वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)
Vedanta Parijata Saurabha of Nimbarkacharya with Commentary
भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य (टीकाकार: श्रीश्रीनिवासचार्य - वेदान्तकौस्तुभ सहित) द्वारा
पृष्ठ 347, कुल 906 में से
संदर्भ में पढ़ें[sū. 2. 2. 1.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 327
Similarly, a mahat and ahaṁkāra, the five pure essences, the eleven
sense-organs, and the five great elements which are limited are 'divi-
sions'; they are due to one cause which is unlimited in space and time
and the common substratum of three guṇas.¹ Whatever is observed
to be connected with something else, is due to that one cause; as
dishes and the rest, connected with the clay, are due to it. Similarly,
the external and internal divisions, connected with pleasures (sattva),
pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas) should properly be due to a common
cause consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion.² Similarly, just as
there is the origin of pots and the like from the power of the cause,
so the origin of the effects like mahat and the rest, too, must be held
to be due to the power of the cause. This being so, the cause, possessed
of such a power, is pradhāna.³ Moreover, it is observed that there
is a distinction between the effects, like ear-rings and the rest, and
the cause, similar to them, such as gold and the rest, as well as a non-
distinction Similarly, there is both distinction and non-distinction
on the part of the manifold universe. Through these two, a cause,
viz. the unmanifest which is the substratum of all beings and consists
of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, is inferred.⁴
On this suggestion, the author replies: "The inference", i.e.
what is inferred, viz. pradhāna, not having Brahman as its common
cause, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the
impossibility of arrangement," i.e. because it is impossible that the
arrangement of the world,—variegated by the aggregate of manifold
objects of enjoyment, conforming to the diverse works of the souls,—
can arise from pradhāna, not having Brahman for its cause, an object
of inference, non-sentient and devoid of any knowledge of the ob-
jects to be created; as we see in ordinary life that the arrangement
of manifold and variegated palaces, chariots, ornaments and the rest
is due to one who is possessed of the knowledge of the objects to be
created.
The particle "and" (in the sūtra) indicates that the reasons,
intended for proving the existence of pradhāna, can very well be set
aside by valid opposite arguments, since the following inference
¹ This explains the first reason.
² This explains the second reason.
³ This explains the third reason.
⁴ This explains the fourth and the fifth reasons.