वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 2. 30.
ADH. 4 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 365
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the argument, viz. The cognitions in the waking state do not
correspond to external objects, because they are mere cognitions,
like the dream-cognitions and the rest, we reply.
It cannot be said that the cognitions in the waking state are
without a basis "like dreams and the rest", i.e. like the dream-
cognitions and the illusory cognitions. Why? "On account of
dissimilarity," i. e. because there is dissimilarity between the cognitions
in the waking state and the dream-cognitions, as the former are due
to attentive sense-organs, while the latter to inattentive sense-organs;
also because—as indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra)—
even the dream-cognitions have bases.
—————
SŪTRA 30
"THE EXISTENCE (OF PAST IMPRESSIONS) NOT (POSSIBLE), ON
ACCOUNT OF NON-PERCEPTION"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Moreover, the "existence" of past impressions is admitted by
you in order that there may be variety in knowledge; this is not
possible, since according to your view, external objects are not
perceived.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Moreover, if knowledge be without a basis, then its varieties,
such as the knowledge of a pot, the knowledge of blue, the knowledge
of yellow and so on, are not possible. If it be said that past impressions
are the cause of the variety of knowledge,—(we reply). "the existence"
of past impressions is not possible on your view. Why? "On account
of non-perception", i.e. because of the non-perception of the cause of
past impressions, or, because no such cause is possible on your view.
The direct perception of external objects is the cause of past
impressions, and that is not possible in your case, owing to your
non-admission of external objects

366 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 31.
ADH. 4.]
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation slightly
different, viz. “The existence (of cognition devoid of corresponding
things) is not (possible), because of non-perception”.¹
SŪTRA 31
“ON ACCOUNT OF MOMENTARINESS ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is no existence of past impressions, “on account of the
momentariness” of their substratum on your view.
Vedanta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, the existence of past impressions is not
possible. Why? “On account of the momentariness” of their sub-
stratum, the receptacle-consciousness,² viz. the ‘I’, as well as of the
single members of the uninterrupted series. Hence, the variety of
knowledge is due to the variety of objects. Therefore, it is established
that the settled conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the
Yogācāra view which is but a childish prattle.
Here ends the section entitled “Perception” (4)
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Baladeva
They add a “ca” at the end ³
1 Śrī. B. 2.2.29, p. 102, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.29, pp. 97-98, Parts 7 and 8.
2 Ālaya-vijñāna. The Vijñāna-skandha consists of vijñānas or cognitions
of two kinds, ālaya-vijñāna and pravṛtti-vijñāna. The former consists of cogni-
tions which refer to the ‘I’, the ego, while the latter those that refer to the so-
called external objects.
3 Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 557, G.B. 2.2.31.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 32.
ADH 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 367
Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
This sūtra is not found in their commentaries
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Incon-
sistency in every way". (Sūtra 32)
SŪTRA 32
“AND BECAUSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY (OF THE DOCTRINE OF A
UNIVERSAL VOID) IN EVERY WAY.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The doctrine of void, too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent
“in every way”, being opposed to the evidence of direct perception
and the rest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now the doctrine of universal void, as held by the Mādhyamikas,
is being disposed of
(The view is as follows·) All the objects mentioned in the sacred
works composed by the omniscient one (viz the Buddha), are simply
for the sake of suiting the intellectual capacities of his disciples, but
are not really existent, owing to the impossibility of the origin and
destruction (of things). The origin of entity from non-entity is
inappropriate (And if an entity arises from another entity, the
question is.) Is the entity which arises from another entity dissimilar
to the latter or similar ? If the first, then there will be the origin of
everything everywhere. If the second, then fruitlessness would result
like the grinding of what has already been ground ¹ Owing to such
inexplicability of origin, destruction, too, is inexplicable Hence, the
doctrine of void is to be accepted. Thus, salvation consists in attaining
a state of void,—such is the view of the Buddha. And this is perfectly
reasonable, since void is not proved by anything else, (but is self-
proved). The conventional distinctions of perceiver and the object
perceived and so on are mere errors.
1 I e. on the first alternative a gold ring may arise from clay; on the second,
there is no sense in producing something already existent, gold (ring) from gold.

368 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 32.
ADH. 5.]
With regard to it we reply The doctrine of universal void does
not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine
of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if
real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition.
"And on account of the inconsistency, in every way," of the doctrine
of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,—
because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant
and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it
is in conflict with the Buddha's doctrine, establishing the existence of
momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas
who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the
process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl
not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous
in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour
of contradiction in the view of Scripture.
Here ends the section entitled "Inconsistency in every way" (5).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the
Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of
universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third
school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside
by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate
refutation.¹
Bhāskara
This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at
the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine
of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of
the sole reality of cognitions.²
¹ Vide Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 558.
² Bh. B. 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with Śaṁkara's number),
p. 125.

[sū. 2. 2. 33.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 369
Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "Impossible
in one". (Sūtras 33-36)
SŪTRA 33
"(THE JAINA DOCTRINE IS) NOT (TENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE
IMPOSSIBILITY (OF CONTRADICTORY ATTRIBUTES) IN ONE (AND
THE SAME THING)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The Jainas ascribe contradictory attributes like existence and
non-existence and so on to all things. This does not stand to reason,
because the co-existence of contradictory attributes, like existence and
non-existence and the rest, is impossible, like that of shadow and
light.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The view of the Buddhists, who leave the hem of their lower
garment loose and untucked, has been disposed of. Now the view of
the Jainas, the naked, are being disposed of
They hold that the universe comprises souls and non-souls, and
is without a Lord. They maintain also that atoms are the causes
of the world. They imagine couples of contradictory attributes, like
existence and non-existence, in all the categories. Thus, according to
them, there are seven categories, summing up all scriptural teachings,
viz. soul, non-soul, influx (of foreign matter into the soul), (its)
stoppage, freedom from decay, bondage and release.1
Among these, the souls are sentient, and endowed with the
attributes of knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. Thus,
knowledge means the apprehension of the real nature of objects through
the right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. Perception
means cognizing objects, being free from attachment and detachment
The souls in bondage have worldly happiness, while the freed souls
have the happiness which inheres in themselves. Likewise strength
means proper endurance. These souls are possessed of parts, and are
of the size of the body. Among them, some are souls in bondage,
some are freed souls, some are ever-perfect The freed souls are
omniscient and possessed of unsurpassed happiness.
1 Jīva, ajīva, āsrava, saṁvara, nirjara, bandha and mokṣa.
24

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33.
370 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 6.]
The non-soul is the group of objects to be enjoyed by the souls.
It is divided into merit, demerit, matter, time and space.¹ Thus,
merit is a special kind of substance, inferrible from proper actions.
Demerit is the cause of the existence of the non-freed Matter is a
substance possessed of colour, smell, taste and touch. It is of two
kinds, viz. atoms, and their aggregates. The atoms are the causes
of the earth and the rest; and they are not of four kinds, as held by
the logicians, but are identical in nature. The distinctions of the
earth and the rest are due to the modifications of these atoms. The
four-fold elements beginning with the earth, as well as the body,
the worlds and so on, are their aggregates Time, on the other hand,
is a special kind of substance which is the cause of the conventional
distinctions of long, quick and fast and so on, and is atomic in form
Space is the absence of covering. It is of two kinds, viz. worldly-
space which is mundane, and non-worldly-space,² which is the abode of
the freed souls.
Influx means the activity of the sense-organs which causes a person
to know ³ sense-objects. Or else, influx means karma which complies
to,⁴ i.e. follows after, pervading the agent (i.e. pertains to him).
Stoppage means that which stops ⁵ the activities of the sense-
organs, i.e. the stoppage of the sense-organs, consisting in a deep
meditation.
Freedom from decay means that which destroys ⁶ the prior-
accumulated sins, i.e. austerities known from the teaching of the
Arhatas, consisting in not bathing, not speaking, squatting on the
thighs with the lower legs crossed over each other,⁷ eating what is spit
out from the mouth, mounting on heated stone, plucking out the
hairs on the head and so on.
Bondage means karma, and is of eight kinds. Among these,
there are four destructive-karmas,⁸---viz. relating to the obscuration of
knowledge, relating to the mental blindness of perception, relating to
delusion, and relating to what hinders ⁹---which obstruct the attributes
of the souls, viz. knowledge, perception, happiness and strength.
¹ Dharma, adharma, pudgala, kāla and ākāśa.
² Lokākāśa and alokākāśa. ³ Āsrāvayati iti āsrava.
⁴ Āsravati iti āsrava. ⁵ Saṁvṛṇoti iti saṁvara.
⁶ Nirjarayati iti Nirjara. ⁷ Vīrāsana.
⁸ Ghāti-karma.
⁹ Jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, mohanīya and antarīya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 371
And, there are four non-destructive karmas,¹—viz. relating to the
knowable, relating to the name, relating to family descent and relating
to life,²—which are the causes of the body, its sense of egoity, regard
and disregard for the happiness and the rest due thereto
On the cessation of bondage, there is salvation, or the manifestation
of the natural and real nature of the soul through the grace of the ever-
perfect Arhatas.
They have also a set of different categories, consisting in five
ontological categories,³ viz. the category of the soul, the category of
matter, the category of merit, the category of demerit and the category
of space ⁴ The term ontological category (astikāya) is denotative of
conventional objects occupying many places. (The compound
‘jīvāstikāya’ is to be explained as) a Karma-dhāraya thus. The soul
is the category,⁵ and so on in all other cases too To all these, they
apply the system of seven paralogisms,⁶ viz. May be it is, may be it
is not, may be it is not predicable, may be it is and is not, may be it is
and is not predicable, may be it is not and is not predicable, may be
it is, it is not, and is not predicable.⁷ (The compound ‘Sapta-bhaṅgī-
naya’ is to be explained thus:) The aggregate of the seven dialectical
formulæ is ‘sapta-bhaṅgī,⁸ its reasoning’ (sapta-bhaṅgī-naya). The
word ‘may’ (syāt) is an indeclinable represented by a verbal ending,
and should be understood to have the meaning of ‘littleness’. Thus,
it is to be construed as—It exists partly and does not exist partly,
and so on. The sense is this: The whole mass of object, consisting of
substances and modifications ⁹ is variable. The form of the substance
being one, permanent and conceivable as existent, existence, oneness,
permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to it. The modifica-
tions are the particular states of the substance, having the forms
of pots, pieces of cloth and the rest. And they being many,
¹ Aghāti-karma.
² Vedanīya, nāmika, gotrika, āyuska. ³ Astikāya.
⁴ Jīvāstikāya, pudgalāstikāya, adharmāstikāya, ākāśāstikāya.
⁵ Jīvaś cāsau astikāyaś ca. ⁶ Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya.
⁷ Syād asti, syān nāsti, syād avyaktavya, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād asti
cāvyaktavyaś ca, syān nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca, syād asti ca nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca.
⁸ Here the ending ‘ī’ is in accordance with Pāṇ. 2.4.17; SD. K. 821, as
modified by the Vārttika-sūtra of Kātyāyana 1556, “Akārāntottarapado dviguḥ
striyāṁ iṣṭaḥ”. Vide B.M., p 548, vol. 1.
⁹ Dravya and paryyāya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33.
372 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 6.]
non-permanent and conceivable as non-existent, non-existence, non-
permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to them.
With regard to it we reply. This cannot be said Why ?
Because the seven-fold reasoning, like partly existent, partly
non-existent and the rest, is not possible "in one object". The
simultaneous co-existence of darkness and light is never seen or
heard. In the same manner, couples of contradictory attributes like
existence and non-existence and so on are indeed impossible in
the same place.
If it be objected: Your own view, too, admits couples of
contradictory attibutes in one and the same substratum, e.g. in the
text "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), Unity is
established, while in the texts: "The Lord of matter and soul, the
Controller of the gunas" (Śvet 6.16), "Two birds" (Muṇḍ 3.1.1;
Śvet. 4.6), plurality is established,—(we reply.) No, because this view
is not based on reasoning,¹ since the real view can be determined, as
mutually non-contradictory, through Scripture alone. Thus, it being
impossible for the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the
non-sentient, to be non-different from Brahman by nature, it is non-
different from Him only as having its existence and activity under
His control (and not by nature), as indicated by the phrase 'emanating
from Him' and so on.² But there is indeed a difference of nature
between the categories, viz. the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman,
because the texts designating duality, too, are no less authoritative,—
just as leaves, flowers and the rest are different by nature from the
tree and are non-different from it on account of having no separate
existence; and just as in spite of the difference of the sense-organs
from the vital-breath by nature, their non-difference from it, as being
under its control, is not incompatible. In the same manner, the
difference and non-difference between the Universe and Brahman are
natural and established in Scripture and Smṛti. What contradiction
is there? In the very same manner, the complementary passage
confirms the relation of difference-non-difference between the Universe
and Brahman. The phrase 'emanating from Him' (tajjātān) is
denotative of the reason, (meaning) because it emanates from that
¹ So that it might be controverted by reason.
² The text is: "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, dis-
appearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1).

[SŪ. 2. 2. 34.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 373
Supreme Cause (tajja), disappears in Him (talla) and breathes, i.e.
acts in Him (tadana) The elision of the parts is in accordance with
Vedic use.
Moreover, a single cause of the world being established by correct
evidence, the causality of a plurality of atoms does not stand to
reason, because that would involve unnecessary cumbrousness and
also because causality is impossible on their parts, owing to their
non-sentience.
Further, the one reality, knowable from the Veda, being the
giver of salvation, it is difficult for salvation to result from the grace
of the perfect souls,¹ that being impossible Does the grace of the
perfect souls depend on meditation or not ? If the first, then, salvation
cannot arise through the meditation on one perfect soul among many
perfect souls of the same nature, for there will be the fault of dis-
regarding many other equally perfect souls. If there be meditation
on all, that would involve unnecessary complication. If it be said
that there is one great (soul higher than the others), then you fall in
with a theistic view. On the second alternative, the consequence
would be a universal release Moreover, there being no evidence of
direct perception and the rest for the existence of perfect souls, it is
impossible that salvation can result from their grace.
SŪTRA 34
"AND THUS (IF) THE SOUL (BE OF THE SIZE OF THE BODY) THERE IS
NON-ENTIRETY.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"Thus", there must be incompleteness on the part of the soul,
assumed to be of the size of the body, when it attains a large body
Vedānta-kaustubha
Just as their view is open to the objection that contradictory
attributes are impossible on the part of one and the same substratum,
so their view that the soul is of the size of the body, too, is open to
1 Siddhas or semi-divine beings, supposed to be of great purity and holiness
and characterized by the eight supernatural attributes.

374 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 35-36.
ADH. 6.]
serious objections. What objection? Listen! When the soul, which
is of the size of the body, having left the body of an ant, attains the
body of an elephant through the influence of its karmas, then there
must be “non-entirety” on its part, i.e. it would not be able to fill
up the whole of the elephant’s body. And when the soul comes out
of the body of the elephant, and enters into a small body, it would fail
to be small like it.
SŪTRA 35
“NOR ALSO IS THERE NON-CONTRADICTION ON ACCOUNT OF
MODIFICATION, ON ACCOUNT OF CHANGE AND THE REST.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It cannot be said also that the soul is possessed of parts which are
subject to increase and decrease and hence there is no contradiction,
—for then there will result the faults of change and the rest (on the
part of the soul).
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be said: The soul, according to us, is possessed of parts.
There is an increment of its parts in the body of an elephant, and
decrement in a small body. Thus “on account of modification”,
there is no contradiction”,—(we reply·) This cannot be said Why?
“On account of change and the rest,” i.e. because there will then
result faults like change and the rest. If the soul be possessed of parts,
on your view, then it must be mutable like the body and the rest and
also non-eternal,—such and other faults would arise.
SŪTRA 36
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE PERMANENCY OF THE TWO (PRECEDING
SIZES OF THE SOUL) OWING TO THE FINAL (SIZE), THERE IS NON-
DISTINCTION (OF THE SIZE).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be said: We admit that the “final” size of the soul is constant,
and hence the initial and the intervening sizes too must be so,—(we
reply:) then, there must be “non-distinction” everywhere, (and

[SŪ. 2. 2. 36.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 375
hence) the doctrine (that the soul is of the) size of the body is set
aside.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The size as well as the real nature (which the soul attains) during
its state of salvation, after the destruction of the final body, are
eternal. At that time there is no assumption of a subtle or gross
body (by the soul), so there is no contraction or expansion of it. Thus,
“on account of the permanency of the final” size, as well as of the real
nature (of the soul), the permanency of both the initial and intervening
(sizes) too is meant by the Arhatas; and hence there must be “non-
distinction” everywhere,—this is the sense. In short, the soul must
have a permanent and constant size in a gross body as well as in a
subtle body, in its state of bondage as well as in its state of release;
and the doctrine that it is of the size of the body must be but a childish
prattle Hence, it is established that our conclusion is not contradicted
by the view of the naked (i.e. the Jainas), based on error.
Here ends the section entitled “Impossible in one” (6).
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation different, viz. “On account of the non-distinction
of the final state, (viz. salvation) (from the mundane state), both
being permanent”. That is, on the Jaina view, there is no difference
between the state of release and the mundane state, because the
former is, according to them, a constant progress upward, or remaining
in the alokākāśa. Now, motion, whether in the world or upward is
always mundane; and no one can possibly feel any pleasure in the
state of constant motion, or in standing still in a place without any
support. Hence there is no difference between release and bondage
on this view ¹
¹ G.B. 2.2.36, pp. 145-146, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 37.
376 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 7.]
Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "Paśupati".
(Sūtras 37-41)
SŪTRA 37
"(THE DOCTRINE) OF THE LORD (IS UNTENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF
INCONSISTENCY."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The Pāśupata doctrine is to be rejected, because it is opposed to
the Veda, which establishes a non-distinct efficient and material cause;
and because it initiates a false faith.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the Pāśupata doctrine is being disposed of.
The maintainers of doctrines opposed to the Veda have been
refuted above. The Māheśvaras, too, are such. They are of four
kinds, viz. Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāśupatas and Śaivas. The
basis of their doctrines is the treatise composed by Paśupati.
The 'Pañcādhyāyī' ¹ is celebrated to be composed by the great Lord
Paśupati Himself. Five categories are mentioned there, viz. cause,
effect, concentrated meditation, injunction, and end of suffering.²
The cause is pradhāna and the Lord. Among them, pradhāna is
supposed to be the material cause, the Lord the efficient cause. The
effect is mahat and the rest. Concentrated meditation is stated in
the passage; "Through the meditation on the Oṃ-kāra once, one
should hold (one's self)". Injunction consists in secret rituals like
three ablutions and the rest The end of suffering is salvation.
Among these, the Pāśupatas and the Kāpālas hold that during
its state of bondage, the soul becomes (non-sentient) like a stone.
And the Śaivas hold that the freed soul is consciousness. They have
minor treatises of their own, designating their mutual differences.
Those Māheśvaras, with their intelligence deluded by the Māyā
of the Lord, maintain and practise, just as they like—as the means
to the highest end—what is "opposed" to the Veda and not practised
by the wise. As the Kāpālas say: "He who knows the six mudrās,
he who is versed in the supreme mudrā, he attains nirvāṇa by
¹ Or having five chapters.
² Kāraṇa, Kāryya, Yoga, Vidhi, Duḥkhānta.

[sū. 2. 2. 37.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 377
meditating on himself as in the posture of bhagāsana. The necklace,
the gold ornament, the ear-ring, head-jewel, ashes, and the holy thread
are said to be the six mudrās He whose body is marked with (mudrās)
is not re-born on earth" and so on. Likewise, the Kālamukhas hold ·
"Using a skull (as the drinking vessel), besmearing one's self with the
ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy
stick, setting up a liquor-jar, worshipping the gods placed on it, and
the rest, are means to obtaining all desired results in this world, as
well as in the next". In the treatise of the Śaivas, too, it is said ·
"A bracelet made of the Rudrākṣa-beads on the arm, matted hair on
the head, a skull, besmearing one's self with ashes", and so on.
Moreover, it is clearly demonstrated in the Mahābhārata in the
story of the Mātaṅga, distressed by the sharp words of a she-ass ¹
and so on, that it is very difficult for a man of another caste to obtain
Brāhmaṇa-hood even by means of penance accumulated through
thousands of years. But they hold that it is easily obtainable by a
man of a different caste thus: "By merely entering in the initiatory
ceremony, one becomes a Brāhmaṇa at once. By understanding the
Kāpāla rite, a man becomes an ascetic".
(Correct conclusion:) With regard to this, we reply. "Of the
Lord" and so on The term 'no' is to be supplied "Of the
¹ The story of Mātaṅga and the she-ass is as follows: Once Mātaṅga, who
was endowed with all qualities and equal to a Brāhmaṇa by all means, while
travelling on a swift chariot drawn by a young ass and its mother, mercilessly
pierced the young ass in the nose again and again Thereupon its mother, being
much grieved, said to him that such an act certainly behoved a person who was
born of a Brāhmaṇa mother and a Caṇḍāla father, but had he been the son of a
Brāhmaṇa father his act would have been otherwise. Much aggrieved at this
painful information, Mātaṅga determined to attain Brāhmaṇa-hood, left home
immediately and engaged himself in a severe penance Therefore Indra being
pleased personally appeared before him to offer him a boon. Mātaṅga asked
for Brāhmaṇa-hood, which however, Indra declined to grant by reason of the
fact that he was the son of a Caṇḍāla. In spite of Indra's straight denial,
Mātaṅga went on performing austereties for a hundred years, standing on one
leg only. Very much pleased, Indra appeared once again only to go back after
saying that it was nnpossible for a Caṇḍāla to acquire Brāhmaṇa-hood, and that
Mātaṅga was most unwise to undergo penance for it. This time Mātaṅga went
on performing penance for a thousand years in the same way. Disappointed
once more, he performed the severest penance by standing on one finger only.
But in spite of this he was never able to attain his heart's desire, simply because
he was a Caṇḍāla by birth Vide Mahā. 13.1870 ff., pp. 85 ff., vol. 4.

[SŪ. 2. 2 38.
378 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 7.]
Lord," i.e. the view of Paśupati is not justifiable. Why? "On
account of inconsistency," i.e because of the inconsistency in their
view by reason of establishing two causes ¹ in direct contradiction to
the scriptural texts like "He thought: 'May I be many'" (Chānd.
6 2 3), 'He became existent and that' (Tait. 2.6), 'All this has
that for its soul' (Chānd 6.8.7, etc.). Moreover, since the practices
like meditation preceded by the pranava, besmearing one's self with
the ashes of a corpse and so on, are mutually contradictory, their
view is indeed inconsistent
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 34 in Bhāskara's Commentary. They do not take
this adhikarana as a refutation of the Pāśupata doctrine only, but of
the Sāṃkhya-yoga as well, in fact of all the doctrines generally, which
maintain the Lord to be the efficient cause only and not the material
cause of the world.²
Śrīkaṇṭha
He takes this adhikarana to be concerned with the refutation of
the doctrine of the Ekadeśī Tāntrikas only or of those Śaivas according
to whom the Lord is the efficient cause only, while Māyā is the material
cause, śakti the instrument ³
SŪTRA 38
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELATION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"And on account of the impossibility of relation" between
Paśupati, the instigator who is without a body, and pradhāna and the
rest, to be instigated, Paśupati is not the cause of the world.
¹ I.e. two causes of the world material and efficient, different from each
other.
² Ś.B. 2.2.37, p. 566; Bh. B. 2.2.34 (written as 2.2.37 in conformity with
Śaṃkara's number), p. 127.
³ ŚK. B 2 3.37.

[sū. 2. 2. 39.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 379
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, the doctrine of Paśupati is not justifiable.
Why? A relation between Paśupati, the efficient cause, the instigator
and pradhāna and the rest, to be instigated, must be admitted,—
and this is impossible. Thus, the Māheśvaras are to be asked the
following. Do you, sirs, follow Scripture or follow what is observed ?
If the first, then the stated conclusion, being opposed to Scripture,
must be rejected. If the second, then it is observed that there is a
relation between potters and the rest only who are possessed of bodies,
and clay and so on. Hence no relation can be established between
Paśupati who is without a body and pradhāna and the rest, by you,
following what is observed. Hence it being not possible for a bodiless
being to have any relation with pradhāna and the rest, to be their
instigator and so on, he is not the cause of the world.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
This sūtra is not found in their commentaries.
SŪTRA 39
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SUBSTRATUM
(I E A BODY) (ON THE PART OF THE LORD) ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“On account of the impossibility” of an eternal body—since it is
opposed to what is observed,—as well as of a non-eternal one—since
it arises later—Paśupati is not the cause of the world
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: Let him then have a body, and hence the above
objection cannot be raised—(the author) replies:—
“The substratum” of all practical transactions is the body—
on account of the impossibility of that, their view is not justifiable.
Thus, the body of Paśupati cannot be eternal, because that is opposed
to what is observed. Otherwise the bodies of potters and the rest,
too, must become eternal. Again, his body cannot be non-eternal,

[SŪ. 2. 2. 40.
380 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 7.]
because a non-eternal body is not possible on the part of the cause of
the world, because all the non-eternal objects arise later as effects,
and because Paśupati, the cause, is prior to everything.¹
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different, viz. “Because rulership (of pradhāna)
and the rest is impossible (on the part of the Lord)”. That is, pradhāna
which is non-perceived and devoid of colour and the rest, cannot be
ruled by the Lord, since it is found that clay and the rest alone, which
are possessed of colour and so on, are ruled by potters, etc.²
Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
Interpretation different, viz. · “Because rulership (of pradhāna)
is not possible (on the part of the Lord)”. That is, Paśupati, who is
bodiless cannot be the ruler of the pradhāna, for only embodied beings
like potters and the rest can be rulers.³
SŪTRA 40
“IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY :)
NO, ON ACCOUNT OF ENJOYMENT AND THE REST.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It is not possible to suppose that the Lord has sense-organs and
body like the individual soul, for there will result enjoyment and the
rest (on the part of the Lord).
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: Just as the bodiless individual soul, existing from
all eternity, has a relation with subsequent sense-organs and body,
due to preceding sense-organs and body, so like it, Paśupati may have a
¹ I.e. non-eternal objects arise after creation. Hence Paśupati who is
present before creation cannot possess a non-eternal body.
² Ś.B. 2.2.39, p. 570. See p. 656 under Śaṁkara.
³ Śrī. B. 2.2.36, p. 113, Part 1; Bh. B. 2.2.35 (written as 2.2.38), pp. 127-128;
Śk. B. 2.2.36, p. 107, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.39

[SŪ. 2. 2. 41
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 381
relation with a body, and no objection can be raised here,—(we
reply:) no. "On account of enjoyment and the rest." The sense is
this: If like the individual soul, the Lord, too, has such a relation with
a body, then all the faults like experiencing pleasure and pain, and
thereby being the agent of good or bad actions and the rest must
pertain to Him also.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and others
Interpretation different, viz. "If it be argued: As in the case of
sense-organs, (we reply:) no, on account of enjoyment and the rest".
That is, if it be argued that the Lord rules over pradhāna in the same
way as the individual soul rules over its sense-organs,—we point out:
In that case the Lord Himself must undergo pleasure and pain ¹
At the end of this sūtra, Śaṁkara gives an alternative explanation
of this and the immediately preceding sūtras and this explanation
tallies with that of Nimbārka.
SŪTRA 41
"(THERE WILL RESULT ON THIS VIEW) FINITUDE OR NON-
OMNISCIENCE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If there be a connection between Him and the unseen principle,²
consisting in merit and the rest, then there must be "finitude" and
"non-omniscience" (on His part).
Vedānta-kaustubha
It cannot be said also: What objection can there be if enjoyment
and the rest result on the part of the Lord? What can a snow-flake
do when fallen on the sun?—for it is unreasonable. On account of
performing good and bad deeds, due to nescience and the cause of
transmigratory existence, and of undergoing their consequences,
there must of course result "finitude", i.e. liability to being created,
¹ Ś.B. 2.2.40, p. 570, Śrī. B. 2.2.37, p. 113, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.2.36
(written as 2.2.39), p. 128; Śk. B. 2.2.37, p. 108, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.40.
² Adṛṣṭa.

[Sū. 2. 2. 42.
382 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 8.]
as well as "non-omniscience" on the part of the Lord; otherwise the
individual soul, too, must cease to be subject to transmigratory
existence,--so much in brief. Hence, it is established that the
stated conclusion is not contradicted by the doctrine of the Māheśvaras
Here ends the section entitled "Paśupati" (7).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
According to them, the particle "vā" means 'or' and not
'and' as held by Nimbārka. Interpretation different, viz. "(There
must be) either finitude or non-omniscience". That is, the Lord
must either define the measure of the individual souls, pradhāna and
Himself, or not define them. If He does, then they become finite;
if he does not, then the Lord becomes non-omniscient.¹
Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "Impossi-
bility of origin". (Sūtras 42–45)
SŪTRA 42
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ORIGIN."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Since the origin of the world from Śakti without Puruṣa is
impossible, the doctrine, too, which maintains it as the cause is not
valid.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the author is refuting, incidentally, the erroneous view of
the Śāktas, viz. that Śakti alone is the producer of the world.
The particle 'no' is to be supplied.
Śakti is not the cause of the universe. Why? Because the
origin of the universe from Śakti, without any connection with Puruṣa,
is impossible. The consequence would be that the Śaktis, being
independent of Puruṣa, would come to be perceived everywhere.

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.41, pp. 571 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.37 (written as 2.2.40), p. 128.

[sū. 2. 2. 43.
ADH. 8 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 383
Or else,¹ because the origin of the world is impossible, it being
eternal, Śakti cannot be its cause, there being no proof that the world
is something produced. If it be said that the Veda is the proof—
(we reply:) Let then the cause of the world be Brahman who is
established by the Veda. The doctrine of the causality of Śakti
which is without any basis is to be rejected.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
They take this adhikaraṇa as concerned with the refutation of the
Pañca-rātra system. Thus, according to them this sūtra means:
“On account of the impossibility of origin”. That is, the Pañca-rātra
doctrine holds that Saṃkarṣaṇa (the individual soul) springs from
Vāsudeva (the Highest self), Pradyumna (the mind) from Saṃkarṣaṇa
and Aniruddha (the principle of egoity) from Pradyumna, is not
tenable, for the individual soul, which is eternal, cannot spring from
the Highest soul.²
Rāmānuja
Rāmānuja also takes this adhikaraṇa as dealing with the Pañca-
rātra doctrine, but not refuting, but establishing, it. Accordingly,
he takes this and the next sūtra as laying down the prima facie
view, the rest the correct conclusion. Interpretation like Śaṃkara
and the rest.
SŪTRA 43
“AND THE SENSE-ORGAN OF THE CREATION (IS) NOT (POSSIBLE).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be said, there is a connection (between Śakti and Puruṣa,)—
(we reply.) No “sense-organ” is possible on the part of Puruṣa at
that time.
¹ An alternative explanation of the sūtra.
² Ś.B. 2.2.42, pp. 572 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.38 (written as 2.2.41), p. 128; ŚK. B.
2.2.39, p. 115, Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 44.
384 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 8.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
(If it be argued:) There is a creator helping Śakti; and the fact
that the world is something produced, too, is inferred on the analogy
of what is directly perceived; hence the above objection cannot be
raised,—then (we reply:) No "sense-organ" is possible on the part
of the creator, since there is no sense-organ prior to creation. In its
absence, it is not possible for Puruṣa to be a helper. Moreover, since
there is no similarity of the ether and the rest with pots and so on,
the fact that the former are something produced (like the latter)
is by no means established. The term "and" (in the sūtra) implies
that if there be Puruṣa as the creator, Śakti is no longer the cause.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
Criticism of the Pañca-rātra view continued: "(There can be)
no (origin) of the organ (viz. the mind) from the agent (viz. the
individual soul)" ¹
Rāmānuja
This is sūtra 40 in his commentary. As pointed out above, he
takes this sūtra as laying down a prima facie view against the Pañca-
rātra doctrine. Interpretation like Śaṃkara and others ²
SŪTRA 44
"OR IF THERE BE THE EXISTENCE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SO ON,
THERE IS NO DENIAL OF THAT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If there be the existence of natural intelligence and so on (on the
part of Śakti), what contradiction can there be in its being the cause
of the world? The doctrine of Śakti is set aside by itself through the
admission of Brahman.
¹ Ś.B. 2.2.43, p. 574; Bh. B. 2.2.39 (written as 2.2.43), p. 129, Śk. B. 2.2.40,
p. 116, Parts 7 and 8.
² Śrī. B. 2.2.40, p. 115, Part 2.