पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

PANIPAT 75
field of battle. But that was no fault of Bhau, but a national misfortune. All
the various units and classes in the vast Maratha camp spread over miles were
not equally affected by the dearth of grain or money, and that seems to be
the reason why some still wanted, and thought it possible, to wait, while others
less fortunate had reached the sinking point. Ultimately the clamour of the
starved decided the day of the battle and not the convenience or forethought
of the commander! This was a calamity, but perhaps there was no help for
it. In any case, had the battle been fought a fortnight earlier, it would have
been better in all respects, for the Marathas.
The actual plan decided and adopted by Bhau in consultation with
Ibrahim Khan Gardi and others was, however, made possible by Abdali's
change of camp-site and could not have been devised prior to 30th December,
1760. A battle before that date would have been only a frontal attack or a
march with a hollow-square formation liable to be disturbed on the flanks
which is the weakest point in such a formation. The direction would have been
from north to south and not north-west to south-east. The plan envisaged by
Kashiraj and put down in a memory drawing of the field of battle, is cor-
rect as far as it goes. Only the direction of the Maratha front he was un-
able to make out. Kashiraj mistook the longer side of the rectangle on the
right-hand side for a front, because guns had been judiciously placed on that
side also, and these were pointed towards the Abdali front. The strategy was
to march past the right-hand corner of Abdali's camp to the river side with
the whole formation, so as to take the river at the back in the evening and
then to meet the Afghan army from the right-hand side, which would then
become the battle-front. The advantage in this move would have been that
the camp-followers would have remained always safe at the back and would
have found it possible to run away to the south towards Delhi or to the east
across the Jamuna into the Doab in case of a defeat. Had the plan succeeded,
the major battle would have come not on the day of the start but on the days
following. This would have given double advantage to the Marathas. They
would have found the much needed rest, as also time to refresh and recoup
at night, and would have been attacking the Afghans on their flank, thus ex-
posing their camp to loot. But the hollow square formation with a long
rectangular side made up of mutually antagonistic generals was at best a
precarious device, as was proved to their cost the next day.
THE TRANS-GANGES RAIDS OF THE MARATHAS DURING THE
PANIPAT CAMPAIGN
At the beginning of July 1760, Shuja-ud-daulah finally made up his
mind and went over to Abdali's side. From that date Sadashivrao Bhau began
writing his letters to Govindpant Bundele, Gopalrao Ganesh Barve, Ganesh
Sambhaji Khandekar and Gopalrao Bapuji, to foment rebellions in Shuja's
dominions beyond the Ganges, and raid them. Many of the big zamindars un-
der Shuja were small chieftains themselves with armies made up of their per-
sonal retainers. Balawant Singh of Benares was the biggest and the most
refractory amongst them, though there were others like Balabhadrasingh of