पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 51
harrao and Surajmal were also keeping correspondence with Shuja and seek-
ing his advice as to the future line of action. Shuja advised the Marathas to
follow only the traditional mode of guerilla warfare, and to Surajmal he ad-
vised to return to his own country. To Bhau, Shuja professed friendship,
while declining to leave Abdali's camp, and promised to help the Maratha cause
by giving his best advice. From Kashiraj's account it seems Bhau had receded
back a great deal on his original terms one by one. As a last resort, he was
ready to surrender the Panjab upto Sarhind, but wanted Abdali no more to in-
terfere in the Delhi affairs. But, as mentioned above, nothing came out of this
boring of the mountain, not even a mouse. Both sides seem to have put their
final faith in a decision by arms. From the beginning, Bhau was ready to al-
low Abdali to return to his own country if he so desired. But if he really had a
mind to gain that end, it would have been better had he never crossed the
Chambal. In that case Abdali would possibly have left India through sheer
weariness. But with Bhau's big army advanced to Delhi, it was impossible
for Abdali to retreat without offering a battle. From that point of view it
would have been better for Sadashivrao Bhau to have turned his attention to
Shuja's dominions and to have proceeded to Benares instead of Delhi. But
unfortunately for the Marathas throughout their career, they had chosen the
cockpit of Delhi as their fighting arena and ultimately lost their all in it.
Meanwhile the condition of the Maratha army deteriorated day by day.
The bullocks of the artillery department died by hundreds and there were not
enough left with strength to drag the guns.⁸⁷ Bhau had also ordered⁸⁸ both
Govindpant and Gopalrao Barve to cross over the Ganges and threaten Shuja's
and the Ruhela's territories. But Govindpant was unable to move, firstly, on
account of the rains, and secondly, because the zamindars in the Doab and
Bundelkhand had become defiant and treacherous, and there was no safety
for the Maratha posts in those regions. Bhau had taken possession of all the
main ghats between Agra and Kunjpura and blocked the crossings for the
enemy. He had kept small patrols to guard the ferry ghats and collected all the
boats at Selimgad near Delhi. Though Bhau had now placed his main faith
in the artillery of Ibrahim Khan,⁸⁹ still he could not recruit any Marathas for
service in that department. He had to call the men from the enemy's ter-
ritories to do such work.⁹⁰ Bhau seems to have called some European gun-
ners from the eastern parts also. Many Portuguese, French, English and other
European adventurers and renegades were at this time spread over India,
ready to offer their services for good money. The war between the French
and the English had detached a number of Frenchmen from Chandranagar
and other places in Bengal. These were probably the persons Bhau was hop-
ing to engage. But none of these projects materialized and only a certain
number of Pathan followers of Ahmad Shah came over to the Maratha side
only to create confusion and disaster in the last fight.
85 RAJ. 1.85
86 SPD 25.279
87 RAJ. 1.231
88 Ibid 1.233, 237
89 Ibid. 1.174
90 Ibid. 1.176, 235