पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

PANIPAT 67
wounded.¹⁷ The Marathas were able to capture more than a hundred horses
and but for the nightfall the result would have been still more decisive, as men
from that part of the Abdali camp which was attacked by the Marathas had
begun to run away from their posts. There was again a similar skirmish after
a few days, with no decisive result. The tone of the rank and file in the
Maratha army, as well as of the commander-in-chief himself, is found to be all
optimistic for over a month, and there is no ground for taking Kashiraj as a
correct reporter for this period. Not only are Kashiraj's forebodings incor-
rect, but the tone also of his narrative is vitiated by his personal predilections.
As Abdali had to retreat from his first position to the riverside, it is
proved thereby that the Marathas were in the ascendant till then. Kashiraj
describes with awe all the actions of Abdali. He praises his arrangement to
guard his camp and to watch the other side day and night. As no such vivid
description is forthcoming from the Maratha side, a wrong impression is
created in the mind of the reader, and he thinks that there was no such system
followed by the Marathas. This is absolutely wrong. Just as parties of thou-
sands were appointed to guard the camp on the Afghan side, similarly the
Marathas were also mounting guard and patrolling around their camp at
night. Kashiraj says that the Afghan monarch was in the habit of going
round not only his own camp and that of his allies, but he also took a round
about the entire Maratha camp from a distance, and every day returned by
noon after having ridden fifty kos in person with a small escort. This seems
a gross exaggeration of Kashiraj. We do not think that the Maratha watch-
men and patrols were so slack as not to see even once the Afghan monarch go-
ing round their camp during a period of more than two months, and one can
guess that it was impossible for the daily rounds of Ahmad Shah to go un-
seen, at whatever distance he might be encircling the Maratha camp. We
also think that it was geographically not possible. The canal on the west side
of the Maratha camp was a great impediment to such a movement, and on
the east side also the land was not very favourable for such an excursion. The
river on the north-east side coming very near and the bogs and the zils, which
exist to this day, do not make such a supposition look feasible. Only during
the last fortnight, when the Maratha army had become quite despondent and
taken to heart the lesson of cold massacre, the Afghan monarch might have
indulged in his rounds, though at great risk even then to himself. Kashiraj was
perhaps remembering this last period when he wrote nineteen years after, and
made it applicable to the whole period of two and a half months.
A fortnight after the Wazir's discomfiture, a major engagement took
place between the two armies. As we have noted above, Abdali had moved
to the riverside by then. As the Afghan camp had now gone far beyond
the range of Maratha fire and in a somewhat difficult terrain, and as the
Afghans would not come out of their own accord to offer a battle, it became
a teasing problem for the Marathas to pass the days in futile inactivity. The
Marathas, therefore, hit upon a plan to call them out. At some distance from
17 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 24

68 PANIPAT. 1761
the Maratha camp, and to the south east of it, they began to clear the jungle
so as to make easy approach possible $^{18}$ They cut down the thick bushes of
short palasa (dhak) trees and prepared a somewhat level battle field and
planted a pillar there The site of this new battle field seems to have been,
from the description in the ballad,$^{19}$ at Chhajpur, beyond which a big nullah
separated it from the Afghan camp They began to drag out their movable
cannon to this place and, standing behind them, to challenge the other side
to come out and dare battle Cut to the quick by these challenges, the Ruhelas
one day came out and began an engagement by firing from a distance The
Marathas advanced a little but by this time it was about sunset Seeing that the
Marathas would take some time to reach back to their camp, Najib's
brother came out to deliver a flank attack as the Maratha army turned
its face in the direction of their camp At this unexpected attack the Marathas
had to leave their guns and run pell mell, which again drew the Ruhelas far-
ther on, close on their heels They almost reached the edge of the Maratha
camp when soldiers from the camp came out, finding their comrades in danger
The Ruhela cavalry fled away, taking advantage of the pitch darkness of that
new moon night, but their infantry was closed in from all sides They fought
with their usual bravery and created havoc in the Maratha camp by their
marksmanship They were well nigh defeated, with great slaughter of fifteen
hundred Ruhelas, and pursued upto a distance But in the midst of this vic-
tory, Balvantrao Mehendale received a bullet shot and came down from his
horse Seeing that he was a sardar of some consequence, the Afghans tried to
cut off his head so as to carry it as a trophy back to their camp, but some
Maratha horsemen, noticing it, turned back to snatch it away just when it
was being cut Khanderao Naik Nimbalkar was responsible for dragging back
the corpse of Balvantrao Mehendale by the feet in the thick of that fight, though
himself wounded Both parties then returned to their camps Though the
Marathas were victorious, the death of Balvantrao had taken away the zest out
of it from them There was a great wailing in the Maratha camp on that night
of the 7th December, 1760 Balvantrao's wife, Lakshmibai, was one of the
few women who had accompanied their husbands to that famous battlefield
Her son, Krishnarao, alias Appa Balvant of later fame, a boy of fourteen or
so, was also with them in the camp, still she at once took the decision of of-
fering herself as a Sati on her husband's funeral pyre No dissuasion by Bhau
himself or by the mother of Nana Fadnis, who was Balvantrao's sister, was able
to change her decision She courageously made over her son to Bhau's care
and faced immolation, making that incident the most dramatic in the whole
Panipat campaign
The seventh of December is taken as a turning point in the Panipat
campaign No doubt it deprived Bhau of a most intimate lieutenant. The
biased Maratha Bakhars and, following them, some Persian chronicles, have
shown Balvantrao as the villain of the piece The Kaifiyat merely depicts the
difference of opinion between Bhau's advisers from the south, and the north
$^{18}$ Ibid. 14-5
$^{19}$ BDCRI 4.179

TO FACE PAGE 68
POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS
FROM 1ST DEC. TO 30TH DEC 1760.
SCALE
0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES
GOHANA
JIND
ROAD
SHAH NAHAR (W. JUMNA CANAL)
PANIPAT
KALA AM
RAJA KHERI
BABAIL
HABLA
JUMNA RIVER
UGRA KHERI
CHANDPUR KHURD
CHANDPUR KALAN
JALALPUR
BARALIPUR
BATTLE FIELD
OLD JUMNA BED
SEHLA (VAJIRPUR)
D. G. SANTURNE D. 1945

70 PANIPAT 1761
over a month ²⁵ That most of the letters sent were intercepted by Abdali is
clear from Nana Fadnis' letter²⁶ to Ramchandrapant Natu at Delhi, which
shows that this work of stopping the Maratha correspondence had begun from
the third week of November, though occasionally a messenger was lucky enough
to elude Abdali's patrols This should also have something to do with the
Maratha distress, as the possibility of the outsiders knowing the real condition
of the Maratha camp was lessened But there is no mention of any distress
in the Maratha camp in the above mentioned letter of 12th December, from
which it would not be wrong to conclude that Abdali had not upto that point
succeeded in completely cutting off the Maratha supply from the north On
that side the Sikhs and the Jats were quite well disposed towards the Marathas
Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State, living at that time at Manuk,
seems to have been actually helping²⁷ the Marathas as he was grateful for
being relieved from the exactions of the Afghan soldiers of fortune like the
chief of Kunjpura and the infamous Mian Qutb Shah The Sikhs were di-
rectly interested in the result of the contest and even after the disaster were the
chief beneficiaries of it Sir Jadunath's harping on the disaffected Jat villagers
seems a figment of the brain There is no ground for such a supposition, though
the Marathas suffered before, during and after the war by the vindictiveness
of the Muslim population, who were equally numerous in those regions and
incomparably more powerful than the submerged Jats and Gujars Bhau is
still a hero in their ballad²⁸ and fire side stories, for whom they have the liveli-
est admiration
Within a fortnight of Balvantrao's death, Govindpant Bundele also met
the same fate Throughout the Panipat campaign, nay, even before starting
for it, Bhau had demanded money of Govindpant ²⁹ The latter sent two lakhs
in the first instance and now at the beginning of December he came to Delhi
with four lakhs and twenty thousand This was all he could possibly bring,
though it was not even a fourth of what Bhau demanded from the beginning.
Handing over the treasure to Naro Shankar, Govindpant sallied forth
with his contingent and crossed over into the Doab He began to cut off
Abdali's supplies coming from the trans Ganges districts and passing through
the Meerut district to Abdali Bhau had intimated to Govindpant that there
were none now to oppose him in the Doab as the Ruhelas had been tied up
to the camp of Abdali So, leisurely and unguardedly, he continued his march,
chastising the refractory local zamindars on the way He seemed to have been
collecting grain also for carrying it to Bhau's camp across an upper ghat on
the Jamuna, to Panipat
But news of Govindpant's depredations soon reached Abdali's camp
The Ruhelas became apprehensive of the safety of their homes The regu-
larity of the food convoy reaching Abdali s camp through these regions had
²⁵ RAJ 3.210
²⁶ Satara 2 300 Letter dated 12th December 1760
²⁷ SPD 27.262, Purandare 1 416
²⁸ BDCRI 1
²⁹ SPD 40 129

PANIPAT 71
been taken away. Abdali, therefore, despatched a select force of some five
thousand horsemen under impetuous Atai Khan, the Durrani Wazir's nephew,
who had recently come from Afghanistan. A few thousand Ruhelas also joined
him to show him the way and properly guide him in their home lands. Cross-
ing the Jamuna at Baghpat and covering some fifty miles in a day and night,
they suddenly alighted upon Govindpant as he was somewhere between Ghazi-
ud-din-nagar (now Ghaziabad) and Meerut. It seems that one Jeta Gujar,
a robber-chieftain in that area, had promised a ransom to Govindpant, and
Govindpant was stopping to recover it. Jeta communicated the news to Abdali
and he sent this force. It is also said that the Ruhelas had assumed different
colours, seeing which Govindpant thought the army from a distance was that of
Naro Shankar.30 While Govindpant was preparing to take a bath and to dine
in the afternoon after a day's hard work, he was overtaken by Atai Khan's
cavalry. He suddenly snatched a horse and began to run with his army. In
the hurry of flight twice he came down from his horse, as he was not properly
seated on a saddle, but reseated again by others. But when he fell for the third
time, none returned to save him, even his son who was accompanying the army
having fled away to a distance. Govindpant's head was cut off and his whole
camp looted. The Maratha loss was some four hundred.31 The rest of the
Maratha army with Govindpant's son Balaji after first having fled to the south,
afterwards returned to Delhi. Atai Khan returned with the loot which con-
tained a good quantity of grain, and Najib presented Govindpant's head to
Ahmad Shah. He sent it to Bhau, announcing his triumph in the undertaking.
The news had already reached Bhau by 23rd December,32 though the head
reached Bhau's hands two or three days later, from which it appears that the
attack on Govindpant must have taken place on 20th December or so, and not
on the 17th as assumed by Sir Jadunath.33 Govindpant had atoned for all his
past sins of commission and omission with his life, and, therefore, the gravamen
of accusations against him is taken away. He might be called slovenly and
not up to the mark in military matters; but none can say that he was disloyal.
After Govindpant's death, when the plan of cutting off Abdali's sup-
plies and directing these to the Maratha camp had failed, the real difficulties
of the Maratha camp began. The Maratha camp was short of not only food
and fodder, but also of coined money necessary to make cash payments for any
supplies brought to the camp from the Panjab. Bhau found it difficult to fetch
money from Delhi where it had been deposited by Govindpant. The first batch
of soldiers from Payagude's troops under the leadership of Krishnarao Ballal,
carrying with them one lakh, ten thousand, started on 22nd December and seems
to have reached the Maratha camp in safety.34 But the second batch under
Parashar Dadaji carrying one and a half lakhs with them, which started on
2nd January, 1761, was cut off by Abdali, as Abdali had shifted his camp
for the last time on 30th December, and was now lying astride the imperial road

30 Bhau Bakhar 129
31 RAJ 1376.
32 Ibid. 1.272.
33 Fall 2.311.
34 RAJ. 1.281.

72 PANIPAT: 1761

from Delhi to Panipat.³⁵ The news of this shifting had not reached Delhi,
and so the Maratha troops were passing along the road in the dead of night
as usual. There were with him three hundred soldiers each carrying five hun-
dred rupees. In the severe cold of January, with their bodies benumbed by
night exposure, they unsuspectingly entered the Afghan camp five miles to the
south of Panipat, thinking it to be the Maratha camp. They alighted from
their horses and tried to warm themselves by the burning fire sides. Some took
out their pipes and began to smoke. As they had entered from the back of the
Afghan camp without fear, none at first seems to have recognised or obstructed
them, the Afghans taking them probably as a batch of their allies. But when the
Marathas began to converse, the Afghans got the clue and raised a hue and
cry. Only one escaped from the tussle and returned back to Delhi.³⁶ The rest
were deprived of their cash and horses and put to the sword according to
Kashiraj,³⁷ while the Bhau Bakhar and the Ka fiyāt say that they reached the
Maratha camp safely after the mishap.³⁸

As more than five lakhs of people were living in that small area from
Panipat to Samalkha for more than two months (in the two camps together),
all the wood and fodder in the vicinity had disappeared and the whole area
had become one vast barren plain. Some ten villages had left their sites and
gone to live elsewhere. The citizens of Panipat had to remain confined in the
small walled area, with no space left for movement. Their farms and gar-
dens had disappeared from the scene. Naturally they had become hostile to
the Marathas and being Muslims for the most part, seem to have acted
treacherously from behind in giving news to Abdali and carrying on nefarious
activities in collusion with the Afghans of Kunjpura and the surrounding area.
The civil behaviour of the Marathas with such people has cost the Marathas
very dearly in history.

In their two and a half months' beleaguerment at Panipat, the Mara-
thas must have spent practically every pie they possessed for buying the vic-
tuals at ten fold prices. The system adopted for fetching grain from a distance
was to send an escort of some thousands to accompany the caravan from
Karnal to Panipat, and while returning to see them back with their pack-
bullocks to Karnal again. But after a time this source also dried up, either
because there was no grain to sell, or more probably because the Afghans had
recovered their posts like Kunjpura and Karnal in the north. Abdali was fur-
nished, some time in the second week of December, with fresh troops from
Afghanistan to the extent of eight thousand. Atai Khan was their leader.
Before joining Abdali, he seems to have followed not the direct route to Pani-
pat, but the safer route across the Jamuna by the Budhia or the Andhera
Ghat north and south of Kunjpura. Before entering the Doab, he could not
but have driven out the small Maratha out posts at Karnal and Kunjpura with
the help of his splendid troops. Diler Khan, the only son of Nejabat Khan, left

³⁵ Shinde 1.229
³⁶ Raj. 1.231. 333
³⁷ Battle of Panipat 19^6 p. 21
³⁸ Bhau Bakhar p 132. Kaifyat p. 21

TO FACE PAGE 72
POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS
FROM 31ST DEC 1760 TO 14TH JAN 1761
SCALE
N
SHAH NAHAR OR JUMNA CANAL
PANIPAT
JUMNA RIVER
GOELA KALĀN
GOELA KHURD
M. G. BARTAKKE

PANIPAT 73
free, now recovered Kunjpura with Atai Khan's help and made it impossible
for the caravans to move on that side Added to this, fire started, either pur-
posely or by random cannon shot, and destroyed the big haystacks heaped in
the Maratha camp 39 This misfortune turned the situation from bad to worse
and finally into utter helplessness As a result of this mishap, twenty thousand
followers issued from the Maratha camp one night to gather firewood and
fodder in the neighbouring woods, but they were overtaken, surrounded and
massacred piece-meal by a body of five thousand horse under Shah Pasand
Khan who was patrolling that area After this slaughter, terror struck the
Maratha camp and nobody seems to have ventured out
In the terrible cold of December and January, the Marathas, with
their scanty clothing meant only for the cold in the Deccan, suffered terribly
in addition to the want of sufficient quantities of good food and firewood As
if this was not enough, it rained heavily that winter, generating biting winds
in their wake 40 Thousands of bullocks, horses, mules and even men died of
this calamity The unburied animals and corpses on the intervening battle
field putrified the air 41 The crowded camp where within a small area men
had to perform all their physical duties made it terribly dirty and full of
noxious air Nana Fadnis vividly describes these conditions in his auto-
biography
Such was the condition of the Maratha camp and the state of the men
and animals who were to offer battle to the strong, stalwart, efficient and un-
perturbed Afghans who were well supplied with necessities and fully inured
to these climes and circumstances
As we have said above, we are completely in the dark as to Bhau's aim
in not sallying out for battle three weeks earlier when he received the news of
Govindpant's death Such a step would have appreciably reduced the suf
ferings which the Maratha camp had to endure in the last period The men
and animals would have been found in better condition for a march or a
fight, before their reduction by starvation and misery for three weeks more
Even their morale would have been found better and still Bhau would not take
such a step A casual remark in the Bakhar (p 136) also supports the view
that "had the Marathas started the next day after the heavy massacre of the
Ruhelas in the intervening daily fights, the Afghans had no strength then to
overpower the Marathas" "But," so remarks the chronicler, "the fate had
ordained otherwise and so the Marathas remained inactive, carrying on the
waiting game!" We do not know whether this was a case of fortune first
taking away the wit and then striking hard afterwards
Our wonder increases still more when we find the chronicles reporting
the discussion in the Maratha camp previous to the battle While Bhau,
judging that the army could not pull on even for a day more, wanted to offer
battle the next day, Malharrao and Janakoji were proposing to postpone the
39 RAJ 6 406
40 Sardesai Commemoration Volume p 259
41 BDCRI 4 181

event by four days 42 If their argument has any sense in it, we must think the
state of the Maratha camp not as bad as it is depicted, otherwise how could
they have waited for four days more? Their confidence is curiously found sup-
ported by a rare letter of Janakoji, written only ten days prior to the battle,
and reaching its destination without being intercepted by Abdali's patrols 43
He does not betray any sign of fear or hopelessness He assures his revenue
collector not to be troubled at the local pin pricks of the Rajput princes, as
after the chief enemy (Abdali) is defeated, others will fall in the line with-
out effort
As we have said elsewhere, the tone of the men who escaped from the
battle field was different from their own earlier writing They charged Bhau
with being obstinate, not listening to milder and saner counsels, and casting
his last die thoughtlessly and in a haphazard manner We take these to be
afterthoughts only Had there been not even a thirty per cent chance of
bettering their position—and not the hope of defeating Abdali decisively—how
the Maratha chieftains could have consented to march out with a hollow
square formation, we are not able to comprehend Let it not be forgotten
also that notwithstanding the starvation of the Maratha camp, the Marathas
were able to charge so effectively in the forenoon part of the battle that they
seemed to carry everything before them On this central point, all the
authorities on the battle are unanimous This clearly proves that but for some
serious disobedience of orders issued after the final decision before the start,
or for the sudden demoralisation due to Vishwasrao being shot down, there
would not have been that debacle and that stampede which actually took
place even to the dismay of such on lookers as Kashiraj and other reporters of
the battle We have thought it necessary to put down all these facts before the
description of the actual battle, because up till now it has been treated by his-
torians in a faulty, not to say malignant, manner
According to the chronicles, the rank and file of the Maratha army,
perturbed at the prospect and desperate on account of starvation, proceeded
to the tent of Bhau and besought him not to allow them to die of starvation and
disease but to lead them to the battle, whatever be the destiny awaiting them
We have said already that Bhau should have anticipated such a clamour and
forestalled it with some continuous preparation spread over a number of days
All the men, high and low, combatants and non combatants, in the Maratha
camp, should have been completely made aware and tutored of their re-
sponsibility and actual part in the battle which was to ensue Clear instruc-
tions about the methods of self-protection in the event of a sudden disaster—
we do not think inevitable and certain—ought to have been circulated Nana
Fadnis says in his autobiography that Bhau had anticipated all possibilities in
the conduct of war and provided for them as best he could, and we do not
think that Bhau could have failed to take these obvious precautions, consum-
mate master of affairs as he was The divergence in the military counsels of the
Maratha chiefs was the basic cause for the opposite manner of acting on the
42 Kaifiyat 0.21 Bakhar 0 141
43 Shinde 1.222

PANIPAT 75
field of battle. But that was no fault of Bhau, but a national misfortune. All
the various units and classes in the vast Maratha camp spread over miles were
not equally affected by the dearth of grain or money, and that seems to be
the reason why some still wanted, and thought it possible, to wait, while others
less fortunate had reached the sinking point. Ultimately the clamour of the
starved decided the day of the battle and not the convenience or forethought
of the commander! This was a calamity, but perhaps there was no help for
it. In any case, had the battle been fought a fortnight earlier, it would have
been better in all respects, for the Marathas.
The actual plan decided and adopted by Bhau in consultation with
Ibrahim Khan Gardi and others was, however, made possible by Abdali's
change of camp-site and could not have been devised prior to 30th December,
1760. A battle before that date would have been only a frontal attack or a
march with a hollow-square formation liable to be disturbed on the flanks
which is the weakest point in such a formation. The direction would have been
from north to south and not north-west to south-east. The plan envisaged by
Kashiraj and put down in a memory drawing of the field of battle, is cor-
rect as far as it goes. Only the direction of the Maratha front he was un-
able to make out. Kashiraj mistook the longer side of the rectangle on the
right-hand side for a front, because guns had been judiciously placed on that
side also, and these were pointed towards the Abdali front. The strategy was
to march past the right-hand corner of Abdali's camp to the river side with
the whole formation, so as to take the river at the back in the evening and
then to meet the Afghan army from the right-hand side, which would then
become the battle-front. The advantage in this move would have been that
the camp-followers would have remained always safe at the back and would
have found it possible to run away to the south towards Delhi or to the east
across the Jamuna into the Doab in case of a defeat. Had the plan succeeded,
the major battle would have come not on the day of the start but on the days
following. This would have given double advantage to the Marathas. They
would have found the much needed rest, as also time to refresh and recoup
at night, and would have been attacking the Afghans on their flank, thus ex-
posing their camp to loot. But the hollow square formation with a long
rectangular side made up of mutually antagonistic generals was at best a
precarious device, as was proved to their cost the next day.
THE TRANS-GANGES RAIDS OF THE MARATHAS DURING THE
PANIPAT CAMPAIGN
At the beginning of July 1760, Shuja-ud-daulah finally made up his
mind and went over to Abdali's side. From that date Sadashivrao Bhau began
writing his letters to Govindpant Bundele, Gopalrao Ganesh Barve, Ganesh
Sambhaji Khandekar and Gopalrao Bapuji, to foment rebellions in Shuja's
dominions beyond the Ganges, and raid them. Many of the big zamindars un-
der Shuja were small chieftains themselves with armies made up of their per-
sonal retainers. Balawant Singh of Benares was the biggest and the most
refractory amongst them, though there were others like Balabhadrasingh of

76 PANIPAT. 1761
Tiloi and Hindupat of Pratapgarh In fact, the times and the surroundings
were such that no potentate could be taken as fully established and free from
internal rebellions Shuja had placed Veni Bahadur with full powers in
charge of his dominions during his absence in Abdali's camp The major
portion of Shuja's troops he kept behind him for guarding his dominions, fully
knowing the risks to which his dominions would be exposed once he antag-
onised the Marathas In fact, his direct help to Abdali was his fine park of
artillery and the moral prestige of his name only Sadashivrao Bhau appears
from his letters to be unaware of this important fact Shuja's troops are found
estimated at 20,000 at the beginning of July, but how many of these he took
with him to Abdali's camp is doubtful, as none seem to give very reliable
figures But if we take Kashiraj's figures as correct, Shuja had at Panipat
2,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry and 20 guns with him, thus leaving 16,000 to
guard his dominions All these troops were well disciplined and well equipped
They were engaged on a permanent footing and very well paid with the re-
sult that they had no cause to grumble and go against their master This was
possible because Shuja possessed the most fertile lands in India and he could
collect his revenues without any hitch The only possible loop hole in Shuja's
dominions was the danger from his big zamindars who were always ready to rebel
and would have liked to become independent When Bhau is found ordering
Govindpant to invade the Ruhela lands beyond the Ganges and Gopalrao
Barve to attack Shuja's dominions, he seems to be talking of something which
he could not understand Abdali had sent many of the Ruhelas back to their
homes during the rains to lessen the pressure on his scanty supplies of grain
and possibly with a view to protect their province, thus making it impossible
for Govindpant to move in the matter Govindpant occupied Ahmad Khan
Bangash's lands in Farukhabad adjoining his, because these were on his side
of the Ganges But beyond the river he could not go Similarly, Gopalrao
found it impossible to move in the face of Veni Bahadur guarding the Ganges
in full force The combined troops of the Marathas under all their captains in
this region, are found estimated at only ten to twelve thousand troops Many
of these were possibly infantry corps only, and not very well disciplined They
were fit for collecting revenues from refractory zamindars hiding in their
fortalices, but not fit to face regular troops under Veni Bahadur The rainy
season passed in mere manœuvring without any actual invasion In the mid-
dle of November, Govindpant turned towards Delhi on account of Bhau's ex-
press orders, with his contingent of some 5,000 troops, and only Gopalrao Barve
was left behind in the lower Doab, facing Shuja's dominions Sadashivrao had
ordered Ganesh Sambhaji Khandekar to join his forces with those of Barve,
but he does not seem to have crossed the Jamuna from the south at all Be-
sides, Shuja's wise mother and Veni Bahadur had by this time quelled the rebel-
lions of the zamindars and brought them over to their side by lavish expen-
diture on them Gopalrao had written to Bhau in his letter of 22nd November,
1760 that he was presently crossing over into Oudh, actually he was unable to
cross before 30th December, 1760, as a part of his army had been sent to
Govindpant's help under Bajirao Barve, Ramchandra Krishna and Ghanashyam
Pandurang, which he was expecting back But Bhau could not spare these

PANIPAT 77

troops, and so Barve engaged new troops. Ganesh Sambhaji kept on writing
that he would come after settling matters in Bundelkhand. Finally, Barve
crossed with his new troops and matchlockmen, about 10,000 strong. After
crossing, he kept 5,000 infantry for guarding the ghats on the Ganges at his
back, and with 5,000 matchlockmen and 1,500 sowars he began his campaign.
A thousand horsemen joined him from the lower Doab. With these he at-
tacked Bhojpur (sixteen miles to the north-west of Dalmau higher up the
Ganges) which was defended by the Ruhelas by forming a square in the
European way. But the impetuous attack of the Maratha cavalry broke their
formation and they ran back into their fortalice. In this action, the Marathas
killed some fifty matchlockmen, ten horsemen and captured the enemy's flags,
themselves losing three horses and one trooper with seven wounded. Next day,
the Ruhelas were pursued into the neighbouring thicket where they had taken
shelter near the village of Dhuremau, five miles to the north-east of Bhojpur,
by the fortalice. When attacked, they again ran away after a little skirmish
in which the Marathas captured five horses, losing two of their own. Gopal-
rao next proceeded to the important fort of Dalmau, which was built on the
bank of the river on a prominent hillock. The Marathas first attacked the
town adjoining the fort when Haji Beg, the Commandant of the fort, sallied
forth two miles with two thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry, con-
sisting of Ruhelas. The attacking Marathas pressed them back into the fort
after losing ten horsemen killed and twenty-five wounded. Two hundred enemy
Ruhelas were cut off and their fifty horses were killed. The Marathas cap-
tured seventy-five horses with the iron drum. The whole town was looted and
the Marathas began their march forward, because, had they laid siege to the
fort, they would have had to sit there for a long time. Their next camp was
at the village of Gaura, on the road to Rai Bareli on the 8th of January, 1761.
In this campaign, Balabhadrasingh accompanied Barve, and later on Krishna-
nand Pant, Faujdar of Karra, joined them near Manikpur in the Pratapgarh
district. Many local Rajput landlords joined them with their retainers so as
to take part in the loot, if possible. They carried fire and sword throughout
the region till they reached Nawabganj, ten miles north-west of Allahabad, to
which they set fire after looting it. Next they proceeded to Fulpura to the
north-east of Allahabad, and there repeated their performance. Thus, after
they had carried their depredations for more than a hundred miles along the
northern bank of the Ganges, retribution descended upon them from behind.
Veni Bahadur had sent a strong army at their heels, coming into contact with
which the rabble, collected in the Maratha camp, broke at once and zamindars,
like Balbhadrasingh, who had joined for loot, fled back. The Maratha army
under Gopalrao was dispersed and they ran back in small parties by different
roads. Gopalrao personally crossed back with some seven horsemen into the
Mirzapur district near the famous temple of Vindhyavasini, and then, taking
a westerly route along the southern bank of the Jamuna, returned to his seat
at Korah-Jahanabad in the Doab. All his broken troops also returned with-
out much mishap. These events took place between 10th to 20th January,
1761. This campaign did not start at the beginning of December as taken

78 PANIPAT: 1761
by Sir Jadunath,⁴⁴ but at the end on 30th December,⁴⁵ and ended within three
weeks Bhau had expected this raid into Shuja's territory to have the effect
of diverting his forces from Panipat, but it could not have had that effect be-
cause the campaign began very late, and ended simultaneously with the battle
of Panipat In joining Abdali, Shuja had insured against any possible attack
by Abdali and his allies, the Ruhelas, but had not neglected the defence of
his dominion either Bhau's information on these points seems to be de-
fective Miscalculation of enemy forces and over-confidence in his own troops
led Bhau astray in the whole Panipat campaign From the dates of the let-
ters giving the news of the campaign, it cannot be said that the rout of Barve's
army took place after the news of the Panipat disaster had reached him, or
was an outcome of it It seems, however, that Barve could not rally his dis-
persed troops to another effort because, by that time, the news had definitely
reached him

I PANIPAT LOCALITY
The Panipat locality did not prove favourable to the Marathas on ac-
count of its being nearer to the home-land of the Ruhelas Panipat itself was
—and is—practically a Muslim town and the areas to its east had a larger
proportion of Muslim population when compared to the southern tracts of the
United Provinces The road from Panipat to Kairana, Shamli and Muzaf-
farnagar across the Jamuna farther on, leads to Sukartal, the stronghold of
Najib Khan on the Ganges, and crossing the Ganges to the actual home-land of
the Ruhelas, in a straight line In fact it looks as if any place south of Delhi
would have been a better locality for the Marathas and worse for the Ruhelas
Their food supply was assured with the least inconvenience to them Suraj-
mal Jat's advice was correct on this point, because he knew the local human
environment. Bhau's original plan of crossing over into the Doab in the
vicinity of Agra was correct, but, on account of procrastination, it was spoiled,
and the campaign was unnecessarily lengthened by the four months of the
rainy season This had a disastrous effect from the financial, physical and
moral point of view Shuja would not have gone over to Abdali had Bhau
placed himself between Abdali and Shuja's dominions The miscarriage of
that project was the first set-back in the Panipat campaign
Shakir Khan Ansari's description¹ of the sad condition of Panipat under
Maratha occupation must be true as far as it goes That the Marathas must
have felled all the trees in the vicinity irrespective of any consideration for the
fruit-trees in the gardens, appears true when we take into account the neces-
sities of the Maratha camp, military as well as personal Many houses in the
city were inevitably demolished by cannon-balls and their residents had to
shift to other places The wonder is not that such things occurred, but that the
Marathas had left the inhabitants comparatively free without imposing any
conditions on them. Most of the inhabitants were allowed to remain where
44 Fall 2.313
45 Ait Sankirna Sahitya, Khanda 3, No 263
1 Fall 2.309

PANIPAT 79
they were and carry on their lives as best as they could under the circumstances
We believe that the presence of such a hostile element at their back must have
helped the Afghan side much in various ways Spying and sending news dis
closing the Maratha position was easy for this population. Besides these, the
two sons of Nejabat Khan Ruhela of Kunjpura were captives in the Maratha
camp What happened to them is nowhere recorded, and there is no ground
for thinking that they were beheaded. Perhaps, in the turmoil just after the
defeat, they might have freed themselves and joined the populace in destroying
the Maratha camp followers in revenge That the Marathas had not destroyed
any edifice wantonly is clear from the undamaged condition of the splendid
tombs of the Saint Bu Ali Qalandar and Ibrahim Lodi with the ancient
mosques adjoining. This is a clear proof of the mildness of Maratha rule even
under the stress of war Their civil manners and inoffensive attitude have
cost the Marathas not a little in history.
That Bhau, in his Panipat campaign, created a tremendous impression
in the Panipat locality is clear from many legends about Bhau, Parvatibai,
Janakoji Shinde and Vishwasrao. The Bhau ballad current in the surround-
ing area, and still sung by itinerant Jogis, Muslim and Hindu, is a living proof
of the impress so created, and this was natural. The camping of lakhs of men
in the locality for about three months was a thing that had never before oc-
curred even in those war-like times. The earlier battles in the Panipat-Karnal-
Thanesar locality had been bloody and decisive from the political point of
view, no doubt, but they were never fought to the last in the proper sense of
the word, nor was there such a massacre of camp followers after the event
The result is seen in the creation of legends. The Jogi, who copied the Bhau
ballad for us (published in the Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Insti-
tute, 4.3 of 1943), does not record Bhau's death, following in this respect the
Maratha chronicles, and says that he went to the village of Bhaopur, some
twelve miles to the south-west of Panipat. There he lived for a long time with
a Fakir, evidently incognito, hiding his identity. Thence he went to Kairana
across the Jamuna after some years, his further life being not known to the
men in the Panipat locality. That Bhau did not die on the battle field and
lived long afterwards became the traditional belief throughout India, giving
rise to imposters who gave themselves out as the real Bhau, and created politi-
cal problems adversely affecting the Maratha history. We think that the bal-
lad singer's account of Bhau living in Bhaopur is a transparent attempt to con-
nect the already existing village of Bhaopur (founded and named after some
Bhaosingh, a name common in the locality) with the name of Bhau, the Mara-
tha general Such a legend is recorded about another place in the Muzaffar-
nagar Gazetteer on page 9 (1920, Reprint) of the U P Series: "The Jamuna
in the extreme north of the district appears to occupy much the same place as
formerly, and on the south also, it washes the high mound on which stood a
Maratha fort still connected with the name of Sadasheo Bhau It may fur-
ther be safely conjectured that the channel of the river has not changed much
at this point since Panipat Between these two extreme points, however, the bed
of the river is tortuous and uncertain" We have seen the mound ourselves
near the village of Isapur on which now stands not a fort but a bairagi's ashrama

80 PANIPAT 1761
and a temple of his household gods, but there was no trace of the fort at
least in 1935—nor was the fact of its previous existence known to the in-
habitants there. The Gazetteer writer, we take it, must have copied the infor-
mation from some local report, or the description given by some previous
traveller in the locality. As the mound in question is a prominent object in
that low-lying river basin, it could have been very effectively used militarily
by placing long-range guns on it and guarding or attacking the passage of the
Jamuna near that point. As Ahmad Shah Abdali had moved his camp along
the river front just opposite to this mound on the other side of it during the
second stage of the Panipat beleaguerment, the military use of such a promi-
nent height is not an impossibility. But the idea of the Marathas making use
of it during the Panipat beleaguerment presupposes that the Maratha line of
communication into the Doab was intact during the earlier part of the Panipat
siege, or alternately, the Maratha contingents detached by Bhau for cutting
off Abdali's line of supply through the Doab, had approached up to this point,
though there is very little likelihood of such a thing happening. As the data on
which the Gazetteer writer based his statement are not before us, it is not pos-
sible for us now to decide the point.
II WAS THE IMPERIAL CANAL TO THE WEST OF PANIPAT FLOWING
DURING THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN?
Most of the historians, depending upon the information supplied by
such sources as Gazetteers whose information is not historically sifted, have
taken the Imperial Canal as having stopped flowing eighty years before 1820,
when it was again repaired by the British. Imp. Gaz. Vol. XIV, p. 234 (1908),
under the heading "Jumna Canal (Western)," supplies the information that
there were ancient bridges over the canal at Karnal and Safidon and that the
Delhi branch ceased to flow sometime during 1753 to 1760. This informa-
tion the Gazetteer has copied from the Persian chronicles, giving an account of
the civil war between the Emperor Ahmad Shah and his Wazir Safdar Jang.
The canal formed the property of the Wazir and with a view to stopping his
income from that source, the canal was broken up by his enemies. But what
has been overlooked by the Gazetteer has been now brought to light by the
deep researches of Dr. T. G. P. SPEAR of St. Stephen's College, Delhi. Writ-
ing in the Journal of Indian History (Vol. XIX, Pt. III, No. 57, p. 326, Dec.
1940), he says that the canal was broken up in 1754 in the civil war no doubt,*
but was repaired by Ahmad Shah. But thereafter sometime, somehow, it was
neglected. Taking into consideration the position of Bhau's camp, the major
portion of which was situated to the north-west of Panipat, and the descrip-
tion found in the local Bhau ballad,¹ which supplies the information that
Bhau's 700 elephants were stationed at the village of Gharaunda, ten miles to
the north of Panipat, we assume that the canal was definitely flowing during
this period. For elephants require a copious water supply which would be
available only in a place like the bank of a river or a flowing canal. That it
was flowing can also be guessed from the fact of the mention of the sojourn of
¹ BDCRI 4.173.

PANIPAT 81

the various conquerors in the Shalimar Garden (which depended upon the
canal water) to the north-west of Delhi Raghunathrao Peshwa lived there
in 1754,² Ahmad Shah Abdalı in 1756-7,³ and Sadashivrao Bhau in September,
1760⁴ They would not have preferred the place unless a copious supply of
water was available in the vicinity for a big army We think this to be sufficient
proof for taking the canal as flowing during this campaign When Ahmad
Shah succeeded in terrorizing the Maratha troops into huddling themselves in
the cramped camp at Panipat during the last fortnight before the great bat-
tle, the Marathas seem to have lost their access to the canal water to the west
of their camp, for Kashıraj says that Ahmad Shah was able to make a circuit
round the Maratha camp from a distance, which we think to be correct for
the last fortnight only On account of this, the Maratha army seems to have
suffered terribly for want of water, in addition to want of food This fact is
found mentioned only in the ballad published by us in the Deccan College Bul-
letin Vol IV, p 184 If their access to the canal water was not cut off, we
think the canal to have been cut higher up in the vicinity of Karnal or Kunj-
pura at the head of the canal The ground for such supposition rests on the
fact of the reconquest⁵ of Kunjpura by the Afghans during the Panipat siege
For the first month and a half, the Marathas were receiving their food supply
from the vicinity of Karnal on account of their friendship with Alasingh Jat,
the founder of the Patiala State, but a new army from Afghanistan under Atai
Khan came along that route to the help of Ahmad Shah early in December
Dılir Khan Ruhela made common cause with these new Afghan troops and
took back Kunjpura from its small Maratha garrison, thus closing the
Maratha supply from that side Taking into consideration the Afghan tactics
it is not unlikely that he might have cut the canal at the head after this event
so as to cut the water supply of the Maratha camp at Ahmad Shah's behest
Lest it be forgotten, it should be noted that the old Imperial Canal was
flowing in those days along a different channel than the present New Delhi
branch of the western Jamuna canal It began lower down on the river
Jamuna to the north of Kunjpura It flowed to the east of Karnal and not
to the west as at present Then it did not take a loop to the west before com-
ing to Panipat as at present, but flowed parallel to the west of the Imperial
Road at a distance of three or four miles Dr SPEAR in his article referred to
above, page 327, supplies the following information "The canal on its old
alignment ran along a depression in the apparently flat Jamuna plain In some
places the bed of the canal was above the level of the land at a great seepage,
and waterlogging was the result The distance between Panipat and
Karnal suffered most from this fact" (P 328) 'Then the alignment was
altered to correspond with the lie of the land, and it now sweeps in a great
curve from Karnal to Panipat "
This discussion should convince the reader that the old canal—Shah
Nahar—was flowing along to the west of Panipat at a distance of some three
to four miles during the Panipat campaign

² SPD 27 74
³ Ibid 21 106.
⁴ RAJ 6 404
⁵ Fall 2.307

82 PANIPAT 1761
III ESTIMATE OF THE CONFRONTING ARMIES AT PANIPAT
The chief trustworthy authority on the numbers of fighting soldiers
engaged in the Panipat campaign is Bhausahebanchi Kafiyat. It never gives
inflated figures. When Sadashivrao Bhau came to Sironj in Malwa and halted
there for a week in April 1760, the estimated strength of the Maratha cavalry
is given as 27,000, besides Ibrahim Khan's trained infantry which is stated to
be 10,000. This figure of the chronicle is testified as correct by figures in some
contemporary letters. Khare I 14 gives 25,000 cavalry, starting with Bhau
from Patdur. The Maratha army under the Peshwa belonged mainly to the
Hujrat division i.e. Peshwa's personal cavalry. Khare I 21 gives a slightly dif-
ferent estimate. It gives the figure of the Telinga Gardis of Ibrahim Khan
at 8,000 and the cavalry at some 33,000 total. This figure was made up of
the personal squadrons of Vishwasrao, the Peshwa's son, and the nominal Com-
mander-in-Chief of the whole army, the troops of Bhau himself and more than
half the troops generally serving under Raghunathrao, who would not lead
the campaign himself and remained in the Deccan. The Maratha chiefs of
note serving as officers in these regiments were Samsher Bahadar (the Muslim
half brother of the Peshwa), Vitthal Shivdeo Vinchurkar, Manaji Paygude,
Antaji Manakeshwar, Damaji Gaikwad, Khanderao Raste, Subhanrao Mane,
Mahadaji Naik Nimbalkar, Balwantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare.
This letter written by Gopalrao Patwardhan, a noted general, estimates the
numbers on Abdali's side at 50,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry including the
Ruhelas. When the Maratha army had not as yet separated from the main
body collected in the Nizam's Dominion, the total strength was estimated at
75,000. Out of this, 10,000 were sent to Karnatak under Visaji Krishna Bini-
wale, and 25,000 remained with Raghunathrao to check the Nizam. The rest,
it seems, were appointed to accompany Bhau to the north. But out of this
number some troops probably remained with the Peshwa as his personal guard,
and some others lagged behind or would not go as ordered, thus making the
figure which went with Bhau near about 35,000. When this army crossed the
Chambal at the beginning of June and joined forces with Shinde and Holkar
with the remnants of their broken armies, the total number is estimated at
70,000 to 80,000, including the contingents of Surajmal Jat and the Wazir
Ghazi-ud-din.¹ The same letter written on 1st July, 1760, estimates Abdali's
side at 60,000 troops, besides the contingent of Shuja-ud-daulah which is esti-
mated at 20,000. When estimating the figures engaged in the final battle of
14th January, 1761, we have first to deduct the Maratha casualties in the
capture of Delhi at the beginning of August 1760 and the sack of Kunjpura
in the middle of October 1760. The Maratha loss before Delhi was only a
few hundreds, and before Kunjpura also not much, though the number of
wounded was considerable.² In short, we need not take the total losses in these
two actions at more than 1,000. In the three considerable battles fought during
the two months of beleaguerment at Panipat, the loss of the Maratha side was
similarly very small, not going beyond 1,000 dead.³
1 Purandare 1.337
2 SPD. 21.193
3 Aitihasik Patra Vyavahar 97

PANIPAT 83
(1) Thus, to calculate the figures left for the final action, we shall
have to deduct first the Jat-Wazir contingents which left the Marathas at the
beginning of September, numbering possibly not more than 5,000 (2) The
troops left in charge of Delhi under Naro Shankar estimated at about 7,000 in
all⁴ (3) The total loss at Delhi, Kunjpura and the three skirmishes at Pani-
pat—3,000, leaving 55,000 out of the combined total estimated at 70,000 near
Agra at the beginning of July Out of this also some thousands will have to
be deducted for those who died as a result of wounds received in the five
actions, as also some disabled on account of serious wounds and starvation
Thus we shall not be far off the mark if we say that the Maratha fighting troops
at Panipat were 50,000 only A writer from Panipat, writing before the three
skirmishes, estimates the Maratha number at 60,000, while he reports Abdali's
troops at 40,000 only Perhaps he omits the infantry on Abdali's side, because
the word “Fauj” in Marathi is generally used for cavalry only Abdali is
said to have received additions to his troops during the Panipat beleagurement
estimated at 8,000 Kashiraj's figures given at the beginning before crossing
over the Jamuna to Panipat, are 40,000 horse and 40 000 foot, including the
troops of Abdali and his allies For Bhau he gives the figures as 55,000 horse,
15,000 foot (including 9,000 Gardis under Ibrahim Khan), besides 15,000
Pendhari horsemen As against this the irregulars on Abdali's side are estimated
by Kashiraj at four times the number of the Durrani horsemen on the muster
roll of the Shah Even if we take the actual Afghan cavalry at 33,000 only,
this estimate would give one lakh and twenty thousand as the figure of ir
regulars, which we think very much overestimated It is true that there pos
s bly would be more soldiers from amongst the camp followers on Abdali's side
than there would be on the Maratha side, on account of the very character of
the two peoples and their usual mode of life An average Afghan camp fol
lower would be a good horse rider even when he had no horse of his own
Similarly, he would be more adept in using arms than possibly an average
camp-follower in the Maratha army But it is incorrect to think that none of
the camp followers and non combatants following the Maratha army would
have horses of their own, we rather think that many of them had the Dec-
can ponies with them serving as baggage carriers for their masters Unfor-
tunately for the Marathas, most of these ponies seem to have perished of
starvation during the beleagurement of Panipat, due to want of fodder, while
the irregular horses on Abdali's side were still serviceable Satvoji Jadhav, writ-
ing after the battle of Panipat,⁵ definitely says that many a cavalryman had
lost his mount before Panipat, and even the rest had become unserviceably
weak If we deduct 20 per cent on this account, then Sir Jadunath's estimate⁶
of 40,000 horsemen actually present in the field seems to be a tolerably cor-
rect figure, though arrived at in a different manner Kashiraj's estimates of the
two armies given in round figures seem to be based on heresay reports, and not
on official figures as he would make us believe by his mode of writing His
only strong point is that he clearly distinguishes between trained government
4 Raj 6 406
5 Ibid. 1 406.
6 Fall 2.287

84 PANIPAT: 1761
paid soldiers and camp-followers or irregulars. The figures given by Shamlu
and others are inflated because they include all the camp-followers also. An
average of four camp-followers for each professional soldier would make a fair
estimate⁷ of persons gathered in the two camps, and on that basis it looks as if
each camp had two and a half lakhs of people in it. The Maratha camp
had many pilgrims also in its entourage. Some sardars had brought their fam-
ilies for this very purpose with them, so as to facilitate their travel in comfort
and safety. Many priests had gathered in the camp from Benares and Prayag
with the hope of getting good fees and alms by plying their trade. Many can-
didate clerks had joined with the hope of getting some temporary work or civil
appointment in the newly conquered territories. This was almost a normal and
permanent camp-following class in the Maratha armies ever since the days
of Shivaji, as is attested by Martin, the French Governor of Pondicherry. In-
cidentally it shows the nature of the Maratha camp. The chartered bazar
accompanying the army supplied all the needs of the people in it. People felt
“so little danger in following their camp that life in camp is spent as happily
there as in towns.” (MALET’S Memoranda Relative to the Maratha Army at
Kharda, Maratha-Nizam Relations, No. 202, p. 272.) Major DIROM writes
that the Maratha army on march “resembles more the emigration of a nation
guarded by its troops than the march of an army only to subdue an enemy.”⁸
The women camp-followers in the Maratha army were a necessary element for
doing certain duties which men thought it derogatory to perform in those days.
Cooking their food and cleaning the vessels could be done by males, but grind-
ing the corn was thought to be an exclusive duty of the female sex, for per-
forming which a number of them accompanied the army. It is difficult to
estimate the number of females in the Maratha army, but we think there were
some 20,000 all told. Most of these were slaves of their masters, who served
in various capacities and also as concubines. Very few married women had
accompanied their husbands in this long-drawn-out campaign. Because Bhau,
Balvantrao Mehendale, Nana Fadnis and possibly a few others had taken their
wives with them, a wrong impression is formed about the total number of
such women accompanying the army. Mirat-i-Ahmadi states that 12,000
women in good position among whom 700 travelled in palkis, were taken prison-
ers.⁹ We think this statement a gross exaggeration. There could not be more
than 100 women carried in litters, nor could the 12,000 women belong to the
married class. A few other sardars had also taken their women-folk with them,
no doubt, for pilgrimage along the route, but their number was not more than
a few hundred at the most.¹⁰ The rest of the women belonged to the slave-
concubine class. Nuruddin Hasan’s mention of “handsome Brahman women”
being sold after the defeat can only be treated as a figment of the brain, and
as to the “rose-limbed slave girls” mentioned by Sir Jadunath,¹¹ their number
could be infinitesimally small, if such were to be found there at all. Had the
7 Dirom p. 242.
8 Dirom p. 243.
9 Sardesai Commemoration Volume (English) p. 260
10 Purandare 3.209.
11 Fall 2.348.

PANIPAT 85
Peshwa's army been going on after Shivaji's pattern, there would have been
no impediment like this in the camp at all. But Shivaji led few campaigns
lasting more than a few months at a stretch or far away from the homes. The
Peshwa's army was modelled after the Mughal pattern with all its draw-
backs, which proved fatal here as they had proved fatal to Aurangzib in his
campaigns against the Marathas.
IV. IMPERFECT SENSE OF TIME AND DIRECTION
Indians of pre-Panipat days had no maps before them to judge properly
of the directions of places, etc, and so we have to take their descriptions of
events cautiously. Bhau writes "Abdali has come to the south by crossing the
Jamuna at Baghpat." Nana Purandare takes Kunjpura as situated on the
south bank of the Jamuna. "Panipat lies 40 kosa from Delhi towards the west."
With these examples from contemporary documents before us, we have to ac-
cept Kashiraj's directions with correct visualisation. Sir Jadunath has bungled
in his attempt to connect Kashiraj's translation with the Browne's map of the
battle. This is also due to his non-visualisation of the path of the sun during
the days of its highest southern declination. A man from the Maratha camp
talking of Abdali's position or Kashiraj writing from the Abdali's camp about
the Marathas was sure to confuse correct direction during December-January.
Kashiraj has naturally taken the Maratha army as facing eastwards and so de-
scribed the Afghans facing westwards on the day of the battle. Another thing
incorrectly calculated by Sir Jadunath is the hours of the day. The sun rose
at Panipat (latitude 29° 23' 30'' North, longitude 76° 58' 30'' East) on
14-1-1761 at 7 A.M. and set at about 5.20 P.M. (local time). The day thus
consisted of about 10 hours and 20 minutes and the battle has to be described
accordingly. The day was, in lunar calendar, 8th of the bright half of the
month. The moon would set about mid-night on such a day and not at
9.15 P.M. as taken by Sir Jadunath. (Vide Fall 2, pp. 369, 346, etc.)