पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

self and soon came into contact with Bhau's right wing. As the fire from the
camel swivels supported by Persian infantry at its back was both quicker and
sharper, they seem to have soon overpowered the Maratha light artillery on
that side and silenced it. As there were no infantry battalions to support it,
Bhau had himself to swerve to the right to its rescue, and thus the Peshwa's
Huzarat came into contact with Shah Wali Khan's troops. The ground where
they met was to the south of Ugrakhedi and to the north of Risalu. The troops
surrounding Bhau belonged to the select group and were possibly in the best
of condition. Working under the eye of the commander in chief himself, and
themselves possessing a high sense of duty with patriotic fervour for the name
of the Marathas, they came sweeping down and would not stop even in the
face of the sharp fire from the swivel guns. Now a cavalry battle fought with
lance and sword on the Maratha side and musketry and archery on the other side
began in good earnest. It is certain that the Afghan cavalry under Ahmad Shah
had more musketeers, match lockmen and archers amongst them than were to be
found in the Maratha army.⁴ Each Maratha of note had possibly a hand
gun by his side but he had neither love for it nor expertness at its use. He pre-
ferred lance and spear at a short distance to the clumsy bow and arrow or heavy,
long matchlock of those days. 'The fighting was so violent that earth and sky
could not be seen and the eye of heaven became dazzled at beholding this
spetacle. (Kashiraj.) The Afghan army was composed of 12,000 horse-
men and 8,000 foot soldiers, besides 1,000 camel guns. 'The Marathas drank
them up like the water of a river.' Atai Khan, the son of the Wazir's paternal
uncle, (who had carried the raid against Govindpant Bundele and slaughtered
him) was slain. 3,000 Durranis were put to the sword and the rest fled back
at the fury of the Maratha charge. Only 200 troops stood surrounding the
Grand Wazir with fifty camel guns in his front. He was clad in full armour
from head to foot, still dismounting from his horse he sat down on the ground,
saying to his followers, "Comrades! Vilayat is far off, whither are you going?"
He asked Kashiraj (who himself reports this) to take a message to Shuja ud-
daulah that he was dying and that Shuja should come to his aid. Shuja did
nothing of the kind, however, excusing himself with the plea that it was not
proper to break the line of battle at that stage and thus allow the Marathas
a possible chance to pierce past the Afghan line through the gap. As a mat-
ter of fact, though Shuja stood ready with all his troops and guns throughout
the day, none moved from the Maratha side against him. This clearly shows
that the oblique Maratha line never came by itself into direct contact with the
Afghan line at the left throughout the main fight, a distance of more than a
mile still intervening between the two armies.
But though Shuja would not come to the Durrani Wazir's aid, Ahmad
Shah was not unaware of his plight. By this time it was twelve noon, and it
seemed for a moment at the centre that the Marathas were triumphing.
Ahmad Shah who was some three miles to the back, received intelligence of
⁴ Even in 1795 match-lock seemed to be daily gaining ground of the long spear ac-
cord ng to MALET. In 1760 it must have been comparatively rare. (Poona Residency Cor-
respondence 4.2 0)