by the defeat of the French in the south and
the occupation of the Northern Sarkars, the English became powerful enough
in the south to defy all others The Peshwa had planned the capture of Janjira
from the Sidi this year (1760), but by the covert action⁴¹ of the English it
never came to pass' Even the lands conquered from the Nizam at the be
ginning of 1760 had to be returned when he threatened Poona after Panipat.
How can a historian account for these results but on the one supposition that
36 BISM (Persian Mss ) No 696, dated 20-12 1758, No 699, dated 15-4-1^759
37 RAJ 1 138.
38 Cambridge History of India 5 162
39 Fall 2.542
40 RAJ 1 166.
41 SPD 40.136

40 PANIPAT. 1761
the Peshwa had miscalculated the forces and had attempted a wrong solution
of the problems?
From Sironj, Bhau proceeded towards Gwalior via Arun,⁴² Malan,⁴³
Pohari and Kaledhar,⁴⁴ arriving there on the 30th of May, 1760 He took
stock of the Maratha forces and tried to strengthen them in every possible way
But his efforts were wasted on men whom he wished to propitiate The fault
was not Sadashivrao's but of the times By the middle of the 18th century,
the dissolution of the Mughal Empire was practically complete and what an
English historian has called "The Great Anarchy" began This anarchy which
lasted almost for a century, ended finally after the great mutiny of 1857 The
various fragments of the Mughal Empire, great and small, powerful and weak,
had entered into a general scramble for power and pelf, and none was think-
ing in terms of principles, nor was anyone in a mood to think of Indian unity
Only the Peshwa was thinking in terms of the whole of India ruled from one
centre and following a common policy But Sadashivrao Bhau's appeal fell
on deaf ears and hence produced no result All the previous sins of commission
and omission by the three Peshwas raised their heads as ghosts from their
graves Everybody who had once been helped by the Marathas forgot all
moral obligation to show gratitude or at least sympathy, while all who had any
sense of having been badly treated sit on the fence in expectancy of the Mara-
thas receiving a good drubbing at the hands of the Durrani king The con-
sciousness of having all the surrounding people against the Marathas must have
had a demoralising influence on the Maratha army Great battles are never
won by despondent soldiers!
The Marathi Chronicles of Sadashivrao Bhau report that Bhau had
sought the opinion of Malharrao Holkar and Janakoji Shinde, and they had
advised Bhau not to come personally, but to send armies for their help on the
strength of which they would defeat Abdali Their opinion was based on the
idea that the prestige of a nation is lowered when the chief himself is obliged
to enter the arena of the battle, because it is thought as a sort of comment on
the (in)capacity of his subordinates and if by chance or through ill luck the
chief is defeated, it becomes difficult for the army to hold out afterwards On
the other hand, the authors of the chronicles report the discussions in the privy
council of Sadashivrao Bhau Therein Bhau's supporters, like Balvantrao
Mehendale, saw more than was obvious in the advice of Holkar and Shinde "
"Because these sardars and mamlatdars in the north had up till then lived in
perfect freedom without feeling the pressure of the chief's control, and feared
that their misdeeds would be revealed in the presence of a strict man like
Sadashivrao Bhau, they are advising Bhau not to advance any farther," they
thought When Bhau proceeded in spite of these remonstrances, the veteran
Malharrao Holkar was reported to have let loose his tongue in wild rage at his
advice being brushed aside with scant respect, and abused the advisers of Bhau
He wrote again that Bhau should at least stop at Gwalior and not cross the
⁴² Raj 1 186
⁴³ Ibid 1 188
⁴⁴ Khare 1.22

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 41

Chambal, at which Bhau's councillors laughed again and said, "Shinde and
Holkar, Antaji Manakeshvar, Govindpant Bundele, Vitthal Shivdeo and Naro
Shankar who had acted as officers with full powers in these parts, are now
ill at ease at our coming and can never feel happy at the event" We reproduce
these lines not because we believe in their truth but because they show an un-
dercurrent of thought diametrically opposite to that of Bhau's policy There
was a good substratum of truth in Holkar's advice To proceed against
Abdali with heavy camp equipage and the encumbrances of women and chil-
dren with a paraphernalia of private servants on a lavish scale, was certainly
a mistake Delhi could never have been a secure base for the Marathas in the
circumstances then existing In all previous campaigns of the Marathas in
the Delhi region, they had suffered from want of food and fodder, not to say
money The circumstances had grown even worse now, as Bhau experienced
to his cost later on There was no valid reason to believe that the circumstances
would have been different in the present campaign But Bhau felt confident
of overcoming any difficulty and crossed the Chambal to Dholpur,⁴⁵ which in
those times was not a Jat capital but a place of pilgrimage

The Maratha army crossed the Chambal on 8th June, and encamped
near the Muchakunda tirth⁴⁶ near Dholpur The whole army went through
the ceremony of a holy bath and sojourned for a few days there An eclipse
of the sun on the 13th of June⁴⁷ added to the merit of the pilgrimage in this
holy place The delay caused by the performance of the rites of pilgrimage
frustrated Bhau's original plan of crossing over the Jamuna before the rains
near Agra into Govindpant Bundeles districts and attacking Abdali from that
base Agra was only some twenty five miles distant from the Maratha camp
between the Chambal and the Gambhira, alias Banaganga, river But Bhau
was unable to cross that small river and reach Agra for about a month more
The monsoon had set in somewhat early that year, and the small river was in
spate On his left hand was the Parvati, in front the Gambhira and at the
back the Chambal The region is extremely uneven At every hundred yards
there is a ravine, a continuous up and down The land is sandy and the rivers
and streams, though shallow, spread over for miles across the banks It is dif-
ficult to set foot in the bed of the river and there is not enough water for boats
to cross In fact, no boats are available on those streams, for after a few days
the water is completely drained away and only level sands, yellow and white
in colour, are left to act as witnesses for the temporary floods The whole camp
must have suffered terribly because camping in those regions looked almost
impossible

Though Sadashivrao Bhau could not cross the insignificant river
Gambhira, he was able to meet Shinde and Holkar and discuss with them the
future problems and line of action, as both of them were encamping on the
same side of the Gambhira in the vicinity of Keraoli The first to see Bhau
was Gangoba Chandrachud, Holkar's Diwan, on 15th June ⁴⁸ Gangoba be

45 Raj 1 199
46 Bhau Bakhar p 113
47 13th of June was 30 Jyestha, Autobiography of Nana Phadnis, K. Patre Yadi 192.
48 Raj 1.203

42 PANIPAT 1761
longed to that generation of the Marathas which grew up with Bajirao's con
quests in Malwa He was the confidential man of Malharrao and had perfect
faith⁴⁹ in the wisdom of his master
Malharrao Holkar seems to have purposely sent Gangoba to meet Bhau
first and sound him in respect of his future policy and temper Malharrao him-
self met Bhau along with Janakoji Shinde, a week later, on the 22nd of June ⁵⁰
No difference of opinion is reported at this meeting which seems to have ended
amicably, thus belying the purposive colourful writing of the Marathi chroni-
cles At the end of the month, Surajmal Jat and the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din saw
Sadashivrao Bhau and discussed the future line of action ⁵¹ The plan at the
beginning of July was still to cross over the Jamuna into the Doab by build-
ing a bridge of boats But even this plan failed because of the rising waters of
the Jumuna In fact Bhau's slow march from the Deccan added four addi-
tional months of the monsoon to the Panipat campaign, and lowered the
vitality and morale of the Maratha army thereby From the tone of a letter
written at this juncture, there does not seem to be any difference of opinion
between Bhau and his sardars or Surajmal Jat ⁵² The total strength of the
Maratha army is given as seventy to eighty thousand while Abdali-Ruhela
strength is reported as sixty thousand The balance was to be decided by the
joining in of Shuja ud daulah to either side Shuja's army is reported as
twenty thousand, with a very strong park of artillery Besides, his army was
one on permanent footing and therefore best trained, best equipped and al
together more efficient than that of the others It was regularly well paid and
therefore contented Naro Shankar and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar,⁵³ Jana-
koji's Diwan, had been despatched as special ambassadors to Shuja as a last
resort to induce him to come over to the Maratha side by offering him any
terms he would choose to ask ⁵⁴ But he finally decided against the Marathas
and proceeded to meet Abdali at Ramgad Bhau at once changed his plan
of crossing into the Doab and arrived at Gau Ghat to the north east of Sikandara
where the great Akbar lies buried This place is some ten miles to the north
west of Agra on the bank of the Jamuna There the Maratha army halted
and bathed in the holy waters on the new moon day of Ashadha, which fell
on 12th July, 1760 ⁵⁵ Thence Bhau proceeded to Mathura where he encamped
on the 15th of July ⁵⁶ Thence he sent advanced troops to lay siege to Delhi,
then commanded by Yakub Ali Khan, a cousin of the Durrani Wazir Shah
Wali Khan ⁵⁷ He had only a small force, not more than two thousand strong
The rest of the camp with women in it went on performing the pilgrim's rites at
Mathura and Brindavan Nana Fadnis, who was accompanying Bhau with
his wife and mother, indulged in the holy pilgrimage to his heart's content,
⁴⁹ SPD 2 116
⁵⁰ Raj 1 217, SPD 2 127
⁵¹ Purandare 1.387
⁵² Ibid
⁵³ Raj 1 208
⁵⁴ Purandare 1 387
⁵⁵ Bhau Kaifiyat p 9
⁵⁶ Raj 1.217
⁵⁷ Ibid. 1.222, 223