पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

daulah were on the plain between Risalu and Siwa. We do not think that the
Afghan army was standing in a continuous line along the whole front between
Chhajpur and Siwa.² There were gaps between the various contingents which
were ordered to the front, though none so wide as to allow a Maratha corps
safely to thrust itself between. Najib-ud-daulah had to cover full three miles
before he could come into contact with the Shinde division to the west of
Ugrakhedi. The army was spread on a front some seven miles in length from
Chhajpur Khurd to the west of Siwa The right-hand side of the Maratha
square was not more than three miles in length, and spread from Nimbdi to
Chandni Bagh (to the east of Panipat) in almost a straight line.
The battle began with a cannonade as usual. Within an hour Ibrahim
Khan's corps touched the Abdali front at the point where the trans-Ganges
Ruhelas were massed in front of the village of Chhajpur Kalan. On the
right-hand side of these Ruhelas Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg were stand-
ing ready to cover the Maratha flank on that side. Ibrahim Khan ordered two
corps to stand in front of them so as to stop their advance with a view to cut
off the gunners in front of the corps of Ibrahim Khan. The rest of his in-
fantry engaged with the Ruhelas. His quick firing muskets soon began to have
their effect on the opposite side. The infantry advanced step by step fighting
for each inch of ground, but the heavy siege-guns seem not to have kept up the
march and soon lagged behind. This was probably due to the difficulty of
dragging them on an uneven ground, and also to the advance of the Ruhela
cavalry to cut off the gunners as is usual in this kind of battle. For three hours
the combat went on, and the Ruhelas were pressed back with heavy slaughter.
Only a few hundred match-lockmen remained with their chiefs Hafiz Rahmat
and Dunde Khan. This was the result of the battle at twelve o'clock. But
before this the Maratha cavalry, detailed for supporting Ibrahim Khan and
standing half a mile at his back, had acted injudiciously, not understanding the
kind of battle they were engaged in. In their impetuosity they seem to have
acted on their own initiative and broken the marching order absolutely neces-
sary when the army is to advance in a square formation. They advanced
rapidly at a trotting pace and soon overmarched the infantry corps of
Ibrahim Khan. But they met with the sharp fire of the Ruhela infantry and had
to run back with broken spirits. Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar then
galloped back and stood behind the heavy guns fixed in the ground and pos-
sibly chained together so as to obstruct the advance of the enemy cavalry to
cut off the gunners. Damaji Gaikawad also met with a similar check from the
Durrani cavalry to his left, and he, too, returned back and stood behind as
at the beginning. This disobedience of orders was the chief cause of the Pani-
pat disaster. Before starting, Bhau had clearly placed his plan before his of-
ficers and asked them to march straight without breaking the order by swerving
to the right or left. The aim of the march was to gain ground and reach the
river Jamuna before evening and not to offer battle. If the enemy would step
aside and allow the Marathas to press forward with their whole mass, then
the Marathas were not to engage with them at all. Only if and when the
² IHQ 10.259, 60.