पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

46 PANIPAT 1761
very remote, still peace parleys continued throughout. Najib Khan's proposal
forwarded through Shuja was to hand over the regions beyond Sarhind to
Abdali and hand over the Delhi affairs into his hands Shuja wanted the
Chancellorship as well as the command over the army of the Mughal Em
pire ⁶⁸ But Najib would never allow the military command to pass out of his
hands Bhau's idea was to fix the boundary at Attock, leaving Peshawar and
Kabul to Abdali, while the imperial defence would be left as it was, meaning
through the agency of the Marathas But Bhau was not obstinate on any
point. He knew that no one could have everything his own way In diplo
macy "give and take" is necessary and inevitable, and therefore he still hoped
to find a via media out of the impasse
The condition in the middle of September was as follows There was
no money left in the government treasury nor was any forthcoming from the
revenue collectors like Govindpant Bundele Bhau knew the economic con
dition of the region surrounding Delhi very well and understood the difficulties
of recovering government dues in the then conditions of northern India Be
sides the military trouble due to war with Abdali, nature also had some say
in the affair Hail storms and certain pests had that year destroyed the crops
in many parts and there was a consequent deficit in revenue collection ⁶⁹ The
dismissal of old collectors like Naro Shankar and his brother and recently of
Mahadaji Govind Kakirde⁷⁰ appointed in his place, had adversely affected the
Maratha revenues in Bundelkhand Bhau also suspected the sincerity of the
collectors who, he thought, were withholding payments with a view to take
advantage of the difficulties of the government ⁷¹ They would pay after the
event instead of before it, as they were not sure of the result of the war and
hoped to profit thereby As the army was starving and not even a week's
payment out of the month could be made to them, Bhau had recourse to the
politically disastrous action of taking out the silver ceiling of the Diwan i khas,
and minting it into money He was able to secure only nine lakhs by this
process and thereby feed his army for one month only It seems this action
was tom tomed as insulting to the Mughal throne by the Muslim partisans of
Najib, and it inflamed the Muslim population in the surrounding regions
against the Marathas As a matter of fact, the Wazir Ghazi ud din had already
taken out a part of that very ceiling previously when he was in need of money,
and Bhau was not the first vandal to touch it as made out by partisan his-
torians ⁷² But none seemed to have noticed the Wazir's act while all flared
up against Bhau's behaviour When the famous peacock throne of Shah Jahan
was taken away by Nadir Shah or when the whole palace and its inmates
were completely stripped of their effects by Abdali, none seemed to have thought
these as an insult to the Mughal throne then, possibly because the spoliators
were devout Muslims
68 Purandare 1.389
69 Shinde 1.222 Purandare 1.386.
70 Satara 2.291 Dabholkar Mss. 152.
71 SPD 27.234.
72 Ibid 27.257

SADASHIVRAO’S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 47
Bhau’s difficulties were increased by the Peshwa’s ignorance of northern
Indian affairs. It was customary for the Maratha army to subsist on the land
they marched through; but, after experience, the people of the regions through
which they marched had become wiser than before, and left nothing on the
spot to be carried away by the Marathas. Bhau had himself taken Raghunath-
rao to task for not being able to defray the expenditure of his campaign, and
now he could not possibly ask for funds from the Deccan. The stress of cir-
cumstances, however, obliged even the proud Bhau to beg for funds. The
Peshwa first ordered the revenue collectors in the north to pay half the revenues
to Bhau. This order only facilitated equivocation by the delaying collectors
They would write to the Peshwa that Bhau had taken the whole revenue from
them and write to Bhau that they had sent the whole money to the Deccan.
Bhau, therefore, over-riding the Peshwa’s orders, asked the collectors to send
the whole amount to him only. Still no money was forthcoming from anybody
Bhau had received two lakhs’from Govindpant and eighty thousand from Babu-
rao Koner of Jhansi. This was all he was able to receive at Delhi. While
Bhau was besieged at Panipat, Govindpant brought four lakhs and twenty
thousand to Delhi at the beginning of December, only a quarter of which
reached Bhau’s camp in safety. Besides Govindpant, some other collectors
like Gopal Keshav of Bhander (SPD, 29-12) also seem to have forwarded
their collections to Delhi after Bhau’s move to Kunjpura. The capture of
Delhi had placed an additional burden on Bhau’s depleted treasury because he
had now to provide for the palace-expenditure which came to more than a
lakh per month.
There is some ground for suspicion that Bhau’s plans were being ob-
structed by certain forces in Poona, antagonistic to him. Gopikabai, the wife
of the Peshwa, always feared, it seems, the complete usurpation of power by
Bhau as he was already the sole administrator. The Peshwa was every day
growing weaker and weaker both physically and morally. This fact also en-
hanced the lady’s fears. She, as well as the Peshwa’s advisers in Poona, espe-
cially the wily Sakharam Bapu, who it should be noted, was with the Peshwa in
the Deccan and had not accompanied Vishwasrao to the north, as wrongly
stated by Sir Jadunath,⁷³ seem to have been responsible for advising the
Peshwa to withhold any more help to Bhau for fear of his increasing power.
Sakharam Bapu was perhaps the cleverest brain in the Poona Court of those
times. He was from very early days a sort of rival to Bhau in diplomatic
matters. The Peshwa seems to have used Bapu as a tool to keep a balance
of power at the Poona Court. Bhau’s ways were open and straightforward.
Bapu’s conduct was exactly the reverse. The two could not go together with
these contrary dispositions. Sakharam Bapu had, therefore, always sided with
the party opposite to Bhau. He accompanied Raghunathrao in his north
Indian campaigns as his chief adviser and administrator. Though Raghunath-
rao as the master cannot be absolved from the blame, the chief responsibility
for the financial mismanagement of his campaigns should be properly placed
on Sakharam Bapu’s shoulders. Being conscious of his share in the guilt,
⁷³ Fall 2.240 (foot note)

48 PANIPAT 1761
Bapu naturally must have come to loggerheads with Bhau when the final ac-
counts of the campaigns came to be settled
Peculation was quite rampant in those days in official circles and the
Maratha state was no exception to the rule Profiteering at the cost of govern-
ment was thought to be no sin and was a normal part of a wise man's living
While some of the generals and diplomats and administrators waxed fat, the
state languished for want of money The Peshwa's government perhaps suf-
fered more than the other governments through this mischief, because the ruder
Maratha generals were more grabbing and the selfish and brainy Brahmin ac-
countants and collectors were clever at figures To spite Bhau now, Bapu must
have taken full advantage of his difficulties in tutoring the Peshwa against him
Bhau's advisers and assistants in this campaign were also rivals of Bapu at the
Poona Court Trimbak Sadashiv alias Nana Purandare and Balvantrao
Mehendale were not well disposed towards him, Nana Purandare was on al-
most inimical terms with Bapu 74 In short Sakharam Bapu belonged to the
party of critics of Sadashivrao's policy One is, therefore, led to believe in
the truth of that one line commentary copied and reproduced in Khare I,75
which also explains to some extent the attitude of the Peshwa towards the
Delhi campaign of Sadashivrao Bhau as reported by Naro Gangadhar from
the Peshwa's camp in the Deccan 76
Sadashivrao Bhau, writing from Delhi in the middle of September 1760
to his intimate friend, Dhondo Malhar Purandare, states that there is no dif-
ference of opinion between him and the two sardars Shinde and Holkar It
means that the dramatic episode of Surajmal described in detail in the Bakhar
is all imaginary and an after thought Honest difference of opinion about the
policy to be followed against Abdali might be there, but the cause of his ab-
ruptly leaving Delhi without taking leave of Bhau must be his disappointment
Bhau would not place the city in the charge of the Jat, but appointed Naro
Shankar as the guardian of the city and the palace, instead Surajmal was,
no doubt, very shrewd and cautious His advice to keep the main camp with
its heavy encumbrances back in the Gwalior region was sound But he was
personally very selfish and always tried to secure his ends under the cloak of
humbleness. This time he wished to follow the same path and set himself
up as a regent in Delhi with the help of the Marathas His past behaviour
towards the Marathas was neither very honest nor consistent After Raghu-
nathrao's campaign against him in 1754, he occupied the lands in the Doab
surrounding Kol Ramgad during their absence from the north in 1755 77 In
1756 he would not risk his troops against Abdali by joining Antaji Manakesh-
war, though he took full advantage of Antaji's cover to guard his dominions
and save his forts When Raghunathrao again returned to the north, he still
kept himself studiously aloof and saved his skin Meanwhile he had reaped
the harvest out of Maratha weakness due to Jayapa's assassination He sud-
denly descended upon the strong imperial hill fort of Alwar which guarded
74 Purandare 3.82.
75 Khare, 1.25
6 SI D 2.133
77 Hingne 1.159.

SADASHIVRAO’S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA . 49
the route from Delhi to Jaipur, and occupied it without much trouble. When
Dattaji returned in 1758 with a strong force he again assumed humbleness and
tried to make a common cause with him in the spoliation of the Mughal em-
pire. He had kept on good terms with the Shinde family since the time he
was saved by Jayapa Shinde against Malharrao's fury at Kumbher, and thus
shielded himself against Malharrao's exactions. But he respected neither friend
nor foe when it was a question of aggrandizing himself at the cost of others.
For the present he had made common cause with Shinde and Holkar, fully
knowing that they would not be troublesome to him after their late defeats
at the hands of Abdali. On the other hand they were useful to him in meet-
ing the calls of Sadashivrao Bhau on his resources. Now finding himself un-
able to fulfil his life's ambition of governing Delhi, he silently walked away
from Bhau's camp with a show of anger at Bhau's policy. Bhau certainly felt
the loss of his help at this crucial time and tried to recall him. Mahipatrao
Chitnis, Gangoba Chandrachud and Ramaji Anant were sent after him to
bring him back.⁷⁸ This proves that Bhau had no intention of insulting him
as is made to appear in the Bhau Bakhar. Nor was he remiss in trying to win
him over with assurances. But it looks as if the Jat Raja was thoroughly
selfish and left the Maratha camp, ostensibly on account of a difference in out-
look on matters of policy, but really to save himself from Bhau's demands
and importunities due to the starving condition of his men and animals
Throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau was never once suspicious of the Jat's
attitude towards the Marathas, but always hoped for good behaviour from him
Though he had openly consented not to help⁷⁹ Bhau in his diplomatic talks
with Najib and Shuja as Abdali's emissaries, with a view to excuse himself
from paying tribute to the Afghan monarch, Surajmal did not do anything
antagonistic to the Maratha interests, but on the other hand considerably
helped them by allowing provisions and money to pass through his territory
unmolested.⁸⁰ There seems to have been talk of Surajmal's son, Jawahirmal,
coming to Bhau's help with the Jat forces at the beginning of October. When
Prince Javan Bakht was proclaimed on 10th October and the seals of his father
were brought into use, the Jat Raja became finally reconciled to the Maratha
side.⁷⁹ All these facts refute the criticism of Bhau's behaviour in his
dealings with Surajmal Jat. His humane behaviour and the monetary help
he afforded to the Maratha fugitives after Panipat completely belies the story
so dramatically related in the chronicle.
As related above, the peace parleys were dragging on all along, but
without sincerity on either side. Ahmad Shah had changed his camp of
thatched huts at Anupshahar on the Ganges at the beginning of August.⁸¹ This
was first a countermove to Bhau's occupation of Delhi, and was also due to the
unhealthiness of the place. Thousands of his horses and camels succumbed
to the heavy monsoon in the low-lying Gangetic valley.⁸² His first thought was
⁷⁸ SPD 27.258.
⁷⁹ Parasnis Persian Akhbars Mss
⁸⁰ Raj. 1.259.
⁸¹ Ibid. 1.226-7, 246.
⁸² SPD 2 131; Raj 6 404
P. F.—4

50 PANIPAT 1761
to move north to the strong fort of Sukartal and remain there At the begin
ning of October, he was reported to have left his camp at Sambharam Serai and
moved to Ahmad Ganj 79 But soon after he came to Shahadra, opposite to
Delhi on the bank of the Jamuna, and encamped there with Shuja and Najib
A distant cannonade was also sometimes indulged in by both the armies from
the two banks of the river It could not be very effective from a distance of
more than a mile with the artillery of those times Besides, none of the parties
was willing to waste its ammunition for merely terrifying without military
effect Internal trouble was also brewing amongst Abdalis allies Shuja and
Najib were strange bed fellows whom only destiny had brought together
Najib had promised that no demands for money would be made on Shuja if
he joined Abdalis camp This hope was belied, for the hungry and grabbing
Afghans tried to make encroachments on him, knowing full well that he was
rich This led to a quarrel between Shuja and the Durranis Shuja felt
himself deceived by the false promise of Najib and was almost in a repentant
mood 63 The Abdali troops, on the other hand, were reluctant to continue
their stay in India amidst misery and destitution, with little hope of earning
anything in the future
Bhau had sent one Bhavanishankar as a Vakil to Shuja across the
Jamuna and Shuja also sent his Vakil to Bhau in return 64 It seems from
Kashiraj s account that he also accompanied Raja Devidatta, Shuja's envoy
But there is no corroboration of the same in Marathi correspondence, a fact
which makes one suspicious about the truth of his narrative As Bhau was
not satisfied with Raja Devidatta, he sent him back with Bhavanishankar
This Bhavanishankar is scarcely mentioned anywhere in the Marathi nar-
rative as a person of importance Kashiraj says he was a native of Auranga
bad and belonged to his caste As the Brahmins of Aurangabad had taken to
Persian studies, they were in great demand at the courts of various north
Indian potentates who had any dealings with the Marathas Knowing both
Persian and Marathi, they were able to correspond and interpret between the
Maratha and other courts, and settled in various capitals The Hingne family
was also engaged by the Peshwa for the same qualifications Bhavanishankar
first came in contact with the Peshwa in his dealings with Shah Nawaz Khan
at the Nizam s court, and seems to have spread his influence over Bhau also 65
As Nana Fadnis in his Autobiography adversely comments on Bhavani
shankars influence over Bhau and expresses himself in disapproving terms
about his conduct it may be taken as a general opinion of the Maratha camp
about the man Bhau over rode the opinions of intimates like Balvantrao
Mehendale and Nana Purandare and completely put his faith in Bhavani
shankars advice, which was also the main cause of Bhaus decision to follow
Ibrahim Khan Gardis French tutored mode of warfare. Perhaps, even in the
succes ful Udgir campaign, 66 Bhau had followed Bhavanishankars advice and
the thundering success in it had established Bhavanishankar in Bhau's con
fidence Whatever the fact, his conduct of peace parleys at this juncture did
not prove succes sful as Najib-ud daulah threw every obstacle in the way Mal
63 Raj 1.235, 216
64 Samra 2.297

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 51
harrao and Surajmal were also keeping correspondence with Shuja and seek-
ing his advice as to the future line of action. Shuja advised the Marathas to
follow only the traditional mode of guerilla warfare, and to Surajmal he ad-
vised to return to his own country. To Bhau, Shuja professed friendship,
while declining to leave Abdali's camp, and promised to help the Maratha cause
by giving his best advice. From Kashiraj's account it seems Bhau had receded
back a great deal on his original terms one by one. As a last resort, he was
ready to surrender the Panjab upto Sarhind, but wanted Abdali no more to in-
terfere in the Delhi affairs. But, as mentioned above, nothing came out of this
boring of the mountain, not even a mouse. Both sides seem to have put their
final faith in a decision by arms. From the beginning, Bhau was ready to al-
low Abdali to return to his own country if he so desired. But if he really had a
mind to gain that end, it would have been better had he never crossed the
Chambal. In that case Abdali would possibly have left India through sheer
weariness. But with Bhau's big army advanced to Delhi, it was impossible
for Abdali to retreat without offering a battle. From that point of view it
would have been better for Sadashivrao Bhau to have turned his attention to
Shuja's dominions and to have proceeded to Benares instead of Delhi. But
unfortunately for the Marathas throughout their career, they had chosen the
cockpit of Delhi as their fighting arena and ultimately lost their all in it.
Meanwhile the condition of the Maratha army deteriorated day by day.
The bullocks of the artillery department died by hundreds and there were not
enough left with strength to drag the guns.⁸⁷ Bhau had also ordered⁸⁸ both
Govindpant and Gopalrao Barve to cross over the Ganges and threaten Shuja's
and the Ruhela's territories. But Govindpant was unable to move, firstly, on
account of the rains, and secondly, because the zamindars in the Doab and
Bundelkhand had become defiant and treacherous, and there was no safety
for the Maratha posts in those regions. Bhau had taken possession of all the
main ghats between Agra and Kunjpura and blocked the crossings for the
enemy. He had kept small patrols to guard the ferry ghats and collected all the
boats at Selimgad near Delhi. Though Bhau had now placed his main faith
in the artillery of Ibrahim Khan,⁸⁹ still he could not recruit any Marathas for
service in that department. He had to call the men from the enemy's ter-
ritories to do such work.⁹⁰ Bhau seems to have called some European gun-
ners from the eastern parts also. Many Portuguese, French, English and other
European adventurers and renegades were at this time spread over India,
ready to offer their services for good money. The war between the French
and the English had detached a number of Frenchmen from Chandranagar
and other places in Bengal. These were probably the persons Bhau was hop-
ing to engage. But none of these projects materialized and only a certain
number of Pathan followers of Ahmad Shah came over to the Maratha side
only to create confusion and disaster in the last fight.
85 RAJ. 1.85
86 SPD 25.279
87 RAJ. 1.231
88 Ibid 1.233, 237
89 Ibid. 1.174
90 Ibid. 1.176, 235

CHAPTER IV
KUNJPURA
TO UNDERSTAND Sadashivrao Bhau's campaign north of Delhi, it is
necessary to acquaint oneself with the terrain on both sides of the river Jamuna
The whole of this area is one vast, continuous, sandy plain formed by the silt
of the river It is a gradually sloping plain from the north to the south, and
just near the river banks very slightly sloping towards the river This plain is
between seven and eight hundred feet above the sea level on an average, with
practically no hills worth the name The rocky arm of the Aravalli Range,
starting from Mount Abu north of Gujarat, extends just up to the north of
Delhi city, and ends in the famous Ridge of Mutiny fame This is the last
rocky spot in the whole area North of it one can see scarcely a stone any-
where The very few elevated spots to be found in this even terrain look more
like mounds than hills, being made up of sandy rubble, and one sometimes
suspects these of being the handiwork rather, of man than of nature Where such
elevated spots occur, they are sure to be occupied by towns if sufficiently large,
or otherwise by a temple, a mosque, a Sadhubava or a Pir Sonepat and Panı
pat, reputed to be dating from the Mahabharata War, along with Indrapat or
the oldest Delhi, are situated on and alongside small hillocks, less than a hun
dred feet above the surrounding level plain Both were walled towns with
small citadels on the hill tops
The main features to be noted for the history of the eighteenth century
in this region were that the region was bounded by the river Jamuna on the
east, and by the imperial Ali Mardan Khan Canal (Shah nahar) on the west.
The imperial road with the Kos minars or pillars at an interval of two and a
half English miles passed through the Doab formed by these natural and man-
made aqueducts The road ran parallel to the east of the canal at a distance
of about five miles on an average, but it passed by the towns of Sonepat, Panı-
pat and Karnal The canal ended in the Delhi palace, after supplying the
famous Shalimar gardens to the north west of the city with ample water It
had been built to meet the needs of the imperial family in the main, but was
probably utilized by others also to the extent possible after fulfilling the re
quirements of the palace.
The area along the canal and beyond was thickly wooded while that
by the side of the river was boggy and marshy, overgrown with rushes and
other water plants for miles together There are fords at a distance of about
five miles on the river at present, but these were probably fewer in former days,
when irrigation canals had not drained the river dry There were ferries and
bridges of boats, however, at convenient and necessary places The river re-
mained unfordable during the rainy season and sometime after At some
places where the river had divided itself into several channels with sandy banks
and islands between, fording was easier and these places became the high roads
of movement and commerce like those near Kunjpura and Budhia Where the
[ 52 ]

KUNJPURA 53

river-bank was steep and the water deep, crossing was very difficult, if not
impossible.
Sadashivrao Bhau, after the first fortnight of August in Delhi, moved¹
his camp from Kalkādevi to the south of the city on the bank of the Jamuna
to the west of the city near Seetaram's serai beyond the canal, and this camp
seems to have extended upto the Shalimar gardens to the north-west, thus
covering an area of more than three miles in length from north to south. Here
he lived for almost seven weeks, till he began his northward march to Kunj-
pura in the first week of October. The Maratha army suffered great priva-
tions² in this camp. The food supply of Delhi was derived from the eastern
Doab side in normal times. But this region was in the possession of Najib
Khan and Abdali. Besides, the Jamuna was in flood making commercial in-
tercourse difficult, if not impossible. Added to the food and fodder scarcity,
there was the scarcity of money. No money was forthcoming from any
source; neither from the revenue collectors of the Maratha lands in north
India, nor from tribute, nor even from loans. Even men of position had to
keep from starvation by selling their jewellery and other personal belongings.³
The result was a great deterioration in the physical stamina of men and ani-
mals. It must have also told on the morale of the army, though in this case
the cool courage and optimism of the commander-in-chief counteracted, to a
great extent, the evil effects of the same.⁴
Placed in this quandary, Bhau had recourse to such things as taking
out the silver ceiling of the Diwan-i-khas to coin money wherewith to pay a
bare subsistence allowance to the troops as stated before.⁵ But this was only
a stop-gap. The nine lakhs of rupees derived from this vandalic source were
just sufficient to feed the army for one month. During a period of three months,
only two weekly payments to the soldiers had been made possible, so precarious
was the situation. Nor was it possible, while the rains continued, to get out of
this plight.
The future plans of Abdali were as yet inscrutable. The early setting in
of the rains that year with the continuous high flood level of the Jamuna for
four months had miscarried the earlier plans hatched by Sadashivrao Bhau to
meet Abdali in a pitched battle. The waiting-time factor had gone against
the Maratha anticipations. Shuja-ud-daulah's pusillanimous efforts to be on
good terms with both the parties had at last resulted in his completely falling
under the influence of the wily Najib. Even after going over to the side of
Abdali, Shuja still continued his efforts for peace during the rainy season, but
to no purpose. Nana Phadnis accuses him of chicanery, though the historian
of Oudh vouchsafes his good intentions.⁶ All the same, Bhau would not rely
on such a broken reed and decided to open the campaign against Abdali by

1 RAJ 6 404; SPD 27.258.
2 SPD 130, 131
3 Aitihasika Tippane 1 14
4 RAJ. 6 101.
5 SPD 27.257.

KUNJPURA 55
Shahdaula and cleared the regions upto Attock In the Jalandar Doab, the
Sikhs firmly established themselves, driving out the Afghan posts Alasingh,
the founder of the Patiala State, promised to join Bhau with his troops Thus,
at the beginning of October 1760, Abdali's hold over the Panjab had been
completely lost, but for a post here and there Abdus Samad Khan found his
position in Sarhind untenable and was reported to be coming down to Kunj-
pura on the Jamuna on his way to join Abdali in the Doab (Persian
Akhbar MS )
From the news available in the Persian Akhbar dated 15-10 1760, it
seems as if Abdali also had become weary of waiting and was ready to solve
the political tangle by negotiations Up till then, Shah Abdullah Darvesh
Pirzada had come as the envoy of Abdali But now it was thought necessary
that these roundabout ways should cease and the plenipotentiaries of the two
sides, if not the chiefs themselves, should meet face to face to have a personal
talk before taking the final plunge It was suggested that the rendezvous
should be near the Buradi Ghat, strongly guarded by Damaji Gaikawad, the
chiefs should meet in midstream, each in his own boat, standing in juxtaposi-
tion But this meeting never took place, however, as Bhau had to hurry up to
Kunjpura so as to cut off Abdus Samad Khan
The plan of marching to Kunjpura was maturing in the mind of Bhau
for more than a month,⁹ but the rainy season had delayed the project The
Deccan bullocks, connected with the artillery department, had suffered most
from the rains Many of them died, probably on account of the northern
Indian climate being unsuitable to them Bhau had sent an express letter to
Govind Ballal for sending 500 bullocks, as early as 17th August, and had also
called for 400 Pathans or northern Indian men capable of enrolment in the
artillery on 27th August ¹⁰ He took over all the ghats on the Jamuna and
made arrangements for guarding the same This had made Abdali power-
less to do anything in the matter Nothing remained for him but to wait till
the subsidence of the river
When Bhau started for Kunjpura in the first week of October, he had
calculated that the water of the Jamuna would not subside for at least one
month ¹¹ But his calculation seems to have been based on incorrect informa-
tion Two important persons of Bhau's office, writing three weeks before he
wrote, calculate one month or even a fortnight as the period necessary for the
river level to go down ¹² According to them, the water should have subsided
by the middle of October, almost the time when Bhau wrote and started for
Kunjpura If we take the calculation of the two officers to be mere guess
work and very rough, we cannot say the same thing of the written opinion
of Balvantrao Mehendale, supposed to be the most intimate friend and ad-
viser of Bhau during the Panipat campaign Writing on 14th October he
9 Ibid 1.237
10 Ibid 1.231, 237
11 Ibid 1.252
12 SPD 2.130-31

54 PANIPAT 1761
first taking the offensive himself His difficulties at Delhi obliged him to take
this decision which was urged on him by all and sundry in the Maratha camp
Before he could continue his march, Bhau thought it wise to make a
political move to counteract the anti Maratha propaganda of Najib and men
of his ilk He had already estranged Wazir Ghazi ud din and his supporter
Surajmal Jat by his non committal attitude towards their aspirations and de
signs All his approaches to Shuja had proved futile It became necessary for
him now to give a demonstrable proof of his ultimate intentions So, setting
aside the boy Emperor, Shah Jahan III (elevated to that dignity by Ghazi ud
din after the murder of Alamgir II in the previous year), Bhau proclaimed the
wandering Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor with the title of Shah Alam II In
his unavoidable absence his son Prince Javan Bakht, residing at Delhi, was
installed as Vali Ahad or Crown Prince and Vicar of the absentee Emperor on
10th October 1760 ⁷ Mints struck new coins in the new Emperor's name, and
his seals were also prepared and brought into use The ceremonies and proces-
sions connected with these acts were seen through by Nana Purandare and
Satvoji Jadhavrao, who had been specially deputed by Bhau for the purpose
while encamped at Lalera, three miles to the south of Gannaur⁸ while on his
way to Kunjpura The office of the Wazir is said to have been conferred on
Shuja in absent a, but there is no mention of this fact in Marathi corre-
spondence and hence seems improbable
The details of this occurrence in Delhi throw a flood of light on Maratha
manners in politics The puppet Emperor, Shah Jahan, was politely asked
to vacate his seat as his days were over This was perhaps the first time in
Mughal history when an emperor had been set aside without violence to his
person The Prince Javan Bakht was escorted to the Juma Masjid by Bapuji
Hingne, the Maratha envoy, who sat with the prince on the elephant, while
Satvoji stood behind with peacock feathers, a sign of royal insignia, in his
hand The ex Empress Zinat Mahal, the grand mother of the prince, was
civilly asked to pay 25 lakhs from her privy purse for the expenses, but she
paid only 5 lakhs The Marathas never set their hands on the persons of the
royal household to get money, like the Afghans of Abdali or the Persians of
Nadir Shah The grateful ex Empress took it upon herself to inform Abdali
of these proceedings and tried her best to bring about a settlement between him
and the Marathas, by forwarding the Maratha draft treaty to him with her
recommendations and consent The good result of this action was seen in the
satisfaction of Surajmal who was now convinced of the Maratha intentions and
henceforward helped the Marathas, though he could not join them with his
army The Afghan rule in the Panjab was challenged by the rebellious Sikhs
who wholeheartedly came over to the Maratha side They proclaimed Bhau
Sahib as the coming ruler with a beat of drums, and devoutly prayed for his
victory in Lahore They beseeched their Guru Sahib to punish Abdali for his
misdeeds Khwajah Mirza Khan, the son in law of Adina Beg, with the
Maratha troops under Krishnaji Pawar stationed at Jammu, invaded Gujrat
⁷ Raj 1.259, Parasnis' Persian Akhbars (unpublished)
⁸ Ibid 1.259

KUNJPURA 55
Shahdaula and cleared the regions upto Attock In the Jalandar Doab, the
Sikhs firmly established themselves, driving out the Afghan posts Alasingh,
the founder of the Patiala State, promised to join Bhau with his troops Thus,
at the beginning of October 1760, Abdali's hold over the Panjab had been
completely lost, but for a post here and there Abdus Samad Khan found his
position in Sarhind untenable and was reported to be coming down to Kunj-
pura on the Jamuna on his way to join Abdali in the Doab (Pers an
Akhbar MS )
From the news available in the Persian Akhbar dated 15 10 1760 it
seems as if Abdali also had become weary of waiting and was ready to solve
the political tangle by negotiations Up till then, Shah Abdullah Darvesh
Pirzada had come as the envoy of Abdali But now it was thought necessary
that these roundabout ways should cease and the plenipotentiaries of the two
sides, if not the chiefs themselves, should meet face to face to have a personal
talk before taking the final plunge It was suggested that the rendezvous
should be near the Buradi Ghat, strongly guarded by Damaji Gaikawad, the
chiefs should meet in midstream, each in his own boat, standing in juxtaposi
tion But this meeting never took place, however, as Bhau had to hurry up to
Kunjpura so as to cut off Abdus Samad Khan
The plan of marching to Kunjpura was maturing in the mind of Bhau
for more than a month,⁹ but the rainy season had delayed the project The
Deccan bullocks, connected with the artillery department, had suffered most
from the rains Many of them died, probably on account of the northern
Indian climate being unsuitable to them Bhau had sent an express letter to
Govind Ballal for sending 500 bullocks, as early as 17th August, and had also
called for 400 Pathans or northern Indian men capable of enrolment in the
artillery on 27th August ¹⁰ He took over all the ghats on the Jamuna and
made arrangements for guarding the same This had made Abdali power
less to do anything in the matter Nothing remained for him but to wait till
the subsidence of the river
When Bhau started for Kunjpura in the first week of October, he had
calculated that the water of the Jamuna would not subside for at least one
month ¹¹ But his calculation seems to have been based on incorrect informa
tion Two important persons of Bhau's office, writing three weeks before he
wrote, calculate one month or even a fortnight as the period necessary for the
river level to go down ¹² According to them, the water should have subsided
by the middle of October, almost the time when Bhau wrote and started for
Kunjpura If we take the calculation of the two officers to be mere guess
work and very rough, we cannot say the same thing of the written opinion
of Balvantrao Mehendale, supposed to be the most intimate friend and ad-
viser of Bhau during the Panipat campaign Writing on 14th October he
9 Ibid 1.237
10 Ibid 1.231, 237
11 Ibid 1.252
12 SPD XXI

56 PANIPAT: 1761
says, "Four to eight' days are necessary for the river water to go down."¹³
And Abdali actually crossed the river at Gauripur on 24th October.¹⁴ It is
impossible to account for this wide discrepancy in the information and calcula-
tion of the two most important personages in the Peshwa's army, the com-
mander-in-chief and his first general. It is difficult to imagine that these two
persons, living in the same camp or even as neighbours, should not have ex-
changed ideas and discussed the probabilities amongst themselves. But un-
fortunately for the Marathas, some such untoward thing seems to have hap-
pened. Bhau, basing his calculation on the idea that the river water would
not go down before the second week of November, planned his campaign ac-
cordingly. His plan was to take Kunjpura, then proceed to Kurukshetra to
perform the pilgrimage, seek allies amongst the Sikhs and the Jats of those
regions¹⁵ and then return in time to meet Abdali after refreshing his starved
troops, horses, and other animals with the ample grain and fodder supplies
of those fertile regions. This plan succeeded as far as the capture of Kunjpura
was concerned, but failed in its second part: to obstruct Abdali while crossing
the Jamuna.
The immediate cause which made Bhau hurry up to Kunjpura within
a week was the news received from the Panjab as mentioned already. Abdus
Samad Khan whom Abdali had kept back in the Panjab as the Faujdar of
Sarhind, had come to Kunjpura with an army of ten thousand and more for
carrying supplies to Abdali in the Doab. He was waiting there for the river
to subside. It was necessary to defeat him before he could cross the Jamuna
and strengthen Abdali's forces. Starting from his camp at Shalimar Bag, seven
miles to the north of Delhi on 7th October, Bhau reached Lalera, three miles
south of Gannaur on 8th October in the evening. He was at Panipat on the
14th and reached his destination on the evening of the 16th. Abdali who
had full information of Bhau's movements, sent an army to aid his men at
Kunjpura along the eastern bank of the Jamuna. But it had to stop opposite
Kunjpura for want of transport. Viewing this additional peril, the Maratha
army decided to storm the fort forthwith. Bhau sent for Ibrahim Khan Gardi-
who was lagging behind by one march. He came hurrying up on the night of
the 16th and commenced the bombardment of the fort soon after his arrival,
on the morning of the 17th
The fort of Kunjpura lies seventy-eight miles to the north of Delhi,
and is situated some two miles distant from the west bank of the Jamuna. It
guarded one of the most frequented roads through the Doab to the Panjab.
The river Jamuna to the south-east of Kunjpura, being divided into several
channels, was easily fordable by men and animals. The important town of
Karnal on the main imperial road lay only six miles to the west of it. The
riverside of the fort was marshy and hence easily defensible. Nejabat Khan
Ruhela was in possession of the fort and he had a few thousand footmen of
his tribe with him to defend the fort. Abdus Samad Khan, Mian Qutb Shah
and Momin Khan, the Ghilzai Sardar who had come from Sarhind, had with
¹³ Ait. Tip. 1.14.
¹⁴ RAJ. 1.260.
¹⁵ SPD 21.197.

KUNJPURA 57
them some seven thousand horse.¹⁶ They were encamped outside the fort and
tried to defend it to the utmost. But the musketry fire of the Gardis soon
broke their resistance by fast withering away their ranks, and they tried to
save themselves by entering the fort. Nejabat Khan was at first apprehensive
of opening the fort gates to get them in, but had to yield to their entreaties and
open the same. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Marathas also fol-
lowed behind them and forced themselves into the fort along with the Durranis
The Durrani horse and Ruhela footmen fought for some time but were ulti-
mately overpowered by the Maratha arms and defeated with heavy slaughter.
Four thousand Ghilzais were put to the sword¹⁷ and the rest, taking grass in
their mouths and uttering the words, "We are your cows,"¹⁸ were allowed to
go, after laying down their arms. The majority of the Ruhela footmen had
been wounded together with Nejabat Khan, who died soon afterwards of his
wounds. Momin Khan died in the battle from a bullet-shot. Abdus Samad
Khan and Mian Qutb Shah were captured alive, beheaded after heaping in-
sults on them and their heads paraded through the Maratha camp. Mian
Qutb Shah was derided, cursed and insulted most, especially by Shinde's men,
as he was responsible for the decapitation of Dattaji Shinde on the battlefield
of Buradi, the previous year. Their bodies were exposed to be eaten up by
vultures and jackals, no funeral rites being allowed them. The conversa-
tion between Qutb Shah and Bhau given in the Bhau Bakhar seems imaginary,
as contemporary letters from Shinde's camp do not say a word hinting at such
a thing. It has been fabricated to suit the dramatic tone of the whole of the
Bhau Bakhar.
Bhau got some seven lakhs of rupees in cash, five thousand horses,
camels and elephants, arms and the rest, as spoils. But the most opportune
gain was of 10,000 khandis of wheat collected at this depot for the Abdali
troops. Starvation in the Maratha army ended for the time being, as the
troops were paid in kind instead of cash.¹⁹ Horses and other animals also got
fodder and grain. More important than this material gain was the revival
of optimism in the Maratha army after a four months' period of doldrums,
leading to a deterioration of morale. The prowess of the Gardi fire had been put
to the test and proved up to the hilt.
Bhau spent a week at Kunjpura destroying the fortifications and ar-
ranging matters in the new light. He seems to have felt no apprehension of
any impending danger as he ordered a march to Kurukshetra of at least a
part of the army. While on his way to Kunjpura, Bhau's idea was to finish the
work there in four days and then to cross the Jamuna by some upper ghat
like that at Budhia, into Saharanpur. He had already seized practically all
the boats on the Jamuna on which he could lay hands, and kept them to-
gether near the Selimgad fort on the bank of the Jamuna at Delhi with a
view to making use of them in case of necessity. He had also kept pickets
with small parties of soldiers to guard the main ghats over the Jamuna from
¹⁶ Shinde 3.234, 392; RAJ 1.260, 265
¹⁷ Purandare 1.391.
¹⁸ Shinde 3.234.
¹⁹ SPD. 21.197-8

58 PANIPAT 1761
Agra to Kunjpura, a distance of nearly two hundred miles Thus he had
unwittingly lengthened his line of communication and taken a certain risk
in proceeding to Kunjpura Had he, after quickly finishing the job, crossed
over the Jamuna into Saharanpur as intended, or, failing that, at once re
turned to Delhi, he would have been saved But here his miscalculation about
the fall in the level of the Jamuna waters proved wrong as we have already
noted The second factor which delayed the Maratha army was that after
a long period of comparative starvation they had found themselves in a land
of plenty, which the army was naturally reluctant to leave and return to bar
ren Delhi The third and the human factor which made Bhau delay his march
was the encumbrance of a horde of women folk family members and priests,
who had accompanied the army for performing distant and dangerous pil
grimages under its protection Kurukshetra is less than thirty miles from
Kunjpura and it was but natural that all the devout people in the army should
wish to visit that holy place of the Mahabharata war where Lord Shri Krishna
preached his philosophy of life to the hero Arjuna But this natural desire re
sulted in an unforeseen calamity and thus proved a veritable Kurukshetra to
the Marathas
The Maratha army, after spending or rather wasting a week at Kunj
pura, moved toward the holy place for one day, but before they could reach
their destination at the first halt for the night Bhau received the disquieting
news of Abdalis beginning to cross the river, on 25th October 20 He at once
made up his mind and turned back toward Delhi with a view to intercepting
Abdali before he crossed the river But such a fully equipped army made up of
three lakhs of people can move but slowly All became disappointed and sullen as
they missed by a hairbreadth the pilgrimage to Kurukshetra They were still
more scared by the news of Abdalis crossing the river and blocking their re
turn On the first day of their return march they halted near the ancient
bridge at Karnal²¹ for the night, the bridge over the famous canal of Firuz
Shah Tughaliq and Ali Mardan Khan which flowed from the eastern to its
western side Because the editor of Bhau's Kaifiyat was unaware of the
geography of these regions, he could not with confidence read the description
in Modi script and the place of halt on the bridge Though Bhau made a
long march of fifteen miles for the day, the camp could not move as fast, so
on the next day he could cover only eight miles and on the third day came,
near Panipat Here he heard the news that Abdalis army had completely
crossed the river, bag and baggage, and was halting at Sonepat
Bhau cautiously sent a party of five thousand men under Baji Hari
Deshpande of Supa to meet and check the advance guard of Abdali and take
a view of his camp and movement there They were in the vicinity of Sonepat,
resting unguardedly after a long march Half of the party was composed of
Shinde's men who had already known and experienced the scourge of the
Durrani army Their leader asked Baji Hari to be on his guard lest he should
find himself surprised But Baji Hari's inexperienced and unbeaten troops
20 RS 1201
1 Bhau Kaifiyat p. 12.

KUNJPURA 59
took the warning lightly and slept soundly on the plains, allowing their horses
to roam in the green fields for grazing, and the unexpected attack came as
forewarned. Shah Pasand Khan, one of Abdali's best captains of cavalry,
suddenly pounced upon the sleeping party. Shinde's men had kept a picket
on a tall tree watching for the danger. As soon as clouds of dust were seen at
a distance the picket came down and cried aloud of the danger. Shinde's men
who were on guard at once took to their horses and ran away.²²· Baji Hari's
party found it impossible to get hold of their horses in the grazing field and it
was some time before they could get them. In the meanwhile, men of Shah
Pasand Khan came, seized as many horses of the Marathas as they could and
• cut down the horsemen. Very few were fortunate enough to escape and carrry
back the news to Bhau. This event checked the further march southwards,
and Bhau had to fall back on Panipat and begin encampment there.
We shall now turn to study Abdali's movements He and his Indian
allies were encamping on the opposite bank of the Jamuna near Delhi. Shuja-
ud-daulah was the first to move to that place in the beginning of August and
encamp to the south of the area near the grain mart of Patpatganj. The
Ruhelas and Abdalis followed sometime later, probably at the end of the month.
They encamped to Shuja's north, near Shahdhada. When Bhau came to
Delhi at the beginning of August, he had encamped to the south of Delhi near
the Kalkadevi Temple, just opposite to Shuja on the other bank. In Septem-
ber, Bhau moved his camp to the Shalimar gardens, seven miles to the north-
west of Delhi amidst pleasant surroundings, and his army encamped to his
south, to the west and north of the city. From these encampments the rival
armies were eying each other inquisitively. They occasionally discharged their
heavy long-range guns and threw some heavy cannon-balls into each other's
camps just to create confusion and fear. But the river flowed roaringly be-
tween. None dare cross the river in the face of the other, though diplomats
were individually going and coming and carrying on peace-talks. As Abdali
had the fertile Doab at his back, and as the home lands of the Ruhelas were
on the other side of the Ganges, his army was comparatively well supplied with
the necessaries of life. To lighten the burden, he had allowed many of the
Ruhela soldiers to return to their homes, asking them to keep themselves ready
to return at the first call. The Maratha army, on the other hand, was living
from hand to mouth. The whole of the surrounding area had been eaten up
by the constant movements of the rival armies in the fields during the last
seven years. The districts to the west of Delhi had been assigned as jagirs to
the Baluch sardars of the Emperor. They were recalcitrant generally, and just
then at loggerheads with the Marathas. Tukoji Holkar and Khandoji Kadam²²ᵃ
had been sent against them at the beginning of October. For getting the food
stuffs from a distance the Marathas had to pay fancy prices to the Banjaras.
Nana Phadnis, Bapuji Ballal Phadke,²²ᵇ Balvantrao Mehendale and others,
writing from Delhi during September and October, describe the woeful state
of the Maratha army: "The horses have forgotten to chew the grain; the

²² Bhau Bakhar 0.126.
²²ᵃ Persian MS
²²ᵇ SPD 2.130-1.

60 PANIPAT 1761
grain is selling at seven or eight seers a rupee High class people like us had
to sell our gold and silver trinkets and live from the proceeds The climate of
Delhi has been found unsuitable to the Deccani oxen of the artillery depart
ment, and they are dying in hundreds" To escape from this dilemma, the
Maratha army had moved to Kunjpura to feed themselves and their horses, with
the consequence noted above
When Bhau moved toward the north, Abdali also sent a party to ac
cost him from the other side of the river, that party could not do anything
to save their brethren on the other side and had to see with open eyes the fall
of Kunjpura They returned to Abdali who was chafing at the result He
at once issued orders to his army and his allies to be ready for the march From
Shahdhada he moved to Luni, thence he came to Baghpat, twenty miles north
of Delhi, in search of a ford for crossing But he searched in vain He chided
his Indian allies for not knowing the fords, but they pleaded their inability to
find any After two days' vain search, Ahmad Shah who was a devout Mus
lim fasted in his agony and beseeched God to point out a ford and tried all
the superstitious and religious methods of search After getting an inspiration
from that source he made his horsemen plunge into an unusual and less fre
quented part of the river and tried to cross He succeeded in the trial, though
a number of horsemen were carried away by the current before the exact
line of crossing could be fixed by driving wooden stakes in the river on the
two sides of the shallow passage and thus clearly lining the way The place
where he actually crossed is not given in histories, though all say that it was
near Baghpat A pontoon bridge used to be constructed at Baghpat in the
fair season in those days as at present, but in the rainy season the place was
not suitable for crossing as the river has a somewhat sharp fall here and con-
sequently the stream turns into a torrent Where the river divides itself into
several streams and spreads over a wider area, it becomes easily fordable Such
a place Ahmad Shah seems to have found five miles to the north of old Bagh-
pat near the village of Gauripur This place is mentioned in the Bhau's ballad
we have copied down from the bard of Siva ²³ Because Ahmad Shah crossed
at this place, he could come straight to Sonepat through Kheora and could
elude the Maratha pickets placed at well known crossings such as Baghpat
Ahmad Shah could dare attempt this because he was experienced in
crossing the rivers and knew all the intricacies connected with such crossings
The Marathas seem to have never taken to such daring Big rivers seem to
have blocked their way throughout their military career They could never cross
the Ganges without the help of local allies A Najib ud daulah could always
laugh at Dattaji and keep him waiting at the ford Ahmad Shah, because he
could take such a risk with confidence, was able to entrap the Maratha
army under Sadashivrao Bhau Bhau, on the other hand, could never perform
such a feat, and hence had perforce to entrench himself at Panipat
Ahmad Shah must have begun his crossing on the 24th October, as
Bhau had received the news the next day at his first halt on the way to Kuru
²³ BDCRI 4 3 stanza 33

KUNJPURA 61
kshetra. Abdali took three days to cross the river with all his army, cannon,
elephants and other camp equipage. The place where he crossed was a little
out of the way where there was no proper ghat for landing. The army had
to cross the various streams and shallows over a distance of half a mile. Some-
times the horses would swim, at others they would wade through sands in knee-
deep water. On the other side was the silt deposited by monsoon floods.
Horses and men found themselves bogged in the soft mud. It was difficult, al-
most impossible, to take a step without sinking still deeper. This difficulty they
overcame by cutting down the various water plants and rushes growing on the
river-bank, and spreading them deep over the passage all along the route.
When these had sunk into the mud, a thatchy road was naturally built over
it by the trampling of thousands of horses and men. Had there been a daring and
resourceful guard of a few thousand troops with a few guns of precision, a
crossing would never have been possible. After safely reaching the other
bank, Ahmad Shah at once sent a small party to drive away all the Maratha
pickets on the western bank, and seize any boats they could find bound fast
at the ghats. They seem to have succeeded in collecting some, which were
used in ferrying the baggage on the second day. Ahmad Shah himself crossed
after half the army was on the other side. There were a few casualties, no
doubt, in the tumult and hurry of crossing. But at last the whole army was
safe on the other bank and began their march to Sonepat, which they reached
on the 27th October.
Next day they moved to Gannaur where Ahmad Shah halted for three²⁴
days. Baji Hari's attempt to scout must have happened during this interval.
The number of casualties in this attempt is not correctly reported anywhere,
though Kashiraj gives the figure at two thousand, and the place where they
crossed swords as near the serai of Samalkha. Bhau fell back as a result of it
and encamped at Panipat. Ahmad Shah advanced to Samalkha on 31st
October, and to Pasina the next day. A distance of some three miles was left
between the advanced posts of the two armies. The two armies came face to
face at last after four months of eying each other on the opposite banks of the
swollen Jamuna. It was seven months since Bhau had started to meet Abdali,
and here he was at last.
But for a final decision by arms, two and a half months had still to
pass. From the first of November 1760 to 14th January, 1761 the two sides
in the struggle for power put their faith in strategy and manœuvring, living in
entrenched camps.
²⁴ RAJ. 1.261.

60 PANIPAT 1761
grain is selling at seven or eight seers a rupee High class people like us had
to sell our gold and silver trinkets and live from the proceeds The climate of
Delhi has been found unsuitable to the Deccani oxen of the artillery depart
ment, and they are dying in hundreds " To escape from this dilemma, the
Maratha army had moved to Kunjpura to feed themselves and their horses, with
the consequence noted above
When Bhau moved toward the north, Abdali also sent a party to ac
cost him from the other side of the river, that party could not do anything
to save their brethren on the other side and had to see with open eyes the fall
of Kunjpura They returned to Abdali who was chafing at the result He
at once issued orders to his army and his allies to be ready for the march From
Shahdhada he moved to Luni, thence he came to Baghpat, twenty miles north
of Delhi in search of a ford for crossing But he searched in vain He chided
his Indian allies for not knowing the fords, but they pleaded their inability to
find any After two days' vain search, Ahmad Shah who was a devout Mus
lim fasted in his agony and beseeched God to point out a ford and tried all
the superstitious and religious methods of search After getting an inspiration
from that source he made his horsemen plunge into an unusual and less fre
quented part of the river and tried to cross He succeeded in the trial, though
a number of horsemen were carried away by the current before the exact
line of crossing could be fixed by driving wooden stakes in the river on the
two sides of the shallow passage and thus clearly lining the way The place
where he actually crossed is not given in histories, though all say that it was
near Baghpat A pontoon bridge used to be constructed at Baghpat in the
fair season in those days as at present, but in the rainy season the place was
not suitable for crossing as the river has a somewhat sharp fall here and con
sequently the stream turns into a torrent Where the river divides itself into
several streams and spreads over a wider area, it becomes easily fordable Such
a place Ahmad Shah seems to have found five miles to the north of old Bagh
pat near the village of Gauripur This place is mentioned in the Bhau's ballad
we have copied down from the bard of Siwa ²³ Because Ahmad Shah crossed
at this place, he could come straight to Sonepat through Kheora and could
elude the Maratha pickets placed at well known crossings such as Baghpat
Ahmad Shah could dare attempt this because he was experienced in
crossing the rivers and knew all the intricacies connected with such crossings
The Marathas seem to have never taken to such daring Big rivers seem to
have blocked their way throughout their military career They could never cross
the Ganges without the help of local allies A Najib ud daulah could always
laugh at Dattaji and keep him waiting at the ford Ahmad Shah, because he
could take such a risk with confidence, was able to entrap the Maratha
army under Sadashivrao Bhau Bhau, on the other hand, could never perform
such a feat, and hence had perforce to entrench himself at Panipat
Ahmad Shah must have begun his crossing on the 24th October, as
Bhau had received the news the next day at his first halt on the way to Kuru-

²³ BDCRI 4.3 stanza 33

CHAPTER V
PANIPAT
To JUDGE from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹
from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha
army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems
strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to
bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no
proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic
tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed
seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha
side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's
splendid corps which, as Kashīrāj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the
defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of
Bhau like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only
confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's
sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and
confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should
have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is
found writing in the same tone for a month more Only during the last fort-
night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³
—writing no doubt to the revenue collector—does not betray any sign of hope
lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with
the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles,
though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing
Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that
all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real
situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that
is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sır
Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that,
because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift
and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they
have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of
final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that
reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part
In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com
munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was
definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a
better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack
at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith
in quite a different strategy—that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak-
ing them fall on his well fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy
1 SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391
2 SPD 2.134
3 Shinde 1.222.
[ 62 ]

TO FACE PAGE 62

PĀNĪPAT VICINITY
AT PRESENT
SCALE
FURLONGS 8 4 0 1 2 3 4 MILES

मानचित्र पर प्रमुख अंकित विवरण / Prominent Text on Map:

• मुख्य स्थल / Major Town: PĀNĪPAT (पानीपत)
• नदियाँ एवं नहरें / Rivers & Canals:
  • JUMNA RIVER (यमुना नदी)
  • W. J. CANAL / WESTERN JUMNA CANAL (पश्चिमी यमुना नहर)
• दिशानिर्देश / Direction: North Indicator (उत्तर दिशा सूचक चिन्ह)
• अक्षांश एवं देशांतर / Coordinates:
  • 29° 25' N — 29° 20' N
  • 76° 55' E — 77° 10' E