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पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Panipat 1761 with Historical Commentary

टी. एस. शेजवलकर / शास्त्रीय अनुवाद द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished197 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 82, कुल 197 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 82

KUNJPURA 53

river-bank was steep and the water deep, crossing was very difficult, if not
impossible.
Sadashivrao Bhau, after the first fortnight of August in Delhi, moved¹
his camp from Kalkādevi to the south of the city on the bank of the Jamuna
to the west of the city near Seetaram's serai beyond the canal, and this camp
seems to have extended upto the Shalimar gardens to the north-west, thus
covering an area of more than three miles in length from north to south. Here
he lived for almost seven weeks, till he began his northward march to Kunj-
pura in the first week of October. The Maratha army suffered great priva-
tions² in this camp. The food supply of Delhi was derived from the eastern
Doab side in normal times. But this region was in the possession of Najib
Khan and Abdali. Besides, the Jamuna was in flood making commercial in-
tercourse difficult, if not impossible. Added to the food and fodder scarcity,
there was the scarcity of money. No money was forthcoming from any
source; neither from the revenue collectors of the Maratha lands in north
India, nor from tribute, nor even from loans. Even men of position had to
keep from starvation by selling their jewellery and other personal belongings.³
The result was a great deterioration in the physical stamina of men and ani-
mals. It must have also told on the morale of the army, though in this case
the cool courage and optimism of the commander-in-chief counteracted, to a
great extent, the evil effects of the same.⁴
Placed in this quandary, Bhau had recourse to such things as taking
out the silver ceiling of the Diwan-i-khas to coin money wherewith to pay a
bare subsistence allowance to the troops as stated before.⁵ But this was only
a stop-gap. The nine lakhs of rupees derived from this vandalic source were
just sufficient to feed the army for one month. During a period of three months,
only two weekly payments to the soldiers had been made possible, so precarious
was the situation. Nor was it possible, while the rains continued, to get out of
this plight.
The future plans of Abdali were as yet inscrutable. The early setting in
of the rains that year with the continuous high flood level of the Jamuna for
four months had miscarried the earlier plans hatched by Sadashivrao Bhau to
meet Abdali in a pitched battle. The waiting-time factor had gone against
the Maratha anticipations. Shuja-ud-daulah's pusillanimous efforts to be on
good terms with both the parties had at last resulted in his completely falling
under the influence of the wily Najib. Even after going over to the side of
Abdali, Shuja still continued his efforts for peace during the rainy season, but
to no purpose. Nana Phadnis accuses him of chicanery, though the historian
of Oudh vouchsafes his good intentions.⁶ All the same, Bhau would not rely
on such a broken reed and decided to open the campaign against Abdali by

1 RAJ 6 404; SPD 27.258.
2 SPD 130, 131
3 Aitihasika Tippane 1 14
4 RAJ. 6 101.
5 SPD 27.257.