पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

78 PANIPAT: 1761
by Sir Jadunath,⁴⁴ but at the end on 30th December,⁴⁵ and ended within three
weeks Bhau had expected this raid into Shuja's territory to have the effect
of diverting his forces from Panipat, but it could not have had that effect be-
cause the campaign began very late, and ended simultaneously with the battle
of Panipat In joining Abdali, Shuja had insured against any possible attack
by Abdali and his allies, the Ruhelas, but had not neglected the defence of
his dominion either Bhau's information on these points seems to be de-
fective Miscalculation of enemy forces and over-confidence in his own troops
led Bhau astray in the whole Panipat campaign From the dates of the let-
ters giving the news of the campaign, it cannot be said that the rout of Barve's
army took place after the news of the Panipat disaster had reached him, or
was an outcome of it It seems, however, that Barve could not rally his dis-
persed troops to another effort because, by that time, the news had definitely
reached him

I PANIPAT LOCALITY
The Panipat locality did not prove favourable to the Marathas on ac-
count of its being nearer to the home-land of the Ruhelas Panipat itself was
—and is—practically a Muslim town and the areas to its east had a larger
proportion of Muslim population when compared to the southern tracts of the
United Provinces The road from Panipat to Kairana, Shamli and Muzaf-
farnagar across the Jamuna farther on, leads to Sukartal, the stronghold of
Najib Khan on the Ganges, and crossing the Ganges to the actual home-land of
the Ruhelas, in a straight line In fact it looks as if any place south of Delhi
would have been a better locality for the Marathas and worse for the Ruhelas
Their food supply was assured with the least inconvenience to them Suraj-
mal Jat's advice was correct on this point, because he knew the local human
environment. Bhau's original plan of crossing over into the Doab in the
vicinity of Agra was correct, but, on account of procrastination, it was spoiled,
and the campaign was unnecessarily lengthened by the four months of the
rainy season This had a disastrous effect from the financial, physical and
moral point of view Shuja would not have gone over to Abdali had Bhau
placed himself between Abdali and Shuja's dominions The miscarriage of
that project was the first set-back in the Panipat campaign
Shakir Khan Ansari's description¹ of the sad condition of Panipat under
Maratha occupation must be true as far as it goes That the Marathas must
have felled all the trees in the vicinity irrespective of any consideration for the
fruit-trees in the gardens, appears true when we take into account the neces-
sities of the Maratha camp, military as well as personal Many houses in the
city were inevitably demolished by cannon-balls and their residents had to
shift to other places The wonder is not that such things occurred, but that the
Marathas had left the inhabitants comparatively free without imposing any
conditions on them. Most of the inhabitants were allowed to remain where
44 Fall 2.313
45 Ait Sankirna Sahitya, Khanda 3, No 263
1 Fall 2.309

PANIPAT 79
they were and carry on their lives as best as they could under the circumstances
We believe that the presence of such a hostile element at their back must have
helped the Afghan side much in various ways Spying and sending news dis
closing the Maratha position was easy for this population. Besides these, the
two sons of Nejabat Khan Ruhela of Kunjpura were captives in the Maratha
camp What happened to them is nowhere recorded, and there is no ground
for thinking that they were beheaded. Perhaps, in the turmoil just after the
defeat, they might have freed themselves and joined the populace in destroying
the Maratha camp followers in revenge That the Marathas had not destroyed
any edifice wantonly is clear from the undamaged condition of the splendid
tombs of the Saint Bu Ali Qalandar and Ibrahim Lodi with the ancient
mosques adjoining. This is a clear proof of the mildness of Maratha rule even
under the stress of war Their civil manners and inoffensive attitude have
cost the Marathas not a little in history.
That Bhau, in his Panipat campaign, created a tremendous impression
in the Panipat locality is clear from many legends about Bhau, Parvatibai,
Janakoji Shinde and Vishwasrao. The Bhau ballad current in the surround-
ing area, and still sung by itinerant Jogis, Muslim and Hindu, is a living proof
of the impress so created, and this was natural. The camping of lakhs of men
in the locality for about three months was a thing that had never before oc-
curred even in those war-like times. The earlier battles in the Panipat-Karnal-
Thanesar locality had been bloody and decisive from the political point of
view, no doubt, but they were never fought to the last in the proper sense of
the word, nor was there such a massacre of camp followers after the event
The result is seen in the creation of legends. The Jogi, who copied the Bhau
ballad for us (published in the Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Insti-
tute, 4.3 of 1943), does not record Bhau's death, following in this respect the
Maratha chronicles, and says that he went to the village of Bhaopur, some
twelve miles to the south-west of Panipat. There he lived for a long time with
a Fakir, evidently incognito, hiding his identity. Thence he went to Kairana
across the Jamuna after some years, his further life being not known to the
men in the Panipat locality. That Bhau did not die on the battle field and
lived long afterwards became the traditional belief throughout India, giving
rise to imposters who gave themselves out as the real Bhau, and created politi-
cal problems adversely affecting the Maratha history. We think that the bal-
lad singer's account of Bhau living in Bhaopur is a transparent attempt to con-
nect the already existing village of Bhaopur (founded and named after some
Bhaosingh, a name common in the locality) with the name of Bhau, the Mara-
tha general Such a legend is recorded about another place in the Muzaffar-
nagar Gazetteer on page 9 (1920, Reprint) of the U P Series: "The Jamuna
in the extreme north of the district appears to occupy much the same place as
formerly, and on the south also, it washes the high mound on which stood a
Maratha fort still connected with the name of Sadasheo Bhau It may fur-
ther be safely conjectured that the channel of the river has not changed much
at this point since Panipat Between these two extreme points, however, the bed
of the river is tortuous and uncertain" We have seen the mound ourselves
near the village of Isapur on which now stands not a fort but a bairagi's ashrama

80 PANIPAT 1761
and a temple of his household gods, but there was no trace of the fort at
least in 1935—nor was the fact of its previous existence known to the in-
habitants there. The Gazetteer writer, we take it, must have copied the infor-
mation from some local report, or the description given by some previous
traveller in the locality. As the mound in question is a prominent object in
that low-lying river basin, it could have been very effectively used militarily
by placing long-range guns on it and guarding or attacking the passage of the
Jamuna near that point. As Ahmad Shah Abdali had moved his camp along
the river front just opposite to this mound on the other side of it during the
second stage of the Panipat beleaguerment, the military use of such a promi-
nent height is not an impossibility. But the idea of the Marathas making use
of it during the Panipat beleaguerment presupposes that the Maratha line of
communication into the Doab was intact during the earlier part of the Panipat
siege, or alternately, the Maratha contingents detached by Bhau for cutting
off Abdali's line of supply through the Doab, had approached up to this point,
though there is very little likelihood of such a thing happening. As the data on
which the Gazetteer writer based his statement are not before us, it is not pos-
sible for us now to decide the point.
II WAS THE IMPERIAL CANAL TO THE WEST OF PANIPAT FLOWING
DURING THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN?
Most of the historians, depending upon the information supplied by
such sources as Gazetteers whose information is not historically sifted, have
taken the Imperial Canal as having stopped flowing eighty years before 1820,
when it was again repaired by the British. Imp. Gaz. Vol. XIV, p. 234 (1908),
under the heading "Jumna Canal (Western)," supplies the information that
there were ancient bridges over the canal at Karnal and Safidon and that the
Delhi branch ceased to flow sometime during 1753 to 1760. This informa-
tion the Gazetteer has copied from the Persian chronicles, giving an account of
the civil war between the Emperor Ahmad Shah and his Wazir Safdar Jang.
The canal formed the property of the Wazir and with a view to stopping his
income from that source, the canal was broken up by his enemies. But what
has been overlooked by the Gazetteer has been now brought to light by the
deep researches of Dr. T. G. P. SPEAR of St. Stephen's College, Delhi. Writ-
ing in the Journal of Indian History (Vol. XIX, Pt. III, No. 57, p. 326, Dec.
1940), he says that the canal was broken up in 1754 in the civil war no doubt,*
but was repaired by Ahmad Shah. But thereafter sometime, somehow, it was
neglected. Taking into consideration the position of Bhau's camp, the major
portion of which was situated to the north-west of Panipat, and the descrip-
tion found in the local Bhau ballad,¹ which supplies the information that
Bhau's 700 elephants were stationed at the village of Gharaunda, ten miles to
the north of Panipat, we assume that the canal was definitely flowing during
this period. For elephants require a copious water supply which would be
available only in a place like the bank of a river or a flowing canal. That it
was flowing can also be guessed from the fact of the mention of the sojourn of
¹ BDCRI 4.173.

PANIPAT 81

the various conquerors in the Shalimar Garden (which depended upon the
canal water) to the north-west of Delhi Raghunathrao Peshwa lived there
in 1754,² Ahmad Shah Abdalı in 1756-7,³ and Sadashivrao Bhau in September,
1760⁴ They would not have preferred the place unless a copious supply of
water was available in the vicinity for a big army We think this to be sufficient
proof for taking the canal as flowing during this campaign When Ahmad
Shah succeeded in terrorizing the Maratha troops into huddling themselves in
the cramped camp at Panipat during the last fortnight before the great bat-
tle, the Marathas seem to have lost their access to the canal water to the west
of their camp, for Kashıraj says that Ahmad Shah was able to make a circuit
round the Maratha camp from a distance, which we think to be correct for
the last fortnight only On account of this, the Maratha army seems to have
suffered terribly for want of water, in addition to want of food This fact is
found mentioned only in the ballad published by us in the Deccan College Bul-
letin Vol IV, p 184 If their access to the canal water was not cut off, we
think the canal to have been cut higher up in the vicinity of Karnal or Kunj-
pura at the head of the canal The ground for such supposition rests on the
fact of the reconquest⁵ of Kunjpura by the Afghans during the Panipat siege
For the first month and a half, the Marathas were receiving their food supply
from the vicinity of Karnal on account of their friendship with Alasingh Jat,
the founder of the Patiala State, but a new army from Afghanistan under Atai
Khan came along that route to the help of Ahmad Shah early in December
Dılir Khan Ruhela made common cause with these new Afghan troops and
took back Kunjpura from its small Maratha garrison, thus closing the
Maratha supply from that side Taking into consideration the Afghan tactics
it is not unlikely that he might have cut the canal at the head after this event
so as to cut the water supply of the Maratha camp at Ahmad Shah's behest
Lest it be forgotten, it should be noted that the old Imperial Canal was
flowing in those days along a different channel than the present New Delhi
branch of the western Jamuna canal It began lower down on the river
Jamuna to the north of Kunjpura It flowed to the east of Karnal and not
to the west as at present Then it did not take a loop to the west before com-
ing to Panipat as at present, but flowed parallel to the west of the Imperial
Road at a distance of three or four miles Dr SPEAR in his article referred to
above, page 327, supplies the following information "The canal on its old
alignment ran along a depression in the apparently flat Jamuna plain In some
places the bed of the canal was above the level of the land at a great seepage,
and waterlogging was the result The distance between Panipat and
Karnal suffered most from this fact" (P 328) 'Then the alignment was
altered to correspond with the lie of the land, and it now sweeps in a great
curve from Karnal to Panipat "
This discussion should convince the reader that the old canal—Shah
Nahar—was flowing along to the west of Panipat at a distance of some three
to four miles during the Panipat campaign

² SPD 27 74
³ Ibid 21 106.
⁴ RAJ 6 404
⁵ Fall 2.307

82 PANIPAT 1761
III ESTIMATE OF THE CONFRONTING ARMIES AT PANIPAT
The chief trustworthy authority on the numbers of fighting soldiers
engaged in the Panipat campaign is Bhausahebanchi Kafiyat. It never gives
inflated figures. When Sadashivrao Bhau came to Sironj in Malwa and halted
there for a week in April 1760, the estimated strength of the Maratha cavalry
is given as 27,000, besides Ibrahim Khan's trained infantry which is stated to
be 10,000. This figure of the chronicle is testified as correct by figures in some
contemporary letters. Khare I 14 gives 25,000 cavalry, starting with Bhau
from Patdur. The Maratha army under the Peshwa belonged mainly to the
Hujrat division i.e. Peshwa's personal cavalry. Khare I 21 gives a slightly dif-
ferent estimate. It gives the figure of the Telinga Gardis of Ibrahim Khan
at 8,000 and the cavalry at some 33,000 total. This figure was made up of
the personal squadrons of Vishwasrao, the Peshwa's son, and the nominal Com-
mander-in-Chief of the whole army, the troops of Bhau himself and more than
half the troops generally serving under Raghunathrao, who would not lead
the campaign himself and remained in the Deccan. The Maratha chiefs of
note serving as officers in these regiments were Samsher Bahadar (the Muslim
half brother of the Peshwa), Vitthal Shivdeo Vinchurkar, Manaji Paygude,
Antaji Manakeshwar, Damaji Gaikwad, Khanderao Raste, Subhanrao Mane,
Mahadaji Naik Nimbalkar, Balwantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare.
This letter written by Gopalrao Patwardhan, a noted general, estimates the
numbers on Abdali's side at 50,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry including the
Ruhelas. When the Maratha army had not as yet separated from the main
body collected in the Nizam's Dominion, the total strength was estimated at
75,000. Out of this, 10,000 were sent to Karnatak under Visaji Krishna Bini-
wale, and 25,000 remained with Raghunathrao to check the Nizam. The rest,
it seems, were appointed to accompany Bhau to the north. But out of this
number some troops probably remained with the Peshwa as his personal guard,
and some others lagged behind or would not go as ordered, thus making the
figure which went with Bhau near about 35,000. When this army crossed the
Chambal at the beginning of June and joined forces with Shinde and Holkar
with the remnants of their broken armies, the total number is estimated at
70,000 to 80,000, including the contingents of Surajmal Jat and the Wazir
Ghazi-ud-din.¹ The same letter written on 1st July, 1760, estimates Abdali's
side at 60,000 troops, besides the contingent of Shuja-ud-daulah which is esti-
mated at 20,000. When estimating the figures engaged in the final battle of
14th January, 1761, we have first to deduct the Maratha casualties in the
capture of Delhi at the beginning of August 1760 and the sack of Kunjpura
in the middle of October 1760. The Maratha loss before Delhi was only a
few hundreds, and before Kunjpura also not much, though the number of
wounded was considerable.² In short, we need not take the total losses in these
two actions at more than 1,000. In the three considerable battles fought during
the two months of beleaguerment at Panipat, the loss of the Maratha side was
similarly very small, not going beyond 1,000 dead.³
1 Purandare 1.337
2 SPD. 21.193
3 Aitihasik Patra Vyavahar 97

PANIPAT 83
(1) Thus, to calculate the figures left for the final action, we shall
have to deduct first the Jat-Wazir contingents which left the Marathas at the
beginning of September, numbering possibly not more than 5,000 (2) The
troops left in charge of Delhi under Naro Shankar estimated at about 7,000 in
all⁴ (3) The total loss at Delhi, Kunjpura and the three skirmishes at Pani-
pat—3,000, leaving 55,000 out of the combined total estimated at 70,000 near
Agra at the beginning of July Out of this also some thousands will have to
be deducted for those who died as a result of wounds received in the five
actions, as also some disabled on account of serious wounds and starvation
Thus we shall not be far off the mark if we say that the Maratha fighting troops
at Panipat were 50,000 only A writer from Panipat, writing before the three
skirmishes, estimates the Maratha number at 60,000, while he reports Abdali's
troops at 40,000 only Perhaps he omits the infantry on Abdali's side, because
the word “Fauj” in Marathi is generally used for cavalry only Abdali is
said to have received additions to his troops during the Panipat beleagurement
estimated at 8,000 Kashiraj's figures given at the beginning before crossing
over the Jamuna to Panipat, are 40,000 horse and 40 000 foot, including the
troops of Abdali and his allies For Bhau he gives the figures as 55,000 horse,
15,000 foot (including 9,000 Gardis under Ibrahim Khan), besides 15,000
Pendhari horsemen As against this the irregulars on Abdali's side are estimated
by Kashiraj at four times the number of the Durrani horsemen on the muster
roll of the Shah Even if we take the actual Afghan cavalry at 33,000 only,
this estimate would give one lakh and twenty thousand as the figure of ir
regulars, which we think very much overestimated It is true that there pos
s bly would be more soldiers from amongst the camp followers on Abdali's side
than there would be on the Maratha side, on account of the very character of
the two peoples and their usual mode of life An average Afghan camp fol
lower would be a good horse rider even when he had no horse of his own
Similarly, he would be more adept in using arms than possibly an average
camp-follower in the Maratha army But it is incorrect to think that none of
the camp followers and non combatants following the Maratha army would
have horses of their own, we rather think that many of them had the Dec-
can ponies with them serving as baggage carriers for their masters Unfor-
tunately for the Marathas, most of these ponies seem to have perished of
starvation during the beleagurement of Panipat, due to want of fodder, while
the irregular horses on Abdali's side were still serviceable Satvoji Jadhav, writ-
ing after the battle of Panipat,⁵ definitely says that many a cavalryman had
lost his mount before Panipat, and even the rest had become unserviceably
weak If we deduct 20 per cent on this account, then Sir Jadunath's estimate⁶
of 40,000 horsemen actually present in the field seems to be a tolerably cor-
rect figure, though arrived at in a different manner Kashiraj's estimates of the
two armies given in round figures seem to be based on heresay reports, and not
on official figures as he would make us believe by his mode of writing His
only strong point is that he clearly distinguishes between trained government
4 Raj 6 406
5 Ibid. 1 406.
6 Fall 2.287

84 PANIPAT: 1761
paid soldiers and camp-followers or irregulars. The figures given by Shamlu
and others are inflated because they include all the camp-followers also. An
average of four camp-followers for each professional soldier would make a fair
estimate⁷ of persons gathered in the two camps, and on that basis it looks as if
each camp had two and a half lakhs of people in it. The Maratha camp
had many pilgrims also in its entourage. Some sardars had brought their fam-
ilies for this very purpose with them, so as to facilitate their travel in comfort
and safety. Many priests had gathered in the camp from Benares and Prayag
with the hope of getting good fees and alms by plying their trade. Many can-
didate clerks had joined with the hope of getting some temporary work or civil
appointment in the newly conquered territories. This was almost a normal and
permanent camp-following class in the Maratha armies ever since the days
of Shivaji, as is attested by Martin, the French Governor of Pondicherry. In-
cidentally it shows the nature of the Maratha camp. The chartered bazar
accompanying the army supplied all the needs of the people in it. People felt
“so little danger in following their camp that life in camp is spent as happily
there as in towns.” (MALET’S Memoranda Relative to the Maratha Army at
Kharda, Maratha-Nizam Relations, No. 202, p. 272.) Major DIROM writes
that the Maratha army on march “resembles more the emigration of a nation
guarded by its troops than the march of an army only to subdue an enemy.”⁸
The women camp-followers in the Maratha army were a necessary element for
doing certain duties which men thought it derogatory to perform in those days.
Cooking their food and cleaning the vessels could be done by males, but grind-
ing the corn was thought to be an exclusive duty of the female sex, for per-
forming which a number of them accompanied the army. It is difficult to
estimate the number of females in the Maratha army, but we think there were
some 20,000 all told. Most of these were slaves of their masters, who served
in various capacities and also as concubines. Very few married women had
accompanied their husbands in this long-drawn-out campaign. Because Bhau,
Balvantrao Mehendale, Nana Fadnis and possibly a few others had taken their
wives with them, a wrong impression is formed about the total number of
such women accompanying the army. Mirat-i-Ahmadi states that 12,000
women in good position among whom 700 travelled in palkis, were taken prison-
ers.⁹ We think this statement a gross exaggeration. There could not be more
than 100 women carried in litters, nor could the 12,000 women belong to the
married class. A few other sardars had also taken their women-folk with them,
no doubt, for pilgrimage along the route, but their number was not more than
a few hundred at the most.¹⁰ The rest of the women belonged to the slave-
concubine class. Nuruddin Hasan’s mention of “handsome Brahman women”
being sold after the defeat can only be treated as a figment of the brain, and
as to the “rose-limbed slave girls” mentioned by Sir Jadunath,¹¹ their number
could be infinitesimally small, if such were to be found there at all. Had the
7 Dirom p. 242.
8 Dirom p. 243.
9 Sardesai Commemoration Volume (English) p. 260
10 Purandare 3.209.
11 Fall 2.348.

PANIPAT 85
Peshwa's army been going on after Shivaji's pattern, there would have been
no impediment like this in the camp at all. But Shivaji led few campaigns
lasting more than a few months at a stretch or far away from the homes. The
Peshwa's army was modelled after the Mughal pattern with all its draw-
backs, which proved fatal here as they had proved fatal to Aurangzib in his
campaigns against the Marathas.
IV. IMPERFECT SENSE OF TIME AND DIRECTION
Indians of pre-Panipat days had no maps before them to judge properly
of the directions of places, etc, and so we have to take their descriptions of
events cautiously. Bhau writes "Abdali has come to the south by crossing the
Jamuna at Baghpat." Nana Purandare takes Kunjpura as situated on the
south bank of the Jamuna. "Panipat lies 40 kosa from Delhi towards the west."
With these examples from contemporary documents before us, we have to ac-
cept Kashiraj's directions with correct visualisation. Sir Jadunath has bungled
in his attempt to connect Kashiraj's translation with the Browne's map of the
battle. This is also due to his non-visualisation of the path of the sun during
the days of its highest southern declination. A man from the Maratha camp
talking of Abdali's position or Kashiraj writing from the Abdali's camp about
the Marathas was sure to confuse correct direction during December-January.
Kashiraj has naturally taken the Maratha army as facing eastwards and so de-
scribed the Afghans facing westwards on the day of the battle. Another thing
incorrectly calculated by Sir Jadunath is the hours of the day. The sun rose
at Panipat (latitude 29° 23' 30'' North, longitude 76° 58' 30'' East) on
14-1-1761 at 7 A.M. and set at about 5.20 P.M. (local time). The day thus
consisted of about 10 hours and 20 minutes and the battle has to be described
accordingly. The day was, in lunar calendar, 8th of the bright half of the
month. The moon would set about mid-night on such a day and not at
9.15 P.M. as taken by Sir Jadunath. (Vide Fall 2, pp. 369, 346, etc.)

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE

FINALLY, as decided at night, the Maratha army rose in the early hours
of Wednesday, the 14th January, 1761, and prepared itself to march out of
the beleaguered camp at Panipat. After going through the morning round
of physical duties, Sadashivrao Bhau and Vishwasrao bathed, worshipped the
gods, had a hurried breakfast and then dressed themselves in full armour for
the ensuing battle. The whole camp was agog throughout the previous night.
They had collected all their little belongings and tied them in bundles to be
carried away by securing them to their backs or on the bullocks and other
pack animals which had survived. Some carts and other heavy goods, found
either difficult to arrange properly or as absolutely unnecessary on the march,
were left behind in the camp in order to facilitate the march. With the first
call of the trumpets, the whole camp started and arranged itself in marching
order as best it could.¹ To the front were placed the heavy cannon, behind
it the infantry of Ibrahim Khan followed in triangular formation so as to make
the artillery in front, the spear head of the march. To their rear were placed
Damaji Gaikawad, Yashwantrao Pawar, Vitthal Shivdeo, Antaji Manakeshwar,
Samsher Bahadar and other small units. Then followed Bhau and Vishwas-
rao with their personal troops. After them came non combatants and bag-
gage. On the right flank of the rear were appointed the Shinde and Holkar
contingents. The lighter artillery was placed mainly on the right of the march-
ing square, though a few were placed on the left and at the back also, to
scare away any surprise attack on those sides. The hollow square thus formed
marched out step by step and stood three miles in front of Abdali. Their posi-
tion at nine o'clock (local time) was: Ibrahim Khan's infantry in the village
of Nimbdi to the south-west of Panipat, Bhausaheb with the centre one mile be-
hind him to the north of Ugrakhedi, Malharrao Holkar at the rear directly one
mile to the south of Panipat. The non combatants and camp followers were
standing between Panipat and Ugrakhedi, their left-hand side reaching the out-
skirts of Rajakhedi to the north. The distance between Malharrao Holkar's
rearmost contingent and Abdali's left under Shah Pasand Khan was more than
three miles, his contingent probably standing in the field to the east of Siwa.
The Afghan army when arranged stood roughly in a crescent shaped
curved line from Siwa to Chhajpur Khurd. Barkhurdar Khan's Risala was
standing there with the nullah at their back. Dunde Khan and Hafiz Rahamat
Khan were standing between Chhajpur Kalan and Ujah. Ahmad Shah was
somewhere between Risalu and Dhadaula, while Wazir Shah Wali Khan's
cavalry stood ready between Risalu and Ujah. Ahmad Shah's baggage and
camp were between Dhadaula and Nurpur. Najib ud daulah and Shuja ud

¹ The front originally was spread from Kabuli Bagh to the north-east of Panipat, to
Chandani Bagh to the west of it, where Ibrahim Khan's corps were camping. This was
the head of the Maratha march in order. The direction it took was to the south-east of
Panipat.

[ 86 ]

TO FACE PAGE 87
BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761
FIRST STAGE 10 A.M.
SCALE

1. MALHARJI HOLKAR
2. SINDIA
3. HUZURAT & BHAU'S BANNER
4. DAMANJ VITHAL SHIV VYT SHYAT
   PUJE & ANTAJI MANKESHWAR
5. IBRAHIM GARDJ
6. SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHAU
   Foot note — Shah Pasand khan was standing with five thousand troops at the left
   flank of Abdali's line of battle across the Mughal Road to the northeast of Siwa

daulah were on the plain between Risalu and Siwa. We do not think that the
Afghan army was standing in a continuous line along the whole front between
Chhajpur and Siwa.² There were gaps between the various contingents which
were ordered to the front, though none so wide as to allow a Maratha corps
safely to thrust itself between. Najib-ud-daulah had to cover full three miles
before he could come into contact with the Shinde division to the west of
Ugrakhedi. The army was spread on a front some seven miles in length from
Chhajpur Khurd to the west of Siwa The right-hand side of the Maratha
square was not more than three miles in length, and spread from Nimbdi to
Chandni Bagh (to the east of Panipat) in almost a straight line.
The battle began with a cannonade as usual. Within an hour Ibrahim
Khan's corps touched the Abdali front at the point where the trans-Ganges
Ruhelas were massed in front of the village of Chhajpur Kalan. On the
right-hand side of these Ruhelas Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg were stand-
ing ready to cover the Maratha flank on that side. Ibrahim Khan ordered two
corps to stand in front of them so as to stop their advance with a view to cut
off the gunners in front of the corps of Ibrahim Khan. The rest of his in-
fantry engaged with the Ruhelas. His quick firing muskets soon began to have
their effect on the opposite side. The infantry advanced step by step fighting
for each inch of ground, but the heavy siege-guns seem not to have kept up the
march and soon lagged behind. This was probably due to the difficulty of
dragging them on an uneven ground, and also to the advance of the Ruhela
cavalry to cut off the gunners as is usual in this kind of battle. For three hours
the combat went on, and the Ruhelas were pressed back with heavy slaughter.
Only a few hundred match-lockmen remained with their chiefs Hafiz Rahmat
and Dunde Khan. This was the result of the battle at twelve o'clock. But
before this the Maratha cavalry, detailed for supporting Ibrahim Khan and
standing half a mile at his back, had acted injudiciously, not understanding the
kind of battle they were engaged in. In their impetuosity they seem to have
acted on their own initiative and broken the marching order absolutely neces-
sary when the army is to advance in a square formation. They advanced
rapidly at a trotting pace and soon overmarched the infantry corps of
Ibrahim Khan. But they met with the sharp fire of the Ruhela infantry and had
to run back with broken spirits. Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar then
galloped back and stood behind the heavy guns fixed in the ground and pos-
sibly chained together so as to obstruct the advance of the enemy cavalry to
cut off the gunners. Damaji Gaikawad also met with a similar check from the
Durrani cavalry to his left, and he, too, returned back and stood behind as
at the beginning. This disobedience of orders was the chief cause of the Pani-
pat disaster. Before starting, Bhau had clearly placed his plan before his of-
ficers and asked them to march straight without breaking the order by swerving
to the right or left. The aim of the march was to gain ground and reach the
river Jamuna before evening and not to offer battle. If the enemy would step
aside and allow the Marathas to press forward with their whole mass, then
the Marathas were not to engage with them at all. Only if and when the
² IHQ 10.259, 60.

THE BATTLE 89
self and soon came into contact with Bhau's right wing. As the fire from the
camel-swivels supported by Persian infantry at its back was both quicker and
sharper, they seem to have soon overpowered the Maratha light artillery on
that side and silenced it. As there were no infantry battalions to support it,
Bhau had himself to swerve to the right to its rescue, and thus the Peshwa's
Huzarat came into contact with Shah Wali Khan's troops. The ground where
they met was to the south of Ugrakhedi and to the north of Risalu. The troops

88 PANIPAT 1761
enemy would not allow them passage in their march, the cavalry was to charge
and press forward, beating the enemy back so as to break their order As at
the very beginning this breach of order occurred, it had a disastrous moral ef-
fect on the frontal troops The first cause of the break in the ordered march
was due to the heaviness of the Maratha guns which, on account of their long
range, fired their shots in a faulty manner so as to fall at the back of the
enemy Thus their ammunition was wasted without gaining the desired ef-
fect of breaking the enemy line of battle and creating a gap in it for the troops
to advance Ibrahim Khan had then to cease fire and order his infantry to
march with bayonets in their hands to break the enemy line and make a breach
The Telinga infantry under Ibrahim Khan was formed of well trained corps
with experience of such battles Their resolute advance made the Ruhelas
fall back, leaving few soldiers with the chiefs as stated above But in this ef-
fort Ibrahim Khan lost half his troops in killed or wounded, and then the
preponderating number of Ruhelas began to tell The Ruhelas were in the
proportion of three to one of Ibrahim Khan's musketeers Their match locks
fired heavier bullets and were even more effective on account of their steady
aim due to their long barrels Their range also exceeded that of the com-
paratively light muskets of French make used in Ibrahim Khan's infantry If,
at this psychological moment of apparent stale mate, the Maratha cavalry had
advanced again, galloping to support him, there would have been no further
slaughter amongst them, and the battle would have been carried on in the
intended order But, as said above, the cavalry ordered for his support had
foolishly advanced first, and then coming back stationed themselves behind
the chained heavy guns, with their strength exhausted and spirits broken
Damaji Gaikawad who was to the left of the Maratha thrust—thus adjoining
Barkhurdar Khan's out flanking cavalry—behaved better than Vitthal Shivdeo
and Yashwantrao Pawar He supported the two corps left by Ibrahim Khan
to meet the enemy on that side As there was no infantry facing them, they
repulsed the Ghilzais on that side as often as they advanced with their scathing
fire But Damaji was himself wounded in the action and he also returned to
stand in the company of Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar
Until now we have said nothing about the Maratha centre under Bhau
He was standing to the right of the (middle) centre of the Maratha march
Behind him to the left were standing the non combatants and camp followers
The attack on Bhau's side seems to have been begun not by Bhau himself but by
the Durrani Wazir who advanced farther than the main line, firing his camel
swivels manned by Persian bombardiers ³ The Maratha light artillery placed
on the right of their march and facing the Durrani line obliquely was gradually
receding back from the Durrani line Its fire would not reach the Durrani
line at all, except at the front under Ibrahim Khan At nine o'clock the dis-
ance between Bhau's right hand side and the Durrani Wazir's front was a
mile or so According to the Maratha plan, Bhau would not swerve to his
right unless it was attacked by the enemy The Wazir on whom naturally the
main responsibility fell and who was stationed at the centre, advanced him
³ MUNDY p. 215 (note)

self and soon came into contact with Bhau's right wing. As the fire from the
camel swivels supported by Persian infantry at its back was both quicker and
sharper, they seem to have soon overpowered the Maratha light artillery on
that side and silenced it. As there were no infantry battalions to support it,
Bhau had himself to swerve to the right to its rescue, and thus the Peshwa's
Huzarat came into contact with Shah Wali Khan's troops. The ground where
they met was to the south of Ugrakhedi and to the north of Risalu. The troops
surrounding Bhau belonged to the select group and were possibly in the best
of condition. Working under the eye of the commander in chief himself, and
themselves possessing a high sense of duty with patriotic fervour for the name
of the Marathas, they came sweeping down and would not stop even in the
face of the sharp fire from the swivel guns. Now a cavalry battle fought with
lance and sword on the Maratha side and musketry and archery on the other side
began in good earnest. It is certain that the Afghan cavalry under Ahmad Shah
had more musketeers, match lockmen and archers amongst them than were to be
found in the Maratha army.⁴ Each Maratha of note had possibly a hand
gun by his side but he had neither love for it nor expertness at its use. He pre-
ferred lance and spear at a short distance to the clumsy bow and arrow or heavy,
long matchlock of those days. 'The fighting was so violent that earth and sky
could not be seen and the eye of heaven became dazzled at beholding this
spetacle. (Kashiraj.) The Afghan army was composed of 12,000 horse-
men and 8,000 foot soldiers, besides 1,000 camel guns. 'The Marathas drank
them up like the water of a river.' Atai Khan, the son of the Wazir's paternal
uncle, (who had carried the raid against Govindpant Bundele and slaughtered
him) was slain. 3,000 Durranis were put to the sword and the rest fled back
at the fury of the Maratha charge. Only 200 troops stood surrounding the
Grand Wazir with fifty camel guns in his front. He was clad in full armour
from head to foot, still dismounting from his horse he sat down on the ground,
saying to his followers, "Comrades! Vilayat is far off, whither are you going?"
He asked Kashiraj (who himself reports this) to take a message to Shuja ud-
daulah that he was dying and that Shuja should come to his aid. Shuja did
nothing of the kind, however, excusing himself with the plea that it was not
proper to break the line of battle at that stage and thus allow the Marathas
a possible chance to pierce past the Afghan line through the gap. As a mat-
ter of fact, though Shuja stood ready with all his troops and guns throughout
the day, none moved from the Maratha side against him. This clearly shows
that the oblique Maratha line never came by itself into direct contact with the
Afghan line at the left throughout the main fight, a distance of more than a
mile still intervening between the two armies.
But though Shuja would not come to the Durrani Wazir's aid, Ahmad
Shah was not unaware of his plight. By this time it was twelve noon, and it
seemed for a moment at the centre that the Marathas were triumphing.
Ahmad Shah who was some three miles to the back, received intelligence of
⁴ Even in 1795 match-lock seemed to be daily gaining ground of the long spear ac-
cord ng to MALET. In 1760 it must have been comparatively rare. (Poona Residency Cor-
respondence 4.2 0)

90 PANIPAT 1761
the dispersion of his troops from the right flank to the centre As a precau-
tionary measure he asked his zenana to mount on horses and camels so as to
be ready to run away in case of emergency At the same time he took the
stern measure of beating back his run away troops who had now crowded
themselves in the Afghan camp He called in his nasaqchs (military
provosts) and ordered 500 of them to go to his camp and striking with their
axes all the camp followers great and small, drive them back to the battle
field caring for nothing else By this method he brought within an hour 8,000
armed men, mostly foot soldiers to fill in the gap created at the back of the
trans Ganges Ruhelas The remaining 1,500 military provosts were sent to
the battle field with orders to kill every man who ran away from the battle
and refuse to return to the charge This order they executed so effectually
that after killing a few they compelled the rest to stand in battle array again
behind the Grand Wazir's line Ahmad Shah sent some 4,000 fresh troops
to reinforce the Wazir from his retinue Thus, within an hour, by one o'clock,
10,000 horsemen stood ready behind the Wazir to charge again, while on the
right hand side of the Afghan line 8,000 soldiers supported the Par Ruhelas
in their efforts to stop the march of Ibrahim Khan's successful Gardi troops
Let us now take stock of the military position at noon At the very
beginning the Maratha cavalry under Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar
had acted impetuously and gone beyond their orders, attacking the Ruhelas
before Ibrahim Khan had created a gap in their ranks by the fire of his
artillery and the attack of his musketry The result was they had to run back
exhausted and stand behind the chained heavy artillery to escape an attack
from the enemy Thus their fighting power was neutralized when it was most
necessary to take advantage of the gap created by Ibrahim Khan Gardi two
hours later Damaji Gaikawad, on the other hand, had succeeded, for the time
being, in warding off the flank attack on Ibrahim Khan's troops by Barkhurdar
Khan and Amir Beg, by supporting the two Gardi corps left by Ibrahim Khan
on his left side In the centre, Shah Wali Khan's quick advance had obliged
Bhau to break the line of the marching square and advance to meet the Wazir,
with what result we have already seen Twelve noon to one o'clock was the most
crucial period of the battle Had the beaten horsemen under Vitthal Shivdeo,
Yashwantrao Pawar and Damaji Gaikawad courageously rushed out and
marched past the chained guns in front of them to support Ibrahim Khan, it
is very likely they would have succeeded in marching past the Ruhela line
with the help of the Gardi troops, and outflanked them But they do not
seem to have done anything of the kind Perhaps there was a distance of one
mile or so intervening by now between the advanced corps of Ibrahim Khan
and the heavy artillery behind which their troops stood, with the result that
no correct news of the condition at the front was available to them For the
time being they stood safe behind the chained guns, Barkhurdar Khan and
Amir Beg finding it impossible to assail them Perhaps these Persian Mughals
did not advance from their flanking position, with a view to cut off the ad-
vancing Marathas if they tried to create a breach on that side Thus it so
happened that the Maratha troops reaped no tactical advantage from the an-

TO FACE PAGE 90

BATTLE OF PĀNIPAT 1761
SECOND STAGE 1 PM

SCALE

1 MALHĀR JĪ HOLKAR
2 SINDHIĀ
3 HUZURĀT & BHĀU'S BANNER
4 DĀMĀJĪ, VITTHAL SHIVDEV & YESHVANT PUĀR, ANTĀJĪ MĀNKESHWAR
5 IBRĀHĪM GĀRDĪ
13 SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHĀU

6 BARKHURDĀR & AMĪR BEG
7 RUHELĀS
8 SHĀH WALĪ
9 SUJĀ
10 NAJĪB
11 SHĀH PASAND
12 ABDALĪ'S RESERVED TROOPS OF SLAVES
14 SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDĀLĪ

Foot note —Ahmad Shah was viewing the Maratha line, it seems, with a telescope (dur
bīn, vide Irvine p 246, note 1)

THE BATTLE 91
nihilation of their five Gardi troops, nor could they succeed in reinforcing
Ibrahim Khan in his time of need and distress
The right centre under Bhau also could not, or rather would not, reap
a tactical advantage, being encumbered with the women folk. There was a
distance of about a mile between Ibrahim Khan's vanguard troops at the left
of the Maratha line and the centre under Bhau It is not clear from the
scanty descriptions of the actual battle whether a line of communication was
maintained from the one end of the line to the other, whether Bhau knew the
condition of Ibrahim Khan's corps or the behaviour of Vitthal Shivdeo and
others Had he with his remaining victorious troops galloped at full speed
for one mile to the left and stood behind Ibrahim Khan's hard pressed mus
keteers confronting the broken Ruhelas, it is certain that he would have suc
ceeded in creating a breach there, and run behind the Ruhela camp Had he
cared to save his life together with that of Vishwasrao and his nearest women
folk, he would have possibly taken such a line of action, and escaped along
the river Jamuna past the Abdali camp But that would have meant a breach
of promise he had entered into with Ibrahim Khan The previous night he
had told on oath to Ibrahim Khan that he would under no circumstances
flee away from the battle field forsaking the Gardi infantry under Ibrahim
Khan, but would rather stand as if entrenched behind him and take the risk
of being cut to pieces rather than leave the field Secondly, it would have
meant a break of the marching square formation, leaving the non combatants,
camp followers and the bazar people to the tender mercy of the Afghan
troops Looking to the result, however, it seems as if that would have been
a better alternative, because, after all, the camp was left to be looted and
slaughtered by the Afghans at the end of the day By it the Maratha defeat
would have been felt less, as it would have resulted in the survival of politi
cally and militarily the most important people in the army
The behaviour of the Maratha rear guard under the Shinde and Holkar
contingents is not known When, actually, Malharrao Holkar and the cap
tains in the Shinde cavalry left the field is not recorded But we take it that
they never came in contact with the enemy throughout the main period of
the battle from 9 A M to 3 P M Exception must, however be made for the
• personal troops under Janakoji, Tukoji and Mahadji Shinde They kept
their eye on the movements of the centre under Bhau and after Vishwasrao's
accidental death ran to his rescue It was an unfortunate necessity of the plan
that these veteran troops practically did nothing in this final battle They
merely neutralised the opposite camps under Shah Pasand Khan, and Shuja
But many of them escaped the last slaughter by taking to their heels just in
time to get their way westwards
The main difference in the position of the two armies was created by
the necessity of the Marathas They had, if they wished to move from Pani
pat, to come out in a body all together, leaving no base with reserves behind
Ahmad Shah's position was the reverse He stood on his ground well en-
trenched He was not out to carry his bag and baggage with womenfolk past

92 PANIPAT 1761
the enemy line, as the Marathas had to do His defensive position was now
as strong as that of the Marathas at Panipat Ahmad Shah took full ad
vantage of this situation Only the fighting force was first sent to the front,
the rest doing all their duties in the usual manner They could cook their
food and have their meals before the Maratha onslaught could reach them
The Shah s personal troops had, as usual, been kept as a reserve Ahmad
Shah seems to have taken the precaution to keep his main body of troops in
tact in all his battles and not only at Panipat He would make the second
rate troops face the enemy first and wear them out Later on, at the critical
juncture, he would rush in with his fresh, unexhausted troops and complete
the victory His methodology was thus quite different from the Indian practice
since the days of the Mahabharata battle In all the noted Indian battles in
history, the chief general was always at the fore front, and at his fall the bat-
tles ended in a rout The battles were fought for the general, and with his
fall no motive remained for the troops to fight any longer Ahmad Shah, in
fact, was the precursor of the European mode of warfare, wherein a general
seldom takes a personal part in the fight In a composite fight he would make
his allies face the brunt of the battle and expose them to severe casualties
He himself would come in last when the result hung in the balance, thus leaving
a preponderating force with him to take charge of the spoils and not leave an
upper hand to others in case of a dispute later on The original Hindu prac-
tice of fighting with a general at the head of the army had been handed down
even to the Muslim rulers of India They also followed the same mode The
Marathas revolutionised the old system by their guerilla mode in which a
face to face battle was to be avoided But Sadashivrao Bhau had now again
brought the original vogue into fashion with the help of the trained infantry
and its park of artillery Unfortunately for him he had to practise this mode
under very adverse circumstances now
Thus the critical hour of the battle, when the Marathas could pos-
sibly have given a different turn to it, passed away with the army standing ex-
hausted and bewildered by the very first effort Sir Jadunath thinks⁵ that be-
cause 'Bhau had no squadron of cavalry in heavy armour and mounted on
powerful horses ready to charge in close order and cut its way like a solid
wedge through the shaken Durrani ranks," he could not complete his initial
success He also thinks that because the Maratha troops did not carry roast ,
meat and dry bread in their saddle bags and water in leather bottles to refresh
and reinvigorate themselves easily in the field on account of their caste suscepti
bilities with its dread of its defiling touch, they could not recoup themselves
in time so as to follow their initial success with further advantage Though these
causes are true so far as they go, we do not think that these decided the line
of action taken by Bhau He knew that Ahmad Shah with his entrenched
camp was behind the Wazir's line, and the possibility of marching through
it was very remote At the same time he was neither prepared to expose his
camp to Afghan butchery as long as he lived, nor would he break the square
formation decided upon the previous night, and run past Ibrahim Khan's in-
⁵ Fall 233, See the appendix on food arrangements

fantry through the gaps created by it and forsake him, going back on his
promise Anyway, the possibility of saving the main centre with the most
important personages on the Maratha side, passed away by one o'clock when
the Wazir rallied his troops and began the fight again
Now the battle entered its most desperate stage The fight was a close
combat with sword, spear, lance, dagger and knife, both sides vehemently
charging each other This went on for an hour or so, and then 'by Ahmad
Sultan's good fortune" an arrow struck Vishwasrao, killing him outright He
fell from his horse The news of Vishwasrao's death spread like wild fire
throughout the Maratha camp in a very short time, and it had a very dis-
astrous effect on the morale of the fighters thenceforward When Bhau heard
of it, he also was very much affected He ordered that the corpse should be
placed on an elephant so as to keep it safe from being trodden upon, and then
ordered a last charge But by this time the news was beginning to have its
effect Timid men, it seems, fell back and began to leave the field, saving them-
selves as best as they could, and in a short time Bhau's flanks seem to have
completely deserted Kashiraj writes that, all of a sudden, the field became
clear, the Maratha army having vanished entirely, and none remained in the
field except heaps of corpses here and there
Besides the news of Vishwasrao's death, another cause which created
panic in the Maratha camp was the behaviour of 2,000 Afghans, employed
by the Marathas and working under Vitthal Shivdeo The sentiment and aim
of the Marathas in this war under discussion is incidentally well illustrated
thereby They were not fighting against the Muslims, not even the foreign
Afghan Muslims, but against Ahmad Shah Abdali who wished to interfere
in Indian politics and bring foreign pressure on the solution of Indian problems
This existence of the Afghan troops serving under the Marathas is not men-
tioned by Kashiraj at all But it is found in both the Ka fijat and Bakhar of
Bhau in Marathi ⁵ᵃ It is also testified by Bhau's correspondence with Govind-
pant Bundele ⁶ It is not clear to which of the Afghan tribes these dissatisfied,
renegade troops belonged They may even be Indian Ruhelas Be that as
it may, these troops, employed without forethought, became a source of great
havoc at this critical juncture To distinguish them from the Afghans on
Abdali's side, they had been given a badge of an ochre coloured headdress⁷ after
the Maratha fashion They were standing behind Vitthal Shivdeo's troops to
the left hand side of Bhau As soon as they heard of Vishwasrao's fall, they
treacherously threw away their badges and began to loot the Maratha camp
adjoining them, circulating the news of the Maratha defeat with exaggerated
accounts The non combatants, consisting of two lakhs of persons, naturally
thought that the Afghans had now penetrated the Maratha lines, and they
took to their heels Vitthal Shivdeo also began to fall back as a result, in-
stead of trying to check these Afghans in their nefarious activities Thus it
was that Kashiraj found the Maratha side suddenly deserted and the field
⁵ᵃ Pp 23 and 143 respectively
⁶ RAJ 1.237, 242, 244
⁷ Bhau Bakhar 143, Bhau Kaifiyat 23

94 PANIPAT 1761
cleared. Now only a few hundred troops surrounding Bhau remained at the
front in the centre of the line.
On the left hand side the Ruhelas now reinforced with fresh troops,
began their attack simultaneously with that of the Wazir at the centre. In
the consequent battle Damaji Gaikawad, Antaji Manakeshwar and Yashwant
rao Pawar fell back defeated unable to stand the heavy slaughter by the con-
secutive rounds of match lock fire from the Ruhela side. They could not
make a united stand in one place. Ibrahim Khan went forth and mixed his
troops amongst the Ruhelas heavily firing his last salvoes but was himself
wounded and carried a prisoner by the Ruhelas. His son and brother in-law
died in the effort. Practically the whole of his corps seems to have died on the
battle field fighting to the last. Yashwantrao Pawar also was cut to pieces.
Damaji Gaikawad received three wounds but retreated safely with his im-
mediate civil assistants.⁸ Antaji Manakeshwar also with his usual cautious-
ness retreated just in time to save himself uncovering the left side of the
Marathas. The Ruhelas now closed upon the left flank of Bhau's personal
cavalry.
On the left hand side of Bhau, Samsher Bahadar was standing. He
behaved on that day as a worthy scion of the Peshwa family and fought to
the last. To his right were standing the Shindes, Tukoji, Mahadji and Janakoji.
Their opposites on the Abdali side were Shuja ud daulah and Najib Khan.
At the beginning of the battle at 9 A. M. the distance between the Ruhela front
and the Shinde line was more than three miles. Najib was the coolest brain
on the Abdali side, never losing his head and never acting impetuously. On
this day he seems to have acted with perfect calculation. As the Maratha
plan of the battle was to march on to the river side before the evening and
not to fight a battle, naturally no one from the Shinde side advanced to at-
tack Shuja or Najib. Besides, there was a great distance intervening between
them. Najib used this respite to act in a systematic manner. He turned all
his troops into infantry, dismounting even his cavalry from their horses. Then
with his 15,000 troops he slowly advanced on foot, throwing up earth works in
front at each quarter of a mile. That is to say, the sappers and others raised
a breast-work of sand and earth a few steps in front of the line, one cubit high,
which afforded a shelter to the stooping infantry and prepared trenches where
the Ruhela infantry advanced and crouched down. Najib had a vast quantity
of rockets with him. He would fire a volley of 2,000 rockets all at once from
his advanced trenches. This had the effect of darkening the ground and the
sky with their smoke and their noise created a sort of terror very useful for
frightening away any advancing force. Kashiraj says that the troops of the
Shinde contingent wanted to attack Najib, but they got no chance on account
of this fire. We think otherwise. Bhau had wisely kept the Shinde and Holkar
contingents with their beaten troops—beaten by Abdali himself in three or four
fights during the last two years—to the rear flanks of his advancing square so
as not to demoralise other troops by their chicken-hearted behaviour in an
*8 SPD 21.200