द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 237
(b) Prisoners convicted of revolutionary offences.
(c) Prisoners under trial for alleged revolutionary
offences.
(d) The under-trial prisoners in the Meerut Con-
spiracy Case.
(e) Prisoners incarcerated in connection with labour
strikes and other labour disputes.
(f) The Garhwali soldiers who had been court-
martialled and given heavy sentences for refusing
to fire on unarmed citizens.
(g) Prisoners sentenced in connection with the civil-
disobedience movement, the charges against
whom referred to violence of some sort.
8. The demand originally made by Mahatma Gandhi
for an inquiry into police atrocities during the period
of the civil-disobedience movement was excluded
from the Pact.
The above criticism met with general approval at the
Youth Congress and a resolution was adopted condemning
the Delhi Pact.
The Delhi Pact, as we shall see later on, proved to be not
a blessing but a curse. The time was not opportune for an
understanding of the sort attempted. The struggle should
have been continued for some time longer. The Pact, as
drafted, contained nothing of value. Ever since the nego-
tiations started in 1929, the Congress leaders had always
insisted on an assurance from the Government, regarding
the grant of Dominion Status. Because that assurance was
not forthcoming, the fight had to be launched in 1930. For
the same reason, the peace-negotiations prior to the First
Round Table Conference in 1930, had proved abortive. How
the fight could be suspended without such an assurance, passes
one's comprehension. The only reason one can suggest is that
there was no one in the Working Committee to point out the
correct thing to the Mahatma and with the lamented death
of Pandit Motilal Nehru, the last intellectual stalwart of the
Congress had disappeared. Though he lacked the emotional
appeal necessary in a front-rank leader, the Pandit was never-
theless a leader among men. He towered head and shoulders

238 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
above his contemporaries and in 1931, he was the one man
in the Congress Working Committee who could have in-
fluenced the Mahatma for good. It was therefore a mis-
fortune that at the time of the Delhi negotiations he was on
his deathbed and it was nothing short of a national calamity
that he passed away early in March 1931.
Inopportune as the Pact was, lack of diplomacy was also
responsible for some of its shortcomings. For instance, on the
demand for an inquiry into the police atrocities, the Mahatma
had been informed that if he stuck to it till the breaking-
point, the Government would yield. Nevertheless, he
voluntarily gave up the demand on an appeal from the
Viceroy. With better bargaining, even in March 1931, one
could have extracted more from the Government, because
they were really anxious for a settlement. But men with
fixed ideas are not well-qualified for political bargaining. So
far as the Mahatma is concerned, he alternates between
obstinacy and leniency and moreover, he is too susceptible
to personal appeals—and with such habits of mind, it is
difficult to get the better of one's opponent in political bar-
gaining. The Delhi truce was a great help to the Government.
It gave them time to inquire more deeply into the tactics of
the Congress and thereafter to perfect their machinery for
dealing with that body in future. In the case of the Congress,
the Pact had a soporific effect. The enthusiasm of the people
began to evaporate and it is out of public enthusiasm that
one gets men and money for a non-violent mass movement.
While the Government could resume their activity at any
time because they had no dearth of men or money, the
Congress would have to wait till public enthusiasm could be
worked up once again. During the period of the Delhi
truce while the Round Table Conference was sitting in
London, the Government were perfecting their plans for
striking at the Congress. For instance, by October 1931, the
emergency ordinances for the next year had been already
prepared. Dr. M. A. Ansari, the Nationalist Moslem leader
of Delhi, had unquestionable proofs of this and he duly
passed them on to the Congress President, Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel. It was easy for the Government to prophesy future

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 239
developments because they knew that nothing substantial
would be offered to the Congress. But the Congress guided
by the honest and straightforward policy of the Mahatma,
made no preparations for the coming fight. In fact, before
he left for London, the Mahatma assured Lord Irwin that
he would try his level best for a settlement there and when he
left London, he assured the Premier, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald,
that he would endeavour till the last to avoid a resumption of
hostilities and if that was impossible, he would at least strive
to avoid bitterness as far as possible.¹ Further, the day before
Mahatma Gandhi landed in Bombay, he sent by radio an
exceedingly conciliatory message which was immediately
published in all the papers. But that had no effect on the new
Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, who had already perfected his
arrangements and was spoiling for a fight in order to avenge
himself for the slight humiliation which the Government
had to face in agreeing to an armistice with the Congress.
In spite of the inadequate provisions of the Pact, if it had
provided for an inquiry into the alleged atrocities, it would
have had a very healthy check on such misdeeds in future.
During the preceding twelve months there had been excesses
committed by the police and the military in Peshawar,
Gujerat, the United Provinces and the Midnapore District in
Bengal, in connection with which the public had demanded
redress. We have already referred to the shooting in Pesha-
war. In Gujerat, the United Provinces and Midnapore,
excesses had been committed by the forces of the Crown in
trying to suppress the no-tax campaign and in the United
Provinces there had been allegations of assault on women of
a revolting description. In addition to these, a recent incident
which was still fresh in the public mind was the assault by
the police on a peaceful procession in Calcutta on Independence
Day (January 26th, 1931). This procession which was being
led by the writer who was then the Mayor of Calcutta, was
suddenly attacked without warning by British mounted
police armed with lathis (powerful sticks covered with leather)
¹ True to his assurance, on the eve of his arrest under Regulation 25
of 1827 on January 4th, 1932, the Mahatma issued an appeal in which
he said, 'Discard every trace of violence from your heart; give abso-
lute protection to every English man, woman and child.'

240 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
and mercilessly belaboured. The writer and a number of
other processionists, including Mr. Chattopadhyaya, the
Education Officer, and Mr. Ghoshal, the Deputy Licence
Officer of the Calcutta Municipality, were seriously injured in
the assault, though the procession remained peaceful and
non-violent till the end. The next day the writer was sentenced
to six months' imprisonment for rioting,¹ by the Chief
Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta. That the Mayor of the
first city in India could be treated by the police in this fashion
was something which even the Indian public could not stand.
The police, on the other hand, felt that they could do just as
they liked because they would never be called upon to appear
before the bar of public opinion.
The restricted scope of the amnesty promised under the
Pact, caused considerable disappointment among certain
sections of the people and alienated the Mahatma still more
from the revolutionaries and from trade-union circles,
including the friends and followers of the Meerut prisoners.
If the Mahatma could have secured amnesty for all these
classes of prisoners, he would have stood out not only as the
representative of the Nationalists but also of the trade-
unionists and the revolutionaries, and he could have exerted
his influence on them for good. The Government, too, if
they had taken courage in both hands and opened wide the
gates of the prison-house, would have made a magnanimous
gesture which would have gone straight into the hearts of the
people. And they would have lost nothing thereby—because
if anyone happened to abuse his liberty, he could again be put
back in prison through the help of the Regulation and the
Ordinances. Since the Mahatma confined himself to the cause
of the Satyagrahis, the revolutionaries in prison addressed a
letter to Lord Irwin stating that a settlement with Mahatma
¹ On this occasion the writer had to spend 24 hours in the Lalbazar
Central Police Station without food and drink and without change. There
was only a small quantity of Tincture of Iodine available at the station
for application to his injuries. This was soon exhausted and when he asked
for more, he did not get any. The next day he had to appear in Court
with his clothes covered with blood and his arm in a sling. He made
a statement before the Magistrate regarding his treatment in the Police
Station which was duly recorded. After his removal to prison he was
X-rayed and it was then found that two of the fingers in his right hand
had been fractured.

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 241
Gandhi would not necessarily be binding on them and that if
'His Excellency desired a real settlement of the Indian question,
the Government should come to a separate understanding
with the Revolutionary Party. This letter reached the
Viceroy’s hands through a prominent Indian politician.¹
This representation was not altogether useless, because a
few months later, the Governor of Bengal, Sir Stanley Jackson,
made an effort to come to an understanding with the revolu-
tionaries. At his instance the late Mr. J. M. Sengupta went to
Buxa Detention Camp in North Bengal and interviewed some
of the leaders. The result was not unsatisfactory. The inter-
viewed prisoners said that they were prepared to discuss
terms, but they insisted that the negotiations should be carried
on direct with the Government and not through any police-
officer. They also gave a preliminary outline of the terms
which the late Mr. Sengupta duly conveyed to the Governor.
Thereafter, a reference was made by the Government to the
prisoners through the Superintendent of the Camp, who was
a police-officer. But they refused to move further in the
matter, if the negotiations were not carried on direct with
them. As the Government were not agreeable to that, the
negotiations fell through.
In spite of all that has been written above, to the un-
sophisticated masses, the Delhi Pact appeared to be a victory
for the Mahatma. Only with the lapse of time were they to
be gradually disillusioned. Many intelligent people seriously
believed that besides the written, there were other unwritten
terms which would be disclosed later on and many of those
who were against the Pact maintained that the Mahatma
should be given a free hand till the end of the Second Round
Table Conference. The Karachi Congress undoubtedly
represented the pinnacle of the Mahatma’s popularity and
prestige. I travelled with him for some days and was able to
observe the unprecedented crowds that greeted him every-
where. I wonder if such a spontaneous ovation was ever
given to a leader anywhere else. He stood out before the
people not merely as a Mahatma but as the hero of a political
¹ I came to know these facts after my release from prison in March
1931.
Q

242 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
fight. The question that stirred me at the time was as to how
he would utilise the unique position he had been able to
attain. Would he be able to move from one victory to another,
or would the anti-climax begin? The first shock came when
the news was announced that the Working Committee on
April 2nd, had selected Mahatma Gandhi as the sole represen-
tative of the Congress at the Round Table Conference and
that he had accepted that decision. What really was behind
that decision I have never been able to understand. Was it
due to the vanity of the Mahatma who wanted to appear
before the world as the sole representative of the dumb
millions of India? Or was it merely one more error of
judgment on the part of the Working Committee? Or was
there some other motive behind the decision? It is impossible
to accept the first explanation. Whatever the real explanation
may be, the decision itself was a thoroughly wrong one. Alone
in an assembly of about one hundred men, with all kinds of
non-descripts, flunkeys and self-appointed leaders arrayed
against him like a solid phalanx, he would be at a great
disadvantage. Moreover, he would have nobody at his side
to back him up in the fight that he would have with the
reactionary Moslem leaders. But there was no help for it.
The blind followers of the Mahatma could not be expected to
criticise him and those who were not his orthodox followers
had no influence on him regardless of their character, wisdom,
or experience.
While the first move of the Mahatma after the Karachi
Congress was not a wise one, the second move was a positive
blunder. In private and in public, he began to say that his
going to the Round Table Conference depended on his ability
to solve the Hindu-Moslem question beforehand. Along with
this statement he also began to say that if the Moslems made
a united demand on the question of representation, electorate,
etc., in the new Constitution, he would accept the demand.
The effect of these statements was a most tragic one. After
the Delhi Pact, the reactionary Moslems had been somewhat
overawed by the strength and power of the Congress and they
were in a mood to come to terms with that body on a reasonable
basis. The first statement of the Mahatma immediately

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 243
changed that mood and made them feel that they held the
key position, since if they refused to come to an understanding
with him, they could prevent his attending the Round Table
Conference. The second statement of the Mahatma made the
reactionary Moslems feel that if only they would remain firm
and secure the support of the Nationalist Moslems, the
Mahatma could be forced to accept all their extreme demands.
After the above statements had been made, the Mahatma had
a conference with some reactionary Moslem leaders in Delhi
in April. I was in Delhi at the time and I went to see him
the same evening, after the conference. He seemed to be in a
depressed mood, because they had presented him with the
fourteen demands made by Mr. Jinnah (known in India as
Jinnah's fourteen points) and he felt that an agreement would
not be possible on that basis. Thereupon I remarked that the
Congress should only care for an agreement between
Nationalist Hindus and Nationalist Moslems and that the
agreed solution should be placed before the Round Table
Conference as the Nationalist demand and that the Congress
need not bother what other anti-Nationalist elements thought
or said. The Mahatma then asked me if I had any objection
to separate electorates since it could be argued that in the
absence of the third party the different communities would
live and work in concord. To this I replied that separate
electorates were against the fundamental principle of
Nationalism and that I felt so strongly on the subject that even
'Swaraj on the basis of separate electorates was, in my opinion,
not worth having. While we were engaged in this discussion,
Dr. Ansari and some of the Nationalist Moslem leaders
including Mr. Sherwani, arrived on the scene and joined in
the discussion. They said that if for any reason the Mahatma
gave up the demand for a common electorate for both Hindus
and Moslems and accepted the demand of the reactionaries for
a separate electorate for each community, they would oppose
the reactionary Moslems and also the Mahatma, because they
were convinced that separate electorates were bad not only
for the country as a whole, but also for the different com-
munities. The strong attitude of the Nationalist Moslems on
this occasion was largely responsible for preventing the

244 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Mahatma from agreeing to separate electorates and forced
him to wriggle out of the uncomfortable situation in which
he had placed himself.¹ Soon after this, the Mahatma issued
a public statement saying that he could not accept the
demands made by the communalist Moslem leaders, since the
Nationalist Moslems were opposed to them.
The atmosphere in Delhi was then (i.e., in April 1931) full
of intrigue. Though Lord Irwin was inspired by a sincere
desire for a settlement, there were many officials who were
against it. These diehard elements were encouraged by the
impending departure of Lord Irwin from India and the
advent of Lord Willingdon, who had the reputation of being
a strong man. While we were in Delhi, information reached
us from a reliable source as to the tactics that the British
Government would follow at the Round Table Conference.
We were told that every effort would be made to drag Mahatma
Gandhi at the very outset into minor issues with a view to
getting the Indians to fight among themselves, so that they
would not be able to combine against the British Government
over the major issues. I duly conveyed to the Mahatma this
information for what it was worth. He said in reply that
his plan was to meet the authorities concerned soon after his
arrival in London and try to obtain satisfaction from them
on the major issues. If he felt satisfied, he would go into the
minor issues—otherwise his work in England would end
there and then. Unfortunately, when Mahatma Gandhi was
in England, the minorities problem assumed the greatest
importance and all the major problems were put aside.
Events took place exactly as it had been prophesied in April
at Delhi.
On April 18th, Lord Irwin's tenure of office came to an
end. Before leaving Delhi he made an exceedingly conciliatory
speech at the Chelmsford Club. Though a prominent member
of the Conservative Party, he had proved himself to be a
well-wisher of India. After Lord Ripon, no Viceroy had
adopted such a friendly attitude towards the Indian people
as he had. That he could not do more for India was due
¹ In the light of these facts, the attitude of the Nationalist Moslems in
1934 to the Prime Minister's Communal Award is inexplicable.

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 245
to the reactionary forces that were working against him
both in India and in England. With the arrival of Lord
Willingdon, the official attitude began to stiffen. Effect was
not given to the Pact by officials in different provinces. In
Gujerat the peasantry had great difficulty in getting back
their confiscated lands and the Mahatma had to spend
practically the whole of his time between the Karachi Con-
gress and his departure for London in attending to their
grievances. In the United Provinces, though the civil-dis-
obedience movement was suspended, the peasants said that
they were unable to pay the rent. Even the Mahatma's advice
that they should pay 50 per cent. of their dues—they could
not give effect to. The situation was, however, worst in
Bengal. In spite of the Pact, imprisonment without trial
continued from day to day on the plea that there was a
revolutionary movement afoot. Out of nearly one thousand
state prisoners incarcerated without trial, not a single soul
was released. The Conspiracy Cases then going on in the
province were continued as usual. From time to time terrorist
activities took place by way of retaliation against official
oppression. No change in the official attitude was visible at
all in Bengal after the truce and in India as a whole, signs of
goodwill on the official side were lacking.
By July, the Congress head-quarters had unmistakable
proofs that the provisions of the Pact were not being given
effect to. A 'charge sheet' containing allegations of breaches
of the Pact on the official side were handed over to the Home
Secretary to the Government of India at Simla by the
Mahatma personally. The air was thick with rumours that
the Mahatma would decline to go to London. The authorities
in London grew anxious as they wanted the Mahatma to come
at any cost. Pressure was brought to bear on the Viceroy to
see that everything possible was done to facilitate his going
to London. In August, the Mahatma had long talks with
the new Viceroy as a result of which the tension was con-
siderably eased. The Mahatma wanted an arbitrator to inquire
into complaints about the non-fulfilment of the Pact, but to
this the Viceroy would not agree. He however promised
inquiries into the specific allegations made by the Mahatma.

246 'THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
An eleventh-hour agreement between the Congress leader
and the Viceroy was somehow arrived at. The Mahatma
took a special train to Bombay and was just in time for the
outgoing boat, S.S. Rajputana. On September 11th, 1931, the
Mahatma set foot on French soil. The next day he was in
London.

CHAPTER XII
MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE (1931)
DRESSED in loin-cloth and sandals and with but a shawl to
protect him from the inclement weather, the Mahatma landed
in Marseilles on September 11th, 1931. A select group of
British and Indian friends and admirers met him there and
accompanied him to London. On arriving there, he was
taken straight to a reception at the Friends' House. In reply
to the address of welcome, referring to the British Govern-
ment, he humorously remarked: 'You cannot honestly balance
the Budget without first balancing the relations between
India and England.'
The writer was one of those who at one time felt mis-
givings as to whether the Mahatma would be well-advised to
visit Europe in his characteristic loin-cloth: On his former
visits to Europe, he was, of course, clothed differently. But
on this occasion he did the right thing in adhering to his
favourite dress. Questioned by a reporter about his dress,
the Mahatma once jocosely remarked: 'You people wear
plus-fours, mine are minus-fours.' Then changing to a more
serious vein, he said: 'If I came here to live and work like
an English citizen, then I should conform to the customs of
the country and should wear the dress of an Englishman.
But I am here on a great and special mission, and my loin-
cloth, if you choose so to describe it, is the dress of my
principals, the people of India.' His countrymen to-day feel
proud that he stuck to the dress of his principals and even
attended the Buckingham Palace party in the same dress.
During his stay in London, between September 12th and
December 1st, the Mahatma spoke twelve times at the Round
Table Conference¹—twice before the plenary session of the
¹ The second Round Table Conference consisted of 107 members, Of
these, 65 were from British India, 22 from the Indian States and 20 from
the three British Parties. The Minorities Committee of the Conference
was composed of 6 Britishers, 13 Moslems, 10 Hindus, 2 from the depressed
247

248 · THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Conference on November 30th and December 1st, eight times
before the Federal Structure Committee and twice before the
Minorities Committee. In his maiden speech before the
Federal Structure Committee on September 15th, 1931, he
explained the position of the Indian National Congress and
the mandate given by the Karachi Congress and went on to
say: 'Time was when I prided myself on being and being
called a British subject. I have ceased for many years to
call myself a British subject; I would far rather be called a
rebel than a subject. But I have now aspired—and I still
aspire—to be a citizen, not in the Empire but in a Common-
wealth, in a partnership if possible, if God wills it, an indis-
soluble partnership but not a partnership superimposed
upon one nation by another.' (It is clear from this speech
that in spite of the Lahore resolution on independence, the
Mahatma was striving for a settlement with Britain on the
basis of Dominion Status.)
In the Press interview which the Mahatma had granted on
board S.S. Rajputana, it was evident that he was full of
optimism. But before the second meeting of the Federal
Structure Committee which took place on September 17th,
disillusionment began to creep in. He began to realise
of what stuff the members of the Round Table Conference
were made. Therefore at the outset of his speech on Sep-
tember 17th, he said: 'I have endeavoured to study, as
I had not done before, the list of the delegates; and the first
feeling of oppression that has been coming upon me is that
we are not the chosen ones of the nation which we should be
representing, but we are the chosen ones of the Government.
Furthermore, knowing well the different parties and groups
in India from experience, as I study the list of delegates I
see some very noticeable gaps,¹ and so I am oppressed with a
sense of unreality in connection with our composition.' The
Mahatma began to see through the game of the British
classes, 2 from Labour, 2 Sikhs, 1 Parsi, 2 Indian Christians, 2 Britishers
domiciled in India, 1 Anglo-Indian and 3 women—total 44. The Moslems
who are a quarter of the Indian population had the largest representation
and there was only one Nationalist Moslem among them.
¹ This reference was to the Nationalist Moslems, among others, whose
absence the Mahatma now began to feel. The discovery of the Mahatma
one cannot help feeling, was rather belated.

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 249
politicians—hence in order to turn the tables on them he
called upon them to make concrete proposals. (In reply to
that move, the Government sought to turn the tables on him
by summoning the Minorities Committee which would form
the battle-ground for the Indian 'delegates.) In the same
meeting, replying to an attack levelled against the Congress,
the Mahatma said: 'Though the Government of the day has
accused us of insolently setting up a parallel Government, I
would like to subscribe to that charge in my own fashion.
Though we have not set up any parallel Government,¹ we
certainly aspire some day or other to displace the existing
Government and in due course, in the course of evolution,
also to take charge of that Government.'
Mahatma Gandhi's first speech before the Minorities
Committee was delivered on October 8th, 1931. The appre-
hension that he had hinted at on September 17th, had been
realised by then and all attempts to arrive at a settlement of
the communal question had ended in failure. No wonder,
when the members were the chosen ones of Government!
This result had been clearly indicated in the manifesto issued
by the writer and others in opposition to the leaders' Delhi
manifesto in November 1929. On October 8th, 1931, the
Mahatma said: 'It is with deep sorrow and deeper humiliation
that I have to announce utter failure on my part to secure
an agreed solution of the communal question through informal
conversation among and with the representatives of different
groups. . . . But to say that the conversations have to our utter
shame failed is not to say the whole truth. Causes of failure
were inherent in the composition of the Indian delegation.
We are almost all not elected representatives of the parties or
groups we are presumed to represent—we are here by
nomination of the Government. Nor are those whose presence
was absolutely necessary for an agreed solution to be found
here. Further you will allow me to say that this was hardly
the time to summon the Minorities Committee. It lacks the
sense of reality in that we do not know what it is that we
¹ The writer moved a resolution at the Lahore Congress in 1929 to the
effect that the Congress should aim at setting up a parallel Government.
This resolution was defeated, all the followers of the Mahatma voting
against it.

250 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
are going to get. . . . I therefore venture to suggest that the
Minorities Committee be adjourned sine die and that the
fundamentals of the Constitution be hammered into shape as.
quickly as possible. . . . Should all efforts at agreement fail
even when the Round Table Conference reaches the end of
its labours, I would suggest the addition of a clause to the
expected Constitution appointing a judicial tribunal that
would examine all claims and give its final decision on all
the points that may be left unsettled.' Going through this
speech, one cannot help thinking what a change it would
have made if the Mahatma had come tc London with a full
contingent of Nationalist representatives of Moslems and
other minority communities to counteract the mischievous
moves of 'the chosen ones of the Government.' It is also to
be regretted that despite the warning he had received at Delhi,
soon after the Karachi Congress, the Mahatma did not realise
that the main function of the Minorities Committee would
be to create confusion among the Indian members and shelve
the main political issues. It was certainly another blunder for
the Mahatma to suggest a judicial tribunal which would of
course be appointed by the British Government and would
in all probability have produced the same document as the
Prime Minister's Communal Award. If the British Govern-
ment had taken the Mahatma at his word and appointed a
judicial tribunal, what would have been the Mahatma's posi-
tion to-day?
Before the next meeting of the Minorities Committee was
held on November 13th, 1931, an interesting development
had taken place. The so-called representatives of the minority
communities had concluded a Pact among themselves as a
solution of the communal question. This Pact—called the
Minorities Pact—vouchsafed to them a very large share of
the loaves and fishes of the Constitution. The Pact was made
with the full approval of the Government and the British
members of the Conference coming from India had taken
a leading part in it. The Sikhs, did not, however, join this
Pact. Before entering into this Pact, Dr. Ambedkar, the
nominated representative of the Depressed Classes, wanted to
come to an agreement with the Mahatma whereby a certain

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 251
number of seats would be reserved in the Legislatures for the
Depressed Classes on the basis of a Common Electorate for
all sections of the Hindus. At that time, the Mahatma would
not think of any such compromise. When Dr. Ambedkar
joined the Minorities Pact, he was assured not only of a
number of seats for the Depressed Classes, but also of a
separate electorate for them. There is no doubt that if a
settlement had then been made with Dr. Ambedkar, the terms
would have been much better than the terms of the Poona
Pact concluded in September 1932, after the historic fast of
the Mahatma.
At the meeting of the Minorities Committee held on
November 13th, 1931, the Chairman, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald,
referring to the Minorities Pact, claimed that it was acceptable
to well over 115 million people in India. He also replied
to the Mahatma's attack at the previous meeting and urged
on the contrary, that inability to solve the communal question
was hampering the progress of Constitution-building. In his
speech the Mahatma emphatically challenged both these
assertions and with reference to the first, he claimed that the
Congress represented 85 or 95 per cent. of the population
not merely of British India but of the whole of India. In
the same speech the Mahatma made one significant assertion:
'I would like to repeat what I have said before—that while
it will always accept any solution that may be acceptable to
the Hindus, Mussalmans and Sikhs, the Congress will be
no party to special reservation or special electorates for any
other minorities.'¹ The Mahatma once again urged the
appointment by the Government of a judicial tribunal to
give a final decision on the communal question.
Before the Federal Structure Committee on October 23rd,
1931, Mahatma Gandhi put forward with due emphasis the
Congress view regarding a Supreme Court for India. He
urged that this Federal Court should be a court of the widest
jurisdiction possible and not one to decide only those cases
that arise from the administration of Federal laws. He
¹ In the light of this statement the Mahatma's endorsement of the
Poona Pact in September, 1932, is inexplicable, since the Poona Pact
provided for reservation of seats for the Depressed Classes.

252 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
opposed the idea of having two Supreme Courts, one to deal
merely with Federal Law and the other to deal with all the
other matters not covered by the Federal Administration or
the Federal Government. On November 17th, 1931, the
Mahatma spoke on the Congress demand for complete control
over the army and over external affairs. He said, that the
present army, whether Indian or British, was an army of
occupation. 'I would say emphatically that the whole of this
army should be disbanded if it does not pass under my control
before I could possibly shoulder the burden of running the
Government of India under the terrible handicaps under
which we are labouring as a legacy of alien rule. . . . If the
British people think that we shall require a century before
that can be done, then for that century the Congress will
wander in the wilderness and the Congress must go through
that terrible fiery ordeal . . . and if it becomes necessary and
if it is God's will—a shower of bullets.'
On November 19th, 1931, before the Federal Structure
Committee, the Mahatma opposed the resolution on com-
mercial safeguards for Britishers passed by the first Round
Table Conference as being detrimental to the interests of the
Indian people. He agreed that there should be no racial
discrimination against foreigners as such. He also agreed
that 'no existing interest legitimately acquired and not being
in conflict with the best interests of the nation in general,
shall be interfered with except in accordance with the law
applicable to such interests.' But he made it clear that the
National Government of the future might find it necessary
to dispossess the 'haves' in the interests of the 'have-nots,'
i.e., the famished millions of India. Existing interests should
be subjected to judicial scrutiny when necessary—but no
racial question would be involved therein. He further
opposed the existing rights¹ of the European community in
India in regard to criminal trials. In his next speech at the
Round Table Conference on November 25th, he maintained
that the obligations to be taken over by the future National
Government of India should be subject to audit and impartial.
¹ For instance the right to have a European judge or a European jury
in the trial.

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 253
examination.¹ He condemned the fixing of the currency ratio
at 1s. 6d. instead of at 1s. 4d., as the Indian people had
demanded. Continuing, he said: 'I would want complete
control of Indian finance if India was really to have respon-
sibility at the centre. In my opinion, unless we have control
over our own purse, absolutely unrestricted, we shall not be
able to shoulder the responsibility nor will it be a respon-
sibility worth the name.' In another speech the same day,
he maintained that after mature consideration he had come
to the conclusion that provincial autonomy and central
responsibility must go together. 'A strong centre governed
and administered by an alien authority and a strong autonomy
(for the provinces) are a contradiction in terms.' Speaking of
central responsibility, he said: 'I want that responsibility at
the centre that will give me, as you all know, control of the
army and finance. I know that I am not going to get that
here and now and I know there is not a British man ready
for that. Therefore, I know I must go back and yet invite
the nation to a course of suffering.'
Mahatma Gandhi's first speech at the plenary session of
the Round Table Conference on November 30th, is a priceless
document, though it affords painful reading, being a record
of disillusionment complete. He started by saying: 'All the
other parties at this meeting represent sectional interests. The
Congress alone claims to represent the whole of India and all
interests. . . . And yet here I see that the Congress is treated
as one of the parties . . . . I wish I could convince all the
British public men, the British Ministers that the Congress is
capable of delivering the goods. . . . But no, although you
have invited the Congress you distrust the Congress. Although
you have invited the Congress, you reject its claim to represent
the whole of India.' Referring to the communal question, he
told the unpleasant truth 'that so long as the wedge in the
shape of foreign rule divides community from community
and class from class, there will be no real living solution,
there will be no living friendship between these communities.'
On the question of the national demand he said: 'Call it

¹ In this connection he referred to the Report of the Public Debt Enquiry
Committee appointed by the Karachi Congress in 1931.

254 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
by any name you like, a rose will smell as sweet by any other
name, but it must be the rose of liberty that I want and not
the artificial product.' Then in order to soften his demand
for independence he appealed in these words: 'I want to -
become a partner with the English people; but I want to
enjoy precisely the same liberty that your people enjoy and
I want to seek this partnership not merely for India and not
merely for mutual benefit.' Then finding that all appeals
were useless, he flared up and said: 'Will you not see the
writing that these terrorists are writing with their blood?'
And then he said: 'I shall hope against hope, I shall strain
every nerve to achieve an honourable settlement for my country.
... It can be a matter of no joy and comfort to me to lead
them again to a fight of that character, but if a further ordeal of
fire has to be our lot, I shall approach that with the greatest joy
and with the greatest consolation that I was doing what I felt
to be right, that the country was doing what it felt to be right.'
At the last sitting of the plenary session of the Round
Table Conference on December 1st, 1931, the Prime Minister,
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, made the following declaration:
'At the beginning of the year (1931) I made a declaration
of the policy of the then Government and I am authorised
by the present one to give you and India specific assurance
that it remains its policy. I shall repeat the salient sentences
of that declaration.
'The view of His Majesty's Government is that respon-
sibility for the Government of India should be placed upon
the Legislatures, Central and Provincial, with such pro-
visions as may be necessary to guarantee during the period
of transition the observance of certain obligations and to
meet other special circumstances and also with such
guarantees as are required by the minorities to protect their
political rights. In such statutory safeguards as may be
made for meeting the needs of the transitional period, it
will be the primary concern of His Majesty's Government
to see the reserved powers so framed and exercised as not
to prejudice the advance of India through the new Con-
stitution to full responsibility for her own Government.
'Regarding the Central Government it made it plain
that, subject to defined conditions, His Majesty's late

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 255
Government was prepared to recognize the principle of
responsibility of the executive to the Legislature if both
were constituted on an All-India Federal basis.
'The principle of responsibility was to be subject to the
qualification that in the existing circumstances, defence and
external affairs must be reserved to the Governor-General
and that regarding finance, such conditions must apply as
would insure the fulfilment of the obligations incurred
under the authority of the Secretary of State (for India)
and the maintenance unimpaired of the financial stability
and credit of India.
'Finally, it was our view that the Governor-General
must be granted the necessary powers to enable him to
'fulfil his responsibility for securing the observance of the
constitutional rights of the minorities and for ultimately
maintaining the tranquillity of the State.'
Moving a vote of thanks to the Premier the Mahatma said
that in all probability he had come to the parting of the
ways but he hoped that if a fight was unavoidable, it would
be conducted without malice on either side. Three days later
the Mahatma said good-bye to the Premier and left London.
Before leaving London in an interview to the Press he stated
that an immediate nation-wide resumption of civil dis-
obedience was out of the question—but he did foresee the
possibility of local civil disobedience being launched as a
protest against specific acts of injustice and tyranny, as for
example the ordinances promulgated in Bengal, the United
Provinces and the Frontier Province.
During his stay of nearly three months in England, the
Mahatma had an exceedingly busy time. A glance at his
daily routine would show that he was overstraining himself
—sometimes not allowing himself to have more than two
hours' sleep for days together. He met all sorts of people
there—M.P.s, politicians, journalists, missionaries, society
ladies, social workers, litterateurs, artists, students, and what
not. During week-ends he would undertake tours to Cam-
bridge or Oxford or Lancashire, in order to awaken interest
in and sympathy for India. But it seems that there was lack
of co-ordination and unity of purpose in all his activities.

256 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Indian members of the Round Table Conference complained
that it was difficult to get at the Mahatma when they wanted
him. Indian Liberal members of the Round Table Con-
ference complained that instead of playing a lone hand, he
could have rallied all the anti-communal forces and become
the leader of a united Nationalist Party.¹ Whatever the truth
of these criticisms may be, there is no doubt that the Mahatma's
visit to England was badly planned—if there was any plan at
all—and his personal entourage did not consist of any advisers
worth the name. His indecision, till the eleventh hour, about
attending the London Conference was largely responsible for
his lack of plan and for his late arrival in London which
considerably handicapped him. As contrasted with him, the
Government had made elaborate arrangements and all their
plans had been carefully worked out in advance. It was only
in London that he realised what it meant to have a conference
with members chosen by the Government, with the Congress
as one of the several parties present there and with himself
as the only representative of the Congress. The wonder of
it is that such a shrewd politician as the Mahatma made
such a belated discovery in spite of the warnings given by
lesser folk in India.
But the causes of the Mahatma's failure in London go
much deeper. If the Mahatma meant to co-operate with the
Round Table Conference, he should have gone there in 1930.
The terms which he got in March 1931—he could have easily
got in August 1930. The assurance regarding Dominion
Status which he had demanded in 1929 and 1930—he could
not get even in 1931 and as for the other concessions in the
Gandhi-Irwin Pact, Lord Irwin would in all probability have
agreed to them at any time. In 1930, the Congress could
easily have got half the number of seats at the Conference.
By going there in 1931, alone and unfriended, the Mahatma
had the tactical disadvantage of having to meet a conference
which had come into existence without the participation of
the Congress and of having to build on sectarian foundations
laid by communalist members. With the Labour Cabinet in
¹ This was the view expressed by the Right Hon. V. S. Sastri in the Indian
Review of January, 1932.