वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 3 25.
ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 417
observed that the drop of sandal-paste occupies one spot of the body;
but it is not known that the individual soul occupies one part of the
body, since consciousness is experienced everywhere,—on account of
such a difference of abode between the two,—
(We reply :) “No”. Why ? “On account of the admission,” viz.
that the soul, atomic in size, abides in one part of the body, i.e. “in
the heart”, by the scriptural text: ‘He who is made of knowledge
among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the heart’ (Bṛh.
4.4.22). The meaning of the term “certainly” is that it is the
attribute of knowledge (and not the atomic soul itself) which abides
in the whole body.
SŪTRA 25
“OR THROUGH ATTRIBUTE, LIKE LIGHT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The illumination of the body takes place only through the attribute
of the soul, like the light of a lamp and the like in a room.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. the doctrine that there is a relation of
attribute and substratum (between knowledge and the soul) is not
proper, since our purpose is served by the very nature only (of the
soul),—(the author) replies :
The term “or” is for disposing of the objection. The sense is
that the experience of the pleasure and the like, pertaining to the
entire body, by the atomic soul, occupying one part of the body, is
possible through its attribute of knowledge which is all-pervading
“As in ordinary life.” In ordinary life, a gem, the sun, a light and
so on, though occupying one place, illuminate many places, as the
case may be, through their attribute alone. Or else, (the combination)
may be disjoined as: “as in the case of light”, i.e. like the light of
gems and the rest. The doctrine of an attributeless soul, as admitted
by the Sāṁkhyas, has been disposed of above.¹
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara reads “lokavat”, all others “ālokavat”.
¹ Vide V.K. 1.3.18.
27

418 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 26-27.
ADH. 9.]
SŪTRA 26
"THE EXTENDING BEYOND (OF KNOWLEDGE) IS AS IN THE CASE
OF SMELL, FOR THIS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
But the "extending beyond" of the attribute of knowledge fits
in "as in the case of smell". The scriptural text: 'He has entered
here up to the body-hairs and finger nails' (Kauṣ. 4.20 1) "shows"
the individual soul to be the substratum of such an attribute.
Vedānta-kaustubha
"The extending" of the attribute of knowledge beyond the soul,
its substratum which is situated within the heart, i.e. its occupying
a larger space, is "as in the case of smell", i.e. is just like smell
occupying a larger space than the flower which occupies a smaller
space. The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body-
hairs and finger-nails' (Kauṣ. 4.2.0) "shows" the soul's pervasion
over the entire body by means of its attribute of knowledge, extending
over a larger space.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
They break this sūtra into two different ones, viz. "Vyatireko
gandhavat" and "Tathā ca darśayati".²
Rāmānuja
He too reads "ca" in place of "hi", but does not break it into
two sūtras.
——————
SŪTRA 27
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Although there is no distinction between the soul and its knowledge
in respect of being knowledge, yet a relation of substratum and
1 Not quoted by others. For correct quotation vide Kauṣ., p. 141.
2 Ś.B., pp. 615-16, Bh. B., p. 136.

[sū. 2. 3. 28.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 419
attribute (between them) is indeed proper. Why? "On account of
the separate teaching," viz : "Having mounted the body by means of
intelligence" (Kauṣ. 3.6 ¹).
Vedānta-kaustubha
Apprehending the objection, viz. Let knowledge be the essence
of the soul. Hence here the distinction,—viz. the substratum is
atomic, the attribute all-pervading,—is not proper,—(the author)
replies here.
"On account of the separate teaching" of the attribute from the
substratum, the soul, in the passages: 'Having mounted the body
by means of intelligence' (Kauṣ. 3.6), 'Having taken by his intelligence
the intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17). That is, in spite of
there being no distinction between the two in respect of being know-
ledge, there can very well be a relation of substratum and attribute
between them, since it is mentioned in Scripture. Equality of nature
does not necessarily mean identity, since it is found that in spite of
there being no distinction between light and its substratum,—both
being equally light,—there is still a difference between them.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 26 in his commentary, interpretation different. It
answers to the objection that intelligence is not a permanent attribute
of the soul. Hence the sūtra: "Intelligence is a permanent attribute
of the soul) since there is a separate (i.e. distinct) statement (in
Scripture to that effect)".²
SŪTRA 28
"BUT THERE IS THAT DESIGNATION ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOUL'S)
HAVING THAT ATTRIBUTE AS ITS ESSENCE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE
INTELLIGENT BEING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"As in the case of the intelligent one," i.e. (just as Brahman is
said to be great, because He is possessed of great attributes, on the
1 Ś. 2 G.B. 2.3.26, p. 197, Chap. 2.

420 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 28.
ADH. 9 ]
ground of etymology thus) ‘Brahman’ is one in whom there are great
qualities,¹ so the soul has been designated as “Eternal, all-pervading”
(Muṇḍ. 1.1.6 ²), because of possessing great attributes. In the first
case, the Intelligent Being, great by Himself, is great by reason of His
attributes too. In the second case, on the other hand, the individual
soul, atomic in size, is great by reason of its attribute only,—this is
the distinction
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. If the individual soul be atomic by nature,
then the texts which establish its all-pervasiveness must be con-
tradicted, such as. ‘Eternal, all-pervasive, omnipresent, extremely
subtle’ (Muṇḍ. 1 1.6), ‘Eternal, all-pervasive, immobile’ (Gītā 2.24)
and so on,—the author replies· No.
The term “but” is for disposing of the objection. On account of
having an all-pervasive attribute as its very essence, “that designa-
tion”, viz. the designation of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, such as:
‘Eternal, all-pervasive’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), fits in. “As in the case of
the intelligent being.” Greatness is said to belong to the Intelligent
Being through His connection with great attributes as well, in accord-
ance with the saying: ‘Brahman’ is one in whom there are great
attributes. The Intelligent Being being great by nature as well, the
example holds good only partially.³ Similarly, there is this designation
of the all-pervasiveness (of the soul) on the ground of its all-pervasive
attribute only, and not by nature. This should be understood here:
Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, is without an equal and a superior and
all-pervasive, in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘Nothing is
observed to be either equal to Him or higher than Him’ (Śvet. 6.8).
The all-pervasiveness of others, such as, prakṛti, time, and the attribute
of the individual soul (viz. knowledge), is relative (and not absolute).
There are contraction and expansion of even such an attribute which
is peculiar to the individual soul, and eternal, in accordance with the
declarations by the Lord Himself: “ ‘Knowledge is enveloped by
¹ Bṛh+man.
² Not quoted by others.
³ I.e. the case of Brahman and the individual soul are not parallel in all
respects, but in some respects only. The former is great by nature, as well as
great by attributes; while the latter is atomic by nature yet great by attributes.
Hence the two cases are parallel only in respect of the second point, and not of
the first as evident.

[sū 2. 3. 28.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 421
nescience. Thereby beings are deluded ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.15), ‘ “ In whom that
nescience has been destroyed by knowledge, in them knowledge shines
forth like the sun, O Bhārata ! ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.16 ¹).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely
different. He takes this and the following three sūtras as laying down
the correct conclusion, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive, in answer to
the prima facie view set forth in ten sūtras above Thus, this sūtra
means, according to him: “But there is that designation (of the
atomicity of the soul) on account of its having that attribute (viz
buddhi) as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent being”. That
is, just as Brahman, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic
for the purpose of meditation, so the individual soul, though all-
pervading, is designated to be atomic through its limiting adjunct of
buddhi.²
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 29 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 27
in the commentary of the last. Baladeva leaves out “tu”. Inter-
pretation different—viz “But there is that designation (i e the
designation of the soul as knowledge) on account of its having that
attribute as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent one” That is,
just as the Lord, though a knower, is sometimes designated as know-
ledge, so the individual soul too, though a knower, is sometimes
designated as knowledge, since it possesses knowledge as its essential
attribute.³ They continue the same topic in the following four
sūtras, although literal interpretation is the same.
Bhāskara
This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely
different. Here he points out that the atomicity of the soul, considered
so long, is not the real form of the soul, but only its transmigratory

¹ Correct quotation: “Prakāśayati tatparam”. Vide Gītā, 5.16, p. 303.
² Ś.B. 2.3.29, pp. 616 ff.
³ Śrī. B. 2.3.29, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.29, p. 147. Parts 7 and 8, G.B.
2.3.27, p. 198, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 29.
422 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9.]
form. Here he follows Śaṃkara, and points out that just as the all-
pervading Brahman is said to be atomic in reference to His abode,
viz. the heart, so the all-pervading soul is said to be atomic through
its attributes of passion and the rest.¹
SŪTRA 29
"ALSO BECAUSE OF LASTING AS LONG AS THE SOUL DOES, THERE
IS NO FAULT, BECAUSE IT IS SEEN."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness, due to its attri-
bute, is not inconsistent. "Also because of" the attribute lasting as
long as the soul does, there is no fault, because it is seen";² i.e.
because it is found in the passage: "‘For there is no cessation of the
knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish-
able, indeed. O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4 3 30 ³).
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. The attribute of the soul being sometimes
present and sometimes not, its all-pervasiveness due thereto vanishes,
and as such the designation of its all-pervasiveness is open to objections
—(the author) replies:
The term "also" is meant for disposing of the objection. The
soul is indeed eternal. As its attribute too "lasts as long as the soul
does", i.e. is an eternal attribute accompanying the soul, so the
designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness is not open to objections,
because we find that there are texts designating the attribute as lasting
as long as the soul does, such as: "‘For there is no cessation of the
knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish-
able, verily, O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4.3.30).

¹ Bh. B. 2.3.29, p. 137.
² C.S.S. ed., p. 440, omits the whole sentence which is but a repetition of the
sūtra itself. The other edition retains it.
³ Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 3. 30.
ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 423
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Interpretation different.
Śaṃkara continues the same theme, and points out that the soul's
connection with buddhi lasts so long as the transmigratory state does.¹
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 30 in their commentaries as well. The interpretation
of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that
all cows, hornless and so on, are called 'cow' (since they all possess
the generic character of cowness).²
Bhāskara
This is sūtra 30 in his commentary too. Interpretation different,
viz. like Śaṃkara's.³
Baladeva
This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation of the word
"tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that the sun and
its light are co-eternal, and that the sun is both light and the
illuminator.⁴
SŪTRA 30
"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MANIFESTATION
OF THAT WHICH IS EXISTENT, AS IN THE CASE OF VIRILITY AND
SO ON."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
During the waking state there is the "manifestation" "of this",
i.e. of knowledge, which is "existent" indeed during the states of
deep sleep and so on. Hence, the attribute of knowledge does last
so long as the soul itself does; just as in youth there is the manifestation
of virility and so on, which are existent indeed during childhood.
1 Ś.B. 2.3.30, pp. 619 ff.
2 Śrī. B. 2.3.30, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.30, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8.
3 Bh. B. 2.3.30, pp. 137-38.
4 G.B. 2.3.28.

424 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 31.
ADH. 9.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. if knowledge, the attribute of the soul,
be eternal, then why should there be no perception of it during the
states of deep sleep and the rest?—(the author) replies.
The term "but" implies emphasis. Knowledge, the attribute
of the soul, does last as long as the soul itself does. Why? "On
account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that which is
existent." That is, the attribute of knowledge, which is "existent
indced", i.e. is present indeed, in a non-manifest form during the states
of deep sleep and the rest is manifested during the waking state,—
just as in youth there is the manifestation of "virility and so on"
which are existent indeed during childhood. By the phrase "and so
on" the natural qualities of magnanimity, good conduct and the like
are to be understood.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 31 in their commentaries. Interpretation different,
they continue the same theme—viz. the soul's connection with buddhi
exists potentially in the state of deep sleep, etc. and is manifested in
the state of waking.¹
SŪTRA 31
"OTHERWISE THERE (WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF ETERNAL
PERCEPTION AND NON-PERCEPTION, OR A RESTRICTION WITH
REGARD TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, the perception and the
non-perception, the bondage and the release of the soul must all
become eternal. The soul will be either eternally fettored or eternally
free,—thus there must be "a restriction with regard to the one or the
other".
Vedānta-kaustubha
This aphorism is meant for indicating the defects in the view
of those who maintain the all-pervasiveness of the soul which is
1 Ś.B. 2.3.31, p. 621; Bh. B. 2.3.31, p. 138.

[SŪ. 2. 3 31.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 425
consciousness. “Otherwise,” i.e on any view other than our view,
viz. that the soul is possessed of the essential attributes of being a
knower, knowledge by nature and atomic in size, i.e. on the doctrine
that the soul is consciousness merely and all-pervading, there must be
the “consequence of eternal perception and non-perception” On
account of the all-pervading soul being ever unenveloped, there will be
perception; on account of the existence of mundane existence, non-
perception. In this way, there will result simultaneous bondage and
release, “or a restriction with regard to the one or the other”. On
our view, on the other hand, the individual soul being of the size of
an atom, going and returning, being enveloped and being unenveloped,
the object to be approached and the one approaching, are all possible,
and hence the respective difference between bondage and release,
too, is possible. But on your view, there will result one or the other
only of bondage and release, having the stated marks There must be
eternal bondage alone on the part of the soul which is consciousness
merely and immobile, or there must be salvation alone,—such a
restriction will result. Hence, it is established that the individual
soul is possessed of the attribute of being a knower, is knowledge by
nature and atomic in size.
Here ends the section entitled “Departure” (9).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sutra 32 in their commentaries. Interpretation different
as before. They adduce here an argument for the existence of buddhi,
being connected with which the all-pervading soul becomes atomic.
Thus: (The existence of buddhi must be admitted) otherwise there will
be the consequence of eternal perception and non-perception . . .¹
¹ Ś.B. 2.3.32, p. 622, Bh. B. 2.3.32, p. 138.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 32.
426 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 10.]
Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "The
agent". (Sūtras 32-39)
SŪTRA 32
"(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS) AN AGENT, BECAUSE OF SCRIPTURE
HAVING A SENSE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The soul indeed is "an agent", because the scriptural texts,
informing us about the means to enjoyment and salvation, such as
'One desiring heaven should perform a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5 ¹),
'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman' ² and so on, have
a sense.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now incidentally, the problem whether the soul is an agent is
being discussed.
On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is an agent or
not,—if the prima facie view be as follows: In the Kaṭha-vallī it
is denied that the individual soul is an agent, thus: 'If the killer
thinks to kill, if the killed thinks himself killed, both these do not
know. This one does not kill, nor is killed' (Kaṭha. 2.19); and it
has been declared by the Lord too: '"All actions are done by the
guṇas of prakṛti. The soul, deluded by egoism, thinks: 'I am the
agent' "' (Gītā 3.27). Hence, the guṇas alone are agents, but never
the soul,—
We reply: The soul alone is the agent. Why? "Because of
Scripture having a sense", i.e. because the scriptural texts, teaching
the means which are dependent on sentient beings, subject to enjoyment
and salvation, viz. 'Only doing works here, let one desire to live a
hundred years' (Īśā. 2), 'One desiring heaven should perform sacrifices'
(Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman',
'Let one worship calmly' (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on, have a sense.
If those non-sentient objects (viz. the guṇas) be the agent, the scriptural
texts teaching the means must be senseless.
The (above-quoted) scriptural text, on the other hand, shows that
the soul being eternal cannot be killed; but it is not by any means
¹ R, B, p. 208, line 27, vol. 2.
² R. B.

[sū. 2. 3 33.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 427
concerned with denying that the soul is an agent. The Smṛti
passage, too, shows only that the soul, which is deluded by the guṇas
of prakṛti, is an agent of mundane activities through those guṇas
And, this has been stated by the Lord Himself thus ‘ “Those deluded
by the guṇas of prakṛti are attached to the activities of the guṇas”’
(Gītā 3 2.9). If the guṇas be the agent and not the soul, then the
following statements will be nullified: viz. ‘“But if you will not carry
on this righteous warfare”’ (Gītā 2.33), ‘“For through action alone
Janaka and the rest have attained to perfection. Having an eye to
the good of the world also, you should perform action”’ (Gītā 3 20),
‘“Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you offer, whatever
you give, whatever you practise as penance,—make that an offering
to me”’ (Gītā 9.27), ‘“I am firm, with my doubts removed. I will do
according to your word”’ (Gītā 18.73) and so on.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 33 in their commentaries. Literal interpretation
same, but they hold that the soul’s state of being an agent is not
natural, but due to limiting adjuncts ¹ The same remarks apply to
the following three sūtras also, which will not be noted separately.
SŪTRA 33
“ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF (THE SOUL’S) MOVING ABOUT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“On account of the teaching of (the soul’s) moving about,”
in the passage: ‘He moves around in his own body as desired’ (Bṛh.
2.1.18 ²), it is an agent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
“On account of the teaching” of the soul’s “moving about”,
i.e. of its roaming around, in the passages: ‘He, the immortal, goes
¹ Ś.B. 2 3.32, p. 623; Bh. B. 2.3 32, p. 138. For the different senses of the
word ‘upādhi’ in the systems of Śaṁkara and Bhāskara. see Bh. B., etc.
² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

428 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 34-35
ADH. 10.]
wherever he wishes' (Bṛh. 4 3 12), 'He moves around in his own
body as desired' (Bṛh. 2.1.18), the individual soul is an agent,—this
is the sense.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They take this sūtra and the next as one sūtra by reversing the
order and adding a "ca" thus "Upādānāt vihāropadeśāc ca".¹
SŪTRA 34
"ON ACCOUNT OF TAKING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul)
thus: 'So exactly he, having taken the senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.18).
Vedānta-kaustubha
On account of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul)
in the passage which introduces the topic thus: 'Just as a king',
and continues: 'So exactly does he, having taken these senses' (Bṛh
2.1.18), 'Having taken by his intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh.
2.1.17), the individual soul is an agent.
SŪTRA 35
"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS AN
AGENT) WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS, OTHERWISE, (THERE WILL BE)
REVERSAL OF DESCRIPTION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"Also on account of the designation (of the soul) as an agent"
thus: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice' (Tait. 2 5 ²), the soul is an
agent. If by the word 'understanding' buddhi be understood and not
the individual soul, the instrumental case would have been used ³
1 Śrī. B., p. 152, Part 2; Śk. B, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
3 I.e. the instrumental case 'vijñānena' would have been used.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 36.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 429
Vedānta-kaustubha
“Also on account of the designation” of the individual soul,
denoted by the term ‘knowledge’, as an agent of ordinary and Vedic
“actions” thus: ‘Understanding performs a sacrifice, performs
actions as well’ (Tait. 2.5), the individual soul is an agent
If it be objected: By the term ‘understanding’ buddhi is to be
understood and not the individual soul,—(the author) replies: “Other-
wise, i.e if by the term ‘understanding’ the individual soul be not
understood, but buddhi is understood, then there must be “reversal
of the description”, i.e. buddhi being the instrument, there must
have been the designation of an instrument thus: ‘by understanding’.
But there is no such designation. Hence, here is a designation of an
agent by the stated case-ending, viz ‘Understanding’ Hence the
individual soul is an agent.
——————
SŪTRA 36
“THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AS IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“There is no restriction” with regard to the actions based on the
perception of their fruits.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. if the individual soul be the agent, then
having taken into consideration the good and the evil which are the
fruits of good and evil works, and being disgusted with the evil, it,
with a view to obtaining the good, ought to do what is conducive to
the latter,—(the author) replies.
“As in the case of perception.” Just as there is the perception
of the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works
performed previously, so there is “no restriction” with regard to works,
since we find that people are by chance sometimes inclined to what is
beneficial and sometimes to what is not beneficial.¹
――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ I.e. although a man perceives the good and evil results of his past acts,
yet there is no fixed rule that he always afterwards does what is good and avoids
what is bad. As he is ruled by external circumstances, he may sometimes be
inclined to what is bad, though knowing from his past experiences that such acts
lead to harmful consequences.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 37.
430 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 10.]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz. “As in the case of perception, there is non-restriction (with regard
to actions)”. That is, just as the soul, though free with regard to
perceptions, sometimes perceives what is good, and sometimes what
is bad, so the soul, though free to act, sometimes does what is good,
and sometimes what is bad.¹
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 36 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 35
in the commentary of the last. They interpret it as following. (If
prakṛti were the agent and not the individual soul, then there would
be) non-restriction (of actions) as in the case of perception”. That is,
just as it has been shown ² that if the soul be all-pervading no definite
perception will be possible, so if prakṛti be the agent, no definte activity
will be possible, since prakṛti being all-pervading and common to all,
all activities would produce results in the case of all souls, or produce
no results in the case of any one.³
SŪTRA 37
“ON ACCOUNT OF THE REVERSAL OF POWER.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If buddhi be the agent, then its instrumental power will cease,
and it must come to have the power of an agent. Hence the individual
soul is the agent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. in the text ‘Understanding performs a
sacrifice’ (Tait. 2.5), by the word ‘understanding’ buddhi alone is to
be understood, and it is the agent. Hence there instrumental case
has not been used ⁴—(the author) replies :
¹ Ś, B, 2.3.37, p. 625.
² Under Śrī. B. 2.3.32, Śk B. 2.3.32, G B. 2.3.30.
³ Śrī. B. 2.3.36, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B 2.3.36, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8; G.B.
2.3.35, p. 208, Chap. 2.
⁴ Vide V.P S. 2.3.35 above.

[sū. 2. 3. 38.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 431
The individual soul alone is the agent. If buddhi be admitted to
be the agent, then "on account of the reversal of power", its instru-
mental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an
agent. Moreover, if buddhi be the agent, then the power of enjoyment,
too, must pertain to it alone. This being so, bondage and release
must result on the part of buddhi alone.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 37 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 36
in the commentary of the last. Their interpretation is similar to the
last portion of Śrīnivāsa's interpretation, viz. that if buddhi or prakṛti
be the agent, the power of enjoyment too must belong to it.¹
SŪTRA 38
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF DEEP CONCENTRATION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If the soul be not an agent, then "the absence of deep
concentration", due to something which is absolutely different from
the non-sentient,² will result, and hence the soul is the agent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
"Deep concentration" means abiding as having Brahman for
one's soul, after meditating on one's own form,—distinct from the body,
sense-organs, mind and intelligence,—preceded by the stopping of the
functions of the mind. As the "absence of such a deep concentration",
the means to salvation, will result, if the individual soul be not an
agent,—it is known that the individual soul alone is the agent.
¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.37, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3 37, p. 154, Parts 7 and 8; G.B.
2.3.36, pp. 208-9, Chap. 2.
² Acetana-mātrāt, i.e. from even the slightest portion of the non-sentient.

432 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 39.
ADH. 10.]
SŪTRA 39
"AND LIKE A CARPENTER, IN BOTH WAYS "
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The soul acts or does not act according to its own wish, "like a
carpenter", and as such a situation is possible "in both ways". If
buddhi be the agent, then there being the absence of desire and the
like on its part, there will be the absence of such a situation.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The soul,—the nature of which is to act or abstain from acting, and
which is possessed of the attributes of 'being an agent' and so on, lasting
so long as it itself does,—though connected with a group of instruments
like speech and the like, performs action or does not perform action
according to its wish, and thus if the soul be an agent a situation is
possible "in both ways",—just as a carpenter, though provided with
instruments like axe and the rest, constructs chariots, etc., according to
his wish. But acting or refraining from action is not possible on the
part of buddhi, which is an instrument like the axe, by reason of its
non-sentience. On account of the eternity of its proximity to a
sentient being, as well as on account of the absence, on its part,—of
any desire—the cause of action or inaction,—there must be either
eternal activity or eternal non-activity, on its part. Hence, it is
established that the soul alone is the agent.
Here ends the section entitled "The agent" (10).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 40 in their commentaries. Interpretation absolutely
different. They take it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, con-
cerned with the question whether the individual soul is an agent by
nature or as connected with limiting adjuncts, and accept the second
alternative. Hence the parallel instance: "i e. yathā ca takṣā"
is interpreted differently by them thus: In ordinary life a carpenter
is miserable and so long as he is an agent, i.e. works with his tools,

[sū. 2. 3. 40.
ADH 11.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 433
etc But when he returns home, lays aside his tools and is no longer
an agent, he becomes happy In the very same manner the soul
suffers so long as it is an agent through nescience, but when it returns
home, i e. realizes its real state, frees itself from sense-organs and so on,
and ceases to be an agent, it becomes happy ¹
Baladeva
This is sūtra 38 in his commentary. He takes it to be an
adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different, viz. "And like the
carpenter (the soul is active) in two ways". That is, the carpenter is
an indirect agent through the medium of its instruments, and also a
direct agent in handling those instruments themselves. Similarly,
the soul is an indirect agent through its sense-organs, and is also a
direct agent in the act of controlling those sense-organs.²
Adhikaraṇa 11. The section entitled "Under
the control of the Highest". (Sūtras 40-41)
SŪTRA 40
"BUT (THE AGENTSHIP OF THE SOUL PROCEEDS) FROM THE HIGHEST,
BECAUSE THAT IS TAUGHT BY SCRIPTURE"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The agentship of that individual soul proceeds "from the Highest"
as its cause, in accordance with the scriptural text "Entered within,
the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 ³).
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now the problem is being discussed whether the individual soul
is an agent as controlled by the Highest Soul, or independently.
On the doubt, viz. whether the stated agentship of the individual
soul is under its own control or under the control of the Highest Soul,
if the prima facie view be: Under its own control alone. In ordinary
¹ Ś.B. 2.3.40, pp 628-29; Bh. B. 2.3.40, p. 139.
² G B. 2.3.38, p. 120, Chap. 2.
³ R., p. 181.
28

434 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2 3. 41.
ADH. 11.]
life, a man engages himself to tilling and the like by himself out of
desire for crops, but does not wait for the Highest,—
We reply: The agentship of the individual soul proceeds "from
the Highest" as its cause. Why? On the ground of the following
scriptural texts: 'For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise
up from these worlds, do good deeds. He alone makes one, whom
he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds' (Kauṣ.
3.8), 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār 3.11.1, 2), 'Who
rules the soul within' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30 ¹) and so on; as well as on
the ground of the Smṛti passages, viz. . ' "And I am situated within the
heart of all. From me proceed memory, knowledge and their absence" '
(Gītā 15.15).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
Literal interpretation same, although as before they are speaking
of the soul's agentship being due to limiting adjuncts. The same
remarks apply to their interpretation of the next sūtra.
SŪTRA 41
"BUT (THE LORD MAKES THE SOUL ACT) HAVING REGARD TO THE
EFFORTS MADE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE FUTILITY OF WHAT IS
ENJOINED AND WHAT IS PROHIBITED AND SO ON."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The term "but" is meant for disposing of the fault of inequality.
The Highest Being, who has "regard" for the works done by the
individual soul, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth
too, "on account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is pro-
hibited".
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. if the Supreme Soul be the instigator, then
He must be open to the charge of inequality and rest,—the author,
replies:
1 P. 1074, line 18.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 41.
ADH. 11.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 435
The term “but” is meant for disposing of the above objection.
The Supreme Soul, who has “regard” for, i.e. takes into account,
the efforts made by the individual soul, i e for its good and bad
deeds, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, and
gives it pleasure and the like accordingly. Hence, He cannot be
charged with partiality, etc.
If it be asked: Why should the Supreme Being take into account
the efforts made by the individual soul?—the author replies: “On
account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited”.
If the Highest Person takes into account the efforts made by the soul,
then alone, injunctions and prohibitions, such as, ‘One who desires
for heaven should perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś S. 10.2 1 ¹),
“A Brāhmaṇa must not be killed” and so on, do not become futile.
The meaning of the phrase, “and so on” is that faults like: suffering
arising from good deeds, and happiness arising from bad deeds, and
so on, result. Since the Supreme Soul takes into account the works
done by souls, He cannot, by any means, be charged with inequality,
etc., though He is the instigator of what is enjoined and what is pro-
hibited, and is, thereby, the bestower of favour and disfavour Under
the aphorism: “(There are) no inequality and cruelty (on the part of
the Lord), because of (His) having regard (for the works of souls)”
(Br. Sū. 2.1.33), it has been said that no inequality and the rest pertain
to the Highest in His creation of the variegated world—this is the
distinction.² Hence, the Highest Person, omnipotent and the Lord
of all, is the instigator of good deeds and the rest in accordance with the
good and bad deeds performed before, and is the giver of fruits accord-
ingly to them. Thus, it is established that the individual soul is an
agent as controlled by the Highest.
Here ends the section entitled “The Highest” (11).
¹ P. 209, vol. 2.
² I.e. there is no repetition here, since under Br. Sū. 2.1.33 it has been
shown that the Lord is not partial as a creator, whereas it is being shown here
that He is not partial as an instigator to action.

436 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 42
ADH. 12.]
Adhikarana 12: The section entitled "A
part". (Sūtras 42–52)
SŪTRA 42
"(THE INDIVIDUAL IS) A PART (OF BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF
THE DESIGNATION OF VARIETY, AND OTHERWISE, ALSO SOME
READ (THAT BRAHMAN IS OF) THE NATURE OF FISHERMEN,
GAMBLERS AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The individual soul is a part of the Supreme Soul, in accordance
with the designation of difference in texts like: 'The two unborn
ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord'
(Śvet. 1 9) and so on ¹, and on account of the designation of non-
difference in texts like 'Thou art that' (Chānd 6.8.6, etc.). And
"also" the Ātharvaṇikas "read" that Brahman is of "the nature of
fishermen, gamblers and the rest", thus: "Brahman are the fishermen,
Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers".²
Vedānta-kaustubha
It has been pointed out that the agentship of the individual soul
is under the control of Brahman. Now, the author is pointing out
the relation between the two, consistently with the scriptural texts
designating both difference and non-difference.
On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is different from
Brahman or non-different from Him, or a part of Brahman and as
such both different and non-different from Him,—if it be suggested:
The individual soul must be different from Brahman, as a man is
from the king, because the texts designating non-difference are figura-
tive and because a non-difference between the non-knowing and the
all-knowing is impossible. Or, it must be non-different only (from
Brahman), because the scriptural texts designating difference are
figurative. There being a mutual opposition between difference and
non-difference, of either the texts about difference or the texts about
non-difference must certainly be metaphorical,—
¹ R. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.