वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 1. 30.
316 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9 ]
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 30
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE
WORLD) BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY,)
THAT HAS BEEN SAID"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that on account of the denial of His sense-organs
in the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6 8¹),
it is not possible for one who is endowed with all powers to be the
creator of the world—(we reply:) the answer to this has already
been given.²
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected: Let Brahman be endowed with all powers;
still, like milk, without implements such as basin, pot and the rest;
like the seed, without implements, such as earth, water, and so on,
and like gods and others without implements befitting particular
places and times, He cannot consistently be the creator of effects,
though possessed of powers, "because of the absence of sense-organs'
on His part, i.e. because He is known to be devoid of sense-organs
from the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8)—
(We reply:) The reply to this has been given in the aphorism:
"Because of being based on Scripture" (Br. Sū. 2.1.26). The
meaning of the above scriptural text is as follows: There exist 'no
action',—i.e. that which is to be done for the purpose of obtaining
bliss,—and 'sense-organ' for the production of desired for action,
'of him', i.e. of the Supreme Lord who is one mass of ever-present
bliss, the Lord of all and the Creator of the world.³ There are scrip-
tural texts to this effect, viz: 'The soul, which consists of bliss'
(Tait. 2.5), 'Filled with His own self alone', 'A flavour, verily, is
He' (Tait. 2 7), 'Having all desires, having all odours, having all
tasks' (Chānd 3 14.2, 4), 'Without hands and feet, he is swift and
a seizer; without eyes, he sees; without ears he hears' (Śvet. 3 19)
and so on. The declaration by the Lord Himself, too, is as follows:
¹ R, ŚK, B. ² Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.26.
³ I.e. the Lord, who is ever blissful does not need to act for attaining any
further bliss; and He has not to depend on the sense-organs for His action.

[sū. 2. 1. 31.
ADH. 10] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 317
‘“I have no duties, whatsoever, O Pārtha, in the three world, nor
anything unattained to be attained; yet I abide in action”’ (Gītā
3 22). Hence it is established that the above-mentioned faults
pertain to the opponent's view alone, but not to the conclusion estab-
lished by the Vedānta.
Here ends the section entitled “The consequence of the
entire” (9).
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. The interpretation of the
phrase “tad uktam” different, viz.· “that has been answered (by
Scripture itself)”. That is the very same Upanisad (viz. Śvetāśva-
tara) which has been quoted by the opponent in support of his
allegation that the Lord, devoid of sense-organs (viz. Śvet. 6 8),
cannot act, answers to the objection by pointing out that though
devoid of sense-organs, He can yet act (viz. Śvet. 3.19 ¹)
Adhikarana 10: The section entitled “Having
a need”. (Sūtras 31–35)
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31)
SŪTRA 31
“(BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT
OF (THE ACTIVITY OF AN AGENT) HAVING A NEED.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It may be objected: The Supreme Being who has all His desires
eternally fulfilled, is not an agent. Why? “On account of the
activity of an agent having a need.”
¹ G B 2.1.31, p. 67, Chap. 2.

318 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 32.
ADH. 10.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, a doubt is raised. Let this be so, yet there being no need
on the part of Brahman,—who has His desires eternally fulfilled by
themselves,—for creating the world, it is not created by Him.
The prima facie view is as follows: Creatorship of the world does
not fit in on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of the
activity of the agent having a need", and on account of there being
no need on His part for creating the world, as He has His desires
eternally fulfilled.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 32–35)
SŪTRA 32
"BUT, AS IN ORDINARY LIFE, (CREATION IS) A MERE SPORT (TO
BRAHMAN)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
With regard to it, we reply. Such creation and the rest of the
Supreme Being are like the mere sport of kings and so on, well-known
in ordinary life.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author is stating the correct conclusion.
The particle "but" is for disposing of the prima facie view.
Just as, in ordinary life, the play of a universal monarch, who has
attained lordship, with various kinds of dice, wooden balls and the
rest, is a mere sport, without any desire indeed for fruit,—so this is
a mere sport on the part of Brahman as well, i e. a mere play with
the creation of the universe and so on.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 33 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but
the phrase: "lokavat" explained a little differently, thus: As in
ordinary life a man, full of cheerfulness or on awakening from a sound
sleep, dances about without any motive or need, but simply from the
fulness of spirit, so is the case here.¹ Here Baladeva criticizes the

¹ G.B. 2.1.33, p. 71, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 1 33.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 319
Viśiṣṭādvaita illustration of a prince engaged in a game of balls (which
is the illustration given us by Nimbārka as well as we have seen)
by pointing out that such a game is not altogether motiveless, since
the prince gets some pleasure from it.¹
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 33
"(THERE ARE) NO INEQUALITY AND CRUELTY (ON THE PART OF
BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF (HIS) HAVING REGARD (FOR THE WORKS
OF SOULS), FOR SO (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Inequality and cruelty, due to unequal creation, destruction
and the rest, depend on the works of the individual souls themselves,
and so they do not pertain to the creator of the origin and the rest
of the world, as in the case of the cloud. "So" exactly the scriptural
text. "One becomes good by good action, bad by bad action" (Bṛh.
3.2.13 ²) "shows".
Vedānta-kaustubha
It may be objected: If Brahman creates the universe in mere
sport, He must be open to the charges of inequality and cruelty.
He must be open to the charge of "inequality", i.e. of creating an
unequal world, creating as He does different grades of beings like
gods, men, animals and so on And, He must be open to the charge
of "cruelty", i.e. of heartlessness, creating as He does the universe
which is an abode of three kinds of sufferings, making the individual
souls, not attached to matter, enter into connection with it at the time
of dissolution, and thereby causing them sufferings like old age, death,
and the rest.
(We reply.) No There cannot be any inequality and cruelty
on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of (His) having
regard", i.e. because in producing different beings like gods and the
rest at the beginning of the creation of the universe, Brahman has
regard for, i.e takes into account, their respective works or karmas,
¹ Op. cit., p. 72. ² Ś, R.

320 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 34.
ADH 10.]
just as the cloud in producing different kinds of shoots depends on
their respective seeds.
If it be asked: Whence is this known? The author replies:
"shows", i.e the holy Scripture shows this thus. 'For he alone makes
one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deed;
he alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down, do bad deed'
(Kaus. 3.8), 'One becomes good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds'
(Brh. 3.2.13), 'The doer of good deeds becomes good, the doer of
bad deeds becomes bad' (Brh. 4 4.5).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva begin a new adhikarana here.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 34
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THIS IS NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT
OF THE NON-DISTINCTION OF WORKS, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT
OF BEGINNINGLESSNESS, AND (THIS) FITS IN, AND IS OBSERVED
ALSO."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that since the text: '"The existent alone, my
dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1 ¹) declares the
'non-distinction' of works prior to creation, the Supreme Being's
dependence on the works does not fit in,-(we reply:) "no", as works
exist even then, the works done by the individual souls in previous
births being eternal. And a prior creation "fits in", as a sudden
subsequent creation is unreasonable.² And this is "observed also"
in the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he
did before' (Rg. V. 10.190.3 ³) and so on.
1 Ś, R, ŚK, B.
2 I.e. since a subsequent creation cannot arise all on a sudden we have to
admit that it arises from a prior creation.
3 Pp. 413-14.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 34.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 321
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected: The reason, viz 'on account of dependence',
does not fit in. Why? "On account of the non-distinction of works."
That is, the non-distinction of the entire world prior to creation being
ascertained from the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this
in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), the
non-distinction of the works of the individual souls, too, is ascertained.
Hence, prior to creation, there are no works as the cause of the diver-
sities of the objects to be created, on which Brahman might depend,—
(We reply:) "no". Why? "On account of the beginningless"
of all. That is, the works, good and bad, done by the individual
souls in a previous creation, become the cause of the diversities in
a subsequent creation. "And" the continuity of creation "fits in"
in accordance with the maxim of 'the seed and the shoot',1 and in
accordance with the above-mentioned difference between the manifest
and unmanifest effect,2 as well as because a sudden subsequent
creation without a prior creation is inexplicable, this last reason being
indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). This is "observed
also" in Scripture. That is, since the text: 'The creator fashioned
the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg.V. 10.190.3), teaches
the existence of a prior creation, the eternity of the flow of creation
is established. And in the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'With
roots above, branches below is this eternal fig-tree' (Kaṭha 6 1),
'With roots above, branches below, the fig-tree is indestructible,
they say' (Gītā 15.1), the reality as well of mundane existence, as
having the Existent as its root, and as having the form of a continuous
stream, is established. Previously, the effect has indeed been deter-
mined to be real 3 In the texts: 'Without beginning and without end'
(Cūl. 5 4), 'A wise man is not born, nor dies' (Kaṭha 2.18 5), 'Know
prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul) to be both beginningless' (Gītā
13.19), the eternity, too, of the sentient and the non-sentient sub-
stances, which are the powers of the Supreme Cause, is established.

1 I.e. just as it is impossible to say whether the seed is earlier or the shoot,
so it is impossible to say whether karmas are the earlier or the saṁsāra. Hence
they are taken to be beginningless.
2 Vide V.K. 2 1 17-18. 3 Vide V.K. 2.1.14 ff.
4 Correct quotation: "Anādavatī" Vide p. 230.
5 Cf. a very similar passage in Gītā 2.20.
21

322 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 35,
ADH. 10.]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras—thus: "Na . . .
. . anāditvāt", and "upapadyate . . . . ca".¹
Bhāskara
He also breaks it into two different sūtras. Further he reads the
first portion differently, thus: "Asmād vibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt",
(sūtra 35), "upapadyate . . . ca" (sūtra 36).²
Baladeva
He also breaks it into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṃkara.
But he takes the first portion only, viz "Na . . anāditvāt"
as indicated within the previous adhikarana beginning a new
adhikarana with the second portion: "upapadyate . . . . ca",
concerned with showing that the grace of the Lord is not partial
Hence it means, according to him: And (the special grace shown by
the Lord to his devotees) fits in (since it is not arbitrary, but depends
on the devotion of the souls themselves), and it is observed also (in
Scripture).³
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 35
"AND BECAUSE OF THE FITTING IN OF ALL ATTRIBUTES."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"And because of the fitting in of all the attributes" of a cause on
the part of Brahman alone, it is established that our view is free from
all contradictions.
Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter of the Vedānta-
pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka.
¹ Ś.B., pp. 498-499.
² Bh. B., p. 107.
³ G.B. 2.1.36, pp. 76-77, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 35.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 323
Vedānta-kaustubha
"And on account of the fitting in." That is, all the attributes,
mentioned or not mentioned, befitting the cause of the world and
inappropriate on the part of pradhāna and the rest,—fit in on the part
of Brahman alone. Hence, it is established that the concordance of
Scriptures with regard to Brahman is not contradicted by any means
whatsoever.
Here ends the section entitled "Having a need" (10).
Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter in the holy
Vedānta-kaustubha, commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā,
and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 37 in both the commentaries. They take this sūtra
to be a new adhikaraṇa by itself.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz. the same theme continued thus: And on account of the fitting
in of all attributes (harmonious in themselves or not) (on the part of
the Lord). That is, the Lord is possessed of paradoxical and myste-
rious powers, and hence it is possible for Him to possess, along with
the attributes of perfect justice and impartiality, the attribute of
showing special favour and partiality for his devotees as well.¹
Résumé
The first section of the second chapter contains—

1. 35 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 37 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara;
3. 36 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 37 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 36 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 37 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.
   ¹ G.B. 2.1.37, p. 78, Chap 2.

324 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 35.
ADH. 10.]
Śamkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide each of the sūtras 17
and 35 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras; while
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha divide sūtra 11 in Nimbārka’s commentary
into two separate sūtras.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)
SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)
Adhikarana 1: The section entitled "the im-
possibility of arrangement". (Sūtras 1–10)
SŪTRA 1
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT
ALSO, NOT THE INFERENCE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Pradhāna, knowable through inference ¹ is not the cause of the
world. Why? "On account also of the impossibility" of a varied
"arrangement" from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the
objects to be created.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, with a view to inducing those who desire for salvation to
the hearing, thinking and the like of the nature, attributes and the
rest of the Supreme Person, it has been firmly established above by
the reverend author of the aphorisms that Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest
Person, omnipotent, the Lord of all, and the Supreme Person, is the
cause of the origin and the rest of the world; and that the views of the
opponents arise not supported by Scripture has been shown under
the aphorism: "Because (the creator of the world) sees, (pradhāna is)
not (the creator), (it is) non-scriptural" (Br. Sū. 1.1.5). Now, with a
view to establishing the acceptability of the conclusion of the Vedān-
tins, the reverend author of the aphorisms is exposing, in this section,
the fallaciousness of the arguments put forward by the opponents.
It is not to be said that those who desire for release being benefitted
through a mere exposition of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, what
is the use of villifying the views of the opponents? Since just as
when a man, giving up the most beneficial food, is about to take
injurious poison and the like, people try to induce him to food and to
1 See footnote 1, p. 42 of the book.

326 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 1.
ADH. 1.]
dissuade him from poison, etc. by pointing out the unwholesomeness of
the latter, so the villification of the view of the opponents is justifiable
for the purpose of preventing people from accepting the views which
are opposed to the Veda, and for inducing those desiring for emanci-
pation to our own view.
Now, the Sāṃkhyas, discarding the Highest Person, omnipotent
and omniscient, as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world,
hold prakṛti, devoid of any connection with Him, non-sentient and
the equilibrium of the three guṇas, to be the cause of the world. This
has been said in the treatise treating of the sixty (categories) ¹:
"The primary prakṛti (i.e. matter) is not an effect. There are seven,
beginning with mahat, which are (both) causes and effects There are
sixteen which are effects (only). ‘Puruṣa (i e. soul) is neither a cause,
nor an effect’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 3 ²). They state the five reasons for the
existence of prakṛti thus: The cause is pradhāna, ‘(1) on account of
the transformation of the divisions ³; (2) on account of concordance ⁴;
(3) on account of the activity preceding from power ⁵; (4) on account
of the distinction between the cause and the effect ⁶; (5) on account
of the non-distinction of what is possessed of all form’ (Sāṃ. Kā.
15 ⁷). The word ‘Vaiśva-rūpa’ means the same as ‘Viśva-rūpa’ or
what is possessed of all forms, i.e. the universe of varied configurations.
Whatever is limited is due to a common cause, like pots and the rest.

¹ Peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas. ² P. 4.
³ I.e. on account of the limitedness (pariṇāma) of the effects (bheda) like
mahat and the rest. Thus: Whatever is limited has a cause, like the pot.
The effects are limited.
∴ they have a cause, viz. pradhāna.
I.e. all the effects possess the common qualities of pleasure (sattva), pain
(rajas) and delusion (tamas). Hence they must have a common cause which
possesses all these qualities, viz. pradhāna.
⁴ I.e. the cause can give rise to the effect only if it has the requisite power.
Now pradhāna alone has the power to give rise to mahat and the rest.
⁵ The difference of the effect from the cause proves the existence of the
cause Thus, the difference of the pot from a lump of clay, viz. the first can
fetch water, the second not—proves that the pot has clay for its common cause.
Similarly, from the mahat and the rest we argue to pradhāna, different from them
⁶ I.e. the whole universe merges in a common cause during dissolution,
and such a cause is pradhāna. Vide Candrikā-vyākhyā of Sāṃ. Kā., pp. 18-19;
also Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya on same, pp. 13-14.
⁷ P. 18.

[sū. 2. 2. 1.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 327
Similarly, a mahat and ahaṁkāra, the five pure essences, the eleven
sense-organs, and the five great elements which are limited are 'divi-
sions'; they are due to one cause which is unlimited in space and time
and the common substratum of three guṇas.¹ Whatever is observed
to be connected with something else, is due to that one cause; as
dishes and the rest, connected with the clay, are due to it. Similarly,
the external and internal divisions, connected with pleasures (sattva),
pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas) should properly be due to a common
cause consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion.² Similarly, just as
there is the origin of pots and the like from the power of the cause,
so the origin of the effects like mahat and the rest, too, must be held
to be due to the power of the cause. This being so, the cause, possessed
of such a power, is pradhāna.³ Moreover, it is observed that there
is a distinction between the effects, like ear-rings and the rest, and
the cause, similar to them, such as gold and the rest, as well as a non-
distinction Similarly, there is both distinction and non-distinction
on the part of the manifold universe. Through these two, a cause,
viz. the unmanifest which is the substratum of all beings and consists
of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, is inferred.⁴
On this suggestion, the author replies: "The inference", i.e.
what is inferred, viz. pradhāna, not having Brahman as its common
cause, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the
impossibility of arrangement," i.e. because it is impossible that the
arrangement of the world,—variegated by the aggregate of manifold
objects of enjoyment, conforming to the diverse works of the souls,—
can arise from pradhāna, not having Brahman for its cause, an object
of inference, non-sentient and devoid of any knowledge of the ob-
jects to be created; as we see in ordinary life that the arrangement
of manifold and variegated palaces, chariots, ornaments and the rest
is due to one who is possessed of the knowledge of the objects to be
created.
The particle "and" (in the sūtra) indicates that the reasons,
intended for proving the existence of pradhāna, can very well be set
aside by valid opposite arguments, since the following inference
¹ This explains the first reason.
² This explains the second reason.
³ This explains the third reason.
⁴ This explains the fourth and the fifth reasons.

[sū. 2. 2. 2.
328 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
establishes the non-validity of the object established (by the Sāṁkhya,
viz. pradhāna):—
Pradhāna as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and not having Brah-
man for its soul, is non-existent;
because it is not perceived.
Whatever is this (i.e. not perceived) is that (i.e. non-existent);
like the sky-flower
Whatever is not this (i.e. not non-perceived) is not that (i.e.
not non-existent);
like the sun.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They take this and the next sūtra as one sūtra.
SŪTRA 2
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITY ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity
(on its part), not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna).
Vedānta-kaustubha
The phrase beginning with ‘on account of impossibility’ is to
be supplied here. And because activity,—viz. spontaneous falling
away from the state of the equilibrium of the three guṇas,—is
impossible on the part of pradhāna which is non-sentient and an
object of inference. Thus, pradhāna, knowable through inference,
is not the cause of the world, since it is observed in ordinary life that
non-sentient objects like chariots and the rest, are moved to action
only when superintended by conscious beings.

[sū. 2. 2. 3.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 329
SŪTRA 3
"AND IF IT BE ARGUED THAT (PRADHĀNA ACTS SPONTANEOUSLY)
LIKE MILK AND WATER, (WE REPLY.) THERE TOO (LORD IS THE
INCITER)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be argued that like milk, etc pradhāna acts for the origin
and the rest of the world by itself, (we reply ) that "there too"
the Supreme Being is the inciter is learnt from the scriptural text:
"Who abiding within water" (Bṛh 3.7.4 ¹)
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: How can it be said that on account of the im-
possibility of spontaneous activity on its part the non-sentient pra-
dhāna is not the cause of the world? Just as milk, though non-
sentient, is by itself transformed into the form of sour milk, and flows
spontaneously for the nourishment of the calf, and just as water
discharged from the cloud is transformed into the form of various
saps of the earth, as well as into the forms of ice, bubble and the rest,
and pours down spontaneously for the growth of plants and the rest,
as well as flows on, so exactly pradhāna too, independent of a sen-
tient being, having entered into a state of mutual inequality of the
guṇas, is transformed into many forms,—
We reply: "There too". That is, in the case of milk and the
rest too, no activity is possible independently of a sentient being.
On the contrary, milk and the rest attain the form of sour milk and
so on only when superintended by a sentient being. It is the cow
herself, fond of her calf, that makes the milk flow out of filial affection,
and being liquid the milk oozes out. If it be argued that even when
the calf is dead, the presence of the milk is observed, and hence to say
that it is the cow that makes the milk flow out of filial affection does
not stand to reason,—(we reply.) there is the flow of the milk then by
reason of her remembrance of the calf, or else it is explicable on the
ground of her love for her master.²
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ Ś, R, Bh.
² I.e. the cow gives milk even when the calf is dead because she still remem-
bers the calf, or because she loves her master and wants to be of benefit to him.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 4.
330 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
Water, too, comes to have the form of ice, bubble and the rest
only when superintended by a conscious being; appears to be of the
form of various saps through its contact with the earth; and flows on
as dependent on a low ground ¹ and on account of being liquid. Every-
thing being superintended by a sentient being, the above examples
all fit in, in accordance with the scriptural texts. 'Who abiding within
water' (Bṛh 3.7.4), '"At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī,
some rivers flow to the east"' (Brh. 3.8 9) and so on. Hence the in-
ference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world
SŪTRA 4
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE (AC-
CESSORY), (PRADHĀNA IS NOT THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-
DEPENDENCE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Pradhāna, not superintended by an intelligent principle, is not
the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the non-existence"
of an accessory other than it, since according to you it does not de-
pend on anything else.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, the cause of the world is not the inference
(i.e. the inferrible pradhāna). Why? "On account of the non-
existence of what is different" That is, if pradhāna,—which is not
superintended by an intelligent principle, but is independent, non-
sentient and an object of inference,—be the cause of the world, there
will be activity on its part at all times, and this being so, there would
not be, at any time, what is different from activity, i.e. inactivity on
its part.²
Or (an alternative explanation), the sense is: On account of the
absence of an object to be instigated or of an instigator other than
pradhāna. The reason for this, again, is: "on account of non-depen-
dence", i.e. according to your view, as the creator of the world,
1 I.e. the flowing of the water depends on its being on a sloping ground
2 I.e. there would be eternal creation and no dissolution.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 5.
ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 331
pradhāna does not depend on an accessory. It cannot be said also
that the variegated works are the instigator of pradhāna,—because
works will then become the cause of the world, because the inde-
pendence of pradhāna in creating the world will be set aside, and, finally,
because this is impossible. Works, on the other hand, are not able
to give even fruits like merit or demerit, pleasure or pain; their agent,
too, does not obtain the fruit by himself. Hence, how can those works,
performed by the individual souls who are vitiated by their contact
with prakṛti or matter, be able to instigate pradhāna? The fact is that
the works bear fruits through the wish of the Lord, and thus their
agent obtains fruits, as declared by the Lord Himself: '"Pleasure,
pain, existence, non-existence, fear and absence of fear, non-violence,
equanimity, contentment, penance, charity, fame and absence of
fame,—the various states of beings arise from me alone"' (Gītā 10.
4a-5b). It is not to be said that pradhāna acts through its proximity
to puruṣa,—for its proximity to puruṣa being eternal, its activity, too,
must be eternal. This will be made clear in details under the
aphorism: "As in the case of a man and stone" (Br. Sū. 2.2.7)
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 3 in their commentaries. Their explanation is
similar to the first explanation given by Śrīnivāsa, viz.: "Because
of the non-existence of what is different (from creation, viz. dis-
solution), on account of (its) non-dependence (to anything else),
(pradhāna is not the cause of the world)".¹
SŪTRA 5
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE ELSEWHERE, NOT LIKE
GRASS AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Since there is no transformation of the grass and the rest, eaten
by an ox, into the form of milk, it cannot be said that just as the grass
¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.3, p. 74, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.3, pp. 57-58, Parts 7 and 8

332 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 6
ADH. 1.]
and the rest, eaten by cows, etc. become milk by themselves, so the
unmanifest, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected Just as grass, water, etc. are transformed into
the form of milk, so the unmanifest is transformed into the form of
mahat and the rest, independently indeed of another efficient cause,
—the author replies: “No”. This cannot be said Why? “On ac-
count of the non-existence elsewhere,” i.e. because “elsewhere”, or
in the case of oxen and the rest, other than that of cows, etc. there
is no transformation of the grass, water and so on, eaten by them,
into the form of milk The particle “and” implies that since the
transformation of the grass, etc , eaten by cows, into the form of milk
is admitted to be due to an intelligent principle, likewise pradhāna, too,
is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest as superintended
by an intelligent principle alone, and not by itself.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They change the order of the sūtras 5–9 which will be noticed at
the end of sūtra 9. Interpretation same
SŪTRA 6
“EVEN IF THERE BE THE ADMISSION (OF ACTIVITY ON THE PART
OF PRADHĀNA, STILL THEN IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT
OF THE ABSENCE OF A PURPOSE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“Even if there be the admission” of activity on the part of
pradhāna somehow or other, still pradhāna cannot be the cause,
since a purpose for such an activity is impossible on its part, it
being non-sentient.
Vedānta-kaustubha
It has been said under the aphorism: “And on account of acti-
vity” (Br. Sū. 2 2.2) that pradhāna has no power of independent
activity, and hence is not the cause of the world. Now the author

[sū. 2. 2. 7.
ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 333
points out here that "even if there be the admission of activity on
its part per force ¹, still then pradhāna is not capable of being the cause.
Why? "On account of the absence of a purpose," that is, because
there is no purpose for the creation of the world, seeing that the souls,
merged in their own bliss, prior to creation, have no regard for en-
joyment or emancipation, while pradhāna, being non-sentient, is
not capable of having enjoyment and the rest. It cannot be said:
What purpose can the Highest Person, who has all His desires ful-
filled, have in creating the world?—since that has already been pointed
out under the aphorism. "But as in ordinary life, a mere sport"
(Br. Sū. 2 1.32).
Or (an alternative explanation of the phrase: "arthābhāvāt")
the sense is On account of the absurdity of the statement, made per
force (and not on the ground of reason), viz. 'Pradhāna acts by itself',
just like the statement 'The ether is running'.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They change the order of sūtras, which will be noticed at the end
of sūtra 9.
SŪTRA 7
"IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF A MAN AND STONE,
(WE REPLY:) THEN ALSO."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be argued that just as a blind man makes a lame man move,
or the stone (i.e. the magnet) the iron, so does puruṣa move pradhāna,
---(we reply:) in that case, the assumption of the non-activity (of
puruṣa) will be contradicted, and pradhāna being something to be
instigated by another will cease to be the primary cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: just as a lame man,—who has the power of vision,
but is devoid of the power of motion,—lost accidentally from his caravan
¹ I.e. somehow or other.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 7.
334 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
and wishing to go to a desired place, on finding a blind man,—who has
the power of motion, but is devoid of the power of vision,—makes
him move by mounting on him; and just as the magnet makes the iron
move, so exactly, though devoid of the power of action, the soul,
possessed of the power of vision, makes pradhāna, devoid of the power
of vision, move by its mere proximity. Hence, in spite of the non-
sentience of pradhāna, the activities of creation and the rest, are possible
on its part,—the answer is : "Then also", i. e. even on the ground of such
examples, no activity is possible on the part of the object exemplified,
viz. pradhāna. Thus, if puruṣa be admitted to be the mover of
pradhāna, then the initial proposition, viz. that puruṣa is not an
agent, will come to be contradicted. If pradhāna be an object to
be moved by puruṣa, then the initial proposition, viz. that pradhāna
is by itself the cause of the world, will come to be contradicted.
Although the power of motion is not manifest in a lame man, he being
without legs, yet he directs the man, who has the power of motion,
by means of speech. And the so-directed man, though not having the
power of vision manifest because of his blindness, yet being a sentient
being, moves in accordance with his (viz. the lame man's) words.
The stone (viz. the magnet), on the other hand, moves the iron
(only) when brought into connection with it by a man, and the iron
does not move by nature. Moreover, it has been said under the
aphorism: "If it be argued: like milk and water, there too" (Br.
Sū. 2.2.3), that everywhere and at all times the Omnipotent and
Omniscient Being abides as the mover of all. Further, the proximity
of puruṣa and prakṛti being eternal, there was no absence of such a
proximity before. Hence the order of creation and dissolution, as well
as the respective difference between bondage and release,—due to
the proximity of prakṛti and puruṣa—, are not possible; and there
must result eternal activity and absence of dissolution. In the case
in hand, on the contrary, there is no defect whatsoever, since it has
been said that: "And that (divinity) is endowed with all (powers)"
(Br. Sū. 2.1.29).

[SŪ. 2. 2. 8.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 335
SŪTRA 8
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING PREPON-
DERANT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As it is impossible for the guṇas, which are in a state of equi-
librium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual
subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i e. the infer-
rible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna)
is not the cause of the world Why? “On account of the impossi-
bility of being preponderant.” Thus, is pradhāna,—consisting of the
three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, not regulated by an intelligent
principle and established by inference as admitted by you,—trans-
formed into the form of the world by means of entering into a state of
mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas), or inde-
pendently of any such state? If the first, then the preponderance of
one among (these three guṇas) sattva, rajas and tamas, which are
in a state of equilibrium prior to creation and are mutually inde-
pendent, being impossible, it is not possible for pradhāna to be the
cause of the world. If the second, then pradhāna, consisting of the
three guṇas in a state of equilibrium and immutable, is not trans-
formed into the form of the world all the more,—there being no state
of inequality consisting in a mutual subordination and preponder-
ance (of the guṇas).
It cannot be said also that at the time of creation there is a lapse
from the state of equilibrium and the guṇas entering into a state of
mutual subordination and preponderance, thereby the world arises,—
for this leads to the horns of a dilemma. Thus, is it admitted by you
that the lapse from the state of equilibrium, at that time, is sponta-
neous; or that it is due to the Omniscient Being? The first alter-
native is not valid because of the impossibility of a spontaneous lapse
without a cause, and also because of the following inference:
Whatever has a cause has lapse,
like seeds and the rest.
Whatever has no cause has no lapse,
like the soul.