पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)
Panipat 1761 with Historical Commentary
टी. एस. शेजवलकर / शास्त्रीय अनुवाद द्वारा
पृष्ठ 120, कुल 197 में से
संदर्भ में पढ़ेंPANIPAT 83
(1) Thus, to calculate the figures left for the final action, we shall
have to deduct first the Jat-Wazir contingents which left the Marathas at the
beginning of September, numbering possibly not more than 5,000 (2) The
troops left in charge of Delhi under Naro Shankar estimated at about 7,000 in
all⁴ (3) The total loss at Delhi, Kunjpura and the three skirmishes at Pani-
pat—3,000, leaving 55,000 out of the combined total estimated at 70,000 near
Agra at the beginning of July Out of this also some thousands will have to
be deducted for those who died as a result of wounds received in the five
actions, as also some disabled on account of serious wounds and starvation
Thus we shall not be far off the mark if we say that the Maratha fighting troops
at Panipat were 50,000 only A writer from Panipat, writing before the three
skirmishes, estimates the Maratha number at 60,000, while he reports Abdali's
troops at 40,000 only Perhaps he omits the infantry on Abdali's side, because
the word “Fauj” in Marathi is generally used for cavalry only Abdali is
said to have received additions to his troops during the Panipat beleagurement
estimated at 8,000 Kashiraj's figures given at the beginning before crossing
over the Jamuna to Panipat, are 40,000 horse and 40 000 foot, including the
troops of Abdali and his allies For Bhau he gives the figures as 55,000 horse,
15,000 foot (including 9,000 Gardis under Ibrahim Khan), besides 15,000
Pendhari horsemen As against this the irregulars on Abdali's side are estimated
by Kashiraj at four times the number of the Durrani horsemen on the muster
roll of the Shah Even if we take the actual Afghan cavalry at 33,000 only,
this estimate would give one lakh and twenty thousand as the figure of ir
regulars, which we think very much overestimated It is true that there pos
s bly would be more soldiers from amongst the camp followers on Abdali's side
than there would be on the Maratha side, on account of the very character of
the two peoples and their usual mode of life An average Afghan camp fol
lower would be a good horse rider even when he had no horse of his own
Similarly, he would be more adept in using arms than possibly an average
camp-follower in the Maratha army But it is incorrect to think that none of
the camp followers and non combatants following the Maratha army would
have horses of their own, we rather think that many of them had the Dec-
can ponies with them serving as baggage carriers for their masters Unfor-
tunately for the Marathas, most of these ponies seem to have perished of
starvation during the beleagurement of Panipat, due to want of fodder, while
the irregular horses on Abdali's side were still serviceable Satvoji Jadhav, writ-
ing after the battle of Panipat,⁵ definitely says that many a cavalryman had
lost his mount before Panipat, and even the rest had become unserviceably
weak If we deduct 20 per cent on this account, then Sir Jadunath's estimate⁶
of 40,000 horsemen actually present in the field seems to be a tolerably cor-
rect figure, though arrived at in a different manner Kashiraj's estimates of the
two armies given in round figures seem to be based on heresay reports, and not
on official figures as he would make us believe by his mode of writing His
only strong point is that he clearly distinguishes between trained government
4 Raj 6 406
5 Ibid. 1 406.
6 Fall 2.287