वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 3. 18.
ADH. 8.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 411
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
They read "śruteḥ" instead of "aśruteh"¹. Interpretation same.
Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "The
knower". (Sūtra 18)
SŪTRA 18
"(THE SOUL IS) A KNOWER, FOR THAT VERY REASON."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The soul, which is an ego, is a knower.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, it has been pointed out that the soul does not originate
like the ether and the rest, since it is eternal, as established by Scripture.
Now, incidentally, its nature, etc. are being determined.
The word 'soul' is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism.
By the phrase "for this reason", the reason mentioned by the term
'therefrom' (in the preceding sūtra) is referred to. On the doubt, viz.
whether the soul is non-sentient by nature, but possessed of the
attribute of knowledge or mere consciousness, or knowledge by nature
yet possessed of (the attribute of) being a knower,—the Vaiśeṣikas ²
and the like hold that it is non-sentient, yet possessed of the attribute
of knowledge; while the Sāṁkhyas and the rest hold that the soul is
mere consciousness.
With regard to it we reply: "A knower", i.e. the individual soul
is nothing but a knower, i.e. nothing but knowledge by nature, yet
possessed of (the attribute of) being a knower. Why? On the
ground of the following scriptural texts, viz. 'Here this person
becomes self-illuminating' (Bṛh. 4.3.9, 14), 'The person who is
made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light in the
heart' (Bṛh. 4.3.7), 'There is no annihilation of the knowledge of
¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.18, p. 136, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.18, p. 140, Parts 7 and 8; G.B.
2.3.16.
² Vide V. Sū. 3.1.18, and Śaṁkara Miśra's commentary, p. 161.

412 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 3. 18.
ADH. 8.]
the knower, because of his imperishability' (Bṛh. 4.3.30), ' “ Whereby
should one know, O ! the knower ? ' ” ' (Bṛh. 2.4.14; 4.5 15), 'This
person simply knows', 'For he is the one who sees, .1 hears,
smells, .2 thinks, conceives, does, the intelligent self ' (Praśna 4 9)
and so on.
The doctrine of the non-sentient soul, on the other hand, is to be
rejected,—because then the attribute of knowledge by itself, being
the effector of all practical transactions, will come to attain primacy,
and hence the non-sentient substratum of the attribute (viz. the
soul), being non-liable to salvation or bondage, virtue or vice, will
come to be non-primary or useless like the nipple on the neck of a
goat; 3 and finally, because of its opposition to Scripture.
The doctrine of mere consciousness, too, is to be rejected, because
if consciousness be all-pervading, then there will be no perception of
the pleasure and the like pertaining to the entire body; but if it be
atomic in size, then there will be no experience of the pleasure and the
like pertaining to hands, feet and so on.
Hence it is established that this soul, known through self-
consciousness, is knowledge by nature and a knower.
Here ends the section entitled “The knower” (8).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different—viz. he interprets the word “jña” as
eternal consciousness and not as a knower.4
1 Touches.
2 Tastes.
3 An emblem of any useless or worthless object or person.
4 Ś.B. 2 2.18, p. 609.

[SU. 2. 3. 19.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 413
Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "Depar-
ture". (Sūtras 19-31)
SŪTRA 19
"(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS ATOMIC ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL
MENTION) OF DEPARTURE, GOING AND RETURNING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The individual soul is atomic, because in the texts: 'By that
light this soul departs through the eye, or through the head, or through
other parts of the body' (Bṛh. 4.4 2¹), 'Whoever, verily, depart
from this world, all go to the moon alone' (Kauṣ. 1.2²), 'Having
come back from that world to this world for action' (Bṛh. 4 4 6³)
and so on, there is the mention "of departure, going and returning".
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, it has been proved that the individual soul is eternal and a
knower. Now its size is being determined.
On the doubt, viz. whether this soul is of a middle size,⁴ or of an
all-pervading size, or of an atomic size,—if it be suggested: It must
be of a middle size, since pleasure and the rest are experienced all
over the body. Or, it must be of an all-pervading size,—
We reply: The individual soul is capable "of departing, going
and returning". These three are not possible if it be all-pervading.
Moreover, if it be all-pervading, then experiences of pleasure and the
like will result everywhere. If, on the other hand, it be of a middle
size, then it must be non-eternal. Hence, the atomicity of the soul
is the only remaining alternative. In the passage: 'When he departs
from this body, he departs together with all these' (Kauṣ. 3.3⁵), its
departure is mentioned. In the passage: 'Whoever, verily, depart
from this world, all go to the moon alone' (Kauṣ. 1.2), its going
is mentioned. And, in the passage: 'Having come back from that
world to this world for action' (Bṛh. 4.4.6), its returning is mentioned.
¹ R, Śk, B.
² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
³ Ś, R, Śk, B.
⁴ I.e. of the size of the body.
⁵ Note that Nimbārka quotes a different text here.

414 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 20-21.
ADH. 9.]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
He takes sūtras 19–27 as laying down the prima facie view.
Literal interpretation same.
SŪTRA 20
“AND (THERE IS POSSIBILITY) OF THE SUBSEQUENT TWO (VIZ.
GOING AND RETURNING) THROUGH ONE’S SELF.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Sometimes departing may be possible on the part of even one
who is not moving, as in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a
village ¹ But, since there is possibility “of the subsequent two
through one’s self” alone, the individual soul is atomic.
Vedānta-kaustubha
As in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village,
departing, which consists in the cessation of the rulership of the body,
may sometimes be possible on the part of the soul even when it is
not moving. But, since there can be the accomplishment “of the
subsequent two”, viz. going and returning”, “through one’s self”
alone, it is established that the individual soul is atomic.
SŪTRA 21
“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE SOUL IS) NOT ATOMIC, BECAUSE
OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION OF WHAT IS NOT THAT, (WE REPLY :)
NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC BEING SOMETHING ELSE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected : In accordance with the text, referring to the
individual soul and designating “what is not that”, viz. : ‘He, verily,
is the great’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22 ²), the individual soul is “not atomic”,—
¹ I.e. when somebody ceases to be the ruler of a village, he may be said to
‘go out’.
² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[sū. 2. 3. 22.
adh. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 415
(we reply:) “no”, because in the middle, the topic is the Supreme
Soul.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected: The individual soul is “not atomic”. Why?
“Because of the scriptural mention of what is not that,”—“that”
means atomicity, “what is not that” means non-atomicity, on account
of the scriptural mention of that,¹—i.e. because in connection with the
discourse on the individual soul, viz. ‘He who is made of knowledge
among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the soul’ (Bṛh. 4.3.7),
there is the mention of greatness in the scriptural text: ‘He, verily, is
the great, unborn soul’ (Bṛh. 4.4 25),—
(We reply:) “No”. Why? “On account of the topic being
something else,” i.e. because the topic is here something other than
the individual soul referred to in the beginning, i e the Supreme Soul,
who is the topic to be established in the middle of the section, in the
text: ‘By whom the soul has been found and realized’ (Bṛh. 4 4.13)
SŪTRA 22
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ITSELF AND OF MEASURE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“On account of the word itself (viz. ‘atomic’) and of measure,”
mentioned (respectively) in the texts: ‘This atomic soul’ (Muṇḍ.
3 1.9²), ‘An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the
tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold’ (Śvet. 5.9³), the individual soul
is atomic.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The phrase: “the word itself” means the word which is denotative
of its own atomicity. The word “measure” means the measure which
is separated from⁴ all gross measures, i.e. an intensely minute measure.
On account of these two, the individual soul is atomic. The word
itself is mentioned in the text: ‘This atomic soul in which the five-fold
vital-breath has entered is to be known by means of thought’ (Muṇḍ.
¹ This explains the compound “atacchruteḥ”.
² Ś, R, B, Śk, B. ³ Ś, R, Bh, B.
⁴ Uddhṛtya mānam = Unmānam.

416 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 23-24.
ADH. 9.]
3.1.9). The measure is mentioned in the text: ‘An individual soul
is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundred-
fold’ (Śvet. 5.9) ‘For the lower one is seen to be like the point of
the spoke of a wheel only’ (Śvet. 5.8).
SŪTRA 23
“NON-CONTRADICTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE SANDAL-PASTE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Just as a drop of sandal-paste, though occupying one spot of the
body, refreshes the entire body, so exactly does the soul illuminate.
Hence, the experience of pleasure and the like over the whole body
is not inconsistent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected: If the soul be atomic in size, then how can
pleasure and the like be experienced over the whole body?—we reply:
There is no such contradiction. Just as one drop of yellow sandal-
paste, occupying one spot of the body, produces, through its own
quality, a pleasurable sensation extending over the entire body, so
the soul too, occupying one spot of the body, experiences, through its
own quality, the pleasure and the like extending over the entire body,
in accordance with the Smṛti passage: ‘This soul, though only atomic,
abides pervading its own body, as does a drop of yellow sandal-paste,
pervading the body’. For this very reason it has been said by the
Lord too: ‘“Just as one sun illuminates this entire world, so the
field-owner (i.e. the soul) illuminates the entire field (i.e. the body),
O Bhārata!”’ (Gītā 13.33).
SŪTRA 24
“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE TWO CASES ARE NOT PARALLEL)
ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIALITY OF ABODE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON
ACCOUNT OF THE ADMISSION (OF AN ABODE, VIZ.) IN THE HEART
CERTAINLY.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected: The example of the sandal-paste is not
appropriate, “on account of the speciality of abode”,—it is directly

[sū. 2. 3 25.
ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 417
observed that the drop of sandal-paste occupies one spot of the body;
but it is not known that the individual soul occupies one part of the
body, since consciousness is experienced everywhere,—on account of
such a difference of abode between the two,—
(We reply :) “No”. Why ? “On account of the admission,” viz.
that the soul, atomic in size, abides in one part of the body, i.e. “in
the heart”, by the scriptural text: ‘He who is made of knowledge
among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the heart’ (Bṛh.
4.4.22). The meaning of the term “certainly” is that it is the
attribute of knowledge (and not the atomic soul itself) which abides
in the whole body.
SŪTRA 25
“OR THROUGH ATTRIBUTE, LIKE LIGHT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The illumination of the body takes place only through the attribute
of the soul, like the light of a lamp and the like in a room.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. the doctrine that there is a relation of
attribute and substratum (between knowledge and the soul) is not
proper, since our purpose is served by the very nature only (of the
soul),—(the author) replies :
The term “or” is for disposing of the objection. The sense is
that the experience of the pleasure and the like, pertaining to the
entire body, by the atomic soul, occupying one part of the body, is
possible through its attribute of knowledge which is all-pervading
“As in ordinary life.” In ordinary life, a gem, the sun, a light and
so on, though occupying one place, illuminate many places, as the
case may be, through their attribute alone. Or else, (the combination)
may be disjoined as: “as in the case of light”, i.e. like the light of
gems and the rest. The doctrine of an attributeless soul, as admitted
by the Sāṁkhyas, has been disposed of above.¹
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara reads “lokavat”, all others “ālokavat”.
¹ Vide V.K. 1.3.18.
27

418 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 26-27.
ADH. 9.]
SŪTRA 26
"THE EXTENDING BEYOND (OF KNOWLEDGE) IS AS IN THE CASE
OF SMELL, FOR THIS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
But the "extending beyond" of the attribute of knowledge fits
in "as in the case of smell". The scriptural text: 'He has entered
here up to the body-hairs and finger nails' (Kauṣ. 4.20 1) "shows"
the individual soul to be the substratum of such an attribute.
Vedānta-kaustubha
"The extending" of the attribute of knowledge beyond the soul,
its substratum which is situated within the heart, i.e. its occupying
a larger space, is "as in the case of smell", i.e. is just like smell
occupying a larger space than the flower which occupies a smaller
space. The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body-
hairs and finger-nails' (Kauṣ. 4.2.0) "shows" the soul's pervasion
over the entire body by means of its attribute of knowledge, extending
over a larger space.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
They break this sūtra into two different ones, viz. "Vyatireko
gandhavat" and "Tathā ca darśayati".²
Rāmānuja
He too reads "ca" in place of "hi", but does not break it into
two sūtras.
——————
SŪTRA 27
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Although there is no distinction between the soul and its knowledge
in respect of being knowledge, yet a relation of substratum and
1 Not quoted by others. For correct quotation vide Kauṣ., p. 141.
2 Ś.B., pp. 615-16, Bh. B., p. 136.

[sū. 2. 3. 28.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 419
attribute (between them) is indeed proper. Why? "On account of
the separate teaching," viz : "Having mounted the body by means of
intelligence" (Kauṣ. 3.6 ¹).
Vedānta-kaustubha
Apprehending the objection, viz. Let knowledge be the essence
of the soul. Hence here the distinction,—viz. the substratum is
atomic, the attribute all-pervading,—is not proper,—(the author)
replies here.
"On account of the separate teaching" of the attribute from the
substratum, the soul, in the passages: 'Having mounted the body
by means of intelligence' (Kauṣ. 3.6), 'Having taken by his intelligence
the intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17). That is, in spite of
there being no distinction between the two in respect of being know-
ledge, there can very well be a relation of substratum and attribute
between them, since it is mentioned in Scripture. Equality of nature
does not necessarily mean identity, since it is found that in spite of
there being no distinction between light and its substratum,—both
being equally light,—there is still a difference between them.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 26 in his commentary, interpretation different. It
answers to the objection that intelligence is not a permanent attribute
of the soul. Hence the sūtra: "Intelligence is a permanent attribute
of the soul) since there is a separate (i.e. distinct) statement (in
Scripture to that effect)".²
SŪTRA 28
"BUT THERE IS THAT DESIGNATION ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOUL'S)
HAVING THAT ATTRIBUTE AS ITS ESSENCE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE
INTELLIGENT BEING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"As in the case of the intelligent one," i.e. (just as Brahman is
said to be great, because He is possessed of great attributes, on the
1 Ś. 2 G.B. 2.3.26, p. 197, Chap. 2.

420 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 28.
ADH. 9 ]
ground of etymology thus) ‘Brahman’ is one in whom there are great
qualities,¹ so the soul has been designated as “Eternal, all-pervading”
(Muṇḍ. 1.1.6 ²), because of possessing great attributes. In the first
case, the Intelligent Being, great by Himself, is great by reason of His
attributes too. In the second case, on the other hand, the individual
soul, atomic in size, is great by reason of its attribute only,—this is
the distinction
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. If the individual soul be atomic by nature,
then the texts which establish its all-pervasiveness must be con-
tradicted, such as. ‘Eternal, all-pervasive, omnipresent, extremely
subtle’ (Muṇḍ. 1 1.6), ‘Eternal, all-pervasive, immobile’ (Gītā 2.24)
and so on,—the author replies· No.
The term “but” is for disposing of the objection. On account of
having an all-pervasive attribute as its very essence, “that designa-
tion”, viz. the designation of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, such as:
‘Eternal, all-pervasive’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), fits in. “As in the case of
the intelligent being.” Greatness is said to belong to the Intelligent
Being through His connection with great attributes as well, in accord-
ance with the saying: ‘Brahman’ is one in whom there are great
attributes. The Intelligent Being being great by nature as well, the
example holds good only partially.³ Similarly, there is this designation
of the all-pervasiveness (of the soul) on the ground of its all-pervasive
attribute only, and not by nature. This should be understood here:
Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, is without an equal and a superior and
all-pervasive, in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘Nothing is
observed to be either equal to Him or higher than Him’ (Śvet. 6.8).
The all-pervasiveness of others, such as, prakṛti, time, and the attribute
of the individual soul (viz. knowledge), is relative (and not absolute).
There are contraction and expansion of even such an attribute which
is peculiar to the individual soul, and eternal, in accordance with the
declarations by the Lord Himself: “ ‘Knowledge is enveloped by
¹ Bṛh+man.
² Not quoted by others.
³ I.e. the case of Brahman and the individual soul are not parallel in all
respects, but in some respects only. The former is great by nature, as well as
great by attributes; while the latter is atomic by nature yet great by attributes.
Hence the two cases are parallel only in respect of the second point, and not of
the first as evident.

[sū 2. 3. 28.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 421
nescience. Thereby beings are deluded ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.15), ‘ “ In whom that
nescience has been destroyed by knowledge, in them knowledge shines
forth like the sun, O Bhārata ! ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.16 ¹).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely
different. He takes this and the following three sūtras as laying down
the correct conclusion, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive, in answer to
the prima facie view set forth in ten sūtras above Thus, this sūtra
means, according to him: “But there is that designation (of the
atomicity of the soul) on account of its having that attribute (viz
buddhi) as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent being”. That
is, just as Brahman, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic
for the purpose of meditation, so the individual soul, though all-
pervading, is designated to be atomic through its limiting adjunct of
buddhi.²
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 29 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 27
in the commentary of the last. Baladeva leaves out “tu”. Inter-
pretation different—viz “But there is that designation (i e the
designation of the soul as knowledge) on account of its having that
attribute as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent one” That is,
just as the Lord, though a knower, is sometimes designated as know-
ledge, so the individual soul too, though a knower, is sometimes
designated as knowledge, since it possesses knowledge as its essential
attribute.³ They continue the same topic in the following four
sūtras, although literal interpretation is the same.
Bhāskara
This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely
different. Here he points out that the atomicity of the soul, considered
so long, is not the real form of the soul, but only its transmigratory

¹ Correct quotation: “Prakāśayati tatparam”. Vide Gītā, 5.16, p. 303.
² Ś.B. 2.3.29, pp. 616 ff.
³ Śrī. B. 2.3.29, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.29, p. 147. Parts 7 and 8, G.B.
2.3.27, p. 198, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 29.
422 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9.]
form. Here he follows Śaṃkara, and points out that just as the all-
pervading Brahman is said to be atomic in reference to His abode,
viz. the heart, so the all-pervading soul is said to be atomic through
its attributes of passion and the rest.¹
SŪTRA 29
"ALSO BECAUSE OF LASTING AS LONG AS THE SOUL DOES, THERE
IS NO FAULT, BECAUSE IT IS SEEN."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness, due to its attri-
bute, is not inconsistent. "Also because of" the attribute lasting as
long as the soul does, there is no fault, because it is seen";² i.e.
because it is found in the passage: "‘For there is no cessation of the
knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish-
able, indeed. O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4 3 30 ³).
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. The attribute of the soul being sometimes
present and sometimes not, its all-pervasiveness due thereto vanishes,
and as such the designation of its all-pervasiveness is open to objections
—(the author) replies:
The term "also" is meant for disposing of the objection. The
soul is indeed eternal. As its attribute too "lasts as long as the soul
does", i.e. is an eternal attribute accompanying the soul, so the
designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness is not open to objections,
because we find that there are texts designating the attribute as lasting
as long as the soul does, such as: "‘For there is no cessation of the
knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish-
able, verily, O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4.3.30).

¹ Bh. B. 2.3.29, p. 137.
² C.S.S. ed., p. 440, omits the whole sentence which is but a repetition of the
sūtra itself. The other edition retains it.
³ Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 3. 30.
ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 423
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Interpretation different.
Śaṃkara continues the same theme, and points out that the soul's
connection with buddhi lasts so long as the transmigratory state does.¹
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 30 in their commentaries as well. The interpretation
of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that
all cows, hornless and so on, are called 'cow' (since they all possess
the generic character of cowness).²
Bhāskara
This is sūtra 30 in his commentary too. Interpretation different,
viz. like Śaṃkara's.³
Baladeva
This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation of the word
"tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that the sun and
its light are co-eternal, and that the sun is both light and the
illuminator.⁴
SŪTRA 30
"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MANIFESTATION
OF THAT WHICH IS EXISTENT, AS IN THE CASE OF VIRILITY AND
SO ON."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
During the waking state there is the "manifestation" "of this",
i.e. of knowledge, which is "existent" indeed during the states of
deep sleep and so on. Hence, the attribute of knowledge does last
so long as the soul itself does; just as in youth there is the manifestation
of virility and so on, which are existent indeed during childhood.
1 Ś.B. 2.3.30, pp. 619 ff.
2 Śrī. B. 2.3.30, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.30, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8.
3 Bh. B. 2.3.30, pp. 137-38.
4 G.B. 2.3.28.

424 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 31.
ADH. 9.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. if knowledge, the attribute of the soul,
be eternal, then why should there be no perception of it during the
states of deep sleep and the rest?—(the author) replies.
The term "but" implies emphasis. Knowledge, the attribute
of the soul, does last as long as the soul itself does. Why? "On
account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that which is
existent." That is, the attribute of knowledge, which is "existent
indced", i.e. is present indeed, in a non-manifest form during the states
of deep sleep and the rest is manifested during the waking state,—
just as in youth there is the manifestation of "virility and so on"
which are existent indeed during childhood. By the phrase "and so
on" the natural qualities of magnanimity, good conduct and the like
are to be understood.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 31 in their commentaries. Interpretation different,
they continue the same theme—viz. the soul's connection with buddhi
exists potentially in the state of deep sleep, etc. and is manifested in
the state of waking.¹
SŪTRA 31
"OTHERWISE THERE (WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF ETERNAL
PERCEPTION AND NON-PERCEPTION, OR A RESTRICTION WITH
REGARD TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, the perception and the
non-perception, the bondage and the release of the soul must all
become eternal. The soul will be either eternally fettored or eternally
free,—thus there must be "a restriction with regard to the one or the
other".
Vedānta-kaustubha
This aphorism is meant for indicating the defects in the view
of those who maintain the all-pervasiveness of the soul which is
1 Ś.B. 2.3.31, p. 621; Bh. B. 2.3.31, p. 138.

[SŪ. 2. 3 31.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 425
consciousness. “Otherwise,” i.e on any view other than our view,
viz. that the soul is possessed of the essential attributes of being a
knower, knowledge by nature and atomic in size, i.e. on the doctrine
that the soul is consciousness merely and all-pervading, there must be
the “consequence of eternal perception and non-perception” On
account of the all-pervading soul being ever unenveloped, there will be
perception; on account of the existence of mundane existence, non-
perception. In this way, there will result simultaneous bondage and
release, “or a restriction with regard to the one or the other”. On
our view, on the other hand, the individual soul being of the size of
an atom, going and returning, being enveloped and being unenveloped,
the object to be approached and the one approaching, are all possible,
and hence the respective difference between bondage and release,
too, is possible. But on your view, there will result one or the other
only of bondage and release, having the stated marks There must be
eternal bondage alone on the part of the soul which is consciousness
merely and immobile, or there must be salvation alone,—such a
restriction will result. Hence, it is established that the individual
soul is possessed of the attribute of being a knower, is knowledge by
nature and atomic in size.
Here ends the section entitled “Departure” (9).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sutra 32 in their commentaries. Interpretation different
as before. They adduce here an argument for the existence of buddhi,
being connected with which the all-pervading soul becomes atomic.
Thus: (The existence of buddhi must be admitted) otherwise there will
be the consequence of eternal perception and non-perception . . .¹
¹ Ś.B. 2.3.32, p. 622, Bh. B. 2.3.32, p. 138.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 32.
426 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 10.]
Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "The
agent". (Sūtras 32-39)
SŪTRA 32
"(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS) AN AGENT, BECAUSE OF SCRIPTURE
HAVING A SENSE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The soul indeed is "an agent", because the scriptural texts,
informing us about the means to enjoyment and salvation, such as
'One desiring heaven should perform a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5 ¹),
'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman' ² and so on, have
a sense.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now incidentally, the problem whether the soul is an agent is
being discussed.
On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is an agent or
not,—if the prima facie view be as follows: In the Kaṭha-vallī it
is denied that the individual soul is an agent, thus: 'If the killer
thinks to kill, if the killed thinks himself killed, both these do not
know. This one does not kill, nor is killed' (Kaṭha. 2.19); and it
has been declared by the Lord too: '"All actions are done by the
guṇas of prakṛti. The soul, deluded by egoism, thinks: 'I am the
agent' "' (Gītā 3.27). Hence, the guṇas alone are agents, but never
the soul,—
We reply: The soul alone is the agent. Why? "Because of
Scripture having a sense", i.e. because the scriptural texts, teaching
the means which are dependent on sentient beings, subject to enjoyment
and salvation, viz. 'Only doing works here, let one desire to live a
hundred years' (Īśā. 2), 'One desiring heaven should perform sacrifices'
(Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman',
'Let one worship calmly' (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on, have a sense.
If those non-sentient objects (viz. the guṇas) be the agent, the scriptural
texts teaching the means must be senseless.
The (above-quoted) scriptural text, on the other hand, shows that
the soul being eternal cannot be killed; but it is not by any means
¹ R, B, p. 208, line 27, vol. 2.
² R. B.

[sū. 2. 3 33.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 427
concerned with denying that the soul is an agent. The Smṛti
passage, too, shows only that the soul, which is deluded by the guṇas
of prakṛti, is an agent of mundane activities through those guṇas
And, this has been stated by the Lord Himself thus ‘ “Those deluded
by the guṇas of prakṛti are attached to the activities of the guṇas”’
(Gītā 3 2.9). If the guṇas be the agent and not the soul, then the
following statements will be nullified: viz. ‘“But if you will not carry
on this righteous warfare”’ (Gītā 2.33), ‘“For through action alone
Janaka and the rest have attained to perfection. Having an eye to
the good of the world also, you should perform action”’ (Gītā 3 20),
‘“Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you offer, whatever
you give, whatever you practise as penance,—make that an offering
to me”’ (Gītā 9.27), ‘“I am firm, with my doubts removed. I will do
according to your word”’ (Gītā 18.73) and so on.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 33 in their commentaries. Literal interpretation
same, but they hold that the soul’s state of being an agent is not
natural, but due to limiting adjuncts ¹ The same remarks apply to
the following three sūtras also, which will not be noted separately.
SŪTRA 33
“ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF (THE SOUL’S) MOVING ABOUT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“On account of the teaching of (the soul’s) moving about,”
in the passage: ‘He moves around in his own body as desired’ (Bṛh.
2.1.18 ²), it is an agent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
“On account of the teaching” of the soul’s “moving about”,
i.e. of its roaming around, in the passages: ‘He, the immortal, goes
¹ Ś.B. 2 3.32, p. 623; Bh. B. 2.3 32, p. 138. For the different senses of the
word ‘upādhi’ in the systems of Śaṁkara and Bhāskara. see Bh. B., etc.
² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

428 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 34-35
ADH. 10.]
wherever he wishes' (Bṛh. 4 3 12), 'He moves around in his own
body as desired' (Bṛh. 2.1.18), the individual soul is an agent,—this
is the sense.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They take this sūtra and the next as one sūtra by reversing the
order and adding a "ca" thus "Upādānāt vihāropadeśāc ca".¹
SŪTRA 34
"ON ACCOUNT OF TAKING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul)
thus: 'So exactly he, having taken the senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.18).
Vedānta-kaustubha
On account of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul)
in the passage which introduces the topic thus: 'Just as a king',
and continues: 'So exactly does he, having taken these senses' (Bṛh
2.1.18), 'Having taken by his intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh.
2.1.17), the individual soul is an agent.
SŪTRA 35
"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS AN
AGENT) WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS, OTHERWISE, (THERE WILL BE)
REVERSAL OF DESCRIPTION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"Also on account of the designation (of the soul) as an agent"
thus: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice' (Tait. 2 5 ²), the soul is an
agent. If by the word 'understanding' buddhi be understood and not
the individual soul, the instrumental case would have been used ³
1 Śrī. B., p. 152, Part 2; Śk. B, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
3 I.e. the instrumental case 'vijñānena' would have been used.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 36.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 429
Vedānta-kaustubha
“Also on account of the designation” of the individual soul,
denoted by the term ‘knowledge’, as an agent of ordinary and Vedic
“actions” thus: ‘Understanding performs a sacrifice, performs
actions as well’ (Tait. 2.5), the individual soul is an agent
If it be objected: By the term ‘understanding’ buddhi is to be
understood and not the individual soul,—(the author) replies: “Other-
wise, i.e if by the term ‘understanding’ the individual soul be not
understood, but buddhi is understood, then there must be “reversal
of the description”, i.e. buddhi being the instrument, there must
have been the designation of an instrument thus: ‘by understanding’.
But there is no such designation. Hence, here is a designation of an
agent by the stated case-ending, viz ‘Understanding’ Hence the
individual soul is an agent.
——————
SŪTRA 36
“THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AS IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“There is no restriction” with regard to the actions based on the
perception of their fruits.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. if the individual soul be the agent, then
having taken into consideration the good and the evil which are the
fruits of good and evil works, and being disgusted with the evil, it,
with a view to obtaining the good, ought to do what is conducive to
the latter,—(the author) replies.
“As in the case of perception.” Just as there is the perception
of the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works
performed previously, so there is “no restriction” with regard to works,
since we find that people are by chance sometimes inclined to what is
beneficial and sometimes to what is not beneficial.¹
――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ I.e. although a man perceives the good and evil results of his past acts,
yet there is no fixed rule that he always afterwards does what is good and avoids
what is bad. As he is ruled by external circumstances, he may sometimes be
inclined to what is bad, though knowing from his past experiences that such acts
lead to harmful consequences.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 37.
430 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 10.]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz. “As in the case of perception, there is non-restriction (with regard
to actions)”. That is, just as the soul, though free with regard to
perceptions, sometimes perceives what is good, and sometimes what
is bad, so the soul, though free to act, sometimes does what is good,
and sometimes what is bad.¹
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 36 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 35
in the commentary of the last. They interpret it as following. (If
prakṛti were the agent and not the individual soul, then there would
be) non-restriction (of actions) as in the case of perception”. That is,
just as it has been shown ² that if the soul be all-pervading no definite
perception will be possible, so if prakṛti be the agent, no definte activity
will be possible, since prakṛti being all-pervading and common to all,
all activities would produce results in the case of all souls, or produce
no results in the case of any one.³
SŪTRA 37
“ON ACCOUNT OF THE REVERSAL OF POWER.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If buddhi be the agent, then its instrumental power will cease,
and it must come to have the power of an agent. Hence the individual
soul is the agent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. in the text ‘Understanding performs a
sacrifice’ (Tait. 2.5), by the word ‘understanding’ buddhi alone is to
be understood, and it is the agent. Hence there instrumental case
has not been used ⁴—(the author) replies :
¹ Ś, B, 2.3.37, p. 625.
² Under Śrī. B. 2.3.32, Śk B. 2.3.32, G B. 2.3.30.
³ Śrī. B. 2.3.36, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B 2.3.36, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8; G.B.
2.3.35, p. 208, Chap. 2.
⁴ Vide V.P S. 2.3.35 above.