पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

CHAPTER V
PANIPAT
To JUDGE from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹
from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha
army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems
strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to
bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no
proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic
tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed
seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha
side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's
splendid corps which, as Kashīrāj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the
defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of
Bhau like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only
confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's
sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and
confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should
have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is
found writing in the same tone for a month more Only during the last fort-
night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³
—writing no doubt to the revenue collector—does not betray any sign of hope
lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with
the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles,
though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing
Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that
all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real
situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that
is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sır
Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that,
because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift
and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they
have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of
final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that
reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part
In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com
munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was
definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a
better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack
at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith
in quite a different strategy—that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak-
ing them fall on his well fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy
1 SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391
2 SPD 2.134
3 Shinde 1.222.
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