वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 2. 8.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 335
SŪTRA 8
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING PREPON-
DERANT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As it is impossible for the guṇas, which are in a state of equi-
librium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual
subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i e. the infer-
rible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna)
is not the cause of the world Why? “On account of the impossi-
bility of being preponderant.” Thus, is pradhāna,—consisting of the
three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, not regulated by an intelligent
principle and established by inference as admitted by you,—trans-
formed into the form of the world by means of entering into a state of
mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas), or inde-
pendently of any such state? If the first, then the preponderance of
one among (these three guṇas) sattva, rajas and tamas, which are
in a state of equilibrium prior to creation and are mutually inde-
pendent, being impossible, it is not possible for pradhāna to be the
cause of the world. If the second, then pradhāna, consisting of the
three guṇas in a state of equilibrium and immutable, is not trans-
formed into the form of the world all the more,—there being no state
of inequality consisting in a mutual subordination and preponder-
ance (of the guṇas).
It cannot be said also that at the time of creation there is a lapse
from the state of equilibrium and the guṇas entering into a state of
mutual subordination and preponderance, thereby the world arises,—
for this leads to the horns of a dilemma. Thus, is it admitted by you
that the lapse from the state of equilibrium, at that time, is sponta-
neous; or that it is due to the Omniscient Being? The first alter-
native is not valid because of the impossibility of a spontaneous lapse
without a cause, and also because of the following inference:
Whatever has a cause has lapse,
like seeds and the rest.
Whatever has no cause has no lapse,
like the soul.