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[Sū. 3. 3. 35.
ADH. 16.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 653
that (the former reply which describes the self as) within (speaks)
of one’s own self possessed of the group of elements, otherwise there is
unaccountableness of difference, (we reply:) no". If it be objected:
The reply, viz. ' "He who breaths in with the in-breath " ' (Bṛh. 3.4.1),
given to the question of Uṣasta, viz. ' " He who is the self within all ' "
(Bṛh. 3.4.1), and referring to something "within", should be known to
be referring to "one's own self possessed of the group of elements",¹
i e. to the individual soul, since the individual soul being the inner soul
of all, viz. of the body, the sense-organs, the mind, the intellect and so
on, can appropriately be the inner soul of all. Consequently, the
question of Kahola and the answer to it refer to the Highest Self,
the primary inner soul, since the Highest Self alone is devoid of
hunger and the rest. Thus owing to the difference of form, the
questions and answers refer to two vidyās. "Otherwise," i.e. if
the vidyās be taken to be identical on the ground that the questions
and answers refer to the Highest Self in both cases, the difference of
the answers is unaccountable,—
(We reply:) "no", i.e. there is no difference of vidyās, as the two
sets of questions and answers refer to the same form, viz. to the Highest
Self (equally). Thus, to begin with, the question of Uṣasta, viz. ' " He
who is manifest and not invisible Brahman, he who is the soul within
all, explain him to me " ' (Bṛh. 3 4.1) does indeed refer to the Highest
Self alone. It means: Reverend Yājñavalkya, he who is Brahman,
explain him to me. I am not asking about Brahman, consisting in
His own power (viz. pradhāna, which may also be called Brahman)
simply because of its connection with great attributes like existence and
the rest.² With this idea he said: 'Explain Brahman who is not
invisible and who is the soul'.³ The individual soul too is Brahman
because of its connection with the attribute of knowledge.⁴ I am not
¹ I.e. possessed of the body, etc., which are products of the elements.
² I.e. the word 'Brahman', meaning 'one possessed of greatness', may
figuratively denote pradhāna too owing to its connection with great attributes.
That a thing, though not great by nature, may yet be designated as great because
of having great attributes, is shown under V.K. 2.3.28.
³ Pradhāna is not 'not invisible', i.e. its evolutes are visible to all, while the
Lord is so to the freed only. Again, pradhāna is not 'soul', which the Lord
is. Hence these two epithets show that the word 'Brahman' does not mean
here pradhāna, but the Lord alone.
⁴ The individual soul, though atomic by nature, is said to be great because
of having great attributes. Vide V.K. 2.3.28.

[SŪ. 3. 3. 35.
654 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 16.]
asking about Brahman having such a mark. With this idea, he said,
'Explain Brahman who is manifest, who is the soul within all'.¹
But such a Brahman is none but the cause of the world, having the
stated marks, called the Highest Person. Thus it is known that the
question is concerned with the Supreme Brahman, in accordance with
the following scriptural and Smṛti texts: "The controller of matter
and soul, the Lord of the properties of matter" (Śvet. 6.16), "He is
your soul, the inner controller" (Bṛh. 3.7.3–23), "Entered within, the
ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2²), "He who abiding within the earth
is other than the earth" (Bṛh. 3.7.3), "He who abiding within the soul
is other than the soul" (Śat. Br. 14, 6.7.30³), '"I transcend the perish-
able and am higher than even the imperishable. Hence I am celebrated
in the world and in the Veda as the Highest Person"' (Gītā 15 18),
'"He who sees me everywhere"' (Gītā 6.30), '"And I am situated in
the heart of all"' (Gītā 15 15) and so on.
The answer, viz. '"He who breathes in with the in-breath"'
(Bṛh. 3.4.1) too refers to the Highest Person alone, since the Highest
alone is the primary agent of in-breathing, in accordance with the
scriptural text: "For who would live, who would breathe, if there
were not this bliss in the ether" (Tait. 2.7).
That the last set of question and answer refers to the Highest
Self is admitted by the prima facie view as well.
There is repetition of question and answer for the sake of demon-
strating that the Highest Person, the cause of the breathing of all
breathing creatures, is beyond hunger and so on. (The author)
states a parallel instance: "As in the case of another teaching".
That is, just as under the same Sad-vidyā, which begins: '"You
are proud. Did you ask for that teaching"' (Chānd. 6.1.2), there is
repetition of the question thus: '"But you yourself, Sir, tell me that"'
(Chānd. 6.1.7), '"Sir, inform me once more"' (Chānd. 6.5.4, etc.);
and repetition of the answer as well, thus: '"That which is the finest
essence—all this has that for its soul"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.)—with a
¹ The individual is not 'manifest' Brahman, i.e. it is not directly and actually
Brahman, but only figuratively, while the Lord is Brahman or great directly.
Again, the individual soul is not the 'soul within all', which the Lord is. Hence
these two epithets show that the word 'Brahman' here does not mean the
individual soul, but the Lord alone.
² P. 181.
³ P. 1074.

[sū. 3. 3. 35.
ADH. 16.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 655
view to demonstrating particular attributes in particular cases of one
and the same object to be known,—so is the case here.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
He breaks the sūtra into two separate sūtras thus:
“Antarā bhūta-grāma-vat svātmanaḥ” (sūtra 35).
“Anyathā bhedānupapattir iti cen nopadeśāntara-vat”
(sūtra 36).
Import and the conclusion reached are the same, only the literal
interpretation different. Thus, while according to Nimbārka the whole
portion “Antarā—bhedānupapatti” constitutes the prima facie view,
according to Śaṃkara, the portion “Antarā—svātmanaḥ” does not
state the prima facie view, but the view of the author, while the portion
“Anyathā bhedānupapattir” alone states the prima facie view. Thus
he interprets the portion: “Antarā—svātmanaḥ” (sūtra 35 in his
commentary) as follows.—“(Both the texts speak) of one’s own self
(viz. the Lord) (to be) within all, (hence these two selves must be
identical, otherwise the inner soul must become relative) as in the case
(of the body composed of the) group of elements”. That is, both the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka passages speak of a self which is within all. Now if
these two selves be different, we have to say that there are two
selves within all. But in that case neither can be said to be the inner
being absolutely, but only relatively, just as none of the five elements
which constitute the body can be said to be within another—i.e.
water within the earth and so on—absolutely or solely, but only
relatively so. Hence to avoid this conclusion we must hold that the
two selves are identical, i.e. the two passages refer to the same vidyā.
Śaṃkara gives an alternative explanation of the phrase: “bhūta-
grāma-vat”, viz. “as (another scriptural passage, viz. Śvet. 6.11
declares the one self to be within all) the group of (beings)”. Hence
here also, there must be only one self within all. This proves the
identity of the two selves and the consequent identity of vidyās.¹
Sūtra 36.—Like Nimbārka’s interpretation.

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.35, pp. 814-815.

656 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 35.
ADH. 16.]
Bhāskara
Interpretation diametrically opposed. He interprets the first
part of the sūtra like Śaṁkara, but arrives at a directly opposite
conclusion. Thus, like Nimbārka, according to him also the portion
"Antarā---bhedānupapatti" constitutes the prima facie view, the
rest the reply. Hence the prima facie view: "(The two passages in
the Bṛhadāraṇyaka refer to the same self, for on this view alone the
self which is designated as) within (can be the absolute inner self and
not relatively only), otherwise (the self would be) like the group of
elements none of which can be said to be within another absolutely).
(Hence there is) inappropriateness of difference, (i.e. the two passages
refer to the same self)".
Correct conclusion: "No, as in the case of the difference ('antarā')
of teaching". That is, just as there are two different teachings here,
so the objects taught by them too must be different. Or, an alter-
native explanation: "No, as in the case of another ('antarā')
teaching". That is, just as in the Chāndogya the nine repetitions of
the dictum: 'Thou art that' show that in every version the object
established is different, so here.¹
Baladeva
He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras exactly after
Śaṁkara. Interpretation absolutely different. He begins a new
adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras) concerned with the topic of the identity
between the Lord and His city. Thus:
Sūtra 36.—"Within (the city of the Lord, viz. Saṁvyoma or the
great Ether), (things appear) like (things in) an elemental city ("bhūta-
grāma-vat") (i.e. in an ordinary city) (to the vision) of His own (i.e.
to the devotees chosen by the Lord)." That is, in the city of the
Lord, everything being a manifestation of the Lord is but the Lord
Himself, but they look like material objects to His devotees.²
Sūtra 37.—"If it be objected that otherwise (i.e. on the view
that there is no difference between the Lord and His city), there is
inappropriateness of difference (between the dweller and the resi-
dence), (we reply:), no, as in the case of another teaching." That is,
¹ Bh. B. 3.3.35, p. 189.
² G.B. 3.3.36, p. 174, Chap. 3. "Yatratyaṁ vastu-jātaṁ sarvaṁ brah-
mātmakam api pṛthivyādi-nirmita-vat sphurati."

[SŪ. 3. 3. 36.
ADH. 16.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 657
just as another text (Tait. 2.1) declares the Lord to be both
bliss and blissful, the attribute and the substratum of attributes, so
the Lord is both the dweller and the residence, i.e. is identical with
His city, yet dwells in the city. Everything is possible in His
case.¹
SŪTRA 36
“(THERE MUST BE) EXCHANGE (OF IDEAS), FOR (THE TWO TEXTS)
SPECIFY (THE SAME BRAHMAN), AS IN ANOTHER CASE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
An investigation into the Highest, distinguished from the
individual soul as the cause of the breathing of all breathing
creatures, is to be made by Kahola as by Usasta. Similarly, an
investigation into Him, distinguished from the individual soul as
beyond hunger and so on, is to be made by Uṣasta as by Kahola.
Thus, there is a mutual exchange of investigations. This being so,
Brahman becomes distinguished from the individual soul. Hence the
answers given by Yājñavalkya “specify”, in both cases, the same
soul of all as the object to be worshipped, just as in the Sad-vidyā
all the answers specify the same Brahman, the Existent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. Let it be that in both the cases the questions
and the answers refer to the Primary Inner Soul of all. Still, the
vidyās do not become identical, a difference between them being
possible by reason of the fact that in the prior section the Primary
Inner Soul, characterized by the attribute of being the cause of the
breathing of all breathing creatures, is of one form as an object to be
known by Uṣasta; while in the subsequent section, the Primary Inner
Soul, characterized by the attribute of being beyond hunger and
so on, is of another form as an object to be known by Kahola,—(the
author) says:
¹ G.B. 3.3 37, p. 175, Chap. 3.

658 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 36.
ADH. 16.]
There is "exchange", i.e. inter-change, of the attributes of
being the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures and being
beyond hunger and so on. The object to be known by Uṣasta too
is the one Supreme Brahman, differentiated from the sentient by the
two distinguishing attributes. Similarly, the object to be known by
Kahola too is the same Brahman, "for", with a view to making it
known that the Highest Person, the soul of all and the object to
be worshipped, is different from the individual soul, endowed with
the attibutes of occupying a small place and so on,—the answers
given by Yājñavalkya "specify", i.e demonstrate, Brahman as differ-
ent from the individual soul by defining His attributes of being the
cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures and being beyond
hunger and so on. "As in another case." That is, just as in another
case, viz. in the case in the Sad-vidyā, by the repeated answers,
establishing diverse attributes, the same Brahman is specified as the
object to be known, but by reason of this difference of attributes,
He Himself does not become different, in those cases, as an object
to be worshipped,—so is the case here.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 37 in Śaṃkara's commentary.
They take this sūtra to be constituting an adhikarana by itself,
concerned with the question whether the Aitareya and Jābāla texts:
"I am he, he is I" (Ait. Ār. 2.2.4, 6), "You are I, I am you" mean
only that the individual soul is the Lord; or both that the individual
soul is the Lord and the Lord is the individual soul. The Prima
facie view is that here the transposition is to be understood in one
way only, viz. that the individual soul is the Lord,—since the lower
can become the higher,—but never that the Lord too is the individual
soul, since the Lord can never become the individual soul. The answer
is: "(The texts designate) exchange (i.e. mutual transposition of
the ideas of the individual soul and the Lord), for (they) specify
(this exchange expressly), as in other cases". That is, in the texts,
we must not only understand the individual soul to be the Lord,
but vice versa as well, seeing that the texts expressly say not only
"I am he", but also "He is I". If the transposition were meant
to be understood in one way alone, they would have stopped by

[sū. 3. 3. 37.
ADH. 16.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 659
saying "I am he". What the above passages aim at enjoining is
the meditation on the unity of the soul. Hence just as other texts
record the attributes of being the soul of all and so on for the purpose
of meditation, so the above texts record a mutual transposition of
the ideas of 'I' and 'He' for the same purpose.¹
Baladeva
This is sūtra 38 in his commentary.
Here he concludes the topic of the identity between the Lord
and His city. Hence the sūtra: "For (texts like Brh. 1.4.15) specify
(that an) interchange (is possible between the Lord and His city),
like other (texts, e.g. Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī, etc.)". That is, the City
of Brahman is identical with Brahman Himself, hence an exchange
is possible between them, and the former is equally adorable like the
latter.²
SŪTRA 37
"FOR HE ALONE (IS THE OBJECT OF MEDITATIONS IN ALL THE
VERSIONS), THE TRUE AND THE REST (ARE INSERTED IN ALL THE
VERSIONS)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"He alone" who is denoted by the term 'true', and is mentioned
in the texts: "That divinity thought" (Chānd. 6.3.2 ³), "Light
(merges) in the highest divinity" (Chānd. 6.8.6 ⁴), is repeated in the
versions, such as: '"Just as, my dear, the bees prepare the honey"'
(Chānd. 6.9.1 ⁵) and so on. The very same (attributes of being) "the
true and the rest", mentioned in the first version thus: '"Everything
has that for its self, that is true"' (Chānd 6.8.7 ⁶), are inserted in all
other versions.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. In the Sad-vidyā too, there being a repe-
tition of question and answer, how is it ascertained that the object
to be meditated on is the same?—(the author) says:
¹ Ś.B. 3.3.37, pp. 816-817; Bh. B. 3.3.36 (written as 3.3.37), p. 189.
² G.B. 3.3.38, p. 176, Chap. 3. "Paramātmaiva loko lokaḥ paramātmeti."
³ R, ŚK. ⁴ R.
⁵ R. ⁶ R, ŚK.

660 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 37.
ADH. 16.]
“For he alone,” i.e. the Highest Divinity alone, denoted by the
term ‘existent’ and referred to in the passages: “That divinity
thought” (Chānd 6 3.2), “Light (merges) in the Highest Divinity”
(Chānd. 6.8.6), is repeated in the versions: ‘“Just as, my dear, the
bees prepare the honey”’ (Chānd. 6 9.1) and so on. The very same
(attributes of being) “the true” and so on, mentioned in the first
version: ‘“All this has that for its soul, that is true”’ (Chānd. 6.8.7),
are inserted in all the other versions. Hence in the Sad-vidyā, the
object to be worshipped is the same indeed. Thus it is established
that in both the cases the questions and the answers are concerned
with the same vidyā.
Here ends the section entitled “Being within” (16).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 38 in Śaṃkara’s commentary. They take this
sūtra too as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the
question whether the two Sad-vidyās (in Bṛh. 5.4 and Bṛh. 5.5)
constitute the same vidyā or two different vidyās. The answer is
that they are the same vidyā. They read “sā” (meaning vidyā)
instead of “sa” (meaning the Lord). Hence the sūtra: “For that
(viz. the same Sad-vidyā) alone (is recorded by the two texts), (hence
the attributes of) truth and so on (are to be comprehended in one act
of meditation)”.¹
Śrīkaṇṭha
He takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself.
Interpretation same.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 39 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as
constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with proving that
the attributes of the Lord are not unreal. Like Śaṃkara and Bhās-
kara, he reads “sā” (meaning the parā-śakti of the Lord). Hence
the sūtra: “She (viz. the parā-śakti of the Lord) alone is truth and the
rest”. That is, the attributes of the Lord like truth, omniscience
¹ Ś.B. 3.3.38, pp. 817–819; Bh. B. 3.3.37 (written as 3.3.38), p. 190.

[sū. 3. 3. 38.
ADH. 17.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 661
and so on, are the modifications of the parā-śakti or the svarūpa-śakti
of the Lord. Hence they are real, constituting the essential nature
of the Lord, and not illusory.¹
Adhikarana 17: The section entitled "Desire".
(Sūtras 38–40)
SŪTRA 38
"(THE ATTRIBUTES OF HAVING TRUE) DESIRE AND SO ON (ARE
TO BE INSERTED) ELSEWHERE (I.E. IN THE BṚHADĀRAṆYAKA)
AND THERE (I.E. IN THE CHĀNDOGYA), ON ACCOUNT OF ABODE
AND SO ON."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In the Chāndogya, in the text beginning: "Now, that which is
within this city of Brahman is a small lotus-chamber. Small is the
ether within that. What is within that should be searched out"
(Chānd. 8.1.1 ²) and continuing: "This soul is free from sins" (Chānd.
8.1.5 ³), it is declared that the Highest Self, possessed of the attributes
of having true "desire and so on" is the object to be worshipped.
And in the Vājasaneyaka, in the text: "He, verily, is the great, unborn
self, who is this one consisting of knowledge among the vital-breaths,
who lies in the ether within the heart, the controller of all, the Lord
of all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22 ⁴), it is declared that the Highest Self, possessed
of the attributes of being the controller and so on, is the object to
be worshipped. Here the vidyās are identical. Hence the attributes
of having true desires and the rest are to be included in the Vājasa-
neyaka, and those of being the controller and so on in the Chāndogya.
Why? On account of the non-difference of abode and so on.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, (the author) points out that when owing to the non-
difference of forms, the vidyās, mentioned in even different treatises,
are not different, how much more it is the case that the vidyās,
demonstrated by two sections of the same treatise, are not different
owing to the non-difference of forms.
¹ G.B. 3.3.39, pp. 177-178, Chap. 3. ² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
³ Ś. ⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

[Sū. 3. 3. 38.
662 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 17.]
Having designated the Highest Self by the term 'ether' in the
passage: "Now, that which is within this city of Brahman is a small
lotus-chamber, small is the ether within that. What is within that
should be searched for" (Chānd 8.1 1), the Chandogas go on to men-
tion His special characteristics by means of eight attributes, thus:
"This soul is free from sins, without old age, without death, without
grief, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires, having true
resolves" ((Chānd. 8 1.5).
Having stated: "He, verily, is the great, unborn self, who is
this one consisting of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who lies
in the ether within the heart" (Bṛh. 4.4 22), the Vājasaneyins too go
on to mention His special characteristics by means of the attributes of
being a controller and so on, thus: "The controller of all, the ruler of
all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22).
Here the doubt is, viz. whether the vidyās of the Chandogas
and the Vājasaneyins are different, or whether they are identical.
On the suggestion, viz In the one case, the object to be meditated
on is the Highest Self, denoted by the term 'ether' and possessed of
the attributes of freedom from sins and so on; while in the other
case, the object to be meditated on is one who abides within a special
kind of ether and is possessed of the attributes of being a controller
and so on. This being so, owing to the difference of forms, there
results difference of the objects to be known, and hence the vidyās
differ,—
We reply: The vidyās are identical, owing to the non-difference
of forms. So says (the author): "Desire and the rest". "Desire
and the rest," i.e. the group of attributes like having true desires
and so on, mentioned in the Chāndogya text. "Free from sins"
(Chānd. 8.1.5) and so on, is to be inserted "elsewhere", i.e. in the
Vājasaneyaka. "And here," i.e. and in the Chāndogya, the group
of attributes like being the controller and so on, mentioned in the
Vājasaneyaka text, is to be inserted. This being so, the form
is not different; that being so, there is identity of the objects to be
meditated on and hence the vidyās are identical.
(The author) states the reasons for this mutual insertion of attri-
butes: "On account of abode and so on", i.e. on account of the non-
difference, in both the cases, of the abode, viz. the heart; ¹ of the
¹ Vide Chānd. 8.1.1; Bṛh. 4 4.22. See the quotations above.

[sū. 3. 3. 38.
ADH. 17.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 663
designation of Brahman, the object to be meditated on, as a bridge; ¹
and of the connection with the fruit, viz. the attainment of Brahman,
mentioned in the passages "Having attained the form of highest
light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd 8 4 4), "He becomes
the fearless Brahman" (Chānd 4.4.25)
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
This is sūtra 39 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an
adhikarana by itself. He begins by explaining the sūtra exactly
like Nimbārka, viz. that there is identity of the vidyās here and hence
the attributes are to be mutually combined. But in conclusion he
adds that there is, however, a difference between the two passages,
viz. that the Chāndogya text refers to the qualified Brahman, the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka text to the highest Brahman.²
Śrīkaṇṭha
He reads: "Kāmādayas tatra tatra". Interpretation same,
only while Nimbārka speaks of only two Upanisads, he speaks of three,
viz. Chāndogya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Māhā-nārāyaṇa (Mahānār.
10.7), and points out that all these three passages refer to the same
vidyā.³ He takes it as forming an adhikarana by itself.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 40 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikarana
here (two sūtras) concerned with Śrī, the eternal consort of the Lord.
According to him, the words 'sā eva' are to be supplied here from the
preceding sūtra. Hence the sūtra: "She (viz. the parā-śakti of the
Lord) alone (is Śrī), (who creates all) objects of desire and so on else-
where (i.e. in the material world) and here (i.e. in the city of the Lord
or Saṃvyoma), (for the Lord) since (she is) all-pervading ("āya"),

¹ Vide Chānd. 8.4.1; Bṛh. 4.4.22.
² Ś.B. 3.3.38, p. 820, "Ayaṃ tu atra vidyate viśeṣaḥ, saguṇā hi Brahma-
vidyā Chāndogye Upadiśyate, . . . Vājasaneyake tu nirguṇam eva paraṃ Brah-
mopadiśyamānaṃ dṛśyate".
³ ŚK. 3.3.38, p. 350, Parts 10 and 11.

[SŪ. 3. 3. 39.
664 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 17.]
spreading out (“tana”) (bliss and release for the devotees) and so
on”.¹
SŪTRA 39
“ON ACCOUNT OF CARE, THERE IS NON-OMISSION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is no negation of the attributes of having true desires and
so on, recorded “carefully”, since the negation: “There is no plurality
here” (Bṛh. 4.4.19; Kaṭha 4 11 ²) refers to the things not having
Brahman for their essence.
Vedānta-kaustubha
It may be objected: The statement, made above, that the group
of attributes like ‘being the controller’ and so on, mentioned in the
Vājasaneyaka, is to be inserted in the Chāndogya, is not justifiable.
In accordance with the text under discussion, viz. “It is to be
perceived by the mind alone. There is no plurality here, He gets death
after death who perceives here apparent plurality. It is to be looked
upon as a unity alone,—this unknowable being” (Bṛh. 4.4.19-20), as
well as in accordance with the subsequent text: “This soul is not this,
not this” (Bṛh. 4.4.22), we arrive at the conclusion that the Highest
is free from distinctions. Hence it is known that like grossness,
atomicity and so on, the group of attributes like ‘being the controller’
and so on, is something to be negated. Hence, it should be known
that in the Chāndogya too, the group of attributes like having true
desires and so on, is something to be negated. This being so, such an
absence of attributes is to be included in all the meditations subserving
final release.—To this (the author) says:
There is “non-omission”, i.e. non-denial, of the attributes of the
Highest Brahman, like ‘having true desires’ and so on and ‘being the
controller’ and so on, which are incapable of being denied and
are taught “carefully” as something new in the texts: “What is
within that should be searched for” (Chānd. 8.1.1), “This soul is free
from sins, without old age, without death, without grief, without
hunger, without thirst, having true desires, having true resolves”
¹ G.B. 3.3.40, pp. 182–184, Chap. 3. ² R.

[sū. 3. 3. 39.
ADH. 17.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 665
(Chānd. 8.1.5), “Those who go, having found here the soul and the
true desires, come to have free movement in all the worlds” (Chānd.
8 1.6), “The controller of all, the ruler of all” (Bṛh. 4.4 22; 5.6.1),
“He is the Lord of all, he is the ruler of all beings, he is the protector
of all beings” (Bṛh. 4.4 22), “He is the separating dam for keeping
these worlds apart” (Bṛh. 4.4.22) and so on. On the contrary, they
are to be inserted, there being no authority for their denial.
The scriptural text: “There is no plurality here” (Bṛh. 4.4.19;
Kaṭha 4.11) states, on the other hand, that in Brahman, who is
the cause of the world, who is different and non-different from the
sentient and the non-sentient and who has the stated marks, there
is no ‘plurality’, i.e. there are no objects which, not having their
existence and activity dependent on Him are dependent on one another
only Since everything has Brahman for its essence, ‘he who perceives
here apparent plurality’, not having Brahman for his essence, ‘gets
death after death’. He is to be ‘looked upon as a unity alone’, since all
things have Brahman for their essence, and since there is nothing
which does not have Brahman for its essence. This is what the text
designates, but it does not prove that the real attributes of Brahman
are to be denied.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 40 in Śaṁkara’s commentary. They begin a new
adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an entirely different
topic, viz. whether the Prāṇāgni-hotra or the offering of the first food
to the vital-breaths, enjoined in the Chāndogya (Chānd. 5.19.1), is
to be omitted when eating itself is omitted or not. This sūtra states
the prima facie view, viz. that there is no omission of the offering
to the vital-breath even when there is the omission of eating, but it
has to be performed by means of water in place of food, since the
Jābāla version of the same vidyā (viz. Vaiśvānara-vidyā) shows
great respect for this ceremony of Prāṇāgni-hotra.
Śrīkaṇṭha
He takes it to be an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets it in a
sectarian way. The question is whether the form of the Lord as
having a blue neck (Nīla-kaṇṭha), having Umā by His side and having
attributes like true desires and so on is something to be negated

666 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 3. 3. 40.
ADH. 17.]
or not. The prima facie view is that having parts like a blue neck
and so on involves increase and decrease and hence it is not possible
on the part of Brahman, the immutable. Therefore, the attributes
of having a blue neck, having Umā by the side and so on, are not His
real attributes, but are simply imagined for the sake of meditation
and are, as such, subject to negation sometime or other. The
answer is: "There is no negation (of the attributes having a blue
neck, three eyes, Umā by the side and so on), since (they are designated
in Scripture) with (great) care". That is, the Lord (viz. Śiva) is to
be meditated on always as having a blue neck and so on and as
accompanied by Umā,—which are His real attributes—for such a
meditation alone leads to release.¹
Baladeva
This is sūtra 41 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic
of Śrī, viz. her identity with the parā-śakti of the Lord. The problem
is that if Śrī be identical with the parā-śakti of the Lord, then she
must be identical with the Lord Himself, since the parā-śakti of the
Lord is identical with Him. In that case, however, she cannot be
devoted to the Lord, since none can be devoted to one's own self.
The answer is: "On account of (her great) regard (for the Lord),
there is non-cessation (of her devotion for Him)". That is, Śrī,
though one with the Lord, cannot but love and be devoted to Him
who is her very existence, just as the branch cannot but love the tree,
or the ray the moon.²
SŪTRA 40
"WHEN ONE HAS APPROACHED (THE LORD, HE COMES TO HAVE
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT), FOR THIS REASON, ON ACCOUNT OF
STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
When one has attained Brahman by means of meditating on Him
who has the stated marks, one comes to have freedom of movement in
1 ŚK. B. 3.3.39, pp. 354-355, Parts 10 and 11.
2 G.B. 3.3.41, p. 185, Chap. 3. "Satyapya bhede vicitra-guṇaratnākarat-
vena sva-mūlatvena ca śriyaḥ parasmin ādarāt tad bhakter lopaḥ. Na khalu-
vṛkṣam anādriyamāṇā śākhāsti, na candram tatprabhā."

[SŪ. 3 3 40.
ADH. 17.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 667
all the worlds. If it be objected: How can one have freedom of
movement everywhere unless one first aspires to attain those
particular worlds and then practises the means leading to them?—We
reply: "For this reason", i.e. on account of this very reason of attaining
(the Lord), in accordance with the statement: "Having attained the
form of highest light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd.
8.3.4¹), "He becomes a self-ruler" (Chānd. 7.2 2²), "He comes to have
freedom of movement in all the worlds" (Chānd. 7.25.2³).
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. In the texts: "Now, those who depart
having the self here and these true desires come to have freedom of
movement in all the worlds. If he comes to desire the world of
fathers" (Chānd. 8 2.1) and so on, it is declared that even by those
who desire salvation, the worlds common to those who desire
enjoyment are attained. This being so, what difference is there
between devotion to works and devotion to knowledge?—(the author)
says:
"When one has approached," i.e. when the knower, freed from
all connection with matter in its causal and effected states, has come
to attain the nature of Brahman, he attains freedom of movement
in all the worlds. Why? "For this reason" alone, i e. on account of
the very reason of attaining the nature of Brahman. The sense is
this: Just as a man, desirous of universal sovereignty, having given
up the objects of enjoyment, common to all men, as well as the
means thereto, attains universal sovereignty through the means
thereto, and afterwards for just that reason, comes to have freedom
of movement among the objects of enjoyment that are common to
all men, as well among those that are difficult to be attained by
them,—though not desired by him,—so the knower, having given
up all enjoyments, here or hereafter, as well as the means thereto,
attains the nature of the Lord through the hearing, thinking,
meditation, worship and so on of Him; and for that very reason
of attaining His nature, comes to have freedom of movement
everywhere. Whence is this known? To this (the author) replies.
"From statement to that effect", i.e. from the statement, every-
where, of a knower's having freedom of movement, such as

¹ R, ŚK. ² R. ³ Op. cit.
13

[SŪ. 3. 3. 40.
668 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 17.]
"Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his
own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4, 8.12.3), "He is the excellent person.
He roams about there laughing, playing, enjoying with women, or
with carriages, or with relatives, not remembering the appendage
of this body" (Chānd. 8.12.3), "He becomes a self-ruler. He comes
to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (Chānd. 7.25.2),
"As to the perfection of means to the four ends of men,—without
it a man, whose refuge is Nārāyaṇa, attains them", and so on. Thus,
there is a great difference between devotion to works and devotion to
knowledge. Hence it is established that through the mutual insertion
of the attributes of having true desires and so on and of being the
controller and the rest, the Brahma-vidyās of the Chāndogas and
of the Vājasaneyins are the very same.
Here ends the section entitled "Desire" (17).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 41 in Śaṁkara's commentary. Here they answer
the prima facie view stated in the previous sūtra, thus: "When
(eating is actually) taking place, (then alone an offering to the vital-
breaths is to be made) from that (i.e. from the first food), on account
of statement to the effect". ¹
Śrīkaṇṭha
He takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpreta-
tion different. The question is whether the freed attain the very
nature of Brahman, as possessed of infinite auspicious attributes,
and so on, or something else. The prima facie view is that Brahman
is declared to be free from distinctions or nirviśeṣa. Hence the
freed souls attain this distinctionless form of Brahman. The answer
is: "When one has approached (Brahman, one attains the nature of
Brahman as possessed of all auspicious attributes), for that reason
(i.e. because the freed soul attains its own form), (and) because of
texts to that effect (i.e. that the freed become similar to the Lord)". ²
¹ Ś.B. 3.3.41, pp. 822–824; Bh. B. 3.3.40 (written as 3 3 41), pp. 191-192.
² ŚK. B. 3.3.40, pp. 356-357, Parts 10 and 11.
13B

[SŪ. 3. 3. 41.
ADH. 18.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 669
Baladeva
This is sūtra 42 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic
of the identity of Śrī with the parā-śakti of the Lord and hence with
the Lord Himself. The contention is that if Śrī be identical with the
Lord, then no erotic sentiment is possible between them, since any
such sentiment is possible only if there be a difference between the
lover and the beloved. The answer is : “(Śrī being the highest of the
females and the Lord being the best of the males, an erotic sentiment
naturally arises between them) when (they) have approached (each
other), hence (such a sentiment is possible on the part of the Lord),
on account of statement to that effect”. ¹
Adhikaraṇa 18: The section entitled “Non-
restriction with regard to the specifying of
that”. (Sūtra 41²)
SŪTRA 41
“(THERE IS) NON-RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE SPECIFYING
OF THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THAT BEING SEEN, FOR THE FRUIT
(VIZ.) NON-OBSTRUCTION IS ‘DIFFERENT’.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is “non-restriction” (i.e. no fixed rule) that the meditations
that are founded on the subordinate parts of sacrificial acts and are
mentioned in texts like: “Let one meditate on the syllable ‘Om’ as the
udgītha” (Chānd. 1.1.1³) and so on (are to be included) in those acts.
Why? Because in the scriptural text: “Both perform with it, he who
knows this thus and he who does not know thus” (Chānd. 1.1.10⁴),
such a non-restriction is found. As we learn from Scripture that
even a non-worshipper is a performer of sacrificial works through
the praṇava, a subsidiary part of sacrificial works, so it is ascertained
that there is no restriction with regard to the act of meditation.
And hence that the fruit of meditation is “different” from the fruit
of work is known from the passage: “What only one does with
¹ G.B. 3.3.42, p. 186, Chap. 3.
² This topic is resumed in Br. Sū. 3.3.59–64.
³ Ś, R, Bh. ⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

670 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 41.
ADH. 18 ]
knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine,—that only becomes
more potent" (Chānd 1.1.10 ¹).
Vedānta-kaustubha
It has been shown at the end of the previous section that
there is a great difference between meditation and work, since the
former is the cause of a knower's (attaining) freedom of movement
and a supreme place. Now (the author) is showing the superiority
of meditation to work, on the ground of the superiority of the fruit
of the meditations, founded on the subsidiary parts of work, over that
of mere works (like sacrifices, etc ) though performed together with all
their subsidiary parts.
Now, there are certain meditations which are founded on the
udgītha and the rest, the subsidiary parts of sacrificial works, such as ·
"Let one meditate on the syllable 'Om' as the udgītha" (Chānd.
1 1.1) and so on. Here the doubt is as to whether they are to be
inserted regularly in the sacrificial acts, like the quality of being made
of parṇa-wood ²; or not regularly, like the milking-vessel With
regard to this, the prima facie view is as follows: As the designation
about the meditation on the udgītha, viz.: "Whatever one does
with knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine, that becomes
more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10), does not mention any separate result,
—just as the hearing of non-sinful verses connected with the quality
of being made of the parṇa-wood, mentioned in the passage · "He
whose sacrificial ladle is made of the prana-wood does not hear sinful
verses" (Tait. Saṃ. 3 5.7 ³) (is not a separate or special fruit),—so
the meditations on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts are to be
inserted regularly (in those acts) as their subsidiary parts, just as
the quality of being made of the parṇa-wood (is always connected
with sacrificial acts) through the sacrificial ladle.⁴

¹ Ś, Bh, ŚK. Vide Br. Sū. 4.1.18.
² A beautiful sacred tree of the wood of which particular sacrificial vessels are
made.
³ P. 311, lines 23-24, vol. 1.
⁴ The problem here is as to whether the meditations, enjoined in the Upa-
niṣads, on certain subsidiary parts of sacrifices, such as, on the udgītha and so on,
are necessarily connected with those sacrifices, i.e. are to be undertaken whenever
those sacrifices are undertaken ; or whether they may be undertaken optionally in
accordance with the will of the sacrificer. In the former case, such meditations

[SŪ. 3. 3. 41.
ADH. 18.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 671
With regard to it, we reply "Non-restriction with regard to the
specifying of that", and so on. The word "specifying" ("nirdhāraṇa)
means complete retention by the mind ¹, i e meditation. There is
"non-restriction" with regard to the meditation "of that", i.e. of the
meditations founded on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, such
as the udgītha-meditation and the like. That is, the meditations on
the udgītha and the rest are not to be inserted regularly in sacrifices
as their subsidiary parts Why? "On account of that being seen,"
i e. because such a non-restriction is found in Scripture Thus, in
the scriptural text: "Both perform with this, he who knows ² this
thus and he who does not know thus" (Chānd. 1.1 10), even a non-
knower being stated to be an agent, it is ascertained that there is no
fixed rule that the meditations founded on the udgītha and the rest
would stand to the sacrifices in the same relation as the quality of being made
of the parṇa-wood (parṇamayītva) does. The quality of being made of the
parṇa-wood is permanently connected with sacrifices through the sacrificial
ladle made of the parṇa-wood. Similarly, these meditations on the udgītha
and the rest would, on this view, be permanently connected with the sacrifices
through the udgītha and the rest. That is, in accordance with the dictum laid
down in Pū. Mī. Sū. 3 6.1-2 (vide Śab. B. on the same, pp. 366–368), a sacrificial
ladle made of the parṇa-wood is an essential ingredient of a sacrifice and is to
be included in it whenever it is performed Similarly, on the first view. the
meditations on the udgītha and so on are to be performed whenever the main
sacrifices are performed.
In the latter case, however, such meditations would stand to the sacrifices
in the same relation as the milking-vessel does. That is, in accordance with
the dictum laid down in Pū. Mī. Sū 4.1.2 (vide Śab B on the same, p. 436),
the milking-vessel (go-dohana) is used in certain sacrifices, viz. in the Daśa-
pūrṇa-māsa, not universally, but only occasionally, i.e. only if the sacrificer
desires for a special end, viz. cattle. Similarly, on the second view, the medita-
tions on the udgītha and the rest are not obligatory to the main sacrifices, but
only optional.
The prima facie view is that the meditations on the udgītha and the rest
serve no special purpose, as the using of the milking-vessel, e.g. does. They simply
secure the greater potency of the sacrifices which is the general fruit of all
other connected acts, just as having one's sacrificial ladle made of the parṇa-
wood secures no special result. Hence it cannot be said those meditations on
the udgītha and the like are to be undertaken at will for the sake of securing a
special result. Therefore, they are to be undertaken always with the sacrifices.
¹ Niravaśeṣatayā dhāraṇam-nirdhāraṇam.
² Here the word "veda" (=knows) may be translated in conformity with
the context, as "meditates", the text meaning that one may perform a sacrifice
either with meditating on the Om, or not meditating on it.

672 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA. [SŪ. 3. 3 41.
ADH. 18 ]
are to be inserted regularly in sacrificial acts as their subordinate
parts. Further, as the fruit of the injunction of meditation is different
from that of sacrificial acts, there is no fixed rule with regard
to the meditations on that,—so says (the author): "For different",
i e. because "the fruit" of the injunction of meditation, consisting
in "non-obstruction", is declared by Scripture to be "different"
from the fruit of sacrificial works. The sense is that the fruit of
one work is obstructed by the fruit of another stronger work; the
fruit of the injunction of meditation is the opposite of that. In
accordance with the text: "Both perform with it, he who knows this
thus and he who does not know thus Diverse, however, are knowledge
and non-knowledge What only one does with knowledge, with faith,
with the mystic doctrine, that only becomes more potent" (Chānd
1 1.10), 'with it', i.e. with the Om-kara, forsooth, both perform
sacrificial acts. Though 'he who knows' 'this', i e the syllable, Om,
'thus', i e. as possessed of the attributes of being the finest essence and
so on, and 'he who does not know', are both equal in point of being
agents, yet there is a difference in the result on account of knowledge
and non-knowledge,—this is what the text designates. Here 'know-
ledge' is 'diverse', i e. different from 'non-knowledge' That work
which one does 'with knowledge', 'with faith', 'with the mystic
doctrine', i.e. with the meditation on the Mystic Deity, 'becomes
more potent',—this is the sense. Hence, it is established that just
as the text: "For one desiring cattle he should fetch water in a milking-
vessel" establishes a (special) fruit of the (use of) the milking-vessel,
having the fetching of water as its abode ¹,—here as the text
can very well be so interpreted, the milking-vessel is not a subordinate
part of sacrificial acts,—so the meditations, founded on the subsidiary
elements of sacrificial acts are to be included in those acts optionally.
Here ends the section entitled "Non-restriction with regard to
the specifying of that" (18).
1 That is, the quality of being made of the parṇa-wood cannot have a
special result of its own, since it is only a quality and not an act and must, as
such, abide in a substratum to be connected with any result. But the milking-
vessel may have a special fruit, since it has an act, viz. the fetching of water,
as its abode. Vide Ś.B. 3.3.42, p. 826.