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पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Panipat 1761 with Historical Commentary

टी. एस. शेजवलकर / शास्त्रीय अनुवाद द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished197 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 119, कुल 197 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 119

82 PANIPAT 1761
III ESTIMATE OF THE CONFRONTING ARMIES AT PANIPAT
The chief trustworthy authority on the numbers of fighting soldiers
engaged in the Panipat campaign is Bhausahebanchi Kafiyat. It never gives
inflated figures. When Sadashivrao Bhau came to Sironj in Malwa and halted
there for a week in April 1760, the estimated strength of the Maratha cavalry
is given as 27,000, besides Ibrahim Khan's trained infantry which is stated to
be 10,000. This figure of the chronicle is testified as correct by figures in some
contemporary letters. Khare I 14 gives 25,000 cavalry, starting with Bhau
from Patdur. The Maratha army under the Peshwa belonged mainly to the
Hujrat division i.e. Peshwa's personal cavalry. Khare I 21 gives a slightly dif-
ferent estimate. It gives the figure of the Telinga Gardis of Ibrahim Khan
at 8,000 and the cavalry at some 33,000 total. This figure was made up of
the personal squadrons of Vishwasrao, the Peshwa's son, and the nominal Com-
mander-in-Chief of the whole army, the troops of Bhau himself and more than
half the troops generally serving under Raghunathrao, who would not lead
the campaign himself and remained in the Deccan. The Maratha chiefs of
note serving as officers in these regiments were Samsher Bahadar (the Muslim
half brother of the Peshwa), Vitthal Shivdeo Vinchurkar, Manaji Paygude,
Antaji Manakeshwar, Damaji Gaikwad, Khanderao Raste, Subhanrao Mane,
Mahadaji Naik Nimbalkar, Balwantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare.
This letter written by Gopalrao Patwardhan, a noted general, estimates the
numbers on Abdali's side at 50,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry including the
Ruhelas. When the Maratha army had not as yet separated from the main
body collected in the Nizam's Dominion, the total strength was estimated at
75,000. Out of this, 10,000 were sent to Karnatak under Visaji Krishna Bini-
wale, and 25,000 remained with Raghunathrao to check the Nizam. The rest,
it seems, were appointed to accompany Bhau to the north. But out of this
number some troops probably remained with the Peshwa as his personal guard,
and some others lagged behind or would not go as ordered, thus making the
figure which went with Bhau near about 35,000. When this army crossed the
Chambal at the beginning of June and joined forces with Shinde and Holkar
with the remnants of their broken armies, the total number is estimated at
70,000 to 80,000, including the contingents of Surajmal Jat and the Wazir
Ghazi-ud-din.¹ The same letter written on 1st July, 1760, estimates Abdali's
side at 60,000 troops, besides the contingent of Shuja-ud-daulah which is esti-
mated at 20,000. When estimating the figures engaged in the final battle of
14th January, 1761, we have first to deduct the Maratha casualties in the
capture of Delhi at the beginning of August 1760 and the sack of Kunjpura
in the middle of October 1760. The Maratha loss before Delhi was only a
few hundreds, and before Kunjpura also not much, though the number of
wounded was considerable.² In short, we need not take the total losses in these
two actions at more than 1,000. In the three considerable battles fought during
the two months of beleaguerment at Panipat, the loss of the Maratha side was
similarly very small, not going beyond 1,000 dead.³
1 Purandare 1.337
2 SPD. 21.193
3 Aitihasik Patra Vyavahar 97