पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

event by four days 42 If their argument has any sense in it, we must think the
state of the Maratha camp not as bad as it is depicted, otherwise how could
they have waited for four days more? Their confidence is curiously found sup-
ported by a rare letter of Janakoji, written only ten days prior to the battle,
and reaching its destination without being intercepted by Abdali's patrols 43
He does not betray any sign of fear or hopelessness He assures his revenue
collector not to be troubled at the local pin pricks of the Rajput princes, as
after the chief enemy (Abdali) is defeated, others will fall in the line with-
out effort
As we have said elsewhere, the tone of the men who escaped from the
battle field was different from their own earlier writing They charged Bhau
with being obstinate, not listening to milder and saner counsels, and casting
his last die thoughtlessly and in a haphazard manner We take these to be
afterthoughts only Had there been not even a thirty per cent chance of
bettering their position—and not the hope of defeating Abdali decisively—how
the Maratha chieftains could have consented to march out with a hollow
square formation, we are not able to comprehend Let it not be forgotten
also that notwithstanding the starvation of the Maratha camp, the Marathas
were able to charge so effectively in the forenoon part of the battle that they
seemed to carry everything before them On this central point, all the
authorities on the battle are unanimous This clearly proves that but for some
serious disobedience of orders issued after the final decision before the start,
or for the sudden demoralisation due to Vishwasrao being shot down, there
would not have been that debacle and that stampede which actually took
place even to the dismay of such on lookers as Kashiraj and other reporters of
the battle We have thought it necessary to put down all these facts before the
description of the actual battle, because up till now it has been treated by his-
torians in a faulty, not to say malignant, manner
According to the chronicles, the rank and file of the Maratha army,
perturbed at the prospect and desperate on account of starvation, proceeded
to the tent of Bhau and besought him not to allow them to die of starvation and
disease but to lead them to the battle, whatever be the destiny awaiting them
We have said already that Bhau should have anticipated such a clamour and
forestalled it with some continuous preparation spread over a number of days
All the men, high and low, combatants and non combatants, in the Maratha
camp, should have been completely made aware and tutored of their re-
sponsibility and actual part in the battle which was to ensue Clear instruc-
tions about the methods of self-protection in the event of a sudden disaster—
we do not think inevitable and certain—ought to have been circulated Nana
Fadnis says in his autobiography that Bhau had anticipated all possibilities in
the conduct of war and provided for them as best he could, and we do not
think that Bhau could have failed to take these obvious precautions, consum-
mate master of affairs as he was The divergence in the military counsels of the
Maratha chiefs was the basic cause for the opposite manner of acting on the
42 Kaifiyat 0.21 Bakhar 0 141
43 Shinde 1.222