वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)
SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)
Adhikarana 1: The section entitled "the im-
possibility of arrangement". (Sūtras 1–10)
SŪTRA 1
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT
ALSO, NOT THE INFERENCE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Pradhāna, knowable through inference ¹ is not the cause of the
world. Why? "On account also of the impossibility" of a varied
"arrangement" from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the
objects to be created.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, with a view to inducing those who desire for salvation to
the hearing, thinking and the like of the nature, attributes and the
rest of the Supreme Person, it has been firmly established above by
the reverend author of the aphorisms that Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest
Person, omnipotent, the Lord of all, and the Supreme Person, is the
cause of the origin and the rest of the world; and that the views of the
opponents arise not supported by Scripture has been shown under
the aphorism: "Because (the creator of the world) sees, (pradhāna is)
not (the creator), (it is) non-scriptural" (Br. Sū. 1.1.5). Now, with a
view to establishing the acceptability of the conclusion of the Vedān-
tins, the reverend author of the aphorisms is exposing, in this section,
the fallaciousness of the arguments put forward by the opponents.
It is not to be said that those who desire for release being benefitted
through a mere exposition of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, what
is the use of villifying the views of the opponents? Since just as
when a man, giving up the most beneficial food, is about to take
injurious poison and the like, people try to induce him to food and to
1 See footnote 1, p. 42 of the book.

326 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 1.
ADH. 1.]
dissuade him from poison, etc. by pointing out the unwholesomeness of
the latter, so the villification of the view of the opponents is justifiable
for the purpose of preventing people from accepting the views which
are opposed to the Veda, and for inducing those desiring for emanci-
pation to our own view.
Now, the Sāṃkhyas, discarding the Highest Person, omnipotent
and omniscient, as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world,
hold prakṛti, devoid of any connection with Him, non-sentient and
the equilibrium of the three guṇas, to be the cause of the world. This
has been said in the treatise treating of the sixty (categories) ¹:
"The primary prakṛti (i.e. matter) is not an effect. There are seven,
beginning with mahat, which are (both) causes and effects There are
sixteen which are effects (only). ‘Puruṣa (i e. soul) is neither a cause,
nor an effect’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 3 ²). They state the five reasons for the
existence of prakṛti thus: The cause is pradhāna, ‘(1) on account of
the transformation of the divisions ³; (2) on account of concordance ⁴;
(3) on account of the activity preceding from power ⁵; (4) on account
of the distinction between the cause and the effect ⁶; (5) on account
of the non-distinction of what is possessed of all form’ (Sāṃ. Kā.
15 ⁷). The word ‘Vaiśva-rūpa’ means the same as ‘Viśva-rūpa’ or
what is possessed of all forms, i.e. the universe of varied configurations.
Whatever is limited is due to a common cause, like pots and the rest.

¹ Peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas. ² P. 4.
³ I.e. on account of the limitedness (pariṇāma) of the effects (bheda) like
mahat and the rest. Thus: Whatever is limited has a cause, like the pot.
The effects are limited.
∴ they have a cause, viz. pradhāna.
I.e. all the effects possess the common qualities of pleasure (sattva), pain
(rajas) and delusion (tamas). Hence they must have a common cause which
possesses all these qualities, viz. pradhāna.
⁴ I.e. the cause can give rise to the effect only if it has the requisite power.
Now pradhāna alone has the power to give rise to mahat and the rest.
⁵ The difference of the effect from the cause proves the existence of the
cause Thus, the difference of the pot from a lump of clay, viz. the first can
fetch water, the second not—proves that the pot has clay for its common cause.
Similarly, from the mahat and the rest we argue to pradhāna, different from them
⁶ I.e. the whole universe merges in a common cause during dissolution,
and such a cause is pradhāna. Vide Candrikā-vyākhyā of Sāṃ. Kā., pp. 18-19;
also Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya on same, pp. 13-14.
⁷ P. 18.

[sū. 2. 2. 1.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 327
Similarly, a mahat and ahaṁkāra, the five pure essences, the eleven
sense-organs, and the five great elements which are limited are 'divi-
sions'; they are due to one cause which is unlimited in space and time
and the common substratum of three guṇas.¹ Whatever is observed
to be connected with something else, is due to that one cause; as
dishes and the rest, connected with the clay, are due to it. Similarly,
the external and internal divisions, connected with pleasures (sattva),
pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas) should properly be due to a common
cause consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion.² Similarly, just as
there is the origin of pots and the like from the power of the cause,
so the origin of the effects like mahat and the rest, too, must be held
to be due to the power of the cause. This being so, the cause, possessed
of such a power, is pradhāna.³ Moreover, it is observed that there
is a distinction between the effects, like ear-rings and the rest, and
the cause, similar to them, such as gold and the rest, as well as a non-
distinction Similarly, there is both distinction and non-distinction
on the part of the manifold universe. Through these two, a cause,
viz. the unmanifest which is the substratum of all beings and consists
of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, is inferred.⁴
On this suggestion, the author replies: "The inference", i.e.
what is inferred, viz. pradhāna, not having Brahman as its common
cause, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the
impossibility of arrangement," i.e. because it is impossible that the
arrangement of the world,—variegated by the aggregate of manifold
objects of enjoyment, conforming to the diverse works of the souls,—
can arise from pradhāna, not having Brahman for its cause, an object
of inference, non-sentient and devoid of any knowledge of the ob-
jects to be created; as we see in ordinary life that the arrangement
of manifold and variegated palaces, chariots, ornaments and the rest
is due to one who is possessed of the knowledge of the objects to be
created.
The particle "and" (in the sūtra) indicates that the reasons,
intended for proving the existence of pradhāna, can very well be set
aside by valid opposite arguments, since the following inference
¹ This explains the first reason.
² This explains the second reason.
³ This explains the third reason.
⁴ This explains the fourth and the fifth reasons.

[sū. 2. 2. 2.
328 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
establishes the non-validity of the object established (by the Sāṁkhya,
viz. pradhāna):—
Pradhāna as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and not having Brah-
man for its soul, is non-existent;
because it is not perceived.
Whatever is this (i.e. not perceived) is that (i.e. non-existent);
like the sky-flower
Whatever is not this (i.e. not non-perceived) is not that (i.e.
not non-existent);
like the sun.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They take this and the next sūtra as one sūtra.
SŪTRA 2
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITY ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity
(on its part), not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna).
Vedānta-kaustubha
The phrase beginning with ‘on account of impossibility’ is to
be supplied here. And because activity,—viz. spontaneous falling
away from the state of the equilibrium of the three guṇas,—is
impossible on the part of pradhāna which is non-sentient and an
object of inference. Thus, pradhāna, knowable through inference,
is not the cause of the world, since it is observed in ordinary life that
non-sentient objects like chariots and the rest, are moved to action
only when superintended by conscious beings.

[sū. 2. 2. 3.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 329
SŪTRA 3
"AND IF IT BE ARGUED THAT (PRADHĀNA ACTS SPONTANEOUSLY)
LIKE MILK AND WATER, (WE REPLY.) THERE TOO (LORD IS THE
INCITER)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be argued that like milk, etc pradhāna acts for the origin
and the rest of the world by itself, (we reply ) that "there too"
the Supreme Being is the inciter is learnt from the scriptural text:
"Who abiding within water" (Bṛh 3.7.4 ¹)
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: How can it be said that on account of the im-
possibility of spontaneous activity on its part the non-sentient pra-
dhāna is not the cause of the world? Just as milk, though non-
sentient, is by itself transformed into the form of sour milk, and flows
spontaneously for the nourishment of the calf, and just as water
discharged from the cloud is transformed into the form of various
saps of the earth, as well as into the forms of ice, bubble and the rest,
and pours down spontaneously for the growth of plants and the rest,
as well as flows on, so exactly pradhāna too, independent of a sen-
tient being, having entered into a state of mutual inequality of the
guṇas, is transformed into many forms,—
We reply: "There too". That is, in the case of milk and the
rest too, no activity is possible independently of a sentient being.
On the contrary, milk and the rest attain the form of sour milk and
so on only when superintended by a sentient being. It is the cow
herself, fond of her calf, that makes the milk flow out of filial affection,
and being liquid the milk oozes out. If it be argued that even when
the calf is dead, the presence of the milk is observed, and hence to say
that it is the cow that makes the milk flow out of filial affection does
not stand to reason,—(we reply.) there is the flow of the milk then by
reason of her remembrance of the calf, or else it is explicable on the
ground of her love for her master.²
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ Ś, R, Bh.
² I.e. the cow gives milk even when the calf is dead because she still remem-
bers the calf, or because she loves her master and wants to be of benefit to him.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 4.
330 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
Water, too, comes to have the form of ice, bubble and the rest
only when superintended by a conscious being; appears to be of the
form of various saps through its contact with the earth; and flows on
as dependent on a low ground ¹ and on account of being liquid. Every-
thing being superintended by a sentient being, the above examples
all fit in, in accordance with the scriptural texts. 'Who abiding within
water' (Bṛh 3.7.4), '"At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī,
some rivers flow to the east"' (Brh. 3.8 9) and so on. Hence the in-
ference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world
SŪTRA 4
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE (AC-
CESSORY), (PRADHĀNA IS NOT THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-
DEPENDENCE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Pradhāna, not superintended by an intelligent principle, is not
the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the non-existence"
of an accessory other than it, since according to you it does not de-
pend on anything else.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, the cause of the world is not the inference
(i.e. the inferrible pradhāna). Why? "On account of the non-
existence of what is different" That is, if pradhāna,—which is not
superintended by an intelligent principle, but is independent, non-
sentient and an object of inference,—be the cause of the world, there
will be activity on its part at all times, and this being so, there would
not be, at any time, what is different from activity, i.e. inactivity on
its part.²
Or (an alternative explanation), the sense is: On account of the
absence of an object to be instigated or of an instigator other than
pradhāna. The reason for this, again, is: "on account of non-depen-
dence", i.e. according to your view, as the creator of the world,
1 I.e. the flowing of the water depends on its being on a sloping ground
2 I.e. there would be eternal creation and no dissolution.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 5.
ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 331
pradhāna does not depend on an accessory. It cannot be said also
that the variegated works are the instigator of pradhāna,—because
works will then become the cause of the world, because the inde-
pendence of pradhāna in creating the world will be set aside, and, finally,
because this is impossible. Works, on the other hand, are not able
to give even fruits like merit or demerit, pleasure or pain; their agent,
too, does not obtain the fruit by himself. Hence, how can those works,
performed by the individual souls who are vitiated by their contact
with prakṛti or matter, be able to instigate pradhāna? The fact is that
the works bear fruits through the wish of the Lord, and thus their
agent obtains fruits, as declared by the Lord Himself: '"Pleasure,
pain, existence, non-existence, fear and absence of fear, non-violence,
equanimity, contentment, penance, charity, fame and absence of
fame,—the various states of beings arise from me alone"' (Gītā 10.
4a-5b). It is not to be said that pradhāna acts through its proximity
to puruṣa,—for its proximity to puruṣa being eternal, its activity, too,
must be eternal. This will be made clear in details under the
aphorism: "As in the case of a man and stone" (Br. Sū. 2.2.7)
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 3 in their commentaries. Their explanation is
similar to the first explanation given by Śrīnivāsa, viz.: "Because
of the non-existence of what is different (from creation, viz. dis-
solution), on account of (its) non-dependence (to anything else),
(pradhāna is not the cause of the world)".¹
SŪTRA 5
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE ELSEWHERE, NOT LIKE
GRASS AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Since there is no transformation of the grass and the rest, eaten
by an ox, into the form of milk, it cannot be said that just as the grass
¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.3, p. 74, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.3, pp. 57-58, Parts 7 and 8

332 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 6
ADH. 1.]
and the rest, eaten by cows, etc. become milk by themselves, so the
unmanifest, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected Just as grass, water, etc. are transformed into
the form of milk, so the unmanifest is transformed into the form of
mahat and the rest, independently indeed of another efficient cause,
—the author replies: “No”. This cannot be said Why? “On ac-
count of the non-existence elsewhere,” i.e. because “elsewhere”, or
in the case of oxen and the rest, other than that of cows, etc. there
is no transformation of the grass, water and so on, eaten by them,
into the form of milk The particle “and” implies that since the
transformation of the grass, etc , eaten by cows, into the form of milk
is admitted to be due to an intelligent principle, likewise pradhāna, too,
is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest as superintended
by an intelligent principle alone, and not by itself.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They change the order of the sūtras 5–9 which will be noticed at
the end of sūtra 9. Interpretation same
SŪTRA 6
“EVEN IF THERE BE THE ADMISSION (OF ACTIVITY ON THE PART
OF PRADHĀNA, STILL THEN IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT
OF THE ABSENCE OF A PURPOSE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“Even if there be the admission” of activity on the part of
pradhāna somehow or other, still pradhāna cannot be the cause,
since a purpose for such an activity is impossible on its part, it
being non-sentient.
Vedānta-kaustubha
It has been said under the aphorism: “And on account of acti-
vity” (Br. Sū. 2 2.2) that pradhāna has no power of independent
activity, and hence is not the cause of the world. Now the author

[sū. 2. 2. 7.
ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 333
points out here that "even if there be the admission of activity on
its part per force ¹, still then pradhāna is not capable of being the cause.
Why? "On account of the absence of a purpose," that is, because
there is no purpose for the creation of the world, seeing that the souls,
merged in their own bliss, prior to creation, have no regard for en-
joyment or emancipation, while pradhāna, being non-sentient, is
not capable of having enjoyment and the rest. It cannot be said:
What purpose can the Highest Person, who has all His desires ful-
filled, have in creating the world?—since that has already been pointed
out under the aphorism. "But as in ordinary life, a mere sport"
(Br. Sū. 2 1.32).
Or (an alternative explanation of the phrase: "arthābhāvāt")
the sense is On account of the absurdity of the statement, made per
force (and not on the ground of reason), viz. 'Pradhāna acts by itself',
just like the statement 'The ether is running'.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They change the order of sūtras, which will be noticed at the end
of sūtra 9.
SŪTRA 7
"IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF A MAN AND STONE,
(WE REPLY:) THEN ALSO."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be argued that just as a blind man makes a lame man move,
or the stone (i.e. the magnet) the iron, so does puruṣa move pradhāna,
---(we reply:) in that case, the assumption of the non-activity (of
puruṣa) will be contradicted, and pradhāna being something to be
instigated by another will cease to be the primary cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: just as a lame man,—who has the power of vision,
but is devoid of the power of motion,—lost accidentally from his caravan
¹ I.e. somehow or other.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 7.
334 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
and wishing to go to a desired place, on finding a blind man,—who has
the power of motion, but is devoid of the power of vision,—makes
him move by mounting on him; and just as the magnet makes the iron
move, so exactly, though devoid of the power of action, the soul,
possessed of the power of vision, makes pradhāna, devoid of the power
of vision, move by its mere proximity. Hence, in spite of the non-
sentience of pradhāna, the activities of creation and the rest, are possible
on its part,—the answer is : "Then also", i. e. even on the ground of such
examples, no activity is possible on the part of the object exemplified,
viz. pradhāna. Thus, if puruṣa be admitted to be the mover of
pradhāna, then the initial proposition, viz. that puruṣa is not an
agent, will come to be contradicted. If pradhāna be an object to
be moved by puruṣa, then the initial proposition, viz. that pradhāna
is by itself the cause of the world, will come to be contradicted.
Although the power of motion is not manifest in a lame man, he being
without legs, yet he directs the man, who has the power of motion,
by means of speech. And the so-directed man, though not having the
power of vision manifest because of his blindness, yet being a sentient
being, moves in accordance with his (viz. the lame man's) words.
The stone (viz. the magnet), on the other hand, moves the iron
(only) when brought into connection with it by a man, and the iron
does not move by nature. Moreover, it has been said under the
aphorism: "If it be argued: like milk and water, there too" (Br.
Sū. 2.2.3), that everywhere and at all times the Omnipotent and
Omniscient Being abides as the mover of all. Further, the proximity
of puruṣa and prakṛti being eternal, there was no absence of such a
proximity before. Hence the order of creation and dissolution, as well
as the respective difference between bondage and release,—due to
the proximity of prakṛti and puruṣa—, are not possible; and there
must result eternal activity and absence of dissolution. In the case
in hand, on the contrary, there is no defect whatsoever, since it has
been said that: "And that (divinity) is endowed with all (powers)"
(Br. Sū. 2.1.29).

[SŪ. 2. 2. 8.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 335
SŪTRA 8
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING PREPON-
DERANT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As it is impossible for the guṇas, which are in a state of equi-
librium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual
subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i e. the infer-
rible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna)
is not the cause of the world Why? “On account of the impossi-
bility of being preponderant.” Thus, is pradhāna,—consisting of the
three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, not regulated by an intelligent
principle and established by inference as admitted by you,—trans-
formed into the form of the world by means of entering into a state of
mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas), or inde-
pendently of any such state? If the first, then the preponderance of
one among (these three guṇas) sattva, rajas and tamas, which are
in a state of equilibrium prior to creation and are mutually inde-
pendent, being impossible, it is not possible for pradhāna to be the
cause of the world. If the second, then pradhāna, consisting of the
three guṇas in a state of equilibrium and immutable, is not trans-
formed into the form of the world all the more,—there being no state
of inequality consisting in a mutual subordination and preponder-
ance (of the guṇas).
It cannot be said also that at the time of creation there is a lapse
from the state of equilibrium and the guṇas entering into a state of
mutual subordination and preponderance, thereby the world arises,—
for this leads to the horns of a dilemma. Thus, is it admitted by you
that the lapse from the state of equilibrium, at that time, is sponta-
neous; or that it is due to the Omniscient Being? The first alter-
native is not valid because of the impossibility of a spontaneous lapse
without a cause, and also because of the following inference:
Whatever has a cause has lapse,
like seeds and the rest.
Whatever has no cause has no lapse,
like the soul.

336 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 9.
ADH. 1.]
The second alternative, too, is not valid, because that is not
admitted and because that will be falling in with the view of your
opponents
—————
SŪTRA 9
“AND IF THERE BE AN INFERENCE IN ANOTHER WAY, (PRADHĀNA
CANNOT STILL BE THE CAUSE) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF
THE POWER OF BEING A KNOWER.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“And if there be an inference” with regard to pradhāna “in
another way”, still then “on account of the absence of the power of
being a knower” on the part of pradhāna, the world is not due to it.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Just as there may be the origin of effects, preceded by (pradhāna’s)
entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance
in a way other than the stated, so if an inference be made with regard
to pradhāna, still then “on account of the absence of the power of
being a knower”, i.e on account of pradhāna being devoid of the power
of being a knower, the objections, viz. impossibility of arrangement
and the rest, mentioned above, must remain in force. Hence the
inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
Interpretation same, but they read sūtras 5–9 in a different order.
Thus:—
Nimbārka, etc. Rāmānuja, etc.
“Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . .” (Sū. 5). “Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . .”
(Sū. 4).
“Abhyupagame . .” (Sū. 6). “Puruṣāśmavat . .” (Sū. 5)
“Puruṣāśmavat . .” (Sū. 7). “Aṅgitva . .” (Sū. 6).
“Aṅgitva . .” (Sū. 8). “Anyathānumitau . .” (Sū. 7)
“Anyathānumitau . .” (Sū. 9). “Abhyupagame . .” (Sū. 8).

[sū. 2. 2. 10.
ADH. 1 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 337
SŪTRA 10
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION, (THE SĀṂKHYA DOCTRINE
IS) INCONSISTENT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The view of Kapila is "inconsistent", because of the opposition
between its prior and subsequent (statements)
Vedānta-kaustubha
The view of Kapila is "inconsistent" in every way. Why?
Because of its opposition to the Vedānta,—that is, the Vedāntas,
independent of all proofs, authoritative by themselves and eternally
established, establish the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as
the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, and the admission
of the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is opposed to this,—because
of that;—because of the rejection of a doctrine based on mere reasoning
in the passage: 'This knowledge is not attainable through reasoning'
(Kaṭha 2.9); and because of the opposition between its prior and
subsequent (statements). Thus, they hold that puruṣa (or the soul)
is all-pervading, devoid of attributes, mere consciousness, isolated
(from prakṛti) by nature, non-attached like a lotus leaf ¹ and inactive
Then again, they maintain also that prakṛti is an agent through its
mere proximity to puruṣa; and that through the super-imposition of
nescience that very same (puruṣa) comes to have the attributes of
'being an agent', 'being an enjoyer' and so on, to be afflicted by the
three kinds of miseries,² and to be subject to transmigratory
existence Again, they teach that the salvation of puruṣa proceeds
from the knowledge of prakṛti and puruṣa Thus, a multitude of
inconsistencies between prior and subsequent (statements) may be
found there.
In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since in accordance
with the Smṛti passages: ' "The evil-doers, the deluded, and the vilest
men do not attain me,—they whose wisdom is destroyed by nescience
and who have resorted to demoniacal nature" ' (Gītā 7 15), 'Know-
ledge is enveloped by non-knowledge; thereby beings are deluded'
¹ I e just as a lotus leaf is not wetted by water, so the soul is not attached
to anything.
² Viz. physical, mental and elemental
22

[sū. 2. 2. 11.
338 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 2.]
(Gītā 5.15.), ‘ ‘ ‘At the end of many births, one who is possessed of
knowledge attains me’ ’ ’ (Gītā 7 19), ‘ ‘ ‘Those who attain me cross
over this māyā’ ’ ’ (Gītā 7 14), ‘ ‘ ‘Many, purified by the penance of
knowledge come to attain my nature’ ’ ’ (Gītā 4.10), the causes of
bondage, as well as of salvation,—liberating the bound soul from its
bondage, unprecedented, and characterized by the attainment of
His nature,—is well-established, there is not even a shadow of any
contradiction among prior and subsequent (statements) Hence
it is established that there is no contradiction of the concordance of
the scriptural texts (with regard to Brahman) by the view of Kapila,
which is opposed to the Veda and is set forward by means of fallacious
reasoning
Here ends the section entitled “The impossibility of arrange-
ment ” (1).
COMPARISON
While Nimbārka adduces two reasons as to why the Sāṁkhya
doctrine is ‘inconsistent’, viz. (1) oppositon to the Vedānta, (2)
internal contradictions,—others adduce only one, viz. Śaṁkara,
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva adduce the second,¹ Bhāskara
adduces the first.² Hence they do not attach any special meaning
to the particle “ca” in the sūtra
Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled “The great
and the long”. (Sūtras 11–17)
SŪTRA 11
“FOR, JUST AS THE (ORIGIN) OF THE GREAT AND THE LONG FROM
THE SHORT AND THE SPHERICAL (IS UNTENABLE) (SO EVERYTHING
IS UNTENABLE IN THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Since if they bo possessed of parts, then there will result an
infinite regress; and if without parts, then it will be impossible for them
¹ Ś.B. 2 2.10, p 513; Śrī. B 2.2 9, pp. 78 ff., Part 2; ŚK B. 2.2 9, p. 61,
Parts 7 and 8; G B. 2 2.10, p. 96, Chap. 2
² Bh. B., 2.2 10, p. 112.

[sū. 2. 2. 11
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 339
to be the producer of other evolutes ¹,—there is inconsistency in
the origin of the binary compounds from the atoms, and there is all
the more inconsistency in the origin of ternary compounds from these
(binary compounds) Like this, everything admitted by the main-
tainers of the atomic view is inconsistent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Apprehending the objection, viz . Let pradhāna, not superin-
tended by an intelligent principle, be not the cause of the world;
but let the groups of atoms, under the control of the wish of the
Supreme Lord, be the cause of the world,—the author is now pointing
out the inconsistencies in the atomic doctrine as well
The procedure of the atomists is the following: A substance
produces another substance, a quality another quality; and the pro-
duction of the effect proceeds from three causes, viz. the inherent,
the non-inherent and efficient ²; just as an effect, viz. a piece of cloth, is
produced by the threads which are the inherent cause, by their mutual
conjunction which is the non-inherent cause, and by the shuttle, the
loom, the weaver and the rest, which are the efficient cause. Like-
wise, there are four kinds of atoms, distinguished as earth-atoms,
water-atoms, fire-atoms and air-atoms; and they are eternal, without
parts, possessed of colour and the rest, and spherical in extension,
and remain without producing effects at the time of dissolution.
At the time of creation, the atoms become the inherent cause for the
production of the effect (viz. the world), their conjunction, the non-
inherent cause, and the unseen principle ³ the efficient cause. Thus,
through the wish of the Lord, first motion arises in the air-atoms, then
a conjunction (between them) and thereby an effect, viz. a binary
compound, arises from two atoms; a ternary compound arises from
three binary compounds; a quaternary compound arises from four
ternary compounds, and so on, and through this process, finally, the
great air arises and remains trembling in space. In the very same
manner, fire arises from the fire-atoms and remains shining in the
form of earthly fire and so on. In the very same manner, the great
¹ C.S.S. ed. reads “parimāṇa” instead of “pariṇāma”, p. 31.
² Samavāyin, asamavāyin, nimitta.
³ I.e. the merit or demerit attaching to a man's conduct in one state of
existence and the corresponding reward or punishment with which he is visited
in another.

[SŪ. 2 2 11.
340 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2 ]
ocean arises from the water-atoms and remains flowing. In the very
same manner, the great earth arises from the earth-atoms and remains
immobile in the form of clay, stones and the rest. Again, the qualities
of the effects arise from the qualities of the cause. Just as the qualities
of a piece of cloth arise from the qualities of the thread,—a red cloth
being found to arise from red threads,—so the qualities of whiteness
and the like, inhering in the binary compounds and the rest, arise
from the qualities of whiteness, etc. inhering in the atoms. But
the combination of two simple atoms, producing a binary compound,
produces different measures, viz. minuteness and shortness, in the
binary compound, but do not produce sphericity, the measure of the
simple atoms themselves,—because, then, there will result an intense
fineness (on the part of the binary compound which it has not).
Similarly, at the time of dissolution, too, through the wish of the
Lord, there is motion in the atoms, thereby the dissolution of their
conjunction, thereby the dissolution of the binary compounds and so
on, and in this manner, finally, there is the dissolution of the earth
and the rest.
This view is being refuted here. The particle "or" in the aphorism
is meant for implying the aggregate (of defects in the atomic doctrine)
left unsaid. The word 'inconsistent' is to be supplied from above.
The phrase: "from the short and the spherical" is to be applied by
dividing it in a compatible manner. This being so, like the doctrine
of the origin of a short binary compound from two simple spherical
atoms, and like the doctrine of the origin of the great and long ternary
compounds from the short (binary compounds), everything else too,
maintained by them (viz. the atomists), is inconsistent—this is the
construction of the words of the aphorism.
The sense is this: The origin of binary compounds from atoms
is impossible. That being impossible, the origin of the ternary com-
pounds from the binary compounds is all the more impossible. In
exactly the same manner, whatever is maintained by the atomists
is simply inconsistent. Thus, it is observed that the parts, viz. the
threads and the rest, produce a whole, viz. a piece of cloth, only by
being conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which
are their own parts. An atom, too, is established to have six parts
through its connection with the six quarters. As has been said:
'An atom has six parts because of its simultaneous connection with the
six (quarters)'. Hence, even the atoms must be productive of effects

[SŪ. 2. 2. 12.
ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 341
as possessed of parts indeed. If they be so, then they themselves
will become effects like the binary compounds because of possessing
parts. And the parts of the atoms too,—conjoined (with one another)
by means of their six sides which are their own parts, and establishing
that the atoms have parts,—must have parts; that parts, again,
further parts and so on, and thus there must be an infinite regress.
If the atoms be admitted to be without parts, then if there be the
conjunction of even a hundred atoms which fill no space, there will
not be any extension different from that of a single atom, and hence
there will never be (different kinds of extensions like) minuteness,
shortness and the rest. Thus, the origin of the binary compounds
is impossible, in their absence, the origin of the ternary compounds
is impossible; and hence the origin of the world must be impossible.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation different. They take this sūtra as constituting
an adhikarana by itself, concerned with refuting the Vaiśeṣika objec-
tion, viz. that the qualities of the cause must inhere in the effect.
Hence if the intelligent Brahman be the cause of the world, then
the quality of intelligence must be found in the world. But since this
is not the case, He is not its cause.¹ The answer is: Or just as (there
is the origin of) big and long (ternary compounds) from minute and
short (binary compounds) so there is the origin of the non-intelligent
world from the intelligent Brahman.²
SŪTRA 12
“EVEN IN BOTH WAYS THERE IS NO ACTION (ON THE PART OF THE
ATOMS), HENCE THERE IS THE ABSENCE OF THAT (VIZ. CREATION).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because it is impossible for the unseen principle to inhere in the
atoms, as well as because it is impossible for it, connected with the
¹ Note that an exactly similar objection has been put forward and refuted
under Br. Sū. 2.1. 4–11. Hence there is no sense in repeating it here. As such
Nimbārka’s way of interpreting seems preferable.
² Ś. B. 2.2.11, pp. 518-19; Bh. B. 2.2.11, pp. 113-14.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 12.
342 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2.]
soul, to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms,—thus “even in
both ways” the first motion of the atoms is not possible. “Hence
there is the absence” of the creation of the world through the successive
order of binary compounds and the rest, due to conjunction, which
again is due to the motion of the atoms.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author is elucidating the statement (made in the last aphorism),
viz. Like the (origin of) the great and the long, everything else, too,
maintained by them, is inconsistent.
“Even in both ways”, no motion is possible in the atoms at the
time of creation. “Hence”, i.e for this reason, viz on account of
the impossibility of motion, “there is the absence of that”, i.e. of the
origin and the rest of the world through the successive order of binary
compounds, ternary compounds and so on, due to the conjunction
of atoms. The phrase: “in both ways” means: Does the first motion
(of the atoms) arise by itself, or through the atoms ? The first alter-
native is not tenable, being impossible. Never does motion, arising
by itself, proceed to bring water in a pitcher. It cannot be said
also that it arises through a cause, because at that time (i.e. at the
time of creation) there exist no human effort, vibration, impact and
the rest (which might have been such a cause). The second alter-
native, too, is not tenable, because then the atoms must become
sentient, it being impossible for non-sentient atoms to be the instigator
of motion. In the building of a palace and the like, the stones and the
rest do not themselves act in conjunction with other works (connected
with the building).
Or ¹, (if it be said that) the motion which arises in the atoms at
that time is caused by the unseen principle, (we reply): There is
negation of motion “in either way”. Thus, does the unseen principle
which causes the motion of the atoms inhere in the atoms, or in the
individual soul? The first alternative is not tenable, because the
unseen principle, being originated by the good and evil deeds of the
individual souls, cannot reside in something non-sentient; because
being non-sentient, it is not possible for the unforeseen principle to
be the cause of motion; because the performance of good and evil
¹ An alternative explanation of the word “Ubhayathā”

[SŪ 2. 2. 13
ADH 2.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 343
deeds being impossible on the part of atoms, the unseen principle
must be necessarily admitted to be natural (to them), and in that case
there will result the origin of motion at all times The second alter-
native, too, is not tenable, because it is all the more impossible for
the unseen principle, inhering in the individual soul, to urge the
motion of the non-sentient (atoms) Thus, there is no motion "even
in both ways".
"Or ¹ else no motion is possible, whether it be due to the individual
soul, or due to the Lord. Thus, does the individual soul give rise to
the first motion through its own destiny (adṛṣṭa), or through its proxi-
mity, or through its attribute of consciousness ? Not the first, because
of the above-mentioned fault Not through its proximity also,
because the proximity of the individual soul to the atoms being eternal,
the consequence will be that it will ever give rise to the world. Nor
even through consciousness, because of the absence of consciousness
then And motion does not proceed from the Lord as well Is the
Lord, according to your view, designated in the Veda or established
by inference and the rest? If it be said: Designated in the Veda,
then have faith in the procedure mentioned by Scripture thus. 'Every-
thing has that for its soul' (Chānd 6.8 7, etc.), 'He became existence
and that' (Tait. 2 6), and being overwhelmed with the sentiment
of love for Him, be free from affliction,—what is the use of your
doctrine of atoms ? If it be said: Established through inference and
the rest,—(we reply :) that it (viz inference) is not even established
has been proved above.²
SŪTRA 13
"(THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE IS UNTENABLE) ALSO ON ACCOUNT
OF THE ADMISSION OF THE RELATION OF INHERENCE, ON ACCOUNT
OF AN INFINITE REGRESS (ARISING THEREFROM) BECAUSE OF
SAMENESS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"On account also of the admission of the relation of inherence,"
the doctrine of atoms is not possible, since just as a binary compound
is connected with its own cause by the relation of inherence, being
¹ A third alternative explanation of the word "Ubhayathā".
² Vide V.K 1.1.3.

344 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2 2. 13
ADH. 2 ]
absolutely different therefrom, so the relation of inherence itself, too,
is to be connected with the two related objects by another relation
of inherence, its absolute difference (from the two related objects)
being the same, that, too, by another relation, and so on—thus there
will be an infinite regress
Vedānta-kaustubha
The phrase: 'on account of the absence of that' is to be supplied
For this reason also, the origin and the rest of the world in the
successive order of the creation of binary compounds and the rest,
due to the conjunction of the atoms is not possible Why? "On
account of the admission of the relation of inherence." Among
separable objects, there is a relation of conjunction,¹ as between a
rope and a pot. Among inseparable objects, on the other hand,
there is a relation of inherence,² just as a piece of cloth exists in
the threads by the relation of inherence, a pot in the two pot-sherds,
cowness in a cow and whiteness and the rest in a piece of cloth. The
relation between objects which are causes and effects is just this
relation of inherence, and this relation is proclaimed to be one, eternal,
and all-pervading like the ether,—on account of the admission of such
a relation of inherence—this is the sense
If it be asked. What objection is there if such a relation of in-
herence be admitted?—(the author) replies: "On account of an
infinite regress because of sameness". That is, just as a binary
compound, absolutely different from its inherent cause (viz. the
two simple atoms), necessarily awaits a relation of inherence (for
being connected with them), so the relation of inherence itself, being
absolutely different from the two related objects, is to be connected
with them by meaus of another relation of inherence,—"because of
the sameness" of absolute difference (i.e because there is absolute
difference equally in both the cases, also because what is itself unrelated
is never observed to be a relation)—that, too, by another relation of
inherence, and that, too, and so on; thus "on account of infinite
regress", the atomic theory defeats itself
¹ Saṁyoga.
² Samavāya.