वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 2. 17-18.
348 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
SŪTRA 17
"AND BECAUSE OF NON-ACCEPTANCE, (THERE MUST BE AN)
ABSOLUTE DISREGARD (FOR THE ATOMIC THEORY)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because of the rejection of atomism by the wise, "an absolute
disregard" for it is to be shown by those who are desirous of salvation.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Certain portions,—such as the doctrine of a pre-existent cause and
the rest,—of the doctrine of the causality of pradhāna, though rejected
on the ground of its opposition to Scripture and reasoning, has been
accepted by those who are versed in the Veda. But "because of the
non-acceptance", i.e. rejection, by the wise, in toto, of the doctrine
of the causality of the atoms, imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas; because of
its opposition to reasoning; and because of its opposition to the Veda,
"there is an absolute disregard",—i.e. the doctrine of the causality
of atoms is to be disregarded by those who wish for the highest.
Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the
doctrine of the causality of Brahman by the doctrine of the causality
of atoms which is to be rejected from a distance
Here ends the section entitled "The great and the long" (2).
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The
aggregate". (Sūtras 18-27)
SŪTRA 18
"EVEN IF THE AGGREGATE HAVING TWO CAUSES (BE ADMITTED),
(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT (VIZ. OF THE
AGGREGATES)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The author is refuting the view of Sugata.¹
Even if the aggregates of the element and the elemental, the
mind and the mental be admitted, still then, on account of the non-
¹ I.e. of the Buddhists.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 18.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 349
sentience of the objects aggregated, as well as on account of non-
admission of another cause of the aggregation, the aggregates are not
possible
Vedānta-kaustubha
Kapila, the maintainer of the doctrine of pre-existing effects,
holds that pradhāna, not having Brahman for its soul, is the cause
of the world He has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is
opposed to the doctrine of the causality of Brahman and the Vedic
doctrine Kaṇāda, inferior even to him in intelligence and the
maintainer of the doctrine of non-existing effects, holds the cause of
the world to be of various kinds ¹, and hence he has been refuted by
reason of maintaining what is opposed to the ‘great’.² Now, the
doctrine of the Buddhists, inferior to that even, is being refuted, on
account of its similarity to that.³
The doctrine taught by the Buddha being interpreted differently,
four views were propounded by his four classes of disciples. These
followers are called, (1) Vaibhāṣika, (2) Sautrāntika, (3) Yogācāra,
and (4) Mādhyamika. Among these, the first two maintain the
reality of external objects Among them, again, the first maintains
that external objects are directly perceivable. According to him,
external objects, like pots and the rest, are knowable by the evidence
of direct perception. The other maintains that external objects are
inferrible through cognitions. According to him, external objects like
pots and rest, which are not directly perceived, are inferred through
cognitions, produced in the forms of pots and so on and directly
perceived. The third maintains the reality of cognitions alone without
any substratum. He holds that external objects are like dreams.
All of them maintain that the objects admitted by them are momen-
tary. The view of the fourth is that everything is void. He holds
that the continuous stream of cognitions, freed from object and
subject-forms, persists from moment to moment of the basis of past
impressions, like a lamp in a place sheltered from wind. But when
past impressions are destroyed, it attains a complete extinction like
the lamp itself, this attainment of non-existence is salvation. The
others, on the other hand, hold that there is no interruption in the
¹ Viz. the four kinds of atoms. ² Vide Br Sū 2.2 17.
³ The Buddhists too admit the aggregation of atoms like the Vaiśeṣikas.

[sū. 2. 2. 18.
350 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.]
continuous stream of cognitions Among them, the views of the
Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika will be refuted later But in this
section, the views of the realists, viz the Vaibhāṣikas and the
Sautrāntikas, are being refuted together
Thus, they speak of five groups,¹ viz colour, cognition, feeling,
name and impression.² Among these, the colour-group consists in the
four elements, like the earth and the rest, and the elemental in the
form of the body, sense-organs, and sense-objects. Among these, the
earth-atoms, possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch, and hard by
nature, are aggregated into the form of the earth, the water-atoms,
possessed of colour, taste and smell, and viscid by nature, are
aggregated into the form of water; the fire-atoms, possessed of colour
and touch, and hot by nature, are aggregated into the form of fire,
likewise the air-atoms, possessed of touch and mobile by nature, are
aggregated into the form of air; and the four elements, like the earth
and the rest, are aggregated into the form of body, sense-organs and
sense-objects In this way, these four kinds of momentary atoms are
held to be the cause of the aggregation of the elements and the
elemental The colour-group, consisting of the elements and the
elemental and due to the atoms, is the external aggregate. The
cognition-group consists in a stream of cognitions like the cognition
of a pot, cognition of a piece of cloth, and so on, based on the internal
cognition of the 'I', and subsisting uninterruptedly. This alone is
the agent, the enjoyer and the soul, and from it alone all ordinary
practical transactions proceed The feeling-group consists in pleasur-
able or painful experiences. The name-group consists in the cognition
of secondary marks, e.g. (in the cognition.) 'a cow possessed of
auspiciousness', the cow is distinguished by the secondary mark of
auspiciousness. The impression-group consists in the mental qualities
of attachment, aversion, delusion, pride, malice, fear, grief, depression
and so on. These last four kinds of groups are said to be the mind
and the mental. Among these, the cognition-group is said to be the
mind or the soul, others mental; and thus they are internally aggregated
in such a way as to be the substratum of ordinary practical transactions
This is the internal aggregate, due to the four groups, beginning
with the cognition-group. The soul and the ether, other than the
1 Skandha.
2 Rūpa, vyñāna, vedanā, samjñā and samskāra.

[SŪ. 2. 2 19
ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 351
two aggregates, are non-existent by nature. These two aggregates
make the course of mundane existence possible, and practical life
being thus made possible, there is no need, it is thought, of an eternal
soul
(Correct conclusion.) With regard to it we reply: Even if there be
the admission, in the above way, of aggregates, i.e. of groups having
two causes, still then "there is the non-establishment of that",—i e
establishment "of that", viz. of that which has two causes, too, is
indeed impossible. The sense is : because the spontaneous aggregation
of non-sentient objects, mutually independent, is not possible, and
also because of their momentariness, the aggregate of the elements
and the elemental, as well as the aggregate of the mind and the mental,
are not possible. Further, because of the non-admission of a
permanent enjoyer, of a sentient controller—one who brings about the
aggregation, of an omniscient and universal Lord, as well as because
of the consequence of the world becoming super-sensible by reason of
the super-sensibleness of the atoms themselves, the course of mundane
existence must disappear The sense is that this view is faulty,
since it rejects Brahman, taught by the beginningless Veda; since it
admits the aggregates of atoms, unseen and unheard, and since a
cause for the aggregation is impossible
SŪTRA 19
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (ON ACCOUNT OF THE MUTUAL CAUSALITY
(OF NESCIENCE AND THE REST), (THE AGGREGATION) IS POSSIBLE,
(WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF (THEIR) NOT BEING THE CAUSE OF
AGGREGATION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It cannot also be that no account of the mutual causality of
nescience, past impressions, cognition, name and form, six supports ¹
and the rest, the aggregation and the rest, are possible,—for they, too,
are not the causes of aggregation.
¹ Avidyā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, etc. For explanation,
see below V.K.

352 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū 2. 2 19
ADH. 3.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected In spite of the non-admission of a sentient and
omniscient being as bringing about the aggregation, no harm is done,
since our view admits the mutual causality of nescience and the rest
That which goes towards the effect as its cause is 'pratyaya', i e the
cause; the state of that, no account of that,¹ all aggregation and the
rest become possible. Thus, nescience and the rest, functioning
from all eternity, are admitted to be the causes of the continuous
stream of cognitions. Among these, the word 'nescience' is denotative
of error, such as, taking the non-permanent as permanent, taking
what is not the way (to salvation) as the way and so on Through it
past impressions, consisting in attachment and so on to sense-objects
like colour and the like, arises. It is through this that activity springs
forth when occasion arises. Activity consists in good and bad deeds,
in accordance with the declaration by the Buddha 'There is action,
there is result'. Through this alone cognition arises. Thence the
four (elements like) the earth and the rest, the cause of the aggregate,
viz the body, arise, and that very thing is said to be name because
of being the substratum of name From them arises the body, from
it the six supports, viz. the five organs of knowledge and the mind,
from them touch; from it feeling, viz pleasure, pain and the rest;
from it nescience and the rest once more. Thus, the objects revolving
unceasingly like water-wheels, aggregation is possible therefrom.
Hence, everything in our doctrine is indeed consistent,—
(We reply.) "no". Why? "Because of (their) not being the
cause of aggregation," i e. because nescience and the rest are not the
causes of aggregation; for it can by no means be said that nescience,
consisting in the error of taking a person at a distance to be a post, is
the cause of the aggregation of the already existing person. Likewise,
attachment and the rest too, caused by it (viz. nescience), are not the
cause of aggregation.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Baladeva
Reading different, viz. "Itaretara-pratyayatvād iti cen notpatti
mātra-nimittatvāt". Interpretation different accordingly: viz. "If
it be said that because of the mutual causality (of nescience and the
1 This explains the compound "pratyayatvāt".

[sū. 2. 2. 20.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 353
rest), (aggregation is possible), (we reply:) no, because of (their) being
the causes of the origin only (of the immediately subsequent effects,
and not of aggregation)”.¹
Bhāskara
Reading slightly different, viz.: “Itaretara-pratyaya-manyat-
vāt . . . .” ²
—————
SŪTRA 20
“AND BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PRIOR ON THE
PRODUCTION OF THE SUBSEQUENT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
For this reason, too, this doctrine is not reasonable,—since “on
the production of the subsequent”, there results the destruction of the
prior, it being momentary.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued that as the prior is the cause of the production of
the later, so our doctrine is consistent,—(we reply:) no “Because
of the cessation of the prior on the production of the subsequent.”
In ordinary life, causality is observed to belong only to an existent
lump of clay, the prior, at the time of the production of a pot, the
subsequent. But on your view, on account of the momentariness of
all existing objects, the prior moment is destroyed and cannot, there-
fore, be the cause of the subsequent moment. Here a momentary
existence is said to be ‘moment’. Now, to begin with, does the prior
moment of the pot ³ give rise to the subsequent effect which exists
at the same time, or as itself unoriginated, or as itself destroyed ?
The first alternative is not tenable, because that (viz the effect) also
(will give rise to) another effect existing at the same time, that,
too, to another and so on, and thus everything will last only for a
moment simultaneously; and because the conventional distinction
between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. The

¹ S.B. 2.2.19, p. 537; G.B. 2.2.19, pp. 113-114, Chap. 2
² Bh. B. 2.2.19, p. 117.
³ I.e. the prior momentary existence pot.
23

[SŪ 2. 2. 21.
354 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible More-
over, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but
its non-existence, and if it (viz non-existence) be a cause, then by
reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of
everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable
because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of
everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary
existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary
existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned.
SŪTRA 21
"(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE
CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF
THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS-
NESS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non-
existent, there must result the "contradiction of the initial proposi-
tion", viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz.
sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the
admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there
must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior
momentary existence is still present, and thus there must be
"simultaneousness" according to your view, the maintainers of the
doctrine of momentariness!
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author condemns the causeless origin of effects.
If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent
(effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot
be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of
the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the
"contradiction of the initial proposition". Thus, there must be the
"contradiction", i.e abandonment, of your initial proposition that
in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main
cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest, the auxiliary
cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;

[sū. 2. 2. 22.
ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 355
and the supporting cause, viz the sense-objects ¹ Moreover, even if
the causeless origin of effect be admitted, the above-mentioned fault,
viz. the origin of everything everywhere, remains unavoidable. If,
again, to avoid this difficulty, the case be admitted to be "otherwise",
i e if it be admitted that the effect originates when the cause is existent,
then there must be "simultaneousness", i e. there must be simulta-
neous existence of the cause and the effect. That is, the above-
mentioned objection remains in force. Thus, does the prior momentary
existence pot come to be the cause of another momentary existence
pot at the time when it (the prior) itself exists, or does it become the
cause of the subsequent moment,—which is being generated,—by
lasting till the time of its production ? In either case, there is simul-
taneousness. On the first alternative, all the momentary existences
will come to be perceived at the same time, and the conventional
distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end.
On the second alternative, their momentariness will be abolished,
and owing to the persistence of two momentary existences, there
must follow a simultaneous perception of two momentary existences
in the same place.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
The meaning of the phrase "pratijñoparodhaḥ" different, viz.
contradiction of the initial proposition (viz. that the world originates
from the skandhas) ²
——————
SŪTRA 22
"(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSCIOUS AND
UNCONSCIOUS DESTRUCTION ³ ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-INTERRUP-
TION (OF THE STREAM OF COGNITIONS) "
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction,⁴
because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous
series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series.
————————————————————————————————————————————
¹ Adhipati, sahakārin, samanantara, ālambana.
² G.B. 2.2.21, pp 115-16, Chap 2.
³ Prati-saṁkhyā and aprati-saṁkhyā.
⁴ For explanation, see below V.K.

356 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 22.
ADH. 3.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents,
has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted
by them, is being disposed of
The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is
"conscious destruction"; destruction not so preceded is "unconscious
destruction". These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them.
Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by
the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination
of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable
and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruc-
tion of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless
and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every
moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is
the "non-establishment", i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of
destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members
of the series. Why? "On account of the non-interruption of the
series." First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus,
it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment
of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is
admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it
of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent
indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the
series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and
the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of
the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being
possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the
case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction
are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed
existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series
is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times—
this is the sense.
Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the
series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction
of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the percep-
tion of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also
that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every
moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the

[sū. 2. 2. 23.
ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 357
above objection cannot be raised,—for then such a destruction being
possible on the part of the last member of the series, a causal destruction
becomes meaningless. It cannot be said also that there is the origin
of a series of dissimilar momentary existences through (the blow of) a
hammer and the rest too, and as such the above objection cannot be
raised,—because when the prior member is destroyed by a hammer
and so on, too, there resulting the origin of a subsequent one, similar
to it, by reason of the absence of contrary circumstances, there is no
possibility for a series of dissimilar existences; and because of the
absence of any reason for the origination of a series of dissimilar
existences.
A causeless destruction of the series, too, is not possible, for then
the disappearance of the entire universe will result
In the same manner, these two (viz. the causeless and causal
destructions) are not possible with regard to the single members of the
series,—for if here the causeless destruction of particular members
be admitted, then the destruction once more of the momentary
members by the hammer and the rest will be impossible. A causeless
destruction, too, cannot become the annihilator of existent objects,
since single members of the series, like pots and the rest, are recognized ¹
COMPARISON
Bhāskara
Reading different, viz "asambhavāḥ" in place of "avicchedāt".²
SŪTRA 23
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because the series has no existence beyond the single members
of the series, and because single members themselves are momentary,
¹ I.e. there can be no complete destruction of that which is, e.g. when
a vessel of clay is smashed to pieces, we still perceive and recognize the material,
viz. clay, which continues to exist.
² Bh. B. 2.2.22, p. 120.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 23
358 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.]
their view, viz. that salvation is the cessation of nescience, too, is
inconsistent
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also, the Buddhistic view is inconsistent. Why?
Because there is "fault" in their view of salvation even "in both
ways". Thus, salvation is held by them to be the cessation of nescience
and the rest Is this (a cessation) of the series or of the single members
of the series? Not the first, because as the series has no existence
beyond the single members, it (viz the cessation of the series) is
incapable of (bringing about) salvation. Not the second, because the
single members are momentary
Moreover, is salvation, consisting in the cessation of nescience
and the rest, due to a cause or not? If the first, i.e. on the view :
Salvation arises from the repeated practice of four-fold truths, viz
the truth that there is a cause, the truth that there is cessation, the
truth that there is suffering and the truth that there is a path ¹ The
truth that there is a cause means the knowledge, i e. ascertainment,
that everything has an origin. The truth that there is cessation means
that everything is momentary. The truth that there is suffering
means that everything is full of suffering. The truth that there is a
path means that everything is void, everything is soulless,--on this
view, the cessation of attachment and the rest being admitted to arise
from these, the initial proposition, viz that there is a causeless destruc-
tion, is set aside. If the second, the teaching of the means will become
futile. And thus there is fault in both the ways
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja
This is sūtra 22 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz.. "Because there is fault in both ways", i.e. the Buddhistic views
of origination from nothing and passing away into nothing are both
open to objections.²
Bhāskara
This sūtra is not found in the commentary of Bhāskara

¹ Samudāya, nirodha, duḥkha, mārga.
² Śrī. B. 2.2.22, p. 93.

[sū. 2. 2. 24.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 359
Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 22 in his commentary too His interpretation is also
very similar to that of Rāmānuja, viz on the Buddhist view, the
originated effect is unreal, (since it passes away as soon as it arises);
also the effect arises from non-existent cause (since the cause which is
momentary is no more, when the effect comes to be) Hence the
Buddhist view is untenable ¹
SŪTRA 24
“AND IN THE ETHER TOO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And the initial proposition enunciated by them was that there
is non-existence “in the ether”; ² and this is not reasonable, “on
account of (its) non-distinction” from the earth and the rest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
They maintain that the destruction of existing objects which is
preceded by an act of thought, the destruction which is not preceded
by an act of thought, and the ether,—these three are non-entities,
and as such, non-definable, causeless and unreal. Among these, the
two kinds of destruction have been disposed of Incidentally, salva-
tion, consisting in the cessation of nescience, has been condemned.
Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms, maintaining the demon-
strated conclusion of Scripture, is condemning the (doctrine of) the
non-definableness of the ether, the remaining one.
The initial proposition of the non-substantiality of the ether is
not reasonable, “on account of the non-distinction” of the ether,
in point of substantiality, from the earth and the rest,—and just as
terrestrial animals move on the earth, and the acquatic animals in
water, so do the flying animals in the sky,—and also on account
of the scriptural declaration of the producibleness of the ether, like
other positive entities,—this is indicated by the particle “and” (in
the sūtra),—in the passage: “From him arise the vital-breath, the
¹ ŚK. B. 2 2.22, p. 86, Parts 7 and 8.
² I.e. the ether is a non-entity.

[SŪ. 2 2. 25-26.
360 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3]
mind, and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, the light, water and
the earth, the supporter of all” (Muṇḍ. 2.1 3) The substantiality of the
ether was approved by the Buddha as well, who said out of compassion:
‘As long as there is the existence of the ether, and as long as there
is the existence of the world, so long may there be the existence of
me, the destroyer of the sufferings of the world’.
COMPARISON
Bhāskara
This is sūtra 23 in Bhāskara ¹ Interpretation of the word
“aviśeṣāt” different; viz. “from the same (scriptural text, viz. Tait.
2 1)” it is known that the ether like the air and the rest, arises from
the soul.²
SŪTRA 25
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And on account of the recognition, viz ‘This is that’, this doctrine
is untrue.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this too the doctrine of momentariness is not reasonable.
Why? “On account of remembrance”, i.e on account of the remem-
brance of an entity, perceived by one. Hence an eternal soul, the
experiencer, must of necessity be acknowledged, otherwise the cessation
of all practical activities will result.
——————
SŪTRA 26
“(THERE CAN BE NO ORIGINATION) FROM THE NON-EXISTENT,
BECAUSE OF NON-OBSERVATION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
An entity does not arise from a non-entity, “on account of non-
observation”.
¹ Written as sūtra 2.2.24 in conformity with Śaṃkara’s number.
² Bh. B. 2.2.23, p. 121.

[sū. 2. 2. 27.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 361
Vedānta-kaustubha
It is assumed by the Buddhists that there is the origin of an
entity from a non-entity. This is not reasonable. Why? Because
the origin of pots and the rest from non-existent clay, etc is never
observed,—on the contrary, their origin from existent clay and the
rest alone is observed.
COMPARISON
Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 25 in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. He begins a
new adhikarana here, ending with the next sūtra, concerned with the
refutation of the Sautrāntika school of the realist Buddhists.
According to him, the preceding sūtras are concerned with the
refutation of the Vaibhāṣika school only But Nimbārka refutes
these two schools together.
Baladeva also takes this sūtra as concerned specially with the
refutation of the Sautrāntika school, though he does not begin a new
adhikarana since he takes the next sūtra to be referring to both the
schools equally.
They interpret the sūtra in the same manner, viz. ("There is no
origin of things from) the non-existent, on account of non-perception".
That is, the Sautrāntika view that an object is inferred from the
impressions left on our mind by it is absurd, for a momentary, and as
such a non-existent, something cannot produce any impressions.¹
SŪTRA 27
"AND THUS (THERE WILL BE) ACCOMPLISHMENT ON THE PART OF
THE INACTIVE AS WELL."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Otherwise, there may be the "accomplishment" of ends like
knowledge and the rest on the part of one who has not resorted to
any means.
¹ ŚK. B. 2.2.25, p. 92, Parts 7 and 8, G.B. 2.2.26. p. 122, Chap. 2.

362 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 2. 28.
ADH. 4.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Moreover, just as it is admitted by you that there is the origin
of entity from non-entity, so there will result the "accomplishment"
of the desired-for effects, through the mere non-existence of implements,
even "on the part of the inactive", i.e. on the part of those who have
discarded the implements leading to their desired ends. But there is
never any attainment of knowledge and the rest by one who is inactive,
and a perpetual religious student, leading a life of chastity ¹ and
unmarried, never gets a son. Hence, it is established that the
demonstrated conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the views
of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, based on a mere semblance
of (and not real) reason
Here ends the section entitled "The aggregate" (3).
Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Percep-
tion". (Sūtras 28-31)
SŪTRA 28
“(THERE IS) NO NON-EXISTENCE (OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS), ON
ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is "no non-existence" of external objects as held by the
maintainers of the reality of consciousness alone; but they are, indeed,
existent. Why? "On account of perception"
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the view of the Yogācāra is being disposed of.
The Yogācāra Buddhist, the maintainer of the reality of
consciousness alone, holds that those objects which are other than
consciousness are all non-existent. Thus, to think that manifold
external objects exist is an error. There are only manifold cognitions
which are momentary, variegated, perceptible and have definite forms.
Only cognitions like 'blue', 'yellow', which have definite forms, are
revealed (directly to the mind). It must be admitted certainly even
by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that the cognitions
arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects
¹ Naiṣṭhika.

[sū. 2. 2. 28.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 363
have forms of those objects respectively If this be so, then all
practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what
is the use of imagining external objects ? It (viz a cognition) being
self-manifesting like a lamp, is directly perceived If what is non-
perceived be cognized, then there will be non-distinction between one’s
own cognitions and the cognitions of others But there is indeed
a distinction (between them). A man acts or refrains from acting on
the basis of his own cognitions. This has been declared by Viprabhikṣu
as well thus: 'There is no understanding of the meaning of what is
non-perceived The cognitive self, though non-divided, is yet looked
upon by men of perverted understanding to be possessed of the
differences of object perceived, the perceiver and consciousness'.
Thus, the object-form is the object to be known, the perceiver-form is
the act of knowledge, and his consciousness is the result, and thus
these three are imagined in one and the same process of consciousness
Hence there are no external objects
For this reason also (there are no external objects—viz.). On
account of being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference
between 'blue' and its cognition. Whenever there is the cognition of
blue, blue, too, is cognized at the very same moment Hence, there is
no difference between these two
For this reason, too, (there are no external objects, viz ) : The
cognitions in our waking state are devoid of (i.e. do not correspond to)
external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-
cognitions and the rest
If it be asked: How can there be a variety of cognitions in the
absence of external objects ? We reply: owing to the variety of the
past impressions The variety (of cognitions) is explicable by reason
of the fact that the cognitions and the past impressions stand in the
relation of mutual causes and effects, like the seed and the shoot.
(Correct conclusion ) On this suggestion, we reply The non-
existence of external objects is not possible. Why ? “On account of
perception,” i e. because of the direct perception of external objects,
other than cognitions. Although the individual soul, having the
stated marks, is eternal knowledge by nature and its attribute of
knowledge, too, is indeed eternal like the ray of the sun, yet since
it has its knowledge veiled by nescience due to the beginningless māyā,¹
1 I e. prakṛti or matter.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 29.
364 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4 ]
it errs in cognizing objects in birth after birth, as well as in one birth
even. And it knows once more the sun and the rest, installed by the
Highest Self, as well as the objects collected by its father and fore-
fathers, which are all already existent, from the surrounding company
of people. The sense is that, hence, there is no non-existence of the
objects which are different from knowledge, the sun and the moon,
fire, mountain, the earth, water, cow, horse and the rest being
established on the ground of direct perception.
The argument,—viz. It is to be admitted certainly even by
the maintainers of the reality of external objects that cognitions
arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects
have the forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all
practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what
is the use of imagining external objects?—is not tenable, since in the
absence of objects, the cognitions of the objects cannot have forms
similar to them. Thus, an external object is other than knowledge
and its knowledge is other than it.
The argument—viz. that owing to their being uniformly perceived
together, there is no difference between blue and its perception,—too,
is not tenable, for there is an admission of difference through this
very admission of a simultaneous perception.¹
SŪTRA 29
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF DISSIMILARITY, (THE WAKING COGNITIONS
ARE) NOT LIKE DREAMS AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state cannot be
established on the analogy of the dream-cognitions and the rest, on
account of there being no parallelism between the two cases; as well
as on account of dream-consciousness too, having a basis.
1 That is, to say that A and B are perceived together is to say that there
is a difference between them. Otherwise there is no sense in saying that A and
B are perceived together.

[sū. 2. 2. 30.
ADH. 4 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 365
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the argument, viz. The cognitions in the waking state do not
correspond to external objects, because they are mere cognitions,
like the dream-cognitions and the rest, we reply.
It cannot be said that the cognitions in the waking state are
without a basis "like dreams and the rest", i.e. like the dream-
cognitions and the illusory cognitions. Why? "On account of
dissimilarity," i. e. because there is dissimilarity between the cognitions
in the waking state and the dream-cognitions, as the former are due
to attentive sense-organs, while the latter to inattentive sense-organs;
also because—as indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra)—
even the dream-cognitions have bases.
—————
SŪTRA 30
"THE EXISTENCE (OF PAST IMPRESSIONS) NOT (POSSIBLE), ON
ACCOUNT OF NON-PERCEPTION"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Moreover, the "existence" of past impressions is admitted by
you in order that there may be variety in knowledge; this is not
possible, since according to your view, external objects are not
perceived.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Moreover, if knowledge be without a basis, then its varieties,
such as the knowledge of a pot, the knowledge of blue, the knowledge
of yellow and so on, are not possible. If it be said that past impressions
are the cause of the variety of knowledge,—(we reply). "the existence"
of past impressions is not possible on your view. Why? "On account
of non-perception", i.e. because of the non-perception of the cause of
past impressions, or, because no such cause is possible on your view.
The direct perception of external objects is the cause of past
impressions, and that is not possible in your case, owing to your
non-admission of external objects

366 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 31.
ADH. 4.]
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation slightly
different, viz. “The existence (of cognition devoid of corresponding
things) is not (possible), because of non-perception”.¹
SŪTRA 31
“ON ACCOUNT OF MOMENTARINESS ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is no existence of past impressions, “on account of the
momentariness” of their substratum on your view.
Vedanta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, the existence of past impressions is not
possible. Why? “On account of the momentariness” of their sub-
stratum, the receptacle-consciousness,² viz. the ‘I’, as well as of the
single members of the uninterrupted series. Hence, the variety of
knowledge is due to the variety of objects. Therefore, it is established
that the settled conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the
Yogācāra view which is but a childish prattle.
Here ends the section entitled “Perception” (4)
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Baladeva
They add a “ca” at the end ³
1 Śrī. B. 2.2.29, p. 102, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.29, pp. 97-98, Parts 7 and 8.
2 Ālaya-vijñāna. The Vijñāna-skandha consists of vijñānas or cognitions
of two kinds, ālaya-vijñāna and pravṛtti-vijñāna. The former consists of cogni-
tions which refer to the ‘I’, the ego, while the latter those that refer to the so-
called external objects.
3 Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 557, G.B. 2.2.31.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 32.
ADH 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 367
Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
This sūtra is not found in their commentaries
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Incon-
sistency in every way". (Sūtra 32)
SŪTRA 32
“AND BECAUSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY (OF THE DOCTRINE OF A
UNIVERSAL VOID) IN EVERY WAY.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The doctrine of void, too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent
“in every way”, being opposed to the evidence of direct perception
and the rest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now the doctrine of universal void, as held by the Mādhyamikas,
is being disposed of
(The view is as follows·) All the objects mentioned in the sacred
works composed by the omniscient one (viz the Buddha), are simply
for the sake of suiting the intellectual capacities of his disciples, but
are not really existent, owing to the impossibility of the origin and
destruction (of things). The origin of entity from non-entity is
inappropriate (And if an entity arises from another entity, the
question is.) Is the entity which arises from another entity dissimilar
to the latter or similar ? If the first, then there will be the origin of
everything everywhere. If the second, then fruitlessness would result
like the grinding of what has already been ground ¹ Owing to such
inexplicability of origin, destruction, too, is inexplicable Hence, the
doctrine of void is to be accepted. Thus, salvation consists in attaining
a state of void,—such is the view of the Buddha. And this is perfectly
reasonable, since void is not proved by anything else, (but is self-
proved). The conventional distinctions of perceiver and the object
perceived and so on are mere errors.
1 I e. on the first alternative a gold ring may arise from clay; on the second,
there is no sense in producing something already existent, gold (ring) from gold.