पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

76 PANIPAT. 1761
Tiloi and Hindupat of Pratapgarh In fact, the times and the surroundings
were such that no potentate could be taken as fully established and free from
internal rebellions Shuja had placed Veni Bahadur with full powers in
charge of his dominions during his absence in Abdali's camp The major
portion of Shuja's troops he kept behind him for guarding his dominions, fully
knowing the risks to which his dominions would be exposed once he antag-
onised the Marathas In fact, his direct help to Abdali was his fine park of
artillery and the moral prestige of his name only Sadashivrao Bhau appears
from his letters to be unaware of this important fact Shuja's troops are found
estimated at 20,000 at the beginning of July, but how many of these he took
with him to Abdali's camp is doubtful, as none seem to give very reliable
figures But if we take Kashiraj's figures as correct, Shuja had at Panipat
2,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry and 20 guns with him, thus leaving 16,000 to
guard his dominions All these troops were well disciplined and well equipped
They were engaged on a permanent footing and very well paid with the re-
sult that they had no cause to grumble and go against their master This was
possible because Shuja possessed the most fertile lands in India and he could
collect his revenues without any hitch The only possible loop hole in Shuja's
dominions was the danger from his big zamindars who were always ready to rebel
and would have liked to become independent When Bhau is found ordering
Govindpant to invade the Ruhela lands beyond the Ganges and Gopalrao
Barve to attack Shuja's dominions, he seems to be talking of something which
he could not understand Abdali had sent many of the Ruhelas back to their
homes during the rains to lessen the pressure on his scanty supplies of grain
and possibly with a view to protect their province, thus making it impossible
for Govindpant to move in the matter Govindpant occupied Ahmad Khan
Bangash's lands in Farukhabad adjoining his, because these were on his side
of the Ganges But beyond the river he could not go Similarly, Gopalrao
found it impossible to move in the face of Veni Bahadur guarding the Ganges
in full force The combined troops of the Marathas under all their captains in
this region, are found estimated at only ten to twelve thousand troops Many
of these were possibly infantry corps only, and not very well disciplined They
were fit for collecting revenues from refractory zamindars hiding in their
fortalices, but not fit to face regular troops under Veni Bahadur The rainy
season passed in mere manœuvring without any actual invasion In the mid-
dle of November, Govindpant turned towards Delhi on account of Bhau's ex-
press orders, with his contingent of some 5,000 troops, and only Gopalrao Barve
was left behind in the lower Doab, facing Shuja's dominions Sadashivrao had
ordered Ganesh Sambhaji Khandekar to join his forces with those of Barve,
but he does not seem to have crossed the Jamuna from the south at all Be-
sides, Shuja's wise mother and Veni Bahadur had by this time quelled the rebel-
lions of the zamindars and brought them over to their side by lavish expen-
diture on them Gopalrao had written to Bhau in his letter of 22nd November,
1760 that he was presently crossing over into Oudh, actually he was unable to
cross before 30th December, 1760, as a part of his army had been sent to
Govindpant's help under Bajirao Barve, Ramchandra Krishna and Ghanashyam
Pandurang, which he was expecting back But Bhau could not spare these