वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 1. 20.
298 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 7.]
suspicion of an absolute non-difference between the Sentient Being
and the non-sentient, the author is here refuting only the view of those
who suppose that there is an absolute identity between Brahman
and the individual soul.¹
It may be objected: If Brahman be the creator of the world
which is the site of the three kinds of miseries, there must be the
"consequence of the fault of not doing what is beneficial". By the
term "and the rest" (in the sūtra) the fault of doing what is not bene-
ficial is understood. Why? "On account of the designation of
another," i.e. on account of the designation of the individual soul as
Brahman in the passage · ‘"Thou art that"’ (Chānd 6.8.7; 6.9.4,
etc.), "This soul is Brahman" (Bṛh. 2.5.9) and so on. The sense is
that the transmigratory soul, performing good and bad deeds and
undergoing threefold pains, is not other than Brahman. Hence
the stated faults must result on the part of Brahman, not subject to
transmigratory existence
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 21 in his commentary. Like Nimbārka, Baladeva
too begins a new adhikaraṇa here, but unlike Nimbārka continues
it up to sūtra 33 (32 in Nimbārka). He takes this adhikaraṇa as
concerned with showing that the Brahman, and not the individual
soul, is the cause of the world. Thus, first, he takes this sūtra as
setting forth the correct conclusion and not a prima facie view (as
according to Nimbārka), thus: "There will be the consequences of
faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest from the designation
of another (i.e. if the individual soul be designated as the creator
of the world)".² That is, if the individual soul were the creator of
the world, it would not have created a world so full of miseries. Hence,
Brahman, not the individual soul, must be the creator.
¹ I.e. the author is not trying to remove the suspicion of an absolute non-
difference between Brahman and the material world,—since none is so foolish
as to suppose that a Sentient Being and non-sentient object may be absolutely
identical—but he is disposing only of the not unnatural belief of an absolute
identity between Brahman and the individual soul
² G.B. 2.1.21, pp. 52-53, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 21.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 299
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 21-22)
SŪTRA 21
“BUT (BRAHMAN IS) SOMETHING MORE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE
INDICATION OF DIFFERENCE ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The refutation of this is as follows.
We hold that the creator of the world is Brahman, who is “some-
thing more” than, i.e. superior to, the embodied soul, the enjoyer
of pleasure and pain. “On account of the designation of difference”
in the passage “Who rules the soul within” (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30 ¹),
there is no absolute non-difference between the two. Hence there
cannot result the fault of not doing what is beneficial
Vedānta-kaustubha
With regard to this prima facie view, the author states the correct
conclusion.
The word “but” disposes of the prima facie view. Since we hold
that Brahman,—omniscient, omnipotent, the Lord of all, without
an equal or a superior, and the one identical material and efficient
cause of the world,—is “something more”, i.e. superior to the
embodied soul, the question of not doing what is beneficial does not
arise. The reason of His being something more is stated in the phrase:
“On account of the indication of difference”, i.e. on account of the
indication of a difference between Brahman and the individual soul
in the passages: ‘“O, the self, verily, should be seen”’ (Bṛh. 2.4.5;
4.5.6), “The knower of Brahman attains the highest” (Tait. 2.1),
‘Who rules the soul within’ (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30). The sense is
this: Just as in the passage: ‘All this, verily is Brahman’ (Chānd.
3.14.1), it being impossible for the group of the non-sentient to be
non-different from Brahman, its difference from Brahman is admitted
by the phrase ‘emanating from Him’ ² so it being impossible for the
¹ P 1074, line 18. R.
² The passage is: “All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him,
disappearing into Him and breathing in Him” (Chānd. 3.14.1).

[sū. 2. 1 22.
300 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 7 ]
individual soul, too, to be by nature non-different from Brahman
on the authority of the stated scriptural text designating difference,
it is declared to be non-different from Brahman, by such texts like
‘“Thou art that”’ (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), only as having no existence
and activity independently of Brahman, but not by nature. Thus,
on account of the designation of difference, in spite of there being
a non-difference between the two, faults like doing what is not bene-
ficial do not arise.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Interpretation same, but in conclusion he adds, as usual, the
explanation that it is only from the empirical point of view that we
can speak of creation of a difference between the individual soul and
Brahman, but from the transcendental point of view no question of
creation arises at all 1
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 22
“AND (THE INDIVIDUAL SOULS ARE) LIKE STONES AND THE REST,
THERE IS IMPOSSIBILITY OF THAT”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which
are the modifications of the earth, the individual soul, though non-
different from Brahman, is also different from Him, possessing, as it
does, some peculiar qualities of its own. Hence, the allegation by
the opponent is an “impossible” one.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Moreover, just as in ordinary life, the stones like the diamond,
the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are modifications of the
earth, though non-different from the earth as consisting in earth,
are yet different from the earth, possessing, as they do, their peculiar
natures,—so is the case here. By the term “and the rest” the
1 “Tatra kuta eva sṛṣṭiḥ, kuto' vā hita-karaṇādayo doṣāḥ?” Ś.B. 2.1.22,
p. 484.

[sū. 2 1 22.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 301
modifications of the tree, such as the leaf and so on, are to be
understood. That is, just as the leaf, though non-different from the
tree, is yet not the tree, so is the case here. Or else, by the term "and
the rest", the ray of the diamond and the rest is understood, for the
ray, though non-different from the diamond, etc., is yet found to
be different. Hence, just as the ray, though non-different from its
substratum, is yet different from it, so it is appropriate to hold that the
embodied soul is by nature different from Brahman, though it is at the
same time non-different from Him as having Him for its soul. Hence,
the respective difference between what is subject to transmigratory
existence (viz the individual soul) and what is not, (viz. Brahman)
being thus established, there is no inconsistency here. Hence "there
is impossibility of that", i.e. there is no possibility of faults like
not doing what is beneficial and the rest, as alleged by the opponent.
Thus, it is established that there no contradiction is involved in our
view.
Hence ends the section entitled "The designation of another" (7).
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja
This is sūtra 23 in Rāmānuja's commentary. Interpretation
different, viz. "Just (as it is impossible for non-sentient objects) like
stones and the rest (to be identical with Brahman, so) there is the
impossibility of that (viz. of an identity between the individual soul
and Brahman)".¹
Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 23 in Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary too. "(Since the
individual soul, possessed of little knowledge, is declared to be belonging
to an absolutely different category from Brahman, the omniscient),
just as (non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest, there is the
impossibility of that (viz. of an absolute identity between the individual
soul and Brahman)."²
¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.23, p. 53, Part 2
² ŚK. B. 2.1.23, p. 32, Parts 7 and 8.

302 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 23.
ADH. 8.]
Baladeva
This is sūtra 23 in his commentary. "(Since the individual soul,
though sentient, is dependent) like (non-sentient objects like) stones
and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of the individual
souls being the creator of the world)." 1
Adhikarana 8: The section entitled "The Obser-
vation of Collection". (Sūtras 23-24)
SŪTRA 23
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE OBSERVATION OF
COLLECTION, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD),
(WE REPLY:) NO, FOR (HE TRANSFORMS HIMSELF) LIKE MILK."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that "on account of the observation of the col-
lection" of many implements by potters and others, Brahman, who
is without any external implement, is not the cause of the world—
(we reply:) "no", since Brahman transforms Himself "like milk",
possessing, as He does, powers peculiar to Him alone.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The objection, viz. if the universal Lord, possessing the sentient
and the non-sentient as His powers, the soul of all, and without an
equal or a superior, be the creator of the world, there arises the faults
like not doing what is beneficial and the rest, has been refuted above
on the ground that the individual soul, though non-different from
Brahman as having Him as its soul, is yet subject to transmigratory
existence as subject to beginningless karmas, and thus different from
Him by nature. Now, the author is disposing of the following objec-
tion, viz. that Brahman is not the creator of the world on account
of the absence of the collection of external implements.
The words "and the rest" are to be supplied from the last
aphorism. The word "for" denotes the reason.
1 G.B. 2.1.23, p. 56, Chap. 2.

[SŪ 2. 1. 23.
ADH. 8] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 303
If it be objected. In ordinary life, it is always found that external
implements like stick and so on are employed for the production of
effects like pots, etc. Hence, Brahman who has no helpers, is not
the creator of the world To the question: Whence is this known ?
We reply. That Brahman is without any helpers is definitely ascer-
tained from the following texts, designating the impossibility of the
existence of any kind of agent in the beginning: " 'The existent alone,
my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second' "
(Chānd. 6.2 1), 'There was, verily, Nārāyaṇa, the one' (Mahā Up.
1.2), "Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, the absolute",—
(We reply.) "no". Why? "Because" Brahman is "like milk"
Just as in ordinary life milk, water and the rest are transformed into
the form of effects like sour milk, ice and so on,—there is no external
implement here,—so Brahman, possessed of the sentient and the non-
sentient as His powers, is capable of being the one identical material
and efficient cause of the world through His very nature He has
not to depend on the collection of accessories for creating the world,
as declared by the text: "Supreme is His power, declared to be mani-
fold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and power" (Śvet
6 8).
Whey, on the other hand, is sometimes mixed with milk, simply
for giving a certain flavour to it, and not for making it turn sour,¹
because we find that milk turns sour even when whey is absent from
it, and that water and the rest do not turn into sour milk even when
whey is present in them.
It is because the potters and others are mere efficient causes that
they have to depend on clay, etc. for making pots, etc.; and it is because
they lack the requisite power that they have to depend on the stick,
the wheel and so on.
Although the facts mentioned in the Veda are ever-established,
yet objections are being raised against them again and again for
removing the doubts of those who are entitled to the study of it, for
silencing the opponent and for making one understand the meaning
of the Veda without a vestige of doubt.
¹ This replies to the objection, viz. that the above example of milk is not
to the point, since milk is not transformed into sour milk by itself, but has to
depend on whey

[SŪ. 2. 1. 24.
304 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 8]
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.
"If it be objected that on account of the observation of the completion
(of a piece of work by the individual soul,) (it cannot be likened to
inert stones and the rest, but is a free agent), (we reply) no, for (the
soul's power of action is) like (the cow's power of producing) milk".¹
That is, although the soul is an agent and can as such bring works to
completion, yet it is not an independent agent, but has to depend on
the Lord for its activities, just as the cow cannot by herself produce
milk, but has to depend on the life-energy.
SŪTRA 24
“AS IN THE CASE OF THE GODS AND THE REST TOO IN (THEIR
WORLD.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Just as the gods and the rest create what they want through a
mere wish, so does the Lord too.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. Milk and the rest are non-sentient, while
Brahman is sentient; as such, the examples cited are not to the point,—
the author replies here.
The word "too" suggests the possibility of an analogy with the
sentient. The case in hand is analogous not merely to that of non-
sentient objects, like milk, etc. as shown above, but is also analogous
to that of the sentient, known from Scripture to be the power of the
Lord. Just as "in the world", i.e. in the world of the gods and the rest,
or in Scripture,—the cause of the beholding of all objects,—the gods,
the fathers, the sages, the Nāgas and the rest, celebrated to be possessed
of great powers, are found to create the objects which they want, as
befitting time and need, through a mere wish; just as a spider acts
by itself alone independently of any external implement, so the Highest
Person, celebrated in all the worlds and Vedas as possessed of great
¹ G B. 2.1.4, pp 56-57, Chap. 1.

[sū. 2. 1. 25.
ADH 9.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 305
powers, omniscient, omnipotent and having true resolves, creates the
whole group of effects through a mere wish. Hence, it is established
that no contradiction is involved in our view simply because certain
well-known implements are found employed in ordinary creations.
Here ends the section entitled "The observation of collection" (8).
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.
(The Lord though invisible, is the creator of the world,) just as
the gods too (though invisible, are seen to work) in the world, (i.e.
to produce rain and so on).¹
Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "The con-
sequence of the entire". (Sūtras 25-30)
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 25)
SŪTRA 25
"(IF BRAHMAN BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD, THERE
WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ENTIRE (BRAHMAN BEING
TRANSFORMED INTO THE WORLD), OR THE VIOLATION OF THE TEXT
ABOUT (BRAHMAN'S) HAVING NO PARTS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
An objection is raised:—
If Brahman be the material cause of the world, then if He be
admitted to be without parts, there will be the "consequence of the
entire" (Brahman being transformed into the world); if possessed of
parts, then the scriptural texts about His having no parts will be
contradicted.
1 G.B. 2.1.25.
20

[SŪ. 2. 1. 25.
306 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 9.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Anticipating the objection,—viz. If Brahman be transformed into
the form of the world absolutely independently of any external im-
plement, then let Him not depend on His own powers as well. But
since the view that Brahman is the material cause through His mere
nature leads to the horns of a dilemma, He cannot reasonably be the
material cause; and hence pradhāna alone must be the material
cause,—the author is replying to it by pointing out that in the case
of Brahman, external implements cannot be admitted, as they are
not mentioned in Scriptures, and as they will make Brahman a
dependent creator, and that His own powers, which are non-different
from Him, may very well be admitted, as they have Scripture for
their authority.
The prima facie view is as follows: Is Brahman,—knowable from
the scriptural texts like: ‘ “The existent alone, my dear, was this in
the beginning, one only, without a second” ’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘The
soul, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Bṛh. 1.4.7) and so
on, and transformed into the form of the effect,—without parts, or
possessed of parts? If it be said: without parts, (we reply.) then the
consequence will be that the entire Brahman will become the effect,
as in the case of milk; there will not remain a transcendent Brahman,
beyond transmigratory existence and to be approached by the freed,
the scriptural texts designating Brahman as unintelligible will be con-
tradicted; universal release will result, and Brahman will come to
possess the attributes of grossness and the rest. If on the other
hand, He be admitted to have parts, then there will not arise faults
like the entire Brahman being transformed into the world, but the
scriptural texts designating that Brahman, the cause of the world,
has no parts will come to be contradicted, viz. the texts: “Without
parts, without action, tranquil, faultless, stainless” (Śvet 6.19), “For
He is the celestial, incorporal Person, the outside and the inside,
unborn” (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2) and so on. So none but pradhāna can be the
the cause of the world.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 26 in his commentary. He reads “vyakopa”
instead of “Kopa”. Interpretation, too, is different, viz.. he takes
this sūtra as setting forth the correct conclusion and not a prima

[SŪ 2. 1. 26.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 307
facie view, thus: ‘(If the individual soul be the creator of the world),
then there will be the consequence of entire (absorption), or the
contradiction of the texts (designating its) being without parts’.
That is, if the individual soul be the creator, we must conclude that,
in as much as it is without parts, its entire self is present in every
act. But this is not really the case, e.g. while lifting a blade of grass,
the individual soul does not employ its entire force to the act. Or,
else we must conclude that the individual soul must be possessed of
parts, which also goes against scriptural authority. Hence, we must
conclude that the individual soul cannot be the creator.¹
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 26–30)
SŪTRA 26
“BUT (THE ABOVE OBJECTION HAS NO FORCE) ON ACCOUNT OF
SCRIPTURE, SINCE (THE FACT THAT BRAHMAN IS THE CAUSE OF THE
WORLD IS) BASED ON SCRIPTURE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The stated objection does not hold good. As the truth mentioned
in the texts: ‘He wished “May I be many”’ (Tait. 2.6.²), ‘He
Himself created Himself’ (Tait. 2.7.³), ‘He became existent and
that’ (Tait. 2.6.⁴), ‘So much is His greatness, higher than that is
the Person’ (Chānd. 3.12.6.⁵), ‘Just as a spider creates, so from
the Person⁶ the Universe originates’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7.⁷) and so on,
is based on Scripture itself—anything else has no basis to stand upon.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author states the correct conclusion.
The word “but” is for disposing of the prima facie view. The
entire Brahman is not transformed, nor is there any violation of texts.
Why? “On account of Scripture.” That is, on account of the mass
¹ G.B. 2.1.26, pp. 58-59, Chap. 2. ² Not quoted by others.
³ Op. cit. ⁴ Op. cit. ⁵ Ś.
⁶ Correct quotation: “Tathā akṣarād bhavati iha viśvam”. Vide Muṇḍ.
1.1.7, p. 9.
⁷ Not quoted by others.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 26.
308 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 9.]
of texts which declare that Brahman is the non-different material
and efficient cause of the world, different from the world, possessed
of powers which are transformed and so on. Such scriptural texts
are· He wished “May I be many”' (Tait 2.6), ‘He Himself created
Himself’ (Tait. 2.7), ‘He became existent and that’ (Tait 2.6),
‘Having created it, he entered into that very thing’ (Tait. 2.6),
‘That divinity thought: “Very well, let me enter into these three
divinities··· (Chānd 6.3 2), ‘Having entered by this living soul’
(Chānd. 6.3.2). ‘Who abiding within the earth, . . from the
earth does not know’ (Bṛh 3 7 3), ‘Entered within the ruler of
men’ (Tait. Ār 3 11.1, 2¹), ‘So much is His greatness, higher
than that is the Person’ (Chānd 3.12 6) and so on. There is a Smṛti
text as well, viz ‘Having voluntarily entered into prakṛti (matter)
and puruṣa (soul), Hari shook the mutable and the immutable at the
time of dissolution and creation’ (V.P 1.2.29 ²). Like a spider,
Brahman is transformed into the form of the world, without waiting
for external helpers. Hence there is no violation of the texts desig-
nating Him to be without parts. The scriptural text to this effect
is as follows ‘Just as a spider creates and takes, just as hairs on the
head and body-hairs arise from a person, and medicinal herbs from
the earth, so this universe arises from the Imperishable’ (Muṇḍ
1 1.7). There is a Smṛti text as well, viz.: ‘Just as a tortoise, having
stretched out its limbs, again draws them in, so the Soul of beings,
having created beings destroys them again’ (Mahā. 12.7072b–7073a³).
Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers,
is declared to be without parts and without limbs, because He has no
parts and limbs as His material cause, as threads are of a piece of
cloth.
If it be objected. If it be admitted that transformation means
the projection of power, then there being no transformation of the
real nature of the creator, what is the difference of this view from
the views of the Sāṁkhyas and the rest? ⁴—(we reply·) Listen. The

¹ P. 191 ² P. 16.
³ P. 615, lines 24-25, vol 3. Reading “sṛṣṭāni harate”. Vaṅgavāsī ed.,
also p. 1571.
⁴ I.e. according to the Sāṁkhyas, pradhāna is transformed into the world,
while according to the Vedāntins also not Brahman Himself, but His power of
the non-sentient (acicchakti)—which is pradhāna—is transformed into the world.
Hence the two views come to the same thing.

[Sū. 2. 1. 26.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 309
Sāṁkhyas hold that the material cause of the world is a substance
which is different from the puruṣa (or the soul) just as a lump of clay
is different from a potter, which does not possess it (viz · puruṣa) as
its soul, and which is possessed of independent existence and activity.
But Brahman, as admitted by the Vedāntins, is One alone. He
transforms Himself into the form of non-sentient objects like the
ether and the rest by projecting His power of the enjoyed (i.e. the
acit-śakti); having projected the sentient power of the enjoyer (i.e.
the cit-śakti) in the form of gods and the rest, and having entered
within as their inner controller, makes them undergo the fruits of their
respective works; and contracts them during the time of dissolution,
as a tortoise does its limbs, and the sun its rays.
To the objection, viz. even if there be the collection of external
helpers by Brahman, no contradiction arises in the case in hand,
and hence pradhāna, established by the Tantra may be the external
implement, suitable for the production of the world, just as clay is
for the production of a pot What is the use of a transformation
consisting in the projection of powers?—the author replies. On this
view, there will be contradiction of scriptural texts. This he says
in the words: “Because of being based on Scripture”. Transformation
consisting in the projection of powers is accepted, based as it is on
Scripture. If implements like pradhāna and the rest be admitted,
that view will have no basis to stand upon; and the consequence will be
that Brahman will have to depend on another for His creation.
Further, the following texts will come to be contradicted, viz. ‘All
this has that for its soul’ (Chānd 6.8.7 ch.), ‘All this, verily, is
Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14 1), ‘Which being known, all comes to be
known’ and so on,—this is the sense
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
This is sūtra 27 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but
he adds his usual explanation in conclusion that from the transcen-
dental point of view, no question of creation arises at all and hence
no question as to how, Brahman, who is partless is yet not transformed
in His entirety.¹
1 Ś B. 2 1.27, p. 491.

310 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 27.
ADH 9.]
Rāmānuja
Interpretation of the word "śabda-mūlatvāt" different,—viz.
(The fact that Brahman is possessed of various powers) is based on
Scripture 1 According to Nimbārka, it means, as we have seen,
"(The fact that Brahman creates the world, yet remains untransformed)
is based on Scripture" 2, while according to Śrīnivāsa '(The fact
that transformation means nothing but projection of powers) is based
on Scripture.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 27 in his commentary, viz. "(But the above objection
does not apply to the case of the Lord, the real creator) on account
of Scripture, because (the knowledge of Brahman) is based on Scrip-
ture".3
—————
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 27
“AND SINCE THESE VARIOUS (MODIFICATIONS) (ARE SEEN) IN THE
SOUL ALSO.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
When various modifications are appropriate on the part of indivi-
dual souls, like gods and the rest, how can they possibly be inappro-
priate on the part of the omnipotent Lord of all, the cause of the
universe?
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author is confirming the stated view on the rule of 'how much
more'!
No wonder that if the creation of the world be due to one who is
possessed of true resolves, of inconceivable and infinite powers, and
is unchangeable by nature, then faults like entire creator being trans-
formed and so on never result,—"since", i e. because "in the soul
too", i.e. in the individual soul which has come to attain lordship,
"this", i.e. without there resulting any faults like entire transforma-
tion, "various" creations are seen in accordance with its own power.
—————
1 Śrī. B. 2.1 29, p. 60, Part 2.
2 This is the interpretation of Saṁkara as well.
3 G.B. 2.1.27, p. 60, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 27.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 311
The second "and" ("ca") is indicative of 'how much more'? (i e.
obviousness).¹
To begin with, the forms of swans and the rest, assumed by indivi-
dual souls, are well-known in Scripture.²
The following Smṛti passages are indicative of the power of the
king of gods: 'Now he changes into those particular forms repeatedly.
He becomes a bearer of the crest and the thunder-bolt, armed with a
bow, and wearing the ear-rings, then in an instant, he comes to look
like a Caṇḍāla ³ Then, again, my son, he comes to be clad in bark,
with a tuft of hair on the top of his head and matted hair Then he
comes to have a large body, becomes fine, likewise stout or thin.
Again he changes himself as fair, dark, likewise black, ugly or hand-
some, likewise young or old; learned, dull or ignorant, likewise short
or long. Then the performer of a hundred sacrifices becomes a high
caste or a low caste. He assumes the forms of a parrot or a crow,
man or cuckoo, and again assumes the forms of a lion, a tiger or an
elephant', and so on
The Smṛti passages concerned with power of the sun are as
follows: 'The abode of many wonders is the revered Sun, from whom
arise all beings, honoured in the three worlds', and so on. Similarly,
the creative power of other gods may be known from Scripture itself.
The following Smṛti passage is indicative of the power of gods:
'They may make a non-god god, and a god non-god When incensed,
they may create rulers of worlds and other worlds'.
The following Smṛti passage designates the power Cyavana:
'O, the power of the Brahma-sage Cyavana, the great-soul! The
ascetic can create other worlds, simply by wishing, through the power
of austerities'.
The following Smṛti texts refer to the power of Vasiṣṭha's cow,
viz. 'The cow, with her head and neck raised, look terrific, her
eyes reddened with anger, and lowing repeatedly. Her body, blazing
with anger, shone like mid-day sun. The cow created the Palhavas
from her tail in great frequency in the form of the piling up of the
¹ I.e if individual souls are capable of assuming various forms without
themselves undergoing modifications, how much more so this must be the case
with the Lord, the omnipotent Being. Kaimutyaka-nyāya.
² Vide, e.g. Chānd. 4 1.2, where certain divine sages are said to have
assumed the form of swans. For fuller account of this story see V.K. 1.3.34.
³ An outcaste, born from a Śūdra father and a Brāhmaṇa mother.

[sū. 2. 1. 27.
312 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 9.]
charcoal, as it were ¹; the Drāviḍas from her tail; the Śakas from her
urine; the Yavanas from her womb, numerous Śabaras from her
dung; the Cicukas, the Pulindas, the Cīnas, the Hūṇas, the Sakelaras
from her foam as well as the Mlecchas of various kinds' (Mahā. 1.6679b–
6680a, 6682-6683, 6685) and so on.
Similarly, other individual souls, too, possess the power of various
kinds of creations, which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity,
and also because they are not suitable here. Even in eminent indivi-
dual souls, the power of creating object is insignificant, befitting
their own powers and only given by the Lord. It is not possible
for even the freed soul to be the creator of the entire universe. This
will be made clear in the aphorism. "Devoid of the activity regarding
the universe' (Br Sū. 4.4.17)
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 28 in their commentaries. Interpretation different:
viz. And thus in the soul (the attributes of the non-sentient are not
found), for there are manifold (powers) (in different objects) That
is, we find that the sentient individual soul, which is different from
non-sentient objects, does not possess their attributes. Similarly,
these non-sentient objects themselves, fire, water and the rest, which
are different from one another, do not share one another's attributes,
but have manifold attributes. In the very same manner Brahman
who is different from both the sentient and the non-sentient does not
possess their attributes, but numerous others not found in them.²
Baladeva
This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.
And thus (there are mysterious powers) in the soul (viz. Brahman),
because various (powers) (belong to the tree of all desires, or to the
philosopher's stone). That is, we believe, on the ground of Scrip-
ture alone, that the tree of all desires and the philosopher's stone
possess mysterious powers, capable of giving rise to elephants, horses
¹ Aṅgār-iva+ṇamul. Here the suffix 'ṇamul' implies comparison in accord-
ance with the rule Pāṇ. 3.4.45. S. K. 3366, p. 714, vol. 2.
² Śrī. B. 2.1.28, pp. 60-61, Part 2, ŚK. B. 2.1.28, p 39, Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2. 1. 28.
ADH. 9] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 313
and the rest. So why should we not believe, on the very same ground.
that the Lord is possessed of mysterious powers ? 1
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 28
“ AND BECAUSE THERE IS FAULT IN HIS OWN VIEW.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Let our view stand Since the faults mentioned by you rebound
to your own view, it is proper for you to keep silent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The particle “and” (“ca”) is meant for disposing of the doctrines
which are opposed to the Vedānta. The Sāṁkhyas and the rest, who
maintain doctrines opposed to the Vedānta, cannot find fault with
our determination of the cause of the world. Why? “Because
there is fault in their own views.” Thus, the Sāṁkhyas admit that
pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, and without parts, is trans-
formed into mahat and the rest This being so, the consequence is
that faults like entire pradhāna being transformed and so on must
pertain to their view as well. Since what is without parts cannot be
transformed, pradhāna cannot also be the cause, otherwise there will
result transformation on the part of puruṣa as well.
If it be argued There are parts of pradhāna, viz. sattva, rajas
and tamas, and hence the above fault does not result,—(we reply )
In that case, according to your view, pradhāna must be an effect,
like a piece of cloth, and sattva and the rest, which are its parts, must
be its cause, like threads
If it be argued again: We do not admit that pradhāna has no
form before, but is brought into existence by its parts, sattva and the
rest, as a piece of cloth by the threads. What we hold is that pradhāna,
already existent in its peculiar form, is the aggregate of sattva and the
rest in a state of equilibrium,—(we reply:) This does not stand to
reason. If this be so, then too, it must be admitted, according to
7 G.B 2.1.28, pp. 63-64, Chap. 2.

314 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 29.
ADH 9.]
your view, that when in a state of equilibrium, sattva and the rest
are pradhāna, and when in a state of non-equilibrium, they give rise
to the world
Moreover, if each of these be possessed of parts, there must
follow infinite regress; but if they be without parts, there must result
the violation of the respective difference between the cause and the
effect, since there will be no distinction between the causal and the
effected states of the aggregate of the sattva and the rest, which are
devoid of parts.
Hereby, the doctrine of Atomism too should be known to be
refuted.
COMPARISON
All others, except Baladeva, read "Sapakṣa-doṣāc ca" 1 Inter-
pretation same
Baladeva
This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz.: he does not take this sūtra to be referring to the Sāṁkhya view,
but to the view that the individual soul, and not the Lord, is the
creator of the world. Hence the sūtra means, according to him,
"And because there is fault in his own view". That is, the objection
raised by the opponent to our view, viz. if Brahman be the creator,
the question arises whether He creates with His entire energy or a
portion of it only, applies equally to the view that the individual soul
is the creator; and while we can answer this objection, the opponent
cannot. 2
――――――
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 29
"AND THAT (DIVINITY) IS ENDOWED WITH ALL (POWERS), BECAUSE
IT IS SEEN." 3
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In accordance with the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His power,
declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge
1 G.B. 2.1.29. 2 G.B 2 1.28.
3 C.S S. ed. leaves out the "ca", p 29.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 29.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 315
and power' (Śvet 6.8 ¹), "that" divinity is "endowed with all
powers", i. e. is able to do everything.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author is demonstrating the omnipotence of the Highest
Person.
The cause of the world, as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and others,
viz . pradhāna and the rest, devoid of a multitude of powers, suitable
for the production of the diverse and multiform world, does not stand
to reason But in the case in hand, the Divinity, worshipped by His
own devotees who resort to none else, is "endowed with all", i.e.
endowed with all powers, "and", i e. hence, He alone is capable of
being the cause, and not pradhāna and the rest Why ? "Because
it is seen,—", i.e (because) Scripture ("darśana") demonstrates it
("tad"),² viz. the divinity who is endowed with all powers;—i e.
because of the scriptural texts like 'The own power of the divinity,
hidden by his own qualities' (Śvet 1.3), 'Supreme is His power,
declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge
and action' (Śvet 6 8), 'Possessed of true desires, possessed of true
resolves' (Chānd 8.1.5, 8.7 1, 3) and so on; and because of the
Smṛti passage: 'Hundreds of positive powers like creation and the
rest, which are inconceivable to the comprehension of all beings, may
belong to Brahman, O best among the ascetics, as heat to fire'
(V.P. 1.3 2 ³)
COMPARISON
All others read: "Sarvopetā ca tad-darśanāt", omitting "sā".
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara begin a new adhikaraṇa here, (ending with the
next sūtra).
¹ R, Śk, B.
² This explains the compound "tad-darśanāt".
³ P 22.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 30.
316 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9 ]
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 30
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE
WORLD) BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY,)
THAT HAS BEEN SAID"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that on account of the denial of His sense-organs
in the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6 8¹),
it is not possible for one who is endowed with all powers to be the
creator of the world—(we reply:) the answer to this has already
been given.²
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected: Let Brahman be endowed with all powers;
still, like milk, without implements such as basin, pot and the rest;
like the seed, without implements, such as earth, water, and so on,
and like gods and others without implements befitting particular
places and times, He cannot consistently be the creator of effects,
though possessed of powers, "because of the absence of sense-organs'
on His part, i.e. because He is known to be devoid of sense-organs
from the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8)—
(We reply:) The reply to this has been given in the aphorism:
"Because of being based on Scripture" (Br. Sū. 2.1.26). The
meaning of the above scriptural text is as follows: There exist 'no
action',—i.e. that which is to be done for the purpose of obtaining
bliss,—and 'sense-organ' for the production of desired for action,
'of him', i.e. of the Supreme Lord who is one mass of ever-present
bliss, the Lord of all and the Creator of the world.³ There are scrip-
tural texts to this effect, viz: 'The soul, which consists of bliss'
(Tait. 2.5), 'Filled with His own self alone', 'A flavour, verily, is
He' (Tait. 2 7), 'Having all desires, having all odours, having all
tasks' (Chānd 3 14.2, 4), 'Without hands and feet, he is swift and
a seizer; without eyes, he sees; without ears he hears' (Śvet. 3 19)
and so on. The declaration by the Lord Himself, too, is as follows:
¹ R, ŚK, B. ² Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.26.
³ I.e. the Lord, who is ever blissful does not need to act for attaining any
further bliss; and He has not to depend on the sense-organs for His action.

[sū. 2. 1. 31.
ADH. 10] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 317
‘“I have no duties, whatsoever, O Pārtha, in the three world, nor
anything unattained to be attained; yet I abide in action”’ (Gītā
3 22). Hence it is established that the above-mentioned faults
pertain to the opponent's view alone, but not to the conclusion estab-
lished by the Vedānta.
Here ends the section entitled “The consequence of the
entire” (9).
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. The interpretation of the
phrase “tad uktam” different, viz.· “that has been answered (by
Scripture itself)”. That is the very same Upanisad (viz. Śvetāśva-
tara) which has been quoted by the opponent in support of his
allegation that the Lord, devoid of sense-organs (viz. Śvet. 6 8),
cannot act, answers to the objection by pointing out that though
devoid of sense-organs, He can yet act (viz. Śvet. 3.19 ¹)
Adhikarana 10: The section entitled “Having
a need”. (Sūtras 31–35)
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31)
SŪTRA 31
“(BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT
OF (THE ACTIVITY OF AN AGENT) HAVING A NEED.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It may be objected: The Supreme Being who has all His desires
eternally fulfilled, is not an agent. Why? “On account of the
activity of an agent having a need.”
¹ G B 2.1.31, p. 67, Chap. 2.