पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

56 PANIPAT: 1761
says, "Four to eight' days are necessary for the river water to go down."¹³
And Abdali actually crossed the river at Gauripur on 24th October.¹⁴ It is
impossible to account for this wide discrepancy in the information and calcula-
tion of the two most important personages in the Peshwa's army, the com-
mander-in-chief and his first general. It is difficult to imagine that these two
persons, living in the same camp or even as neighbours, should not have ex-
changed ideas and discussed the probabilities amongst themselves. But un-
fortunately for the Marathas, some such untoward thing seems to have hap-
pened. Bhau, basing his calculation on the idea that the river water would
not go down before the second week of November, planned his campaign ac-
cordingly. His plan was to take Kunjpura, then proceed to Kurukshetra to
perform the pilgrimage, seek allies amongst the Sikhs and the Jats of those
regions¹⁵ and then return in time to meet Abdali after refreshing his starved
troops, horses, and other animals with the ample grain and fodder supplies
of those fertile regions. This plan succeeded as far as the capture of Kunjpura
was concerned, but failed in its second part: to obstruct Abdali while crossing
the Jamuna.
The immediate cause which made Bhau hurry up to Kunjpura within
a week was the news received from the Panjab as mentioned already. Abdus
Samad Khan whom Abdali had kept back in the Panjab as the Faujdar of
Sarhind, had come to Kunjpura with an army of ten thousand and more for
carrying supplies to Abdali in the Doab. He was waiting there for the river
to subside. It was necessary to defeat him before he could cross the Jamuna
and strengthen Abdali's forces. Starting from his camp at Shalimar Bag, seven
miles to the north of Delhi on 7th October, Bhau reached Lalera, three miles
south of Gannaur on 8th October in the evening. He was at Panipat on the
14th and reached his destination on the evening of the 16th. Abdali who
had full information of Bhau's movements, sent an army to aid his men at
Kunjpura along the eastern bank of the Jamuna. But it had to stop opposite
Kunjpura for want of transport. Viewing this additional peril, the Maratha
army decided to storm the fort forthwith. Bhau sent for Ibrahim Khan Gardi-
who was lagging behind by one march. He came hurrying up on the night of
the 16th and commenced the bombardment of the fort soon after his arrival,
on the morning of the 17th
The fort of Kunjpura lies seventy-eight miles to the north of Delhi,
and is situated some two miles distant from the west bank of the Jamuna. It
guarded one of the most frequented roads through the Doab to the Panjab.
The river Jamuna to the south-east of Kunjpura, being divided into several
channels, was easily fordable by men and animals. The important town of
Karnal on the main imperial road lay only six miles to the west of it. The
riverside of the fort was marshy and hence easily defensible. Nejabat Khan
Ruhela was in possession of the fort and he had a few thousand footmen of
his tribe with him to defend the fort. Abdus Samad Khan, Mian Qutb Shah
and Momin Khan, the Ghilzai Sardar who had come from Sarhind, had with
¹³ Ait. Tip. 1.14.
¹⁴ RAJ. 1.260.
¹⁵ SPD 21.197.