वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 2. 7.
334 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
and wishing to go to a desired place, on finding a blind man,—who has
the power of motion, but is devoid of the power of vision,—makes
him move by mounting on him; and just as the magnet makes the iron
move, so exactly, though devoid of the power of action, the soul,
possessed of the power of vision, makes pradhāna, devoid of the power
of vision, move by its mere proximity. Hence, in spite of the non-
sentience of pradhāna, the activities of creation and the rest, are possible
on its part,—the answer is : "Then also", i. e. even on the ground of such
examples, no activity is possible on the part of the object exemplified,
viz. pradhāna. Thus, if puruṣa be admitted to be the mover of
pradhāna, then the initial proposition, viz. that puruṣa is not an
agent, will come to be contradicted. If pradhāna be an object to
be moved by puruṣa, then the initial proposition, viz. that pradhāna
is by itself the cause of the world, will come to be contradicted.
Although the power of motion is not manifest in a lame man, he being
without legs, yet he directs the man, who has the power of motion,
by means of speech. And the so-directed man, though not having the
power of vision manifest because of his blindness, yet being a sentient
being, moves in accordance with his (viz. the lame man's) words.
The stone (viz. the magnet), on the other hand, moves the iron
(only) when brought into connection with it by a man, and the iron
does not move by nature. Moreover, it has been said under the
aphorism: "If it be argued: like milk and water, there too" (Br.
Sū. 2.2.3), that everywhere and at all times the Omnipotent and
Omniscient Being abides as the mover of all. Further, the proximity
of puruṣa and prakṛti being eternal, there was no absence of such a
proximity before. Hence the order of creation and dissolution, as well
as the respective difference between bondage and release,—due to
the proximity of prakṛti and puruṣa—, are not possible; and there
must result eternal activity and absence of dissolution. In the case
in hand, on the contrary, there is no defect whatsoever, since it has
been said that: "And that (divinity) is endowed with all (powers)"
(Br. Sū. 2.1.29).